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A LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HON. SIR J. HOBHOUSE,

PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF CONTROL,

ON

THE BAGGAGE OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

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BY

SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G.C.B.,

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL; AND COLONEL OF THE 22ND REGIMENT OF FOOT.

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A LETTER.

SIR,

IN a discourse which I had the honour of holding with you upon the subject of the baggage corps formed by me in Scinde, I engaged to point out the value of that institution in opposition to the opinion of those persons who had recommended its abolition. I now fulfil that engagement, and I do so in the form of a public printed letter, because it is not a restricted question as to the utility or inutility of that particular body in Scinde, but one affecting, I will presume to say, the well-being of the Indian army at large: moreover, I earnestly wish to offer to the soldiers, European and native of all ranks, who served under my immediate command in that distant country, a proof of my desire to be useful to them by recommending a system which, though diminishing their luxuries, would increase and secure their real comforts in the field, and add to their means of acquiring more renown for great deeds in war. I have not now, indeed, any better way of expressing my admiration of their courage and discipline, and my affection for them generally.

The Indian army, when well commanded, is indomitable: it is capable of subjugating all the countries between the

Black and Yellow Seas. The population from which it is drawn is so numerous and warlike—the land so wealthy—that the noble Indian army may vie with any force existing, in numbers, courage, and equipment. Its discipline and intelligence are in proportion. The European officers are all English, Irish, and Scotch gentlemen; whose honour and courage have created in their troops such an intrepid spirit as to render India secure against every evil from which an army can protect a country.

I will now commence the task I have undertaken; arranging the subject under separate heads, for the sake of perspicuity.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble Servant,
C. J. NAPIER,
Lieut.-General, Colonel of the 22nd Regiment.

GENERAL REMARKS.

PREVIOUS to my going to Scinde in the year 1842, I found the general opinion to be that we should immediately have a war with the Ameers. Major-General England was about to cross the Kujuk and Bolan Passes, and the Bombay government was in considerable alarm for the safety, not only of General England's force, but also for that which occupied Scinde, to which country I was sent by the direct order of Lord Ellenborough.

On the arrival of General England's troops at Sukkur I was first made acquainted, by ocular demonstration, with the dangerous and disorderly state in which the baggage of an Indian army marches. I had read of it in the accounts of Indian wars, but till then I had never seen it. To my aide-de-camp I said (having ridden out to meet the arriving column), "If a troop of active cavalry were to hang on General England's march, his baggage would be lost."

Yet General England's baggage was not worse than any other General's baggage.* It arose from the Indian system, and it was plain to me that no army in India could be thoroughly effective while encumbered by such a disorderly mass.

I therefore turned my thoughts towards applying some remedy to such an inconvenience, and the following reflections appeared to me incontrovertible :—

* I make no reflection upon that officer; on the contrary, he had unusual difficulties to encounter; and, I believe, he will coincide with all I say on the subject of baggage.

1st. That an Indian army requires more baggage than any other army in the world.

2nd. That the Europeans of an Indian army require more baggage than any other part of that army.

3rd. That the officers carry a great deal more baggage than is necessary, and that the private Sepoys comparatively collect more than the officers.

4th. That as the climate renders a great deal of baggage necessary, care must be taken that in a zeal to reduce the quantity of this great impediment to war we do not over-reduce and create suffering. The line which divides *necessaries* from *luxuries* must be drawn with much care, for in India luxuries and necessaries are near akin, especially among the Europeans.

5th. That the baggage allowed in war should be much less than that allowed in peace.

6th. That all private baggage should be carried by the public; because an officer who is allowed money by the public to provide his own means of carrying his baggage, may lose his animals without any fault of his own or of his servants. Now, if he be only allowed by regulation to furnish himself with a stated number of animals—a number that is barely sufficient to carry what is necessary to his health and efficiency (and more, on service, no regulation ought to permit), if any of this regulated number of beasts fail, he loses that baggage which is *necessary*, and, consequently, *his* services may be lost also—at all events he is doomed to endure serious suffering. I say, therefore, that "*carriage*" should be provided by the public for private baggage, as well as for the public baggage of an army; and no private "*carriage*" should be allowed in the field.

By this arrangement, no officer can lose his baggage in the ordinary course of things, for if a camel fails, another is at once supplied by the public, because, with every

force in the field, there are animals to spare, and ready to furnish assistance on an emergency.

The foregoing considerations reduce the matter to this : that there should be only the necessary quantity of baggage with an army, and nothing more than what is necessary ; and that the whole of this should be conveyed by the public carriage when the army takes the field.

Let us now consider what is the best way of transporting that baggage which accompanies an army of *regular* troops, whose operations are to be sustained, and are not like those of an army of *irregulars*, which last, in India, merely make inroads—carry no baggage—ravage the country, and retreat rapidly, overburdened with plunder certainly, but tolerably secure of not being pursued, as they seldom leave anything alive to pursue them. Their inroads are devastations, and of the most cruel description.

QUANTITY, CHARACTER, AND INCONVENIENCE OF INDIAN BAGGAGE IN ITS PRESENT STATE.

THE baggage of a regular army in India depends much on the country in which war is made.

If that country be fertile and full of supplies, the quantity of baggage of course is less.

If the country be a desert, the necessary supplies must be carried with it, and the quantity of baggage becomes immense. I have even been obliged to carry water.

We must, therefore, consider the baggage, not when its quantity is small, but when its quantity is large, namely, when a large force makes war in a sterile country full of active enemies and when the climate is inimical to health; for then does the hospital increase fearfully, while the means of assisting the sick diminish in an inverse ratio to the demand for attendance on the sick.

Carriage must be prepared to meet these exigencies.

I will now endeavour to give the reader some idea of the baggage of an Indian army.

Let us suppose our baggage to require 20,000 camels. That, being led as is the usual way in the East, by a string fastened through the nostril of one animal and tied to the tail of his leader, these 20,000 camels occupy about fifty miles; allowing five yards from the nose of one animal to the nose of his follower; and consequently half the camels would not have quitted the old camp from which the army marched, when the leading camels had arrived on the new encamping ground!

This shows the reader what an enormous affair is the

baggage of an Indian army; because, though it does not march in so regular a train as I have just described, yet, place the animals as you will, the incumbrance of this unwieldy mass is immense;* for the animals and their burdens must have room. Here they are jostling—crowding in now—spreading widely then—at times the strong animals far in front—the weaker as far in rear—some dying—some throwing their loads and running away—the tired servants labouring after, and often—very often getting slain, or, losing the column, perishing miserably—thousands of camels dying, not only from fatigue, but from ill-usage by both soldiers and the drivers, and from being always overloaded. Such is the picture of the baggage of an Indian army: Smithfield market alone can rival it!

The loss of camels thus created, is one great item in the cost of an Indian campaign; the vast increase of their hire, when war breaks out, is another; and this last, of course, increases every day. The owners seeing such destruction and danger, naturally increase in their charge for hire.

Then, again, when a defile is to be passed, the delay and confusion are almost beyond description. I recollect in the Hill campaign, that six or eight hours elapsed before the baggage passed through one of the defiles at a place called *Tussoo.* Had our baggage been carried by a "*baggage-corps,*" it would have made a saving of some four or five hours in passing; which gain of time, in certain positions, might be of vital importance; and we must not forget the sufferings of the sick, for the hospital, or a portion of it, is generally with the baggage.

Such is the confusion, and such are some of the evils of

* I see by the papers that the march of Lord Gough's siege-train of artillery alone occupies *sixteen miles* in length! This is exclusive of the baggage. Whether this be true or false I know not, but I can easily believe it to be true.

baggage not being properly organised ; and these evils do not end with the march, for on the troops reaching the new encamping ground, each regiment marches to the position which is marked out for it ; the men then halt and pile arms, and there they remain for *two*, for *three*, and *four hours*, some even longer, under a burning sun, harassed and exhausted by fatigue, and waiting for the tired camels as they gradually arrive ; and here, from a deficiency of proper superintendence, the camels are often detained for many hours before they are taken to graze. Then, when the wearied animals are at last taken out to graze after the march, I have, myself, frequently detected the drivers in the jungle tying their animals by their noses to small bushes (which the poor brutes devour in five minutes), and the men then go to sleep ; there the animals fast till night comes, and the guard drives the whole home to the camp. The Commissary, supposing that the beast has been feeding all these hours, and he having other duties to look after, is unable to attend to the camels in order to prevent such villanies, nor can he easily discover them.

All this knocks up the soldiers' minds as well as their bodies ; they hate the war, and they go to its severe trials with vexed spirits. It is true that, when the day of battle comes, they rouse themselves to it nobly. But ere that day of powerful excitement arrives, how many have fallen under the trials of hardships and discomforts, or are far in the rear, sick and heart-broken !

THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY.

Now, let us see how all this hampers the Commander of the army. We have seen how it distresses his soldiers, and the unfortunate quadrupeds. Now for the chief himself.

In the first place, this crowd of baggage, jostling, striving, straggling,—opening for miles, and covering "the length and breadth of the land;" seeking to avoid a marsh here; a defile there; now a hill, now a wood; and so urging its rolling mass first on one side, then another;—this confused mass, I say, cannot be forced beyond the rate, on an average, of one mile per hour, or very little more; say one and a half per hour, and you have the full estimate of its most rapid progress. Now, as the General cannot lose his baggage without danger to his army, if it should have to make a long campaign, and especially if his army be a large one, it results that his marches must be regulated, not by the powers of his troops—not by the movements and position of the enemy—not with a view to his taking the initiative, but—by the motions of his baggage at the pace of one and a half mile per hour! We know that his columns of infantry can march two miles an hour on any ground. Taking, therefore, their slowest rate, and the fastest rate of baggage marching, in the present disorderly system, the General loses, by means of his baggage, half a mile per hour—a great loss, for each march occupies one-third more time than it ought to do, which is very important in war; and if an active enemy be in front, the campaign is likely to be disastrous. Therefore,

the Commander curses the baggage as a drag which impedes those rapid movements that lead to victory.

Let us look at the details of his day's march.

He turns out the troops at four in the morning, or say at three. The tents are struck, and all is packing and preparation. The morning is dark as pitch, perhaps wet. The soldiers and camp-followers are employed in cramming all sorts of baggage on the backs of the animals, without regard to weight or the just arrangement of the loads, and in defiance of all orders. The camel is not *theirs*—who cares for it? No one! The camp echoes with the loud and piteous moans of the camels, remonstrating against the weight of their burdens.* The noise of bipeds and quadrupeds is tremendous — shouting, groaning, swearing, and with loud cries seeking for their respective brigades and divisions. In vain staff officers and their assistants try to guide the baggage to the road, which is not easily found in a dark, wet morning, or in a desert, where guides are scarce.

At last the army moves, but soon is obliged to halt to let the baggage get up. Finally, with infinite trouble, the General is able to collect his troops and baggage, and, after this loss of time, he hopes to see all trudging along slowly in the right direction; though with all the

* Here I cannot refrain from telling a story of one of the Scinde elephants taken in 1843, and called by some one "*Kubadar Moll.*" He belongs to the baggage corps, and has been attached to a regiment marching up to Mooltan. My letters tell me that Kubadar Moll allows them to load him as much as they like, and then deliberately, with his trunk, takes all off again beyond the quantity he thinks fair to be put on his back! They dare not put anything on again! *Kubadar Moll* should be in his proper place, carrying the great lantern, and not carrying the mess-tent of a regiment. Why this irregularity goes on I do not know. There may be reasons for it with which I am unacquainted; but that this useful corps has not had a fair trial to do it justice I am compelled to believe, though with regret, for I maintain that it ought to be in perfect order.

difficulties and confusion that I have before described, to prove the loss of time and distance which these difficulties engender.

Well, he feels very happy when he sees that, at last, all are likely to march, though rarely in a compact form.

But now for misfortune. Up comes the Commissary with the news that 500 camel-drivers and their camels have deserted in the night! This has occurred to me, even to a greater extent: about ten days before the battle of Meeanee we lost 1000 camels; the contractor's family having fallen into the hands of the Ameers, the man secretly sent the camels away, and we only got 170!

Again, during the two nights preceding the battle of Hyderabad, 200 camel-drivers deserted. The approach of a great battle naturally frightens men who are not soldiers and are paid by the day, for they run great danger, and in case of defeat the camp-followers get dreadfully cut up.

Again, in the Hill campaign in 1845, the success of our operations was very much endangered by the desertion of 500 camels and their drivers, owing to the dread which the latter had of the Hill tribes and the general belief among the natives that our army would be destroyed. In 1844 we lost no less than 456 animals in the month of December at Hyderabad alone, and 1341 at Sukkur. At Hyderabad we lost 408 camel-drivers out of 729 in five months. I do not, therefore, speak of imaginary, or even improbable dangers and difficulties. "*Well, sir*," says the General to his Commissary, "*and how are you to carry the loads of these deserters?*" "*Why, sir, we are much pressed, but we have divided their loads among the remainder.*" Aye! so he has. And the remainder having been before overloaded, are now necessarily more so. Down—down—down the poor animals go, one after another, under their crushing loads, all along the march. Their ears and their tails are

immediately cut off by the drivers to prove that they are dead or useless; a cruel precaution, but said to be requisite to prevent the cheating tricks played by the contractors, who get paid for the camels that die, on producing the ears and tails. The animals are often not quite dead, but are unable to stand; and where the camel falls, there this ill-treated, patient creature lies bleeding, and without food or water, till death puts an end to its sufferings. If there happen to be trees or other forage for him near where he falls, and that, in despite of the mutilation and fatigue, he recovers a little, he *may* live; but he is of course stolen by the country people, who find him afterwards and without a master. However, camels when overworked rarely recover, as horses and other animals do by rest; they are generally observed to become daily weaker, till they die, and when a camel dies the loads of the survivors increase, as I have stated, and the more they are laden, the slower they move; and the slower they move, the more they are beaten; and the more they are beaten, the faster they perish. Sticks, stones, butts of muskets, points of bayonets, are all vigorously put into action to urge the overloaded camels on their weary march, which is tracked by their dead bodies.

BIVOUAC.

WELL, now for a new scene. Some hours after the troops, the camels arrive on the new encamping ground, where the General and his men await them, if the enemy has not obliged the troops to keep near the baggage, which delay, by keeping the soldiers long under arms, wears them out and turns short marches into long ones.

The soldiers, tired with the march and having no tents pitched, lie down and fall asleep in the sun or the rain, and then the hospital fills with a quickness proportioned to the slowness of the camels. The good and brave soldier thus falls a sacrifice to want of arrangement. He has reached his encamping ground at eight o'clock; from nine till four the tents arrive: he has spent these mortal hours in the heat or rain, idly lying down, and must now go to work at pitching his tent, unloading baggage and putting his arms and appointments in order! But let us take two hours only, and say that the soldier arriving at eight o'clock, his baggage arrives at *ten*. It rarely does so. (Mind, reader, I speak of the *private soldier*.) He has to pitch his tent after many hours' march with a pack on his back, his pouch full of heavy ammunition. Just take a soldier's pouch, good reader, with sixty rounds of ball cartridge in it and feel its weight; and if you be of a right military spirit fit to be a soldier (I do not write for Sybarites), put on a pack, a pouch with sixty rounds of ammunition, take a musket and bayonet on your shoulder, and then walk thirty miles, or say *ten*, and then write down in your memorandum-book how you like it. No,

do not write down in your memorandum-book how you like it; there is no chance of your forgetting it if you live to be a hundred years old! But you may as well write down as follows:—"Remember to apply the feelings *I now have* when in future I, being on horseback, call on the soldiers to '*close up,*' and to do this, that, and t' other: when I order fatigue parties and sentries to be placed, and, in short, whenever I order *any* fatigue to the soldier that is not *necessary:* when I do these things, let me remember the weight the soldier carries and how terrible it is, especially to those who are not strong by nature." The soldier has done this on a march; he has carried his pack and pouch and haversack and provisions, and waited till his baggage arrives; he being fatigued and wet or worse, frying in an Indian sun, either awake or asleep: in the latter case fever will supervene in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. Now he has to pitch his tent, and many have also to take what are called "*grazing guards;*" that is to say, guards to follow the camels out to graze when unloaded. Their grazing-ground may be one or two or more miles distant; and thus European soldiers, as well as natives, are at times kept out all day in the sun. The fire now is lighted, and after two hours more he gets his food, —say about mid-day or later; sometimes it is nearly dark. He then rests as well as he can. Sixteen men are in a hot tent. Mosquitoes bite. Fatigue and heat produce a feverish state, and may prevent his getting sleep, or even rest. Some may be strong and bear it, but the weakly soldier is soon knocked down: he may stand such trials for a while, but not very long.

DANGER OF WANT OF CARRIAGE.

THE Commander is now "*put to his trumps*," he must get more carriage—his hospital fills—he is forced to throw away baggage, that he may have means to carry his sick, his ammunition, and his provisions. If he succeeds in getting more carriage near where his mishaps befal him, he continues his operations against the enemy. If not, he must *halt* till carriage comes from afar to his relief. Should he be obliged thus to halt in the *early* part of the cold season, he loses time which the enemy gains, and the hour of victory is lost.*

But should the General be thus obliged to halt at the *closing* of the cold season, then he may probably be obliged also to retreat; and his retreat will be difficult, if not disastrous, in proportion to its length, to the season, and to the activity of the enemy. The General may now be forced to give battle to save his hospital, his guns, and his baggage; and he fights with disheartened troops, unless he happens to have such a spirit in himself that he can inspire his soldiers with confidence in his genius even under defeat. If not, his troops despond, as on the retreat from Cabul. Then the chances are that he will be defeated in battle, and defeat in India is worse than in any other country; for victory being our only tenure, defeat is the signal for all around to rise upon the discomfited forces!

This is the worst; but things may not reach that terrible result, and yet be very bad.

* There are but five months in which war can be made by Europeans in that part of India which I have seen, viz. *December*, *January*, *February*, *March*, and *April*. To attempt it in the hot weather is only excusable when danger *forces* a General to this sad alternative. This was the case in Scinde in 1843, when I was obliged either to take the field in June, or risk the destruction of the army under my command.

FIGHTING MEN AND CAMP-FOLLOWERS.

THE General marches with his baggage either in *front* of the army, in its *rear*, or on the reverse flank, according to the position of his enemy. Now let us first take a look at the composition of an Indian army, as regards fighting men and camp-followers. The usual calculation is, that for every fighting man in the high caste *Bengal army*, there are five servants or "*camp-followers*," non-combatants.

In a *Bombay army*, where the caste is generally lower, there are about three "*camp-followers*" for every fighting man. How nearly this general average may be correct, I will not pretend to say; but such are the proportions which are generally supposed to exist.

Suppose the army in march, and to consist of 10,000 fighting men, and that an enemy attacks the fighting men and camp-followers amounting in the mass to 40,000 or 60,000 men, of which 30,000 or 50,000 are unorganised, unmanageable camp-followers; suppose them to be attacked suddenly, and that when so attacked, they all rush back upon the column of fighting men, as they always do, and always will do, until well organised! When you have painted this pretty picture in your mind—this picture of noise, confusion, danger, and slaughter—I will ask you how the column of 10,000 fighting men are to fight? borne down by multitudes—confused by noise—how are they to form in order of battle? If once, by the exertion of their officers, they do form, how are they to fire?—on their own followers: their own animals! What may happen, no one can tell, but human foresight says that the whole will stand a fair chance of being utterly defeated. It is said that this took place, and caused, in a great measure, the Cabul massacre. I can easily believe it.

QUANTITY OF BAGGAGE.

I WILL state one more evil that the Commander has to contend against in the matter of baggage. Almost every officer tries to bring into the field as many animals, and as much baggage as he can afford. I heard from a very high authority in India that, on one occasion, when a reduction of baggage was ordered, one officer sent in his list for *sixty servants as the least number which he required*, and this on active service! In short, the European reader, who has not been in India, will scarcely believe in the unmilitary luxury of the East.

DIFFICULTY OF FEEDING CAMP-FOLLOWERS.

THE General must feed this crowd of non-combatants and their animals. I do not mean that he must alway *find* the food for them, but that in finding it for themselves they consume the whole country, their animals eat up all the forage, and the troops suffer in proportion. Besides, the inhabitants dread and fly from these camp-followers, who are under no discipline in the present state of baggage disorganisation and consequently are mischievous to the character of the troops, especially on the march. Therefore, although they may, and do in general provision themselves, they still increase the consumption by waste and devastation, and, as I have said, render it more difficult to supply the fighting men. This, at times, drives a prudent General to his wits' end.

THE COMMANDER STILL MORE EMBARRASSED.

LET us, once more, put the Commander upon "*tenter-hooks.*" Imagine his baggage straggling all over the country: the baggage-master, and a few mounted men doing their best to keep the mass more collected; but still, as every camp-follower is responsible for his own animal, he takes the road he judges best to aid his progress towards the new encamping ground. I imagine the baggage-guard zealous, but tired with a long, hot march, and with its exertions to keep the baggage together—the rear-guard also tired, and delayed by the numbers of camels that have thrown their loads, or fallen from fatigue, and by other stragglers. At this moment, suppose that a body of irregular horse belonging to the enemy, or possibly (as I believe happened more than once in India) the enemy in full force, falls upon the baggage, and the Commander sees it swept away before his face, and his sick murdered; or his baggage, if compact, is driven in confusion upon his army,—all this I have already stated; and, what is the Commander to do? These are very awkward moments for a General Officer; yet how can he help himself? This enormous unwieldy mass cannot move except straight forward! There is no arrangement, no obedience, no power to govern it; and destruction follows!

Whereas, if formed into a baggage-corps, it would move rapidly away fighting; or throw itself into hollow squares, and defend itself till aid arrived.

Again, let us suppose that the Commander wishes to make a forced march against one of two corps, which the

enemy may have in the field. His baggage cannot accompany his troops ; it must be either left with a powerful guard, or, struggling to keep pace with the troops, it trails for miles, and is exposed to be attacked by flying corps of the enemy, and plundered even by the people of the country : among the camp-followers also there are numbers of rascals always ready to plunder the property entrusted to their charge. These men join the army again, if they can dispose of their plunder by sale, or conceal it about their persons ; but if it consists of objects too bulky for concealment, or immediate sale, they join the enemy, often having some friends in his ranks with whom they divide the booty, and from whom they receive protection. We must recollect that the enemy and our followers are countrymen, and that we are invaders.

It would be endless to detail all the opportunities which the present want of system offers to robbery, whether committed by the enemy, or by the thieves among the camp-followers.

If pursuing an enemy, the Commander quickly outmarches his baggage, and finds himself without food or tents, and perhaps without water ; for in the deserts of India the wells are few, and may be poisoned. In short, the baggage of an Indian army shackles the General in all his movements, which instead of being rapid and assisted by his baggage, are rendered slow and uncertain ; thus in place of all things being made secondary in importance to what ought to be the first great object,—that of beating the enemy,—the first object becomes that of protecting the baggage.

If this was *necessary*, we should only have to bend our minds to a necessary evil, and protect the baggage. The enemy would be obliged to do the same for *his* baggage. So far we should be on a par ! But it is *not necessary*,

and we paralyse the efficiency, and dim the glory of our armies,—to do what?—why, to meet a difficulty of our own creation, and of course one which we can remove, and which, if the enemy should remove his own first, would enable him to fight us with advantage in that respect: indeed he does so now in the Punjaub. The baggage of a native army is trivial, compared with our baggage.

To prove what I have said,* I will here quote from the despatches of Major-General England, from the Camps of Quetta, Bagh, and Abjoor, dated September and October, 1842.

(*Extract* 1.)

CAMP QUETTA,
20th September, 1842.

You will have been made aware of the doubtful conduct of the Ameers of Scinde, of their desire to strike if they dare, and of their wish to incite the Belooches, and, indeed, all the tribes hereabouts under our route, to molest us in every possible way. There is no doubt of our being so far *at the mercy of the people here to require their camels*, and to the present moment they are freely given to us on hire; but, if the Ameers had time to spread abroad their inducements to the Brahooees, and thus prevent us from obtaining, on this ground, the requisite carriage for our force, we might be subject to some difficulty, not having 1000 government camels forthcoming.

(*Extract* 2.)

The difficulty of carriage for our sick, and the rascality of all Brahooee contractors for such assistance, have been my *chief difficulties* in this march—

referring to his march from Kandahar to Sukkur, a very difficult march, in which every man who was left a few yards behind the rear-guard was murdered; indeed this may generally be expected in Indian warfare.

The General would indeed have been subjected to "*some difficulty;*" even that of halting at Quetta and the risk of

* The Italics are the General's.

being destroyed unless I had been enabled to relieve him; an operation somewhat doubtful, for my force in Scinde was then very weak and very sickly.

(*Extract* 3.) BAGH,
17*th October*, 1842.

We lost upwards of 200 camels at Dadur, but I shall pause on the subject of compensation for them till it can be quite proved that there has been no collusion between the contractors and the robbers (i.e. the enemy); *no uncommon case!* Our sick is not increasing, but we have still one man in seven to carry.

No small number, when it is recollected that, on such occasions, every sick man who can march, is made to do so; his arms and his knapsack being carried for him. This long retreat of Major-General England's was in every sense of the word one of great danger, and had he been sharply attacked it is more than probable that the whole of his hired camels and camel-men would have run away. It cannot be expected that men who are hired by the day, will risk their lives for their employers. Such devotion can only be demanded from *soldiers:* from men who are drilled, disciplined, paid, clothed, fed, men who have had a moral spirit instilled into them: and even then, human nature makes a severe sacrifice.

I will give one more extract from another officer, and a very noble soldier he was, Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, who fell gloriously in battle on the banks of the Sutlej.

(*Extract* 4.) CAMP FURRACHAND,
31*st December*, 1842.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I marched this morning to this place. . . . . We had four or five hours' incessant rain, and an immense number of camels are floored on the road. . . . . When we crossed the river Indus on the first December* there were about 500 camels. . . . . It is now

* His brigade had been in camp the whole of the time up to the 25th of December. The Italics are Colonel Wallace's.

2 P.M., and a great portion of the baggage has not yet reached camp, and it is difficult to say when it will, the roads are in such a state now from the late rain. For the hired camels I am sorry to say the men *will not go.* They agreed in the morning to get the number of camels we required to go back; but in the evening the camel men came to Captain Dallas, and declared most positively that they *would not* go to the southward. This change took place from reports being circulated in the country that the Ameers intended to hold out, and they should lose their camels (thinking we should be defeated). Every means was used to persuade them to go, but as yet it has been of no avail. . . . . 200 camels *must,* somehow or other, be got to enable this detachment to move. Both Dallas and myself will do all in our power to do as you wish, and to get the troops off when the weather clears up.

Now the move of this detachment was one of great importance at the time;—I give these extracts as coming first to my hand among a multitude of unarranged papers packed in boxes, and which I have not time to examine to find more, nor are more required.

There are other evils of a minor nature to those above described, but these are enough. They do not, *all* of them, *always* happen, but they *may always* happen and do *often* happen; some of them on every occasion: that of the baggage not being up in time for the troops is constant, mischievous in the extreme, the most fatal to the soldier, and most dangerous in every point of view.

I will now beg of the reader to consider these evils, which are not exaggerated, and then ask him to consider the remedy which I applied; he may judge for himself. That remedy was to form

A BAGGAGE-CORPS.

THIS corps is composed of officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers; which last both conduct and guard the camels, while the former see that these poor animals are well treated, their loads properly placed, and

that they do not exceed the regulated weight, for that they should not exceed the regulated weight, is that which, above all other things, requires the greatest attention. If overloaded, the camel inevitably perishes.

The details of the formation of the baggage-corps were as follows :—

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCINDE BAGGAGE-CORPS

ON THE FIRST OF MAY, 1846.

Europeans.	Monthly Pay of each.	Total.	
	Rupees.	Rupees.	
1 Commandant	850 . .	850	
1 Quarter-master	200 . .	200	
2 Ditto	130 . .	260	
3 Sergeants	50 . .	150	
Natives.			
9 Subedars (or Captains)	40 . .	360	
36 Jemidars (Subalterns)	30 . .	1,080	
36 Havildars (Sergeants)	20 . .	720	
108 Naigues (Corporals)	15 . .	1,620	
1800 Privates	8 . .	14,400	
3 Nagurchees (lantern-bearers) . .	10 . .	30	
			19,670

MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT.

Europeans.			
1 Assistant-Surgeon	450 . .	450	
Natives.			
1 First Hospital Assistant	30 . .	30	
2 Second Ditto	20 . .	40	
2 Apprentices	10 . .	20	
3 Camel Doctors	20 . .	60	
2 Bearers	6 . .	12	
			612
Carried over		Rupees	20,282

STAFF.

Natives.	Monthly Pay of Each. Rupees.	Total. Rupees.	
Brought over			20,282
1 Native Adjutant	35	35	
1 Havildar Major	25	25	
9 Pay Orderlies	5	45	
1 Quarter-master Havildar	25	25	
1 Moonshee	30	30	
Office Establishment	80	80	
Stationery	60	60	
Office Tentage	30	30	
3 Armourers	15	45	
3 Carpenters	20	60	
3 Moochees (workers in leather)	15	45	
18 Puckaulias (water-men)	12	216	
3 Bellows-boys	5	15	
Allowance for charcoal	21	21	
			732

ELEPHANT ESTABLISHMENT.

1 Jemidar	12	12	
4 Mahouts	10	40	
4 Coolies	8	32	
			84
Total monthly cost of Establishment		Rupees	21,098
Or £2,109 16*s.*			

The Corps is divided into *three Divisions;* each Division consists of

Europeans.	
1 Quarter-master.	1 Sergeant.
Natives.	
3 Subedars	1 Armourer
12 Jemidars	1 Carpenter
12 Havildars	1 Moochee
36 Naigues	6 Puckaulias
600 Privates	1 Bellows-boy
1 Nagurchee	1 Mahout
1 Coolie.	

Each Division is divided into three Companies. Each Company consists of

1 Subedar (or Captain)	4 Havildars (or Sergeants)
4 Jemidars (or Subalterns)	12 Naigues (or Corporals)

200 Privates.

REGARDING THE COST.

SUCH was the establishment of the Baggage-Corps on its foundation in 1846. I make few remarks upon the *cost*, because what war requires, war must have ; for defeat in war costs a vast quantity of human life and of treasure in addition to its inevitable miseries, and the disgrace to our arms, the last being a certain source of future wars, and additional expense. Therefore let the needful be done at once, and then it is done cheaply. If delayed, it must still be done, but very dearly. Such, in war, is the distinction between parsimony and economy. The first consists in refusing to make that complete which is necessary. This is in war the worst kind of extravagance, because the evil which results cannot be estimated, and may be vital. Economy is to allow of nothing which is not necessary. To pay for what is not necessary is extravagant, but in a less degree, because the extent of the evil is known. To make that complete which is necessary, may amount to millions, and still be economy. To pay for that which is not necessary may cost but a few shillings, but is nevertheless extravagance. The *principle*, not the *amount*, should be our guide. These may be truisms, but they apply here.

The expense of the "*Baggage-Corps*" may be reduced in time of peace by selling the greater number of camels,

and retaining the men, who form good troops for garrison duty, especially for frontier garrisons, and a portion of camels must always be retained; for wherever there is a Commissariat, camels are required. A small body of fighting men, in case of sudden emergency, may at any time be transported on the camels to a great distance, or if that be not necessary, the camels may be used for the baggage of the detachment marching in the usual manner.

This power to move a detachment suddenly and rapidly is especially required in India, where some robber gets up from time to time, and with his followers, defies the Government for months. All these things go to prove, if the calculation were to be entered into, that the expense of the baggage-corps would be covered by the savings in other ways, both in peace and in war.

In diminution of the cost of this useful corps, I will set off one expense by an example.

In Lord Keane's short and successful campaign, the loss of camels was generally estimated at 50,000. (What would it not have been had he been defeated?) Now, if we take them at the average of sixty rupees for each camel, the loss was 300,000*l.* sterling in a few months! To this the loss in the Cabul massacre must be added: it must have been immense: and in all wars it will be so, unless prevented by the formation of baggage-corps in each of the three Presidencies. In short, the objection that this corps would be "*costly*," is not the truth, and contemptible if it were true.

But the object of this pamphlet neither requires nor admits of such details: it is not written to prove the economy of a "Baggage-Corps," but its use in helping to produce victory in war, and so preventing the unnecessary bloodshed and sufferings which are created by bad management and defeat.

ADVANTAGES OF THE BAGGAGE-CORPS TO AN ARMY.

I NOW come to the advantages of having a baggage-corps well arranged.

First. By being well looked after, the animals are properly fed, properly loaded, and consequently are strong, and able to move much more rapidly than hired camels.*

Secondly. They "*fall in*" (to use a military expression) with regularity; they form in lines, or columns, or files, as the nature of the case admits; that is to say, they manœuvre—they are manageable—they obey a word of command—and all obstacles on the line of march are then passed with the greatest rapidity that the case admits of, because passed with regularity and with care. If any accidents occur, then help is at hand; for all people, and animals, and things are in their proper places ready to assist.

Thirdly. To insure order by night, an elephant is attached to the baggage-corps, and carries a large lantern raised above his back, on a sort of gallows fixed on the "howdah," or "castle," which he carries. This lamp is so prepared, that those sides which are exposed to the view of the enemy may be screened, so that he cannot by those lights see the march of the corps if a concealed march be required. On this high light carried by the elephant, the baggage-

* I have seen in the newspapers, that, on the march of the troops from Kurrachee to Roree, the camels of the baggage-corps have died in great numbers. I see also in public papers, and by private letters, that the principles which I had established for the formation of the baggage-corps have been deviated from, and that it has been neglected altogether. If these things be true, they require no comment from me; every soldier will make them for himself.

corps can, in the darkest night, form rapidly and without difficulty; each division having a smaller lantern giving a *coloured light* and placed on the back of a camel. This colour is that of the division to which the lantern appertains, and every man of that division is clothed in a dress of the same colour as that of his divisional lantern.

The order of march for the troops being regulated, the elephant-lantern takes its position at the place appointed for the assembling of the baggage, each divisional lantern takes up its ground at the proper position with regard to the elephant-lantern, and each camel-man forms upon his own coloured lantern. Thus, in the darkest night, in the confusion of an alarm, even in that of a sudden attack and retreat at night, the baggage can form with comparative ease and rapidity, while on the march the elephant light, like the "*pillar of fire*" which led the Israelites, is the beacon and guide.

Nor would it be easy for any part of the baggage to go astray and be lost. If it be objected that those lights would also guide the attacks of an enemy, the answer to such hypercriticism is, that the march of baggage is always so noisy, that this alone is generally a sufficient guide for any enemy, and the lights can be at any moment either partially concealed or wholly extinguished.

In the day-time, coloured flags are substituted for lanterns.

Fourthly. The dress of the men belonging to each division being of a different colour, enables every driver to find his own place quickly: "birds of a feather flock together," and especially in those moments of confusion and hurry which will often occur in a campaign, however well conducted it may be.

The troops also know by the colour the division to which their respective baggage belongs, and in case of a column

being detached, its baggage can at once be found and separated.

In a moment of difficulty which occurred in the Hill Campaign, 1845, I had to divide my force unexpectedly. The baggage was, at the moment, in the act of threading a long defile; as usual, it was all mixed, and the march of the whole army was delayed many hours. The reader can imagine what difficulty there was in getting loaded camels to pass each other through a crowded narrow defile; it was almost impossible and the army in consequence, did not arrive at its encamping ground till long after dusk. Had an attack been made by the enemy, alarms and panic would have taken place among the baggage, numbers would probably have been crushed and the whole force would have been obliged to halt. Thus a march would have been lost at a moment when the effect of the campaign depended entirely on marches. Had a baggage-corps existed then, the whole would have been in order, passing by files, leaving a passage for the conveyance of orders, and for the loaded animals to countermarch if required. In the defiles of the hills of Cutch Gundava, it was at times all but impossible for Staff Officers to pass through the baggage and convey orders.

Fifthly. Every man being armed, and under the command of officers, and non-commissioned officers, is able to defend himself and his beast, and is also prevented from plundering the inhabitants.

Sixthly. Being a soldier, and not a camel-man hired for the campaign, he neither deserts, nor robs, he is like every other soldier regularly paid, full of "esprit de corps," and looking to his pension when his service is done. This last I consider essential, as the baggage-corps private is not only a fighting man, but one entrusted with valuable

property, for which he is responsible : he has higher duties, if possible, than any other soldier, and those duties are also of a nature which requires more experience and reflection than an ordinary infantry soldier. They involve the care of an animal, as well as defending it and its load, and when the baggage of an army is increased for a time, the camel-man will have to command and drill men hired for the campaign. The private of the baggage-corps requires strength and intelligence.

Seventhly. If attacked, the baggage-camels form in squares. The heads of the animals towards the centre. Thus, a living fort is formed, the men firing from between the camels, which are all made to kneel, having their legs tied, and also their noses, so that they cannot break away —a strap round one leg when the animal kneels, generally prevents his rising when loaded, especially if the animals are also tied to each other by the nostrils, for through these the string, by which they are led, passes, and thus the operation of shackling the animals is performed in an instant. In this position, no horseman could reach far enough with his sabre, to cut down the man inside. The defender is also protected, in a great measure, from the fire of matchlock-men, by the baggage on the animal's back. This arrangement gives a musket and bayonet to about every two yards, without calculating on the camp-followers, who are generally armed, and would form an immense body, far more numerous than the camel-men. This body of camp-followers marshalled under the orders of the baggage-corps officers, would support the fire of the camel-men, and be too powerful for irregular troops without artillery, to attack with much hope of success. In India almost every officer's servant carries his master's double-barrelled gun, and every servant knows how to use it too.

Thus in case of necessity a powerful defence can be made when once the baggage of an army becomes organised; and why its organisation should be neglected in India, I do not know: but all know this, that in work of all kinds, and most in soldier's work, the division of labour and methodical proceedings will produce the greatest results; results which will be in proportion to such methodical arrangements;—and, in war, what are the results sought for? They are the prosperity of countries; the cessation of war itself. The cessation of bloodshed—of murder—of robbery—of rapine—of fraud, public and private—of every crime that fills the "Newgate Calendar," and of every horror that visits human nature—to prevent these evils is the calling of a good soldier. A well disciplined army does not commit these enormities; but in the best army there are ruffians who will commit them when they can, as there are men in civil life who do so. The only difference between the non-military ruffians and the military ruffians is, that the first have greater opportunities, they form a more numerous class, and are constantly at their wicked work; whereas, the last have, happily, only a chance in war-time, and are then controlled by vigorous discipline, rendered effective by methodical arrangements; without which last, neither vigour, nor rigour are of much avail.

To prevent these miseries is the object of war; of defensive war; which is the only war that any government can make without infamy. To secure peace, to curtail the horrors of war, as far as may be in his power, is the object and duty of every honourable soldier. To assist in the accomplishment of this in India, among other things, requires the formation of a "*Baggage-corps*," by which, all operations will be facilitated, and many disorders will be repressed; for the uncontrolled followers of an army, that is to say, the non-military people, are more dangerous to the poor

people of a country than are the fighting men; yet the last are dangerous enough in all conscience!

Eighthly. In order to assist men of all services and of all ranks in protecting the camels from being overloaded, I divided the camels of the baggage-corps into two classes: the *strong* and the *weak*. The load for the strong was fixed at 300*lbs.*, and that for the weak at 200*lbs.*, and round the neck of each camel I ordered a brass plate to be suspended as here represented—



By this plate any person seeing a camel overloaded, knows what it ought to carry; the plate being engraved with the *weight*, Company's *letter*, *number*, and *divisional colour*. Thus any infringement of orders can be easily ascertained and punished. In short, I omitted nothing in the formation of this corps that I could devise for the protection of the camels and, as far as the experiment had gone, that is to say, being made with an imperfectly formed corps, it surpassed all expectation. What then ought it not to be *now*, after its commanding officer has had a year and a half to bring it to perfection? In a less space of time Lieutenant Fitzgerald brought his "Camel Corps" to perfection; not a "Baggage-Corps," but a regiment mounted on camels, which is the same thing.

NUMBER OF CAMELS.

I THINK that the strength of the baggage-corps for Scinde ought to be at present about 1800 camels. This must be decided by circumstances. But it may be taken, as an approximate rule, to determine nearly the number of camels required, that it will average about one half of the number of men which form the army, taking European and Native troops together, and adding about 30 per cent. for contingencies, for example—

DISTRIBUTION OF CARRIAGE

FOR ONE OF HER MAJESTY'S REGIMENTS OF INFANTRY, TAKING ITS STRENGTH AS FOLLOWS:

	Proportion of Camels to each.	Total Camels.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel	5	5
2 Majors	5	10
7 Captains	4	28
20 Subalterns	3	60
1 Paymaster	4	4
1 Quarter-Master	3	3
1 Surgeon	4	4
2 Assistant-Surgeons	3	6
1000 Non-Commissioned rank and file	1 to 8 men	125
63 European tents	2 to 3 tents	42
6 Hospital tents	5 to 2 tents	15
6 Rowties (small tents) for guards and stores		4
Hospital stores and establishment		4
Quarter-Master's stores, Adjutant's office		3
Camp kettles		2
200,000 rounds spare ammunition		50
Officers' mess (1 camel to 2 officers)		18
		383
Spare camels (1 to 10)		38
Total Camels		421

DISTRIBUTION OF CARRIAGE

FOR A NATIVE REGIMENT OF INFANTRY, TAKING ITS STRENGTH AS FOLLOWS :

Europeans.	Proportion of Camels to each.	Total Camels.
1 Major	5	5
3 Captains	4	12
8 Subalterns	3	24
1 Assistant-Surgeon	3	3
1 Sergeant-Major	2	2
Natives.		
20 Officers	1 to 4	5
800 Non-Commissioned rank and file	20 lbs.	50
160,000 rounds spare ammunition		40
Puckauls (skins for water)		16
Kajavahs (panniers for sick)		16
32 Rowties (native tents)		22
5 Rowties for native officers		4
Officers' mess		6
Hospital rowties		4
Hospital stores and establishment		3
Quarter-Master's stores, and Adjutant's office		3
		215
Spare camels (1 to 10)		21
Total Camels		236

The above is put down from memory, and may not be accurate in every particular ; it must, however, be within a very few camels of the regulated number ; and I consider that the number of camels allowed to the higher ranks of officers is too large. No regimental officer should be allowed more than three camels in the field. I speak from experience. When I took the field in the Hill Campaign against the robber tribes, I had but five camels. I was then not merely Commander of the Forces, but also Governor, and one camel out of the five was loaded entirely

with official documents, stationery, maps, books, and correspondence, civil and military. If I could do this (and on the march to Emaum Ghur, in 1843, I and my aide-de-camp had but three camels between us!) a regimental officer can do with three camels, whatever be his rank. What does he want?—his tent, his bed, a canteen, a second pair of breeches, a second pair of shoes, half a dozen shirts, a second flannel waistcoat, a couple of towels, and a piece of soap; all beyond is mere luxury, and not fit for a campaign. His regimentals he carries on his back. An Indian campaign lasts five months. No man takes the field for comfort;—he goes to win renown, and no Sybarite wins renown in war.

With regard to increasing the corps when war is expected, the government would merely make a temporary addition by—

1st. Hiring camel-men.

2nd. Purchasing more camels.

3rd. Attaching a few more officers for the campaign.

This temporary increase would be determined by the strength of the force with which it is proposed to take the field. The additional officers would be but few. And the government must eke out the strength of the corps by hiring as many drivers as may be required. This, at first, appears to be an abandonment of the principle on which I formed the corps; but it is not so, for by attaching one hired camel-man and one camel to every regular soldier camel-driver of the corps, the hired man is forced at once into a strict compliance with the system of the regiment, which only requires obedience to orders: that is to say, *discipline*, not *drill*, such as is required in a cavalry or infantry soldier. The most uncouth lout of a camel-driver can load and fire a musket and lead his camel where he is ordered; and his superior (the regular baggage-corps

soldier) is close by to direct him both by word and example. Thus the baggage-corps could be, on an emergency, quadrupled without the necessity of an increased permanent expense ; for every baggage-corps soldier could easily direct *three* animals and their drivers, which, with the assistance of the orderly officer of each regiment, who ought to attend the baggage during the march, (as likewise the Quarter-Masters of regiments, till ordered forward to take up the new camp-ground,) would make the superintendence of the baggage sufficiently vigorous for emergent service, and would prove the soundness of the principle on which the baggage-corps was established if that principle be vigorously maintained ; for if not, if the corps be commanded by a bad officer, then it will be of no use ;— what corps can be, if a bad officer be at its head ?

Thus a baggage-corps of 1800 or 2000 camels, in Scinde, would enable 4000 men to march at any moment. Such a corps will be more than ever required, if the Punjaub be annexed to our dominions ; for the government of India may rest assured, that unless the troops are kept ready to move within an hour after the arrival of despatches, the Punjaub will be more troublesome than ever. I consider that this baggage-corps will be a powerful auxiliary to the troops in the hands of the General Officer who may be intrusted with the government of the Punjaub after the present war is over : during the war, I hold it to be indubitably necessary, and the larger the army the more a baggage-corps is required. Every operation will be executed more rapidly, more safely, more vigorously, and great vigour will be necessary to conquer and settle the Punjaub. No man, who had any correct ideas of war, doubted what a troublesome job Mooltan would prove to be. The sending of regular troops against that strong fortress at the time they were sent, was unwise : to have

sent them at an earlier period would have been more so: it would have cost more blood and more money than the later expedition has cost. Both were contrary to sound judgment. There seems to have been a want of knowledge both of the climate and the state of the Punjaub.* But the difficulties attending the siege of Mooltan appear to me to be small when compared to those difficulties that may attend the final conquest of the Punjaub: a large country full of rivers, mountains, climates, plains, deserts, supplies scarce, and a hostile, well-armed, brave people, apparently resolved to wage a partisan warfare. These are not ordinary difficulties; and Lord Gough has wisely assembled an overwhelming force to meet them. But that force will have a world of camp-followers; and I do think that the organisation of a large and well-commanded baggage-corps will enable his Lordship to deal with his army of camp-followers so as to feed his troops with greater ease than he can otherwise do. To find supplies for such a mass of men will be no easy task without the most vigorous and systematic arrangements which no doubt have been made, and in my opinion the formation of a baggage-corps is an essential one. At all events I can say, that next to the unremitting exertions of the Staff, of those employed as collectors, and of the Indian Flotilla, we were indebted to the Scinde baggage-corps for the rapidity with which we were enabled to assemble an army of 15,000 men at Roree in North Scinde, in 1846. On the 24th December, 1845, I received a letter from the Governor-General, saying, that the Sikh army had suddenly crossed the Sutlej, and his Excellency desired me

* Major Edwards should have been aided by money and irregular corps, and left to carry on a partisan warfare if he believed it to be practicable; at all events he could have given support to the Nawaub of Bahawalpoor, till a regular force was sent strong enough to take Mooltan at once.

immediately to assemble 15,000 men at Roree. This was on the 24*th December*, and on the 6*th of February* I was at the head of 15,000 men, all encamped at Roree, with 86 pieces of cannon, and 300 yards of flying bridges, consisting of pontoons, native boats, with rafters and planking; the whole ready to march, carriage and everything complete, and such a spirit in the troops as cannot be surpassed. Proud as I ever must feel of the exertions made by all ranks under my orders, for the extraordinary rapidity with which that army was assembled, I feel that it is due to Sir George Arthur, then Governor of Bombay, to say, how zealously and promptly he executed the orders of the Governor-General in sending up reinforcements to Scinde. To him and to that excellent naval officer, the lamented Sir Robert Oliver, I was deeply indebted for the quickness with which the regiments ordered from Bombay were sent to Kurrachee; and, indeed, the same conspicuous energy in sending reinforcements had been displayed by Sir George Arthur after the battle of Meeanee and Hydrabad.

STATE OF BAGGAGE-CORPS.

THAT the baggage-corps which I formed in Scinde would prove as useful to the troops when lately moving up from Kurrachee towards Mooltan, as it proved to me on a similar occasion in 1846, I did not doubt, but I am forced to do so now because I have seen letters from Scinde saying, that the corps which I left scarcely formed, yet rapidly progressing, has been allowed to deteriorate as rapidly. This I cannot altogether believe, but if it be not, as it ought to be, in PERFECT ORDER, a rigid inquiry should be instituted into the cause of such a loss to the public. I do not know that the baggage-corps *is* in bad order, but I do know that when any regiment is in bad order, it is the fault of the commanding officer.

This corps was formed by me in 1845, just before I was ordered by Lord Hardinge to march a force to the north with the intention of assisting in the campaign against the Sikhs. After the troops had marched to Bahawalpoor, a march, including the return to Kurrachee, of about 1,000 miles, I caused reports to be made by the different commanding officers of regiments as to the working of the baggage-corps of which they had, by that long march, acquired great experience, and under such a severe and disadvantageous trial to the corps, that I was surprised to see it of any service at all! I say "a severe and disadvantageous trial," because it had been only just formed. Neither officers, nor non-commissioned officers, nor privates, had ever before seen each other. They had all been drawn hastily from various regiments of the line and knew nothing of the new duties required of them. The few Government

camels we had, were many of them just bought. The greater number forming the corps were, therefore, hired: neither the lanterns for the night, nor the sounding horns and coloured flags to assemble by day, had been purchased; nor the men dressed in the colour of their divisions. In short, the corps was unorganised and its Commander, the excellent, zealous, and lamented Major Jameson, absolutely *formed his corps on the march.* Yet, under this mass of difficulties, I received from the commanders of regiments their perfect approval of the working of the baggage-corps and also some suggestions for its improvement in the details, which suggestions I had desired them to make in order to render the working of the corps more perfect. A Captain of Artillery made some trivial objections but they were of no value.

It is to me a matter of deep regret that I cannot lay these reports before the public, having mislaid them. But, on the other hand, I have been fortunate in obtaining a copy of one of them: it is the report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Pennycuick, C.B. and K.H., an officer of long and very distinguished services. I do not think that any military man who knows this officer, will say that I exaggerate in calling him one of the best officers in the army, and whose long services in the East Indies makes his opinion of the highest authority in this matter, and, indeed, in most military matters.*

For my good fortune in this instance, the 17th Regiment having returned to England, I applied to its commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson and he extracted

* I am delighted to see, by the newspapers, that this officer, and another friend of mine, Colonel Colin Campbell, of the 98th Regiment, are at the head of large bodies of troops in Lord Gough's army. These two able men are of that stamp who only want an opportunity of adding more renown to their already distinguished service, and to our arms. The coming war will give it to them.

from the regimental letter-book, a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Pennycuick's letter to Major Jameson, on the working of the baggage-corps, and I now give it to the public, together with that of my friend Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson himself; who having been on my staff in Scinde and being one of the most experienced officers in the army is not a bad judge of the matter. He himself made this march to Bahawalpoor and back in command of a wing of the 17th Regiment. I am therefore fortunately able to publish the opinions of these two officers as to the working of the baggage-corps on the march. I have great regret at having lost the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Derinzy, K.H., of the 86th, of Lieutenant-Colonels Reid, C.B., Corsellis, and others of the Company's service, all to the same purpose. These are opinions formed by able and experienced officers of high rank, and bearing especially on what is, perhaps, the *most essential part of my plan*, viz. the getting up quick of the tents, and of the food for the soldiers, so as to prevent their being harassed and the hospitals filled with sick men.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL McPHERSON TO SIR C. NAPIER.

CHATHAM, *October* 21*st*, 1848.

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

I am happy to be able to send you the copy of a letter Lieutenant-Colonel Pennycuick, late of the 17th Regiment, wrote to Major Jameson, giving him his opinion of the constitution and working of that most excellent and most useful corps, "The Camel Baggage-Corps," in Scinde.

He having spoken so much to the purpose relative to the great advantages of it over every other means of conveyance of baggage in India, leaves me little or nothing more to say in its praise, but that I fully concur in all his views on the subject. But I beg to mention one circumstance which did not come under his notice, which is the great difference of the working of the camel-corps over the system in which our baggage

was conveyed during the campaign in Scinde in 1843, from Sukkur to Hyderabad, when the camels were furnished and fed by the Commissariat. In no one instance do I remember the baggage of the army being upon the ground until three or four hours after the troops, and, more frequently than otherwise, until nearly dark; while the baggage conveyed by the "Camel Baggage-Corps" during the march from Kurrachee to Bahawalpoor and back, was generally upon the ground before the men had taken off their accoutrements; and which, in a country like Scinde, is of the utmost importance, not only to the health but the comfort of the troops; and I can safely say, speaking within bounds, that, for every camel lost by death in the Camel Baggage-Corps, those furnished by the Commissariat in 1843 lost from ten to twelve.

Believe me, &c.,

(Signed) P. McPherson,
Lieut.-Colonel 17th Regiment.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PENNYCUICK TO MAJOR JAMESON,

COMMANDING "SCINDE CAMEL BAGGAGE-CORPS."

Sukkur, *24th July*, 1846.

Sir,

I beg to apologise for the delay that has occurred in answering your letter, addressed to me while in command of the second brigade of the Indus field force, and dated Bahawalpoor, 9th March last.

In that letter you desire to know my opinion of the Camel Baggage-Corps, from what I observed of its working from Kurrachee to Bahawalpoor.* The delay that has taken place in answering your letter in due course, has given me a further opportunity of observing the working of the Camel Baggage-Corps from Bahawalpoor back to Sukkur;† and the result is, my firm conviction of the vast utility and many advantages of the establishment to all classes, officers as well as soldiers.

These advantages can, I imagine, be fully appreciated by those only, who have had an opportunity of comparing the working of the Camel Baggage-Corps, with the system of private conveyance in operation on former occasions, when troops took the field. I, for one, have had this opportunity, and when I compare the trouble, the anxiety, the expense, and the loss experienced in the conveyance of baggage of officers and soldiers by private camels, during the campaign in Affghanistan and Beloochistan, in the year 1839, with the comfort attending the conveyance

* 547 miles. † 222 miles.

of the baggage to Bahawalpoor and back—the comparison is, in every respect, greatly in favour of the "*Camel Baggage-Corps*,"—nothing, indeed, could have been more regular, or more satisfactory, than the manner in which the baggage of the brigade under my command was conveyed on the latter occasion. No trouble, no anxiety, and far less expense, taking into consideration the purchase and feeding of camels, the attendance required, and the constant losses occurring from one cause or another, than would have attended the carriage of the baggage on private camels. The regularity too, with which the baggage arrived at the new encamping ground, owing, in a material degree, to the general orders limiting the weight to be carried by each camel, was not, by any means, the smallest benefit experienced,—the men having hardly time, in general, to take off their accoutrements, when the camels began to come in; instead of being exposed to the sun, until late in the afternoon, as was very frequently the case in the campaign I have before alluded to.

I may add that no complaints worth repeating came to my notice, nor was any serious loss sustained throughout the whole march that I am aware of; which, considering the circumstances mentioned in your letter, that the corps was then only in its infancy, that many of the surwaus* had been only two or three months in the service, and moreover, that more than half the camels employed by my brigade did not belong to the Establishment, is, I think, surprising.

It would be unfair to omit remarking, that on one occasion, after a heavy fall of rain overnight, I directed the brigade to march, as usual, in the morning—being desirous to satisfy myself of the efficiency of the baggage-corps attached, and how far it could be depended upon, under such circumstances. The result was most satisfactory. The tents, although thoroughly soaked with the rain,† the road deep in many places, and heavy throughout, were, in general, up about the usual time.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) S. PENNYCUICK,
Lieut.-Colonel Commanding 17th Regiment.

True copy.

(Signed) P. MCPHERSON,
Lieut.-Colonel 17th Regiment.

* Camel-men.

† This generally stops the march of an Indian army. The camels are generally unable to move in rain when heavily laden, for the wet tents are too heavy. See the difference between the above letter and that of Colonel Wallace given in a former part.

Here I bid adieu to the subject, leaving this letter as a legacy to those for whose benefit it was written, and confident that, sooner or later, a "*Baggage-Corps*" must become a part of the army of India, which is in every way worthy of the vast empire that it won and holds—holds by DISCIPLINE! Let not, then, the word become an empty boast. Let it not lose its *reality*. Let not victory lull our soldiers to sleep. Let every British officer recollect that powerful nations surround our Indian empire; that they are rapidly acquiring our military system, our tactics, our arms. Let him compare our earlier battles with our last—*Plassy* with *Feroshahur* and *Sobraon;* setting our losses in killed and wounded at each battle in juxta-position. Let us look to these matters that we may not have to exclaim with Pyrrhus at Asculum, "*Another such victory will undo us!*"

APPENDIX, No. I.

I HAVE added this Appendix because, although it contains little that has not been stated in the foregoing letter, it gives an account of the actual formation of the Scinde baggage-corps, as well as the orders and instructions for that corps as they were issued—and thus may prove useful to any officers called upon to form another corps of a similar nature in either of the other divisions.

SECTION BAGGAGE-CORPS.

Minute in the Assistant Quartermaster-General's Office in Scinde, relative to the formation of the Scinde Baggage-corps.

KURRACHEE, 1847.

THIS important corps was formed by order of His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B., with a view to bring under control the unwieldly masses of baggage and followers which accompany an army in India, and form a continual source of anxiety to the general officer commanding the troops.

The principal inconveniences attending the march of an army so accompanied in an enemy's country are occasioned by—

First. Overloading; which causes the animals to break down, or not being able to keep up with animals more lightly laden, lengthen and weaken the line of baggage, which no guard, however strong, can properly protect.

Secondly. The guard required for the efficient protection of the baggage in front of an enemy, weakens the line of battle; and the guard required to go out with the camels while they graze, are not the least of the harassing duties after a march.

Thirdly. Immense loss to Government from animals broken down and abandoned on the line of march, or rendered utterly

useless from sore backs, all caused by overloading, ill treatment, and a bad system generally.

Fourthly. The above causes too frequently produce a scarcity of carriage; the men suffer, the movements of the army become crippled, and the General's operations ruined.

Fifthly. The very attendants of the camels, usually drawn (with their animals) from the countries adjoining the theatre of operations, can never be attached to the service—when ill treated or discontented, they desert in the hour of need, not unfrequently taking their animals along with them. The proportion of attendants are thus often reduced to one man to five or more camels; a number totally inadequate to the care of the animals, and mischievous in every way.

With practical experience of the disadvantages inflicted by a disorderly baggage on a General while conducting his field operations in India, Sir C. J. Napier ordered the formation of a baggage-corps consisting of 1800 enlisted privates (or surwans), as many camels, and a proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers, as per scale: the latter were composed partly of the original jemadars and duffedars (superintendents) of camels, and partly drafted from the line.

Those from the line thus acquired a knowledge of the treatment of the camel from their new comrades in their respective grades, who, in their turn, were drilled and instructed in military duties. The men are armed with the percussion fusee.

The corps is divided into three divisions, 600 men and camels in each division. These, at present, are distributed in Upper, Middle, and Lower Scinde.

The depôts and reserve stores of these divisions are stationed at Sukkur, Hyderabad, and Kurrachee. The outpost of Jerruck and the entrenched camp at Hyderabad are garrisoned by the corps.

The clothing of the men of each division and the equipments of their camels are of different colours, in order that no confusion may occur when on service, and when leading into, and out of, camp.

At night, each division is known by the colour of its lantern, carried on the back of a camel, and at the head of the whole, a large lantern is carried on the back of an elephant. A peculiar

description of musical instrument, such as *tom-tom, kettle-drum,* or *horn,* is to be used by the baggage-corps to distinguish its call from any other music used by the troops. Thus the baggage can always be assembled by its own sounds.

The financial arrangements of the corps are conducted in two branches, the *Military* and the *Commissariat.*

In the former, the abstracts for the pay of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the corps, are audited and passed through the divisional paymaster similar to other corps. In the latter, all accounts connected with the supply of grain, forage, equipments, &c., are rendered.

The officer commanding the baggage-corps has received the Commissary-General's instructions to render his accounts through the Hyderabad Commissariat Office; this arrangement is not likely to be attended with much advantage, as in the first place, the Commanding Officer of the baggage-corps must naturally feel a disinclination to submit his accounts through a subaltern; and secondly, the less connection the accounts of the baggage-corps have with the Commissariat Offices in Scinde, the better. The officer commanding the baggage-corps should, from his position, render his accounts direct to the Commissary-General, and this can be done without inconvenience, as all contracts for supplies of every description for the corps, are entered into by its own Commandant, are independent of the Commissariat in Scinde, and after receiving the approval of the Scinde Government, are transmitted direct to the Commissary-General at Bombay, for the sanction of the Military Board. The accounts, therefore, of these contracts, should also be rendered *direct* to the Commissary-General.

Should it ever be deemed expedient to reduce the baggage-corps in Scinde, the reductions should be made first in the animals: these can always be replaced if necessary, and are already trained to carry loads; but the present establishment of the corps should be reduced with great caution, because the camel-men or privates of the corps are now chosen men, armed and drilled, and fond of the service, which they will not desert in time of need; they form valuable garrison troops in the time of peace, and when the force takes the field and camels are

purchased, they are immediately equipped from the depôts of the corps—an armed man to each camel takes his place upon the line of march, at once the trained keeper of the animal and the guard over the load which it carries. Thus the baggage-corps gives confidence to the General, comfort to the troops, and security to the baggage which is intrusted to its charge.

On the other hand, if the privates are reduced as well as the animals, and a force is called on to take the field, inevitable delay will occur in procuring, not only camels, but camel-men,—men who know how to take care of the animals; men who, forgetting former injustice and ill-treatment by understrappers in the Commissariat department, will not fly with their camels into the hills on the first rumour of danger.

This is no idle fear, no imaginary danger; it has been proved every time a force has taken the field since our army was withdrawn from Affghanistan. The success of the campaign of 1845 in the Boogtee hills was endangered from this cause; and the army, destined to operate towards Mooltan in the beginning of 1846, owed its ability to move so suddenly as it did entirely to the existence of the baggage-corps, which, though increased in camels far beyond what its half-fitted, half-arranged establishment could control, still carried the moral influence of its wholesome regulations throughout the line of march, though the worst of camel-men at times rendered those regulations nearly abortive.

Equipments, too, if not kept always ready in store, are required to be hurriedly made up to meet such emergent demands as are made by a force taking the field; this is the harvest-time of those knaves who unsparingly rob the Honourable Company—*contractors*—who, smelling war from afar, assiduously purchase up cheap materials, and make up bad equipments upon their own terms, which equipments too often fall to pieces at the beginning of the campaign, or, by the contraction of the green and raw materials of which they are made, render the animals useless from sore backs. This statement may be verified by a reference to the Committee Proceedings on Equipments, that were supplied by a contractor to the force which marched lately to Bahawalpoor. The whole of the equipments were

condemned as having been made originally of raw and bad materials; yet this contractor had the audacity to send in bills to Government for the same, amounting to 86,000 rupees, or 8600*l.* sterling! of which 40,000 rupees were disallowed.

Now the depôts of the baggage-corps at Sukkur, Hyderabad, and Kurrachee, contain complete equipments for 1000 camels in reserve, that is, exclusive of the quantity of equipments in charge of the three divisions, viz. for 1800 camels; and it is hoped that Government will be rescued from future dependence on contractors in time of need, as far as Scinde is concerned.

Taking the strength of the force in Scinde at 10,000 men, including local corps, let it be assumed that on such an important frontier 6000 men are expected to be able to take the field, if necessary, leaving 4000 in garrison, and that the force selected for service is to consist of—

1 Troop European Horse Artillery,
2 Companies Native Foot Artillery,
200 Men of the Corps of Sappers and Miners,
1 Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse,
1 Regiment European Infantry,
4 Regiments Native Infantry.

The above corps, completed to their establishments, would muster about 6000 men. The following distribution of camels would be required to render such a force efficient in carriage:—

	Camels.
1 Troop Horse Artillery	66
2 Companies Native Artillery	68
200 Men, Sappers and Miners	62
1 Regiment Scinde Irregular Horse *	
1 Regiment European Infantry	497
4 Regiments Native Infantry	1356
Engineers' Stores	25
Reserve Ammunition for 3 batteries	108
5 Days' Commissariat Supplies, and Medical comforts, &c.	84 †
5 Days' Grain for 2266 Camels, at 4 lbs. per diem	114
5 Days' Grain for 114 Camels, and of those carrying it	5
Total	2385 ‡

* Irregular corps are not provided with carriage by Government.

† Exclusive of 75 Commissariat carts.

‡ To this should be added about 30 per cent. reserved for contingencies which arise in the field.

Thus it is seen that 2385 camels would be required to complete the carriage of a column of 6000 men of the arms already stated. It might not, therefore, be deemed prudent to reduce the present establishment of the baggage-corps.

If the line of operations be parallel to the Indus, or any of the five rivers, the quantity of carriage ought not to exceed the above, as the great bulk of ordnance, commissariat, and engineer stores would be transported by water, moving on the flank of the column.

But should the force be required to operate on any line deviating from those above mentioned, it may be assumed that not less than fifteen days' supplies would always be kept up in camp.

Moving in any direction from the vale of the Indus at times involves the necessity of feeding irregular corps, and public and private followers, by the Commissariat. Therefore, *exclusive of convoy*, 1232 camels would be required by the Commissariat, for the carriage of fifteen days' provisions, making a total with the force of 3617 camels, exclusive of contingencies.

The number of camels which would be required along the line of communication would of course be regulated by its length; but this, and the establishment of intermediate posts or depôts, are points on which the General alone can decide at the time, and then only according to circumstances.

SCINDE, G. O., 22*nd July*, 1845.

No. 1. "The following memorandum from the officer commanding the camel baggage-corps is published for general information, and is to be strictly attended to:—

"The Form of Indent circulated is to be strictly adhered to.

"All Indents on the baggage-corps for carriage beyond the established proportion (or for which no proportion has been established) must be sent through the Assistant Quartermaster-General, for the sanction of his Excellency the Governor. But in cases where delay would be occasioned before obtaining previous sanction, and be injurious to the public service, the Indents should be marked '*Emergent*,' and bear the countersignature of the officer commanding the division.

"When the carriage is required for arms, stores, ammunition, &c., the weight of such to be inserted in the body of the Indent, if possible.

"When officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, are proceeding on their own account, or moving in the course of regular reliefs, or indeed on any duty which is not reckoned *field* service, it is supposed that ample time and means will be afforded for all parties to provide themselves with private carriage.

"Therefore, camels will not be provided by the baggage-corps, for conveyance of private baggage in time of peace. See G. O., 19th May, 1845."

SCINDE, G. O., 19*th May*, 1845.

With reference to General Orders of the 9th instant, No. 2, "All Indents on the camel baggage-corps for carriage beyond the established proportion are to be sent through the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

"Camels will not be provided by the camel baggage-corps to officers travelling in time of peace. But on a campaign they will be supplied to regiments and departments on Indent."

FORM.

INDENT on the Camel Baggage Corps at for the undermentioned Camels required for the proceeding to Camp 1845.

Letters.	Names.	Established proportion.	Balance remaining.	Number indented for.			For what purpose required.	Authority and Date.	Hire.		
				As due on former Indent.	Number indented for in addition.				Rate	per	Amount.
C	Camels . . .	100	50	50	50	Fifty.	For the conveyance of Camp Equipage of the Regiment.				
	„ . . .				1	One.	To replace one unserviceable, as per Returning Indent.				

I do hereby certify that the above specified are necessary for the purpose mentioned, according to the best of my judgment and belief, after the most careful examination.

Passed. Contents received.

Captain, Major, Major,

Assistant Quartermaster-General, Scinde. Commanding. Commanding.

SCINDE, G. O., 27*th September*, 1845.

No. 4. "On the requisition of the officer commanding the camel baggage-corps, the officer commanding at Jeruck will be pleased to assemble committees for the examination of any camels that the officer commanding the baggage-corps may wish to be reported on.

"Captain Stewart, Deputy-collector at Jeruck, is to be considered available for this duty when the exigencies of the service require it, and when these duties do not interfere with those of a civil nature.

"This part of the order is equally applicable to the different deputy-collectors stationed where troops may be serving on outpost duty, or where other officers are not available."

SCINDE, G. O., 24*th November*, 1845.

No. 1. "The Commandant of the baggage-corps has reported to head-quarters that the animals sent to carry the baggage of the * * * * * were overloaded to an enormous extent. Upon this the Major-General commanding has to make the following observations, to which he begs that officers commanding regiments in Scinde will pay the strictest attention, for the Major-General is resolved to enforce them rigidly."

First. "Every officer commanding a brigade, regiment, or detachment, is responsible for obedience to general orders. These are explicit with regard to the loads which are to be put on camels. They were issued at Abubuker in 1843, and no excuse can ever be received that an officer did not know these orders. The Major-General is not obliged to read his orders to the officers commanding the regiments forming the army in Scinde, nor will he repeat them; but he will take care that they are obeyed."

Secondly. "The first and highest duty of the officer, non-

commissioned officer, and private composing the camel baggage-corps, is to prevent camels from being overloaded, and to report to the senior officer of the camel baggage-corps present (and commanding the baggage of any division, brigade, regiment, or detachment), when he sees any animal overloaded; upon which such officer is immediately (and without reference whatever to any other officer commanding) to unload the camel, reload it with *half* the ordered burden, and throw the overplus baggage clear of the line of march, nor is the officer commanding a rear-guard to permit any European soldier, sepoy, or public servant to remain in charge of such cast away baggage, under pain of being brought to trial before a General Court-martial for disobedience of orders."

Thirdly. "The officers commanding regiments are responsible that no public stores are put on camels beyond the weight allowed by the general orders of January 1843, and any neglect of this must be at their private peril, for the stores shall be destroyed, and will probably be charged to such commanding officer's private accounts by order of the supreme Government, to which the Major-General will report with a strong recommendation to that effect."

Fourthly. "All camels who may be injured by being overloaded are to be given up to the commanding officer of the corps, who is to be charged with the value paid for the animal by the public in the first instance; a court of inquiry having first made a report on the subject in order to decide between the Honourable the Company, and the commanding officer, who may afterwards settle with his regiment as he pleases, the public hold the commanding officer answerable as having signed the '*Indent*,' and having full power to enforce, an obedience to general orders."

Fifthly. "Every camel is to have a brass plate hung round its neck, with the number of pounds weight it is to carry written on it; that is to say, the animals of the corps are to be divided into two classes, the *strong* and the *weak*, and the plate to be so marked in large letters; the load for the strong being 300 lbs.; that for the weak being 200 lbs.—the Company's *letter* and

number being placed under, and also the divisional *colour*. This plate to be four inches by three."

STRONG.

To carry 300*lbs. only.*

A.

No. 1.

Red.

Sixthly. "Thus will everybody know the proper weight, and it is the duty of every one to report to the nearest officer belonging to the camel-baggage corps if a camel is overloaded."

Seventhly, "With regard to private or hired camels, their owners must settle their own loads; but if they once enter the line of march they must be submitted to the orders of the Commandant of the camel-baggage corps in every particular, for under his immediate command is placed the whole baggage of the troops serving in this province when in the field or on a march, and he is responsible to no one but the officer commanding the troops on the spot, provided that officer is his senior in rank; and no officer is to alter the standing orders issued for the camel-baggage corps."

Eighthly. "No officer commanding a regiment or detachment is to order a separate baggage guard to mount: every soldier is to march with his corps; any breach of this order is to be immediately reported to head-quarters, by the Commandant of the baggage-corps."

Ninthly. "In the field all baggage found to be above the proper weight is to be *burned on the spot;* but where animals fail from any other cause than disobedience of orders, the baggage is to be immediately taken care of, and spare camels furnished. The honour of the corps would be compromised by loss of

baggage, even the smallest quantity, when orders have been obeyed by the proprietors."

Tenthly. "Officers' servants are strictly to comply with all orders issued by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the baggage-corps."

Eleventhly. "The Provost-Marshal's deputy is to attend the Commandant of the baggage-corps in the field."

Twelfthly. "There may be some points in the foregoing orders which appear, at first sight, to be harsh; but to control baggage is as difficult as it is indispensable; it is only by severity that such order can be preserved as will insure the general safety of the baggage, and its prompt arrival at the encamping ground. The necessity as well as the comfort of this, especially to Europeans, require no comment."

Thirteenthly. "As regards the complaint made by Captain Jameson against both his own officers and the officer commanding the second division of the * * * regiment * * *, the Major-General has to regret that these officers should have allowed general orders to be broken by their men; but as the regiment is now leaving his command, he shall say no more about it, except to set Captain * * * right in an erroneous idea which that officer seems to have formed, as the Major-General understands his letter, that it rests with the officer of the baggage-corps alone to see that the camels are not overloaded. This is a great and important error: one of the first duties of the commissioned officer of every body of men is to look to their comfort and health, and both depend on their having their baggage properly arranged. The officer in command indents for animals to carry a certain weight of baggage; and it is his duty to see, and make those under him see, that not a pound more baggage is put on the camels than that for which he has signed the Indent. The duty of the officer of the baggage-corps is to detect any breach of orders in this respect, not to weigh and pack the baggage of the troops. It might as well be expected, when a regiment is ordered to march, that the officers should lift all their troopers into their saddles. The Major-General corrects this erroneous view as regards baggage, because though this fine regiment and its excellent Com-

mandant, * * * *, are going to leave Scinde, the Major-General still hopes to have the honour of again commanding it, baggage and all."

SCINDE, G. O., 27*th July*, 1847.

No. 3. "In modification of Scinde General Orders of the 5th January, 1843, and 24th November, 1845, his Excellency the Governor is pleased to fix the weight of baggage, supplies, and government stores, to be carried by the camels of the baggage-corps on the line of march at the following scale:—

Private baggage or dead stock, 1 camel to 320 lbs.
Commissariat supplies, such as grain and other articles which load compactly, 1 camel to 400 lbs.*
Hospital tent, 941 lbs., 3 camels to 1 tent.
Or 5 do. to 2 tents.
E. N. P. soldiers' tent, 526 lbs., 3 camels to 2 tents.
Bengal ditto, 667 lbs., 2 do. to 1 do.
Warrant officers' 570 lbs., 1½ do. to 1 do.
No. 1, Routee average, 257 lbs., 2 do. to 3 do.
No. 2, Ditto, 244 lbs., 2 do. to 3 do.
No. 3, Ditto, 223 lbs., 2 do. to 3 do.
Copper camp kettles, dish and cover complete, average 45¼ lbs., 1 camel to 8 sets."

SCINDE, G. O., 18*th Oct.*, 1845.

No. 2. "With reference to No. 5 of the General Orders by the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, dated Fort William, 15th August, 1845—

"The 3rd paragraph, No. 1 of the General Order by his Excellency the Governor of Scinde, dated 22nd July, 1845, will refer to officers only when marching in the course of ordinary relief, &c., and the regulated proportion of private carriage for the non-commissioned officers and privates will therefore on all future occasions be furnished on indent on the camel baggage-corps at the rate of 10 rupees a month for each camel."

* Circumstances in 1847 induced me to admit an increase of 20 lbs. weight to the load of a strong camel.

SECTION MARCHES.

Extract from Standing Orders for the Army of Scinde.

"On ordinary occasions (of march) the first drum is to beat two hours before the time of marching, upon which the non-commissioned officers must take care that the squads dress and accoutre, tents be struck, and baggage loaded.

"In the interval between the first and second drum the subalterns are to visit the whole company in order to see that the non-commissioned officers are doing their duty, and assist the officers of the baggage train in loading, which should be finished at least ten minutes before the second drum beats.

"The second drum or bugle is to sound or beat an hour and a half after the first, upon which the companies are to turn out on their respective parades, and the baggage to be sent to the place of rendezvous, accompanied by the subaltern of the day of each regiment, who is to place himself for that day under the orders of the officer of the baggage corps unless he be his senior in rank, which occasionally may happen on detachment.

"The Baggagemaster and his Quartermaster are to assemble the baggage at the hour appointed, and at the place assigned by the Assistant Quartermaster-General for the assembly of the baggage of the division.

"If any baggage does not come at the proper time to the place of assembly for the baggage, it must be reported by the Baggagemaster to the Commanding Officer of the troops, and the officers commanding divisions and brigades must be responsible for this serious irregularity.

"The position of the baggage and that of all camp followers on the line of march, is decided by general orders, as circumstances may dictate; and in the passage of obstacles, such as nullahs, &c., it should be the care of the Assistant Quartermaster-General to cause one or more roads for the baggage, to be opened well clear of the column.

"On the halt sounding, the baggage should close up to the reverse flanks of their respective divisions or brigades, or rear of the column, according to the orders of the day, and take as compact a form as circumstances permit."

SCINDE, G. O., *9th January*, 1846.

"It is to be clearly understood that no one but the officer in command of the troops is on any pretence whatever to interfere with, or to give any orders to the Baggagemaster, Quartermasters, or their assistants, under whom the whole baggage is placed; no officer is to send any camel away on the line of march, nor to give any orders whatever relative to baggage. All orders are to come from the officer or non-commissioned officer in command of the baggage with every brigade, regiment, or detachment.

"If any officer or non-commissioned officer in command of baggage misconducts himself, the officer in command of the brigade, regiment, or detachment, is to take the proper steps in regard to him, as usual, for the due maintenance of military discipline. But this corps or any detachment therefrom having the Commander of the troops' orders at what time the troops are to march, is to be left to his own discretion in all points relating to the march of the baggage, and no baggage is to march in front of the troops, unless by order of the Commander of the troops, but always on the reverse flank of the column or in rear of the column. This rule is imperious, and no Commander of a brigade, regiment, or detachment, is to break through it—without being forced by unforeseen circumstances to make so dangerous an innovation on the orders of march.

"The officers of this army will on due reflection see that the comfort and even the safety of the force depends on the good regulation of the march of the baggage; and that unless *one system* is rigidly enforced there cannot be any *good regulation*, and *one* system cannot be established if any interference is permitted with those who are intrusted with the march of the baggage, and who have their orders from the Baggagemaster, Captain Jameson; orders that have for their object the preservation of the camels. The Quartermasters and non-commissioned officers of the baggage-corps have great exertions to make, and if they are crossed in those exertions by the interference of staff and regimental officers, they cannot do their duty: it is impossible. The Major-General, therefore, being

determined to give full effect to the experiment which the general Government has permitted him to make, calls with much confidence upon all officers under his command to render every assistance in their power to the Baggagemaster and his Quartermasters, whose labours in all circumstances will be trying both to their strength and to their temper, especially at first.* He cannot doubt that this appeal to the zeal and kindly feelings of officers will be responded to generally.

"It is positively prohibited to the guards, to servants, or to any persons with the baggage, to beat or hurry on camels or to disobey the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the baggage-corps, who are to have the entire command of the baggage on the line of march.

"The Major-General therefore repeats, that it is only by enforcing the above regulations that the baggage can be brought well up to the encamping ground, and the comfort of the troops secured. His chief object in forming this corps is, while diminishing as far as possible the quantity of baggage, to secure comfort to the army, and that the baggage shall be able to accompany the troops in the most trying marches. The good treatment of those poor animals is essential to their exertions, and on these must depend the efforts of the troops, especially Europeans, who without their baggage are incapable of making war in this climate."

The following General Order was issued with reference to the engagement of extra camel-men to accompany the army to Bahawalpoor in the beginning of 1846 :—

SCINDE, G. O., 14*th January*, 1846.

"If any camel-men who have been engaged for the public service desert the same and are apprehended, they shall be tried for the offence by a General Court-martial, and the sentence shall be immediately executed.

* So true was this that Major Jameson fell a sacrifice to his zeal, his exertions and his anxiety, in the formation of the baggage-corps, and the difficulties of which were increased by the villany of three Quartermasters, whom I brought to trial, and they were all condemned.

"The officers of the Commissariat and baggage-corps are to explain this to the men concerned, and the magistrates are to do so likewise when engaging these men."

SCINDE, G. O., 16*th January*, 1846.

"The proportion of Kujawahs to troops on the line of march is fixed at one to every 100 men."

APPENDIX, No. II.

CHATHAM, *February 2nd*, 1849.

MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

I have just received yours of yesterday, and hasten to answer it. We had but *three* camels between us on our trip to Emaumghur, and with light loads, as we each only had one bullock trunk and our bedding, with a camp-table and two chairs, and canteen, and a captain's servant's Routee tent, with some *beer*, *wine*,* and brandy. We went nearly in the old Peninsula style.

Believe me, my dear Sir Charles,

Yours very sincerely,

P. M'PHERSON.

To Sir Charles Napier, &c.

* More shame for us! What have soldiers to do with *beer* and *wine* on a campaign?

PRESTON, *February 22nd*, 1849.

DEAR SIR,

I saw in the *Times* newspaper an article on a letter said to be published by you on the subject of Indian Baggage, but I could not find the letter.

I should esteem it a favour if you will tell me how I can procure a sight of it, or if it will appear in the public prints.

I fully agree with you in almost all your opinions on Indian affairs.

I hope it is a common consequence of a general law that *correct* observers will form the same conclusions when the same objects are presented to observation.

In Bengal there is a regular scale laid down, directing the quantity of Baggage for each officer and mess.

The 39th, when on service, always acted up to the order, but when we went on the expedition to Gwalior it is incredible the confusion which arose from the endless piles of Baggage.

After the battle of Maharajpore the army pushed on the following day about 14 miles, and on our arriving at the encamping ground the officer commanding one of the native corps, in my brigade, came to me to state that his men were physically incapable of performing some detached duty for which they were detailed, as they were exhausted from hunger; that they had not had a morsel of food for two days, and (as you well know natives will not touch any which is not prepared by themselves,) all their cooking utensils and food were in the rear. I saw Lord Gough about a quarter of a mile distant on an elephant, with the Adjutant-General, Sir W. Lumley, in the same howdah.

I accordingly went to him and mentioned the subject. Lord Gough saw and felt I regretted it. Sir William replied, "Oh, it is an emergency, and such things must occasionally be tolerated!" Here it ended.

I afterwards had an opportunity of speaking to Lord Gough on the subject of the Baggage, and pointing out to him how it

retarded our advance; that on our flanks and on our rear the ground was darkened by camels, so much so, that being in an open champaign country, an enemy with an enterprising cavalry, might have dashed through and cut them to pieces, for we had not room even to form.

General Churchill, who was killed, had carried all he had in the world,—horses and all, dinner and cooking apparatus for eighteen persons, and others in proportion. The 39th carried each his own plate and knife and fork, and a few cooking utensils, and as small tents as possible. I had a subaltern's tent; *you*, I am told, had what in Bengal is called a hill tent.

I particularly brought to Lord Gough's notice this inordinate quantity of Baggage, but whether it was afterwards remedied on the Sutlej I know not, as I was then in orders for Dinapore to return with my regiment to England.

I am quite certain, should the fortune of war ever place my corps under your command, that I shall have as much pleasure as I should have pride in serving under you.

Pray pardon my officiousness in corroborating your views and arguments, and believe that I ever have the honour to be,

Dear sir,

Faithfully and sincerely yours,

T. WRIGHT,
39th Regt.

Sir Charles Napier, &c.

THE END.

LONDON:
BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.

REFUTATION OF CHARGES

AFFECTING THE

QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT AT BOMBAY

CONTAINED IN A POSTHUMOUS WORK

BY THE LATE

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR CHARLES J. NAPIER,

ENTITLED

"INDIAN MISGOVERNMENT."

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL HOLLAND,

QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL.

(PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION ONLY.)

LONDON:

SMITH, ELDER, & CO., 65, CORNHILL.

BOMBAY: SMITH, TAYLOR, & CO.

1855.

REFUTATION OF CHARGES

AFFECTING THE

Quarter-Master-General's Department,

AT BOMBAY.

INTRODUCTORY CORRESPONDENCE.

His Excellency The Right Honourable Lord F. FITZ-CLARENCE, G.C.H., *Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

MAHABLESHWUR, 6th May, 1854.

MY LORD,

Sometime in December of last year I brought under your Lordship's notice a serious imputation on my character, contained in a posthumous work by Lieutenant-General Sir C. Napier; and I then intimated my intention, with your permission, to submit to your Lordship, and through you to Government, as my legitimate judges, my reply to this attack, and not to notice in any other manner these or other remarks on the same subject; and to this course your Lordship was pleased to express your approval.

The difficulty, owing to the long period that has elapsed since the date of the matters referred to by Sir C. Napier, of collecting accurate information on

some of the points, has caused a delay I much regret. I now, however, beg to lay my reply before your Lordship, and to solicit the favor of your submitting it to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council; and to express a hope that it will be considered sufficient in your Lordship's opinion, and in that of Government, to relieve me from the serious imputations contained in Sir C. Napier's work.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) J. HOLLAND, *Lieut.-Col.*
Quarter-Master-General.

To the Right Honourable the Lord ELPHINSTONE, G.C.H., *&c.*

MY LORD, POONA, 27th August, 1854.

I do myself the honor of forwarding to your Lordship in Council, a statement I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, the Quarter-Master-General of the Army of this Presidency, relative to some remarks made by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Napier, in a recent publication on the subject of India. Knowing as I do the high and honourable sentiments of Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, and having perused the papers, which I consider most fully and completely to exonerate him from any implication which may appear in the above work; and from his being immediately under my command, I conceive it my duty to forward his statement, which I trust will be as satisfactory to your Lordship as it is to me; and to

beg you will have the goodness to forward it, as requested, by Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, to the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

(Signed) FREDERICK FITZCLARENCE.

Military Department.—No. 3338.

To the Military Secretary to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

BOMBAY CASTLE, 24th October, 1854.

SIR,

I am directed to acknowledge your letter, dated the 25th September last, transmitting a communication from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and to state, for his Lordship's information, that the statement prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, in reply to remarks affecting the Quarter-Master-General's Department, contained in a posthumous work by Lieutenant-General Sir C. J. Napier, will be transmitted to the Honourable Court and to the Government of India, with the concurrence of this Government in the opinion of his Lordship, that Lieutenant-Colonel Holland's exculpation is complete.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. MAUGHAN, *Lieut.-Col.*

Secretary to Government.

To Lieutenant-Colonel H. HOLLAND, *Quarter-Master-General, Poona.*

HEAD QUARTERS, POONA,

SIR, 9th December, 1854.

I have the honor, by desire of the Commander of the Forces, to forward the accompanying copy of a letter from Colonel Maughan, together with one from the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 550, dated the 18th ultimo, for your information.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

H. G. E. SOMERSET,

Lieutenant and Military Secretary.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT, No. 3831.

To the Military Secretary to the Commander of the Forces.

BOMBAY CASTLE, 8th December, 1854.

SIR,

With reference to your predecessor's letter, dated the 25th September last, transmitting a communication from His Excellency the late Commander-in-Chief, with a statement prepared by Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, in reply to remarks affecting the Quarter-Quarter-Master-General's department, contained in a posthumous work by Lieutenant-General Sir C. Napier, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to communicate for the information of the

Commander of the Forces, the accompanying copy of a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India, No. 550, dated 18th ultimo.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed) J. MAUGHAN, *Lieut.-Col.*
Secretary to Government.

No. 550 of 1854.

To the Secretary to Government, Military Department, Bombay.

COUNCIL CHAMBER, FORT WILLIAM,
SIR, 18th November, 1854.

Having laid before Government your letter, No. 3337, of the 24th October, 1854, submitting copy of a statement made by Lieutenant-Colonel Holland, Quarter-Master-General, Bombay Army, in reply to remarks affecting the Quarter-Master-General's Department at Bombay, contained in a posthumous work by Lieutenant-General Sir C. Napier, entitled "Indian Misgovernment," I am desired to state that the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, in Council, entirely concurs with the Bombay Government and with his Excellency the late Lord Frederick Fitz-Clarence, Commander-in-Chief, in considering Lieutenant-Colonel Holland's vindication of himself to be complete.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. J. H. BIRCH, *Col.*
Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department.

To Major-General Sir H. SOMERSET, K.C.B. & K.H.,
Commander of the Forces.

SIR, POONA, 20th December, 1854.

I have had the honor to receive from your Military Secretary, copy of Government letter dated 8th instant, No. 3831, with its accompaniment from the Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, No. 550, concurring with the Bombay Government, and with his Excellency the late Lord F. Fitz-Clarence, Commander-in-Chief, in considering my vindication in reference to remarks affecting my department, in a posthumous work by the late Sir C. Napier, to be complete.

While expressing my satisfaction at this result, I request you to have the goodness to apply for the permission of Government to print, at my own cost, and circulate the memorandum and its appendices, and the other public correspondence connected therewith.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) J. HOLLAND, *Lieut.-Col.*
Quarter-Master-General.

Military Department.—No. 4105.

To Major-General Sir H. SOMERSET, K.C.B. & K.H.,
Commander of the Forces.

SIR, BOMBAY CASTLE, 23rd Dec. 1854.

I am directed to acknowledge your Letter, dated the 21st instant, with its accompanying application

from Colonel Holland, and in reply to acquaint you that his Lordship in Council has no objection to the course proposed by that Officer.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

J. MAUGHAN, *Lieut.-Col.*

Secretary to Government.

To Major-General Sir H. SOMERSET, K.C.B. &c.

POONA, 23rd December, 1854.

Sir,

Having applied for the permission of Government to print the documents connected with the vindication of my character from a charge of official corruption contained in Sir C. Napier's posthumous work, based on my endeavours to supersede the use of country boats in the transport of troops, European and Native, to and from Sinde, by the employment of private steamers; and as you commanded the troops in Sinde for two years, and are practically and intimately acquainted with the advantages, or otherwise, of both modes of conveyance, I hope you will do me the kindness to state and allow me to quote your opinion on the subject, as it would necessarily carry great weight, and may be of use in quarters where the facts and circumstances are unknown.

I have the honor, &c.

(Signed) J. HOLLAND, *Lieut-Col.*

Quarter-Master-General.

To Lieutenant-Colonel HOLLAND, *Quarter-Master-General of the Army.*

POONA, 26th December, 1854.

SIR,

In reply to your letter of the 23rd instant, requesting my opinion as to the advantage of conveying troops by the private steamers from Scinde, in preference to employing country boats, I have the honor to state that I am decidedly of opinion that the steamers are in every way preferable to the country boats—the latter being the most uncertain as well as the most uncomfortable and unfit vessels for troops that could be selected. The little inconvenience, if any, that may be experienced by troops on board the small steamers, is greatly counterbalanced by the certainty of making the passage within a prescribed time.

I am myself entirely opposed to dispatching any troops whatever in the country boats, and have never sanctioned it from Scinde, when steamers could be procured; the experience of the last two years has shown how highly objectionable it has been to send troops by that mode of conveyance, from the delay that has occurred in making their passages to and from Kurrachee, during which time the troops were exposed to and suffered the greatest discomfort and inconvenience.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

H. SOMERSET, *Maj.-Gen.*

Commander of the Forces, Bombay.

REFUTATION OF CHARGES,

&c. &c.

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1. The following extract is from a posthumous work by the late Sir CHARLES J. NAPIER, entitled "*Indian Misgovernment.*"

"'Indus' has dealt only with direct unscrupulous "bribery; but there are various ways in which money "may be officially obtained. The following papers "came to my hand in a private—not a secret mode— "and broadly they show what manner of men the "Sinde Quarter-Master-General, Major McMurdo, "and myself, had to deal with at Bombay, in defence "of the public interest. The transaction took place "a few weeks after my departure.

"'BOMBAY, 15th November, 1847.

"'*I have been desired* to write to Colonel Dundas, "'as you will of course see that *the Government are* "'*desirous* of using the private steamers for troops, in "'preference to country vessels, even if the charge "'should be higher. They are now only commencing, "'and will have more steamers out soon, when I hope "'we shall be able to dispense altogether with the "'clumsy beastly country boats. I hope you will lend "'your aid as far as possible; and in case you have "'not *concluded* a contract for boats for the 18th regi-

"' ment, see if you can send them down by two com-
"' panies at a time on the private steamers, and the
"' same with the 7th Native Infantry. I do not expect
"' the aid of another of the large steamers for some
"' time to come, if at all; and the letter I have sent to
"' Colonel D. will warrant your acting as I propose.

"' (Signed) J. HOLLAND.'

"The expression "*I have been desired*," gives this "letter a demi-official character; and as the writer is "the Bombay Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, it must "be taken as coming from the head of that office. "*The "Government are desirous*," is another plain indication "of the original source of the transaction. Now, at that "time Willoughby and Reid, whom *Indus* has made "such prominent characters, where Members of Coun-"cil, and chiefly directed the Government of Bombay; "and here we find that Government, through the "Quarter-Master-General's Department, striving to "force Colonel Dundas, now Lord Melville, the Com-"mander at Kurrachee, and Major McMurdo, his "Quarter-Master-General, to ship the troops in *private "steamers*, and break off their transmission by native "boats between Kurrachee and Bombay.

"The stern official answer follows:—

"KURRACHEE, 23rd November, 1847.

"I am directed by the Officer Commanding in "Sinde and Kutch to acknowledge the receipt of "your letter, No. 1849, of the 13th instant, relative "to the transport of troops on board the vessels of "the Steam Navigation Company; and to state that "however expedient and desirable it may be that

" these vessels should be used in the transport of " parties of troops occasionally to and from Sinde, " and especially of Europeans, Colonel Dundas con- " siders that in despatching any considerable body of " native troops from Sinde, the employment of country " craft is more expedient in point of time and expense, " for the following reasons, viz:—

" 1st. As regards time: A Native regiment can " embark in boats at Kurrachee and reach Bombay " in from four to five days, when the whole regiment " may land effective; whereas by adopting the trans- " port by the Steam Navigation Company's steamers, " not more than two companies could embark together, " which would occupy a period of five weeks in the " transport of one regiment to Bombay.

" 2nd. As regards expense: The 18th Native Infan- " try, now under orders to Bombay, may be taken as " an instance. The tonnage for boats, required for this " corps, will amount probably to 3545 candies, which " at ten annas a candy, will cost 2215 rupees; whereas " in sending the regiment, as proposed, the cost would " be as follows:—

" 7 European Officers, at 107 rupees each	749
" 892 Native Officers and non-com- " missioned rank and file, at eight " rupees each.	7136
" 75 public followers at eight rupees each	600
" 165 wives at eight rupees each . . .	1320
" 155 children at four rupees each . . .	620
" 3 horses at twenty-five rupees each . .	75
" The N. Infantry would cost rupees . .	10500

" Under these circumstances, I am desired to say " the contract for the supply of boats for the convey- " ance of the 18th and 7th regiments, will not be " relinquished."

" (Signed) M. McMURDO, &c."

" This attempt to have troops transmitted by a " *private company*, with great loss of money, greater " loss of time, and other public injuries, without a " single counteracting advantage, is a proof either of " gross ignorance, or reckless disregard of the public " good. But Messrs. Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, and " Holland, have spent their lives in their respective " departments, and such a degree of ignorance is in- " credible even in them. Yet a motive there must be. " Why were those gentlemen so zealous for a private " company's emoluments, to the great injury and loss " of the public? The answer involves another ques- " tion. Were Messrs. Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, " and Holland, *all large holders of Shares in that private* " *Company?*"

2. The extract above given contains a direct charge of official corruption against Messrs. Reid and Willoughby, late members of the Government of Bombay; against Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, late Quarter-Master-General of the Army of that Presidency; and against Major Holland, then the Deputy, but who has since succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, at the head of the office.

3. The charge against these four gentlemen, briefly stated, is that they abused the official power with which they were invested, in the endeavour to benefit a private Company in which they were "all" large holders of Shares.

4. Whether any such abuse was committed or attempted, it is the purpose of this memorandum to show; but that Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell *could* have been actuated by the motives assigned by Sir C. Napier is simply impossible, as he was not and never had been a Shareholder in the Company in question; and although it cannot affect the real question, which is whether steamers were employed and encouraged on grounds purely public, and for good and sufficient reasons, it may be as well to add that Major Holland's interest in the Company consisted of fifteen Shares, costing £50 each.*

5. At the time of which Sir C. Napier has written, Sir George Clerk was the Governor, and Sir Willoughby Cotton the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Bombay. It is well to note this; because with those eminent men at the head of it, it is another misstatement to assert that Messrs. Reid and Willoughby "chiefly directed the Government of Bombay;" and it is well known that Sir George Clerk personally took a great interest in the introduction of private steamers as means of transport, as indeed he did in every measure likely to benefit either the troops or the country generally, under his charge.

6. In the first place it is necessary to explain the circumstances under which the sanction of the Bombay Government was given to the transport of troops by private steamers.

7. The extreme unsuitability of country craft for

---

* Since completing this paper I have been informed by a friend that he has ascertained that Messrs. Reid and Willoughby never held more than thirty Shares each in the steam Navigation Company.

the transport of troops had long been subject matter of complaint from all quarters; and public steamers, when available, had been consequently very generally employed. The demand for the Government steamers on other service had frequently, however, been so great as to render the employment of country craft to a certain extent unavoidable, while as yet the only steamers entering Bombay harbour were those belonging to the state.

8. During the Monsoon of 1847, the annual relief of troops to take place in the ensuing cold season was, as usual, determined upon, the Commander-in-Chief being at that time in the Deccan; and the arrangements were made under the expectation that public steamers would be available, for the relief of the regiments to be sent to Sinde and of those relieved from duty in that province.

9. On the 26th October 1847, or within a few days only of the commencement of the reliefs, the Military-Secretary to Government informed the Quarter-Master-General of the Army that the Indian Naval Authorities saw little or no prospect of being able to comply with the Commander-in-Chief's requisitions for steamers.

10. Meanwhile, however, to ensure tonnage of some sort being in readiness, in the event of no public steamers being at the last moment available, tenders for a supply of country craft had been invited by the Commissary-General; whose Deputy, on the sixth of the month, (October) had addressed the Quarter-Master-General, No. 3,236, in the following terms:

" Having submitted for the sanction of the Military " Board, the tenders received by this department, for " the supply of tonnage in country craft, for the

" approaching relief of the troops, that body has " suggested that a reference may be made, (if time " will permit) to the proprietors of the private steam- " ers, to ascertain if these steamers can be obtained to " perform the required service, and if so, upon what " terms; and therefore, while carrying out the instruc- " tions of the Board, I beg, in the absence of the " Commissary-General, the favor of your submitting " my request to his Excellency the Commander-in- " Chief, to be informed, whether in the event of private " steamers being tendered for the conveyance of troops " from Bombay to the northward *and back*, it can be " accepted with reference to the previous arrange- " ments, communicated by your department, connected " with the relief of the troops in question."

11. The question submitted by the Deputy-Commissary-General was referred for the orders of Government, with the following letter, No. 414, of the 11th October, from the Quarter-Master-General.

" In continuation of my immediate letter, No. 391, " of the 30th ultimo, with accompaniments, I am " directed by the Commander-in-Chief to transmit, for " the purpose of being laid being the " Honourable the Governor in Coun- " cil, the annexed letter, dated the " 6th instant, No. 3,236, from the " Deputy-Commmissary-General, and " request to be informed whether the Commissariat " Department may have authority to make the arrange- " ments therein proposed for the conveyance of troops " to Sinde, during the approaching reliefs, provided " the Indian Naval Department is unable to supply

" On the subject of " Government Steam- " ers required for the " transport of troops " to and from Sinde, " during the ensuing " reliefs.

" steamers to the extent required in my communica-
" tion above referred to. His Excellency solicits to
" be favoured with an early reply on the subject."

12. Government called for the report of the Military Board, who with their letter, No. 2900, of the 23rd October 1847, submitted a comparative Statement, affording the results shewn below.

COST OF TONNAGE.

	By country craft at existing contract rate to Kurrachee @ Rs. 1 12 ₹ Candy.	By private steamer to Kurrachee.
Captain	Rs. 52 8 0	Rs. 48 0 0
Native officer . .	12 4 0	10 0 0
European soldier .	8 12 0	8 0 0
Native do. . .	5 4 0	8 0 0
European women .	7 0 0	7 0 0
Native do. .	3 8 0	7 0 0
Followers	3 8 0	7 0 0
	92 12 0	95 0 0

In submitting this statement, the Military Board observed:

"The expense to Government on account of
" European and Native commissioned officers and
" European non-commissioned rank and file, if con-
" veyed by the Steam Navigation Company, would
" be less than if they were taken up in country craft,
" at the rates tendered by Calliandass Sewjee; whilst,
" on the other hand, the expense for Sepoys, followers,
" and native women, would be more by steamers than
" by the country boats. In this statement *the differ-*

" *ence of time occupied on the voyage, and the conse-*
" *quent saving of provisions for Native Troops, has not*
" *been taken into account.*"

13. The comparative statement also shewed that in the event of tonnage not being procurable at Kurrachee for the conveyance of troops thence to Bombay, and of its being necessary to furnish country craft for the purpose *from Bombay*, the expense of doing so would amount for one of each of the grades above specified, to rupees one hundred and thirty nine and annas two (139 2 0), while the cost by private steamers would be no more than in the other case (from Bombay to Kurrachee) rupees ninety-five (95 0 0).

14. The Government decision was conveyed to the Military Board in the following letter from their Military Secretary, of the 12th November, 1847.

"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your
" letters, Nos. 2900 and 2939, dated 23rd and 28th
" ultimo, with their accompaniments, and to inform
" you that if His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief
" is of opinion that advantage should be taken of the
" private steamers for the conveyance of parties of
" troops occasionally, the Honourable the Governor in
" Council will offer no objection, even though the
" rates may be higher than charges incurred by the
" employment of country craft.

"Copies of your report and of this reply will be
" transmitted for the information of His Excellency.
" In the mean time you will be pleased to communicate
" with the Steam Navigation Company, and endeavour
" to establish more favorable rates, together with a

" clear understanding of the space to be allowed for " each individual soldier or follower, with the tonnage " for baggage, &c."

15. The orders which had been issued by the Government were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief in the following letter, No. 4616, of the same date (the 12th November,) from their Military Secretary to the Quarter-Master-General of the Army.

" With reference to my letter, No. 4343, dated the " 26th ultimo, I am directed to transmit, for the infor- " mation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, " the accompanying copies of a letter from the Mili- " tary Board, No. 2900, dated 23rd idem, and its enclo- " sures, and my reply thereto of this date, regarding " the conveyance of troops to Sinde by private " steamers."

16. The communication referred to in the last paragraph passed, as usual, through the Presidency Office, in charge of the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, Major Holland; who, being aware of the views of the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject of the use of steamers in preference to country craft, at once carried into effect the sanction accorded by the Government, by addressing the following letter, No. 1849, of the 13th November, to the officer commanding in Sinde, Colonel the Honourable H. Dundas:—

" I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to " acquaint you that Government is of opinion that " advantage should be taken of the private steamers, " for the conveyance of parties of troops occasionally " to and from Sinde, although the rates may be higher

" than the charges incurred by the employment of " country craft; and His Excellency requests, therefore, " that in despatching troops and details from Sinde " you will have the goodness to act on this principle."

17. Two days later the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, who had been on terms of free and constant private or demi-official intercourse on all public matters with Captain McMurdo the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Sinde, wrote, as explained in the 21st paragraph, to that officer the demi-official letter published by Sir C. Napier; who, however, thought fit neither to publish nor even to allude to the existence of the *official* order conveyed by Major Holland, (the letter No. 1849, of the 13th November, just given) *to which*, and *not* to Major Holland's demi-official or private communication, Captain McMurdo's published letter was " the stern official answer."

18. To account for the communication of this order by the *Deputy*-Quarter-Master-General at the Presidency, it must be explained that the Commander-in-Chief had, with his staff, including the Quarter-Master-General, left Poona on a tour of inspection on the 7th November; and the latter had, as a matter of necessity, ceased to superintend and control the reliefs, everything connected with which had been placed by him in the hands of the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General. Shortly before quitting Poona he had informed Major Holland, " you will understand now " that the reliefs are all in your hands until we return " from this tour."

19. Under the above arrangement, copies of all Major Holland's letters were, according to custom, sent to head quarters, for information and further orders,

if required; and an unreserved correspondence on all public matters was kept up by that officer with his official superior the Quarter-Master-General, who, a few days after the date of the above note, thus expressed himself in another demi-official communication: "You see what Melvill (the Military Secretary "to Government) says about the private steamers, "which is satisfactory, and may eventually render us "very independent of the Commissariat," (viz. as regards the provision of country boats for troops.)

20. The Commander-in-Chief was prompt in his acknowledgment of the Government sanction of the 12th November, No. 4616, (see paragraph 15) upon which the Deputy-Quarter-Master-General had acted; and the following reply was conveyed to the Government in the Quarter-Master-General's letter, No. 552, dated the 15th November, 1847, from the Commander-in-Chief.

"I have had the honor to receive and submit to "the Commander-in-Chief your communication, dated "the 12th instant, No. 4616, forwarding copies of a "letter from the Military Board, and its enclosure, "and your reply thereto, regarding the conveyance of "troops to Sinde by private steamers.

"In reply, I am directed to request you will have "the goodness to inform the Honourable the Governor "in Council that his Excellency begs to tender his "warmest thanks for the prompt and liberal manner "in which his Honour in Council have met the Com-"mander-in-Chief's wishes in respect to the employ-"ment of private steamers for the conveyance of troops, "should no Government vessel be available."

21. The desire of the Bombay Government to encourage private enterprise having for its object steam communication from port to port of Western India, has already been adverted to; and in this spirit it was that Major Holland was demi-officially addressed on the 13th November, 1847, by the Senior Civil Member of the Bombay Council, Mr. Reid—the Governor, Sir G. Clerk, being then absent from the Presidency.

"How is it that you cannot avail yourself of the "private steamers in the conveyance of the different "corps to their destination? Both the Governor and "Commander-in-Chief have written to me on the sub-"ject, and I can give them no reason why an attempt "was not made to adopt this ready and effective mode "of carrying out the reliefs. I fancy it is now too late "to do anything in the matter."

22. It was not, however, too late to make an *attempt* to carry out the wishes of all the highest authorities thus strongly expressed, but which had only then been *officially* communicated; and Major Holland, therefore, added to his official letter of the 13th November the demi-official communication of the 15th of the same month; which, after a period of *six years*, has now been published to prove (it is said) official corruption, which surely, if believed, ought to have been long ago exposed, and its alleged perpetrators then and there arraigned.

23. Before addressing Captain Mc Murdo, Major Holland had been in communication with the Chairman of the Steam Navigation Company, and had been informed by him that the charge for native soldiers was to be reduced from eight to seven rupees per man,

(Appendix A), which arrangement was formally carried into effect on the 20th of November, five days later, in a letter from the Secretary of the Company to the Deputy-Commissary-General; he added that *two* steamers could, if a double trip could be promised, be employed for the conveyance of the Sinde troops, these two steamers being together capable of transporting about *five hundred* persons; that a fourth steamer was on its way out, or expected from England; and that, as traffic increased, more vessels would be added, and rates still further reduced.

24. But it yet remains to be stated that Major Holland, when he thus requested Captain Mc Murdo to make use of steamers "*if possible*," had before him that officer's own official report, dated the 3rd November 1847, in which it was stated, that the 18th regiment was to be halted at Garra, (near Kurrachee) in consequence of small pox having broken out, "*till* " the transport *directed to be ready* for its conveyance " to Bombay, *is ready*, when the regiment will be " marched direct to the Bunder, and embark." There was, therefore, reason to believe that tonnage had yet to be prepared; and it could only be supposed that the employment of the steamers would expedite rather than retard the arrival of the regiment in Bombay, especially as the difficulty and uncertainty of procuring boat transport at Kurrachee, unless on long notice, had been matter of notoriety; and that after a detention at Garra of nearly a month, boats were not *even then* readily procurable, will be seen from the following extract from instructions* addressed

* Dated the 30th November, 1847, No. 1073.

to the officer commanding the 18th regiment, by the Assistant Quarter-Master-General in Sinde. "Regarding the 18th Native Infantry, it was recommended by "the senior medical officer in Kurrachee, in reply to a "report of the Assistant-Surgeon of that corps, that "at least twenty-one days must elapse from the date "of the last case in the regiment, before it ought to be "embarked; that period will elapse on the fifth proximo; but, as ten* days' notice are required by the "contractor for boats before the date of embarkation "is fixed, the regiment will leave Garra on the 8th, "reach this on the 10th, and embark on the following "day, with the exception of the infected, who are to "be left behind at Garra." And it may be added that 53 seapoys and followers of this very regiment, the 18th, were actually provided with passage from Sinde to Bombay, *by private steamer;* and, with the exception of a few of them who missed their passage, arrived there on the same day that the head-quarters reached it by boat; thus further shewing the want of sufficient boat tonnage at Kurrachee, for the entire regiment.

25. With regard to the other regiment, (the 7th) it is necessary to supply a fact omitted in the publication, viz.: that it came down the Indus, *not entire*, but in two separate divisions, six weeks after the 18th regiment; and the effective portion of each of these divisions could, therefore, under the arrangement contemplated, have embarked without delay on board the two steamers, which could have been in readiness to receive them.

* The time stipulated in the contract, dated the 28th November, 1847, and referred to in the next paragraph but one, is fifteen days.

26. Further, the heavy expense liable to be incurred in Sinde on account of demurrage, owing to unexpected delay in movements already ordered, should be borne in mind. In Bombay, where the contractor was bound to furnish tonnage *on requisition*, demurrage was not payable for *fifteen* days (excluding Sundays,) after the date of survey; at Kurrachee it was payable *three* days after survey, although the contractor was entitled to **fifteen* days' notice, to enable him to procure it. This difference, however great, was doubtless unavoidable, in regard to the time allowed to the contractor at Kurrachee; where, being a place of little trade, very frequently boats could not be procured at all.

27. These considerations, as well as those that follow, refer chiefly to the introduction generally of private steamers in supercession of country boats for the transport of troops, as adverted to in Major Holland's demi-official note. As regards the particular case of the 18th regiment, he was at the time necessarily unaware of many circumstances connected with its movements; he knew not whether contracts had been entered into for boats, and whether boats were procurable; or if so, at what rate; and he therefore limited his suggestion to aid in the proposed new system on this occasion, "*as far as possible*,"—that is (according to the understanding of any person of common intelligence, not predetermined to see dishonesty in every proposition he might not approve of, or fully comprehend,) *as far as was reasonable and proper* under the actual circumstances of the time and place.

* As per contract, dated the 20th November, 1847.

28. The correspondence had been forwarded, as usual, to the Quarter-Master-General, whose acknowledgment of its receipt conveyed the following satisfactory intimation to his deputy:

"The Chief is perfectly satisfied and indeed pleased "with the arrangements you have made, and desires "you will continue so to act without reference."

29. Sir Charles Napier has left the public to infer that Captain McMurdo's "stern official answer" closed the transaction, and left its guilty authors in confusion; it was at once, however, submitted by the Commander-in-Chief for the information and orders of the Government, with the following letter from the Quarter-Master-General, No. 584, dated the 2nd December 1847, from the Commander-in-Chief's camp:

"With reference to your communications dated the "26th of October and 12th of November last, No. "4343 and 4616, sanctioning the employment of pri-"vate steamers in the conveyance of details to and "from Kurrachee, I am directed by his Excellency the "Commander-in-Chief to transmit, for the purpose of "being laid before the Honourable the Governor in "Council, the annexed letter, without date, No. 1045, "from the Assistant Quarter-Master-General, Sinde "Division, containing objections, for the reasons stated "on the part of Colonel Dundas, the officer command-"ing the division, in sending considerable bodies of "Native troops by private steamers, in the case speci-"fied, and the employment of country craft for their "transport to India."

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*Lieutenant General Sir Willoughby Cotton.

"His Excellency, however, desires me to add, that "to the extent contemplated by Government, and "whenever the services of these private steamers can "be had, he considers that to the amount of their "accommodation they should always be preferred."

30. The Military Secretary conveyed the orders of Government in the following letter, No. 5067, dated the 14th December, 1847:

"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your "letter, No. 584, dated 2nd Instant, with its enclosure, "and in reply to state, for the information of his Excel- "lency the Commander-in-chief, that the Honourable "the Governor in Council never contemplated the "exclusive use of private steamers for the conveyance "of troops, but only the occasional use of this mode of "conveyance, when the convenience of the service and "comfort of the troops may be thereby promoted.

"Such being the general principle laid down, and it "being also clearly understood that the Government is "willing and desirous to encourage the navigation of "private steamers from port to port in India, the "Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to "leave to the direction of His Excellency the choice "of accommodation to be provided in such vessels or "in country craft, on all occasions of the movement of "troops."

31. The decision of the Government, which has been set forth in the last paragraph, was communicated to Colonel Dundas in the Quarter-Master-General's letter, No. 2710, dated the 20th December 1847.

32. Such are the recorded facts of the case, which Sir Charles Napier's work so greatly misrepresents.

The full extent, however to which the calumniated parties have a right to complain has yet to be shewn; and for this purpose it is necessary, firstly, to explain *correctly* and minutely the cost, both then and subsequently, of private steamers as compared with that of country craft.

33. That seven, and not eight, rupees per man was the actual rate which would have been paid for the Native soldiers, has already been explained;* although this reduction was not known in Sinde at the time Captain Mc Murdo wrote, (Appendix B.); but a further deduction has to be made in the charge for European officers, which Captain McMurdo erroneously set down at rupees 107, the correct sum being 48 rupees;† the rate for females and public followers was in like manner incorrectly shewn by him as eight instead of seven, and that for children as four instead of three and a half rupees.

These corrections, therefore, reduce the amount shewn by Captain McMurdo as follows:

				Rs.		
For 7	European officers deduct	Rupees 59	each	413	0	0
„ 892	Native officers and men .	„ 1	„	892	0	0
„ 75	public followers . . .	„ „	„	75	0	0
„ 165	females	„ „	„	165	0	0
„ 155	children	„ 8 ans.	„	77	8	0
				1622	8	0

34. The next correction to be made is on account of the saving in the item of provisions, which were

* Paragraph 23.

† See paragraph 12. Rs. 107 is the sum which Government issued to an officer on duty without troops, finding his own passage from Sinde to Bombay. Rs. 48 is the amount *paid by Government* for the passage of an officer on a steamer when accompanied by troops.

supplied gratis by Government, to troops proceeding by sea between Bombay and Sinde; and the cost for which varied of course with the length of the voyage. The official tables, furnished by the Master Attendant, and which are the authority on which all transport arrangements are made in the Quarter-Master-General's office, show the usual passage by boat from Sinde (Appendix C.) in November to be from six to ten (or average eight) days' duration; the voyage *to* Sinde averaging twenty days, (Appendix D.) while on the other hand the actual passages made by the private steamers, as shown by their logs *to and from* Kurrachee, (Appendix E.) have averaged during a whole season a trifle exceeding *three* days.*

35. The following statement, compiled from the actual cost of provisions in November, 1847, (Appendix F.) as supplied by the Commissariat Department in Bombay, shows the expense of provisioning the 18th regiment Native Infantry, to be 155 rupees per diem.

	R.	A.	P.
120 fighting men cooking, at 1/7¾ each per diem.	12	5	6½
772 ditto. not cooking, at 2/8½ ditto.	130	10	10
59 public followers ditto, at 2/0½ ditto.	7	8	5½
16 ditto. cooking, at 1/2¼ ditto.	1	2	8
Wood and water to 165 women and 155 children.	3	6	3
	†155	1	9

	dys.	hrs.
* To Kurrachee	3	6
From ditto	2	23½

† The actual numbers provisioned were 884 fighting men and 52 public followers, 119 of the former and 41 of the latter of the cooking castes, the remainder of the not cooking. The numbers shown in Captain Mc Murdo's letter have been taken however with the same proportions of castes, in order to shew correctly the cost, as based on his statement of numbers.

Five times this amount, or rupees 775, is the average saving on board the steamers in the item of provisions alone for the *downward* voyage in November. It may here be incidentally mentioned that the 18th regiment was provisioned in Sinde for only six days, but was actually seven on the voyage; and the Commanding Officer reported the distress of the men in consequence, on arrival in Bombay Harbour; and it may be further added that, experience having shown the necessity of the measure, all boats proceeding with troops from Sinde to Bombay are, and have for some years past been, provisioned for *twelve* days.

36. To obtain a correct estimate, however, it is obviously necessary to take into calculation the passage *to* as well as that from Kurrachee; because, although the steamer rates were the same both ways, it was very different with regard to country boats, the average passage of which is shown by the Master Attendant's official table to occupy twenty days; while the rate per candy (see paragraph 12) was 1 rupee, 12 annas.

37. The following then is a complete statement of the actual expense in November 1847, of each mode of transport:

Per Steamer.	Rupees		
Amount of Captain McMurdo's estimate . .	10500	0	0
Deduct, as explained in paragraph 33 . . .	1622	8	0
	8877	8	0
Add provisions for 3 days at Rs. 155 per day .	465	0	0
Cost of a steamer either way	9342	8	0

PER COUNTRY BOATS.

Amount of Captain Mc Murdo's estimate from Kurrachee to Bombay, being 3545 candies, at 10 annas per candy	2215	10	0
Ditto. from Bombay to Kurrachee, at 1 rupee 12 annas per candy	6203	12	0
Provisions for 28 days on both voyages, at rupees 155 per diem	4340	0	0
Expense of both voyages	12759	0	0
Average	6379	11	0
Difference in favor of boats	2962	13	0

38. Such then was the expense of steamers as compared with that of country boats, at the time which Sir C. Napier has selected, and at the *Kurrachee* tonnage rates *then* obtainable; but these rates were exceptional, *twelve* annas per candy being the average rate which has prevailed since Sinde became a British Province. The records, however, show the rates to have been as high as a rupee; and the last commissariat contract (from February 1850, to 31st October 1852,) was at the rate of 12 annas 7 pies, per candy (Appendix G.); while it must be remembered that it was always difficult, frequently impossible, without long notice, to procure a sufficiency of boats *at any rates;* as will be hereafter more fully explained.

39. Substituting for ten the Sinde *average* rate of twelve annas, the tonnage from Kurrachee would cost rupees 2658 12 annas, instead of rupees 2215 10 annas, as shewn in the 36th paragraph; so that the average expense of boats therein shewn at rupees 6379 11 annas, would be increased by rupees 221 9 annas; and would amount to rupees 6601 4 annas,

leaving rupees 27,414 4 annas, as the probable *average* difference in favour of boats in 1847.

40. It has thus been shown that the *average* cost of transporting a regiment by private steamers exceeded that of transport by country boats by rupees 2741 4 annas, and *not* by rupees 8285, the difference between the estimates set forth by Captain McMurdo. But it is the further object of this memorandum to describe fully and fairly the effect of the arrangement which was proposed, in all its bearings and *as a whole*, and not only in the one isolated case selected by Sir C. Napier, for purposes of personal disparagement. It need scarcely be added that this general view of the question has been the one taken by the military authorities and by the Government, and the one which has guided their deliberations.

41. But even this difference existed only at the outset, and when the Government distinctly notified their desire to employ private steamers, not merely on the military grounds assigned by the Commander-in Chief, but in furtherance of an extended policy of encouraging, so far as practicable and proper, an enterprize which promised to be productive of much public benefit. The steamer rates have since been greatly reduced, as reported to Government by order of the Commander-in-Chief, on the 4th February 1853, in the Quarter-Master-General's letter, which is below transcribed:—

"The Bombay Steam Navigation Company have "tendered for the conveyance of troops between the "Presidency and Kurrachee, and *vice versa*, by the mail "steamers, at the rates shown in the annexed schedule,

" and the Commander-in-Chief instructs me to recom-
" mend the proposal for the sanction of the Right
" Honourable the Governor in Council, and that all
" troops and followers entitled to free passage be sent
" to and from Sinde by these vessels, when public
" steamers or transports are not available.

" Although the rate for passage per individual is a
" little higher by steamer than by boat, yet as the cost
" of *provisions* will be altogether saved on the former,*
" there will be actually a considerable saving by adopt-
" ing the proposed plan, as shown in the accompanying
" statement; while the saving of time and certainty
" of arrival will be of great value."

42. The Government reply, conveyed in the Military Secretary's letter, No. 720, of the 7th March, 1853, was as follows:—

" I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your
" letter, No. 397, dated 4th ultimo, and in reply to
" acquaint you, for the information of His Excellency
" the Commander-in-Chief, that the Right Honourable
" the Governor in Council, is pleased to authorize
" the acceptance of the tender of the Bombay Steam
" Navigation Company for the conveyance of troops
" to and from Kurrachee; but it must not be under-
" stood that under this arrangement the Government
" binds itself to send *all* troops requiring passage to
" and from Kurrachee, by the vessels of the Steam
" Navigation Company, when public steamers or

* It had been some time previously ordered by Government that troops proceeding on steamers should pay for their own provisions, whilst those by boat, in consequence of the uncertainty of the passage, should still be supplied gratis by Government.

" transports are not available. Such a stringent con-
" dition would be embarrassing, and is unnecessary
" as well as inexpedient."

43. At these reduced rates the expense of transporting the 18th regiment Native Infantry, or any other body of troops of the strength shown in Captain McMurdo's estimate, at the present day, would be as follows:—

	R.	a.	p.		R.	a.	p.
7 European officers at	48	0	0	each	336	0	0
16 Native officers	„ 10	0	0	„	160	0	0
876 rank and file -	„ 5	0	0	„	4380	0	0
75 public followers	„ 3	0	0	„	225	0	0
165 wives	„ 3	0	0	„	495	0	0
155 children	„ 1	8	0	„	232	8	0
3 horses	„ 20	0	0	„	60	0	0
					5888	8	0

44. the subjoined statement shows the present probable expense of steamers, as compared with that of country craft; a still further deduction having now to be made from the former, on account of provisions, which are *only* allowed to troops proceeding by *sailing boats;* while on the other hand, the cost of country boats from Bombay, and of provisions, is less than in 1847.

By Country Boats.

	R.	a.	p.
3545 Candies of boat tonnage at rupees 12 7 annas per candy, from Kurrachee, (see paragraph 38.)	2788	0	0
Ditto from Bombay at rupees 1 6 annas 9 pies per candy	5040	7	11
Carried forward	7828	7	11

				R.	a.	p.
Brought forward				7328	7	11
Provisions for twenty-eight days on both voyages at present rates, viz.—						
120 men cooking, at 1 anna 3¼ pies per diem	9	8	6			
772 men not cooking, at 2 annas 4 pies	144	9	4			
75 public followers, as before .	8	11	1½			
Wood and water to families do.	3	6	3			
	136	3	2½	3813	9	10
Total of two voyages . .				11,642	1	9
Average of one voyage . .				5,821	0	10½
By Steamer.						
Present rate as in para. 43 .				5888	8	0
Difference in favour of boats .				67	7	1½

45. So much for the question of expense. But the case is as yet incomplete; grave omissions have yet to be supplied, before a correct opinion can be formed as to the grounds upon which an officer holding Sir Charles Napier's position, has, on his death-bed, put forth to the world charges of so serious a nature.

46. It had long been known that fraud to a very considerable extent was practised by boat contractors; but the facilities offered were so great that it flourished in spite of the utmost endeavours of the Government and of their officers; and of this no one was better aware, as shall presently be shown, than Sir Charles Napier himself.

47. It will suffice for present purposes to afford one or two instances. In 1846, the attention of the Bombay Government having been directed to the matter,

a Committee of Survey was assembled to inspect certain craft, supposed to be incorrectly rated, and fraudulently tendered for the public service at a tonnage greater than the measurement.

The Committee reported that "a number of boats, "consisting of no picked selection but taken indis- "criminately on arrival in harbour, were handed "over to the Master-Attendant's Department, where "twenty-one of them have been re-measured, and their "actual and registered tonnage has been found to "correspond in *no one* instance.

"These boats belong to Bombay, Tanna, Broach, "Surat, and Amlee; and—with the exception of two "of them, whose tonnage, by re-measurement, has been "increased $1\frac{3}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ ton respectively—the decrease "in the actual, as compared with the registered ton- "nage of each of the remaining nineteen boats, varies "from $\frac{3}{4}$ ton up to 17, $24\frac{1}{4}$, $26\frac{3}{4}$ tons, and even as far "as $35\frac{1}{2}$ tons.* Of these twenty-one boats, twelve "have, during the last year, been employed by the "Commissariat Department, seven of these twelve "providing actual tonnage, and five being engaged "upon their registered burthen; in the case of these "last, the registered burthen being greater than the "actual tonnage of the boats, Government has been "overcharged the sum of rupees 412 10 11."

The inquiry resulted in the discovery "that out of "seventy boats selected indiscriminately, two alone "have their actual tonnage inserted in their registers; "a circumstance which gives somewhat less than three

* The native boats in use for the conveyance of troops are generally from about 40 to 100 tons burthen, or from 130 to 330 candies, but not averaging more than 180 candies, or 54 tons each.

" per cent as the proportion of small craft correctly " registered."

48. The next case is one brought to notice by Sir Charles Napier, in consequence of a report received from an officer of the Commissariat Department to the following effect:

" On my watering the boats at Mandavie for the " conveyance of the 16th Regiment N. I. to Bombay, " I discovered that the tonnage of each boat inserted " in the distribution returns of the regiment was from " 50 to 100 candies and upwards, according to the " size of the boats, more than the actual registered " tonnage.

" This I proved by comparing the register of the " boats signed by Captain Ross, Master-Attendant, " Bombay, and the distribution return of the regi- " ment, and can produce witnesses to prove its cor- " rectness."

49. This report Sir Charles Napier, then Governor of Sinde, forwarded with his Assistant Quarter-Master-General's letter of the 23rd February, 1847, in which the Commander-in-Chief was informed—

" Though His Excellency is unwilling to believe " that Mr. Hawse (the harbour master) has been led " into error, still the frauds so frequently practised by " the boat contractors are *so numerous and audacious* " that he begs to recommend these measures being " adopted."

50. Inquiry followed and resulted in the discovery that 672½ out of 8162½ candies of tonnage charged for (being the whole number of the boats employed

which could be procured for the survey)* had not been supplied; this however was probably but a mere fraction of the loss, for a very much larger number of boats had been employed.

51. In March 1851, on a complaint of the unseaworthiness of a boat by which a detachment of European troops had nearly lost their lives, the Assistant-Master-Attendant, who had surveyed the vessels supplied, stated his belief that "at times boats are secretly "substituted by the contractor for those surveyed by "the officers of this department."

In submitting this report to Govenrment, for the purpose of inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief stated—

"Complaints are not unfrequently made of boats "being dirty, ill-manned, and *much crowded*, by the "number of men allotted. There is, in the Commander-"in-Chief's opinion, a probability that this statement "is grounded in fact;" adding "a complaint of unsea-"worthiness of a boat, by which the lives of a detach-"ment were endangered, was reported to Government "on the 2nd instant. And in addition to the instance "now reported, Major James, commanding the 18th "Regiment, reported that cholera had broken out on "board two of the boats of his wing, which he attri-"buted to the dirty and *crowded* state of these boats."

52. It is not surprising that frauds to which Sir Charles Napier's administration failed to put a stop should still exist; and that they do so was noticed by the Assistant Quarter-Master-General in Sinde, in a

* Not including those referred to in the two last paragraphs, as they had been nearly all destroyed in a gale.

demi-official letter of the 23rd November 1850, in which he stated:

" Everything has gone well, excepting getting off " the 19th. The naval officer and myself, having our " suspicions of my friend the boat contractor, instituted " an inquiry, and found he had been tendering boats " for survey of a much smaller tonnage than he had " put down in the list."

53. Next, as regards the supply of tonnage usually procurable at Kurrachee. On the 4th May 1848, the Harbour Master at Kurrachee reported the uncertainty of the supply, and the consequent impracticability of laying down anything like a fixed scale of rates; which must vary, he observed, according to the demand and the amount of tonnage in the harbour. As an instance of this, be alluded to the rates from Kurrachee to Cambay, which varied from half a rupee to two rupees per candy.

54. The terms* upon which it was found necessary to accept contracts are equally illustrative on this point; and that matters are still little better, has been shewn by the reports and returns received since the Province has been placed under the direct control of the Bombay Government.

55. On the 2nd November, 1850, the Commissariat Officer in Sinde reported (No. 3273) as follows:—

" There is, I beg to observe, at Kurrachee a very " uncertain supply of country craft; and on all occa-

* Viz. 15 working days' notice, and demurrage at the rate of Rs. 4 per 100 candies per diem, for any delay beyond three days after survey.

" sions of heavy demands for tonnage, the boats must " be procured from Mandavie and Bombay; which " may lead in the present instance to great incon- " venience, from the uncertain period of their arrival."

56. On the same date, the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Sinde informed the head of his department, in a demi-official letter:—

" I have only time for a few lines to tell you of our " mishaps regarding boats for the 8th (Queen's.) A " fleet of boats left Mandavie on the 25th and 26th " ultimo, and only a few have reached Kurrachee; two " boats are known to have foundered, and the rest are " supposed to have been driven out to sea. I fear from " this that I shall not be able to get the head quarter " wing off by the 10*th instant;* and as for the left " wing, it must stop at Hydrabad till boats can be " reported ready; it is impossible to say now when " we can collect a sufficient number of boats."

57. On the 5th of the same month the same officer stated that the 19th regiment Native Infantry, then under orders for India, could not be embarked, owing to the want of boats; and must remain until the arrival of tonnage from Bombay, expected with other troops. On the 13th of the following month (December) another report was received, intimating the continued detention of the regiment.

58. On the 14th March, 1852, the same officer reported:—

" I am afraid there is only sufficient boats for a " wing of the 5th, but an embargo has been laid upon " *all boats* in the harbour. I think I shall be able to

" get the head quarter wing off in six or seven days; " but no time will be lost, and if possible I will get " it off sooner. The contractor will have to get boats " from Mandavie for the left wing."

And on the 24th of the same month a further letter was received to the following effect:

" Such has been the difficulty in getting boats for " the 5th, that I have only been able to send off the " Wagotun detachment yesterday; and the head quar- " ters and upwards of six hundred men leave on " Thursday next, the 25th instant; remainder on " Saturday, if the boats can be got ready. I have " nothing to complain with regard to the Commissariat " Department."

59. On the 4th January, 1853, the Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Sinde—in transmitting a report from the Port Officer at Kurrachee, dated the 27th December 1852, as to the measures required for supplying the left wing of the 28th regiment Native Infantry with tonnage, in case a regiment, then expected in boats from Bombay, should not arrive—stated, the boat contractor " informs me that he will " not be able to procure the remaining 1249 candies, " although he has hitherto led me to suppose he could; " in fact that he had it." The Assistant-Quarter-Master-General adds " up to yesterday 711 candies " were still wanting."

60. The next point for consideration is whether these country boats are or are not a safe, suitable, and convenient means of transport for Native Troops; for to this point alone can, it is presumed, the other " great public injuries " adverted to by Sir C. Napier, have

reference. Some instances of the unfitness of these craft for the conveyance of troops have already been noticed (see paragraphs 49 and 54); and a few more, confined to the year 1847, of which Sir C. Napier wrote, and to a recent period, shall be here adduced.

61. In January, 1847, the 16th regiment Native Infantry, embarked at Mandavie, in Kutch, for Bombay; but before the boats could leave their anchorage a gale came on, disabling thirteen out of twenty-four, seriously injuring five, rending a sixth into two portions, and leaving a seventh totally destroyed. Much property was lost, and the State suffered to the amount of rupees 1929, as compensation for injury to boats, exclusive of that for property; one of the boats, containing 350 stand of arms and all the ammunition and stores, which had put to sea before the gale commenced, was missing for more than a fortnight.

62. On the 21st January 1847, Captain Mc Murdo, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Sinde, reported that a boat of 250 candies, conveying a detachment of the 17th regiment Native Infantry from Sinde to Vingorla, had been wrecked off the mouth of the Indus, and the sepoys transhipped to another boat.

63. A portion of the 3rd Light Cavalry left Kurrachee on the 27th March, 1847, and reached Bombay on the 3rd April; one boat having foundered with the loss of all the property, including twenty-two Government horses on board. The men were saved and taken back to Kurrachee.

64. On the 25th March 1847, Lieutenant-Colonel Stack, the Commandant of the regiment, reported that a boat containing a portion of his corps had been *eleven* days at sea; that the water, supplied only for an

average passage, had consequently run short, and that the horses had narrowly escaped destruction.

65. On the 15th of the following April, a report from Major Walter, of the same regiment, informed the Commander-in-Chief, that his whole squadron had been from *ten to twelve days at sea*, and had suffered in like manner.

66. On the 17th of April, 1847, Captain McMurdo, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Sinde, reported that a boat containing a detachment of Native Artillery had been dismasted and nearly sunk in a gale, almost in sight of Kurrachee.

67. On the 11th May, 1847, Lieutenant McGowan, who had embarked in command of a detachment of the 10th regiment Native Infantry, reported the privations to which his men had been exposed, in a vessel described by him as—

"Unseaworthy, and so leaky that she had to be baled "day and night, and so wet amidships, that the "Sepoys had not a dry spot to sit on. They were "consequently huddled aft into the miserable shed "where I was sheltered, which, from the swarms "of vermin with which it was infested, was anything "but a desirable berth; moreover, the boat, instead "of being 130 candies as reported, did not exceed 70 "candies; we ran short of water likewise, and touched "at a place called Puttun, where the casks were "replenished at my expense."

68. In November 1852, a detachment of sick of Her Majesty's 64th and 83rd regiments, which had been improperly sent from Sinde on country boats instead of by private steamer, reached Bombay in two

boats, which had been seven and nine days respectively on the voyage from Kurrachee. Of the invalids, one died off Bombay harbour, and three on being landed; and the Major of Brigade of Queen's troops reported on the 3rd of the month—

"The sick men, women, and children, suffered con-
"siderably from exposure to the sun, the want of
"medical attendance, and other arrangements." And the medical officer in charge of the department reported "the death of an invalid from sun-stroke, caused by "insufficient shelter on board the 'Pattemars.'"

69. The 6th regiment, Native Infantry, left Bombay harbour for Kurrachee on the 16th November 1852, in twenty-six boats, eighteen of which reached Kurrachee after an average passage of *eighteen* days; five were driven back to Bombay, after having been on an average *twenty-eight* days at sea; one was driven into Rutnagherry, after knocking about for the same period; and the remaining boat got into a small harbour near Bankote on the *thirty-first* day, and just in time to avoid sinking. The sepoys, in all these cases, having suffered severely from cold and wet, and in some from actual starvation.

70. The Quarter-Master-General, on the 29th December, 1852, in reporting these disasters to Government, stated that "water and provisions for twenty-
"four days, being four days beyond the estimated
"length of passage, were supplied by order from this
"office," and that in the Commander-in-Chief's opinion,
"the misfortune is attributable to the severity of
"the weather coupled with the *general unfitness of*
"*country craft* and ignorance of the tindals;" and

Government, in a letter of the 11th January 1853, No. 109, from the Quarter-Master-General, were further informed that "subsequent reports from all the Euro-"pean officers of the 6th Native Infantry, who pro-"ceeded in charge of boats to Kurrachee, point to the "total want of knowledge on the part of the tindals "and crews of the navigation of the coast of Sinde, "and their consequent helplessness when the gale "occurred."

71. On the 7th December, 1852, the right wing of the 28th Native Infantry left Kurrachee in ten boats, which reached Cambay, (about the same distance as Bombay from Kurrachee,) after an average passage of *eleven* days; the shortest being eight and the longest fourteen days.

72. The other wing of the regiment left Kurrachee on the 13th January, 1853, and reached Cambay after an average passage of *fifteen* days; the shortest being twelve, and the longest twenty-eight days; one of the boats having put into Bombay, 230 miles south of Cambay, in a damaged state.

73. Yet another and a serious objection to these country boats lies in the impossibility of providing the greater portion of a fleet, consisting, as in the case of the 18th regiment, of seventeen vessels, (which number is below the average for an equal amount of tonnage,) with any medical attendance at all; whereas, with rare exceptions, it is practicable to supply this want on board *every* steamer. In these cases, whenever sickness does break out on board a country boat, nature is not only left unaided, but is often deprived of the last chance, by an unexpectedly protracted voyage.

74. It is true that the expectations entertained by the Bombay Government of a great increase to the private steam tonnage of the port of Bombay, when they wisely and liberally proposed to encourage it even though "the rates may be higher than charges "incurred by the employment of country craft," have been but imperfectly fulfilled, and the military authorities are often compelled, sorely against their will, to employ country boats in the transport of troops; nor is it intended to assert that the private steamers employed are all that could be desired for the purpose, or that the men do not occasionally suffer privation and discomfort on them; all that is stated, or meant, is simply that, as compared with country boats, they are, from their sea-worthiness, speed, and certainty of arrival by a fixed date, and the absence of any possibility of fraud or deception as to tonnage, (which, be it observed, does not simply involve a payment by Government for what is not provided, but very considerable privation and distress to the over-crowded men for an indefinite period,) vastly superior for the transport of troops; and that whatever be the amount of privation or discomfort on them, it is but for a brief period.

75. There is little more to add; the object of this memorandum is merely to record *proof* founded upon recorded *facts*, in correction of assertions put forward in defiance of or in suppression of them. It only remains, therefore, to furnish a brief summary of the subject matter of the preceding paragraphs, in which the endeavour has been made to show:—

I. That the comparative statement of cost, pub-

lished by Sir C. Napier, is, *even as far as it goes*, not correct.

II. That it is, moreover, incomplete and one-sided, and fails to notice, or to take into calculation, *any one* of the items which lessen the cost of steam, or which increase that of sailing-vessel transport.

III. That while charging the authorities at Bombay with the basest of motives in sanctioning the employment of private steamers, it carefully avoids even allusion to any one of the many facts which were before the Government, and which may be classified as—

1st. The distinct declaration by the Government, that they were "willing and desirous to encourage "the navigation of private steamers from port to port "in India."

2nd. The difficulty of procuring tonnage at Kurrachee, save on long notice.

3rd. The notorious unfitness of the Native craft, more especially for long voyages.

4th. The constant frauds practised in supplying boat tonnage, and the impossibility of effectually checking them.

5th. The impossibility of supplying medical attendance for a great majority of the troops embarked on a fleet of country boats.

IV. That "the source of the transaction" was traceable, by the slightest endeavour on Sir C. Napier's part, to the heads of the Government and the Army of the Bombay Presidency, Sir George Clerk and Sir W. Cotton, and *not* to Messrs. Reid and Willoughby.

V. That while all the advantages which steam transport then offered continue and will continue to

be realized, the difference of expense, which was even then inconsiderable and greatly below the sum stated in Sir C. Napier's publication, has, as was anticipated, now ceased to exist.

VI. That the "loss of time" upon which Sir C. Napier has laid stress, does not exist.

VII. That the "other public injuries" which Sir C. Napier has included in his charge, have not been specially met, only because the absence of any specification has rendered it impossible to discover them.

76. One more observation will conclude this memorandum. The circumstances, now under discussion, occurred more than *six years* since. It was in Sir Charles Napier's power at any time to prefer the charges only now made. With what object they were suppressed by him has not been explained; but it is sufficiently obvious that it could not have been "in "defence of the public interest." In this, indeed, as in all similar cases, the public, and still more so private interests, might have suffered from a procedure opposed alike to English law and English justice; for it might have so happened that time, by removing persons and things, had rendered a complete refutation, or an exposure of guilt equally an impossibility.

J. HOLLAND, *Lieut.-Col.*
Quarter-Master-General.

MAHABLESHWUR, 6th May, 1854.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A.

No. 1040.

CAPTAIN R. MIGNON, *Deputy Commissary-General.*

BOMBAY, 20th November, 1847.

SIR,

In reply to your letter of the 17th instant, the Directors desire me to state that they will be prepared to take Europeans and Natives, except Commissioned Officers, at the following rates, viz.: for Europeans, rupees 12; and rupees 8 for Natives for the first fifty men; and at the rates of rupees 9 for Europeans, and rupees 7 for Natives, for every additional man.

The Directors trust that the reduction which they have now made in their charges will secure them the carriage of all government troop and stores.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) N. W. HASLEWOOD,

Secretary.

APPENDIX B.

No. 6064 of 1848.

To Major D. DAVIDSON, *Commissary General.*

BOMBAY DEP. COM. GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Sir, 6th October, 1848.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 3157, of this date, and in reply beg to acquaint you that passage money was paid to the Bombay Steam Navigation Company, at 48 rupees per each officer, as per letter from that Company dated 1st November last, exclusive of messing charges at 32 rupees per each officer; this latter charge, although included in their letter, was objected to by the Military Board, as not being Commissariat charge, on their first bills being submitted for audit.

Since writing the above, I have received the accompanying original letter from the Manager, Bombay Steam Navigation Company, complaining of the trouble and delay experienced by the Commanders of the Company's Steamers, in recovering the charge for the messing of officers proceeding on them; and altering the rate for passage from 48 to 50 rupees, including messing. In this case the trouble and inconvenience of revovering the charge for messing would devolve upon this department, it being entirely a private transaction between the Commanders and their passengers; I am of opinion that the rates for passage should remain as before, and that the Company's officers should make their own arrangements for securing the payment of their charges on that account.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

(Signed) E. WHICHELO, *Captain,*
Deputy Commissary General.

APPENDIX C.

TABLE, *shewing the average period of Boat Passages* to *Bombay* from *the different Out-ports, in the fair season.*

	NUMBER OF DAYS.																
	Cambay.	Tankaira.	Vingorla.	Mandavie.	Broach.	Bassein.	Hurnee.	Dumaun.	Gogo.	Gao.	Bankote.	Parebunder.	Rutnaglierry.	Surat.	Kurrachee.	Mhar.	Vizladroog.
May	5 to 6	5 to 6	5 to 8	4 to 7	5 „ 6	1 to 2	3 to 4	3 to 5	3 to 6	6 to 9	2 to 4	4 to 5	4 to 6	4 to 6	8 to 10	4 to 5	4 to 6
September . . .	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	3 „ 5	2 „ 4	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	10 „ 12	4 „ 5	4 „ 6
October	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	2 „ 4	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	10 „ 12	4 „ 5	4 „ 6
November . . .	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	2 „ 4	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	6 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 6
December . . .	2 „ 4	2 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	7 „ 10	3 „ 4	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	6 „ 8	4 „ 5	4 „ 6
January. . . .	2 „ 4	2 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	3 „ 5	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	6 „ 8	4 „ 5	4 „ 7
February . . .	2 „ 4	2 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 4	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	3 „ 5	4 „ 5	4 „ 6	4 „ 5	6 „ 8	4 „ 5	4 „ 7
March	2 „ 4	2 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 5	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	3 „ 5	4 „ 5	4 „ 7	4 „ 5	6 „ 8	4 „ 5	4 „ 7
April.	2 „ 4	2 „ 4	7 „ 10	4 „ 5	4 „ 5	1 „ 2	3 „ 5	3 „ 4	3 „ 5	8 „ 10	3 „ 5	4 „ 5	4 „ 7	4 „ 5	6 „ 8	4 „ 5	4 „ 7

(Signed) J. FRUSHARD,

Master-Attendant.

APPENDIX D.

TABLE, *shewing the average period of Boat Passages* from *Bombay* to *the different Out-ports, in the fair season.*

	NUMBER OF DAYS.																		
	Cambay.	Panwell.	Colsette.	Tankaira.	Vingorla.	Mandavie.	Broach.	Bassein.	Hurnee.	Dumann.	Gogo.	Gon.	Bankote.	Parelbunder.	Rutnagherry.	Surat.	Kurrachee.	Nagotana.	
May . . .	6	1 Tide.	1 Tide.	5	From 1 to 11 May. 5	10	From 1 to 20 May. 9 From 1 to 31 May.	2 Tides	2	From 1 to 20 May. 6 From 21 to 31 May.	From 1 to 20 May. 8 From 21 to 30 May.	From 1 to 15 May. 6	2	8	From 1 to 15 May. 4	From 1 to 20 May. 7 From 21 to 31 May.	Not certain.	2 Tides	*For Cambay and Broach to sail so as to arrive during the Spring.*
September .	6	1 do.	1 do.	5	5	10	9	2 do.	3	5	7	5	2	8	4	4	15	2 do.	
October . .	10	1 do.	1 do.	9	4	12	9	2 do.	2	4	7	5	2	10	3	5	15	2 do.	
November .	10	1 do.	1 do.	9	3	12	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	
December .	10	1 do.	1 do.	9	3	12	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	
January . .	11	1 do.	1 do.	9	3	12	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	
February .	12	1 do.	1 do.	9	3	12	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	
March . . .	12	1 do.	1 do.	9	3	12	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	
April . . .	11	1 do.	1 do.	8	3	10	8	2 do.	2	5	8	4	2	12	3	6	20	2 do.	

C. EVERARD BOYCE,

Assistant-Master-Attendant.

APPENDIX E.

MEMORANDUM.

The manager of the Bombay Steam Navigation Company, in reply to the Memorandum from the Quarter-Master-General, requesting to be furnished with a statement of the average length of passage, in hours, between Bombay and Kurrachee, both ways, begs to inform him that the following have been the average rates of the Company's steamers, during the present season, viz:—

Steamer, Bombay to Kurrachee, 80 hours.
Do. do. from do. 74 „
Steamer Victoria, to do. 76 „
Do. do. from do. 69 „

(Signed) L. C. DE MENEZES,
Manager.

BOMBAY STEAM N. C'S OFFICE,
30th Jany. 1854.

APPENDIX F.

Statement showing the cost of provisions, fuel, and water, to a fighting man and public follower, cooking and not cooking, per man, per diem, proceeding to Sinde, in November 1847.

	AMOUNT.		
Fighting man, cooking per diem . .	Rs. 0	1	$7\frac{3}{4}$
Do. not cooking do. . . .	0	2	$8\frac{1}{2}$
Public follower, do. do. . . .	0	2	$0\frac{1}{2}$
Do. cooking do. . . .	0	1	$2\frac{1}{4}$

(Signed) A. W. LUCAS, *Captain.*
For Acting Dep.-Com.-General.

BOMBAY, DEPUTY COM.-GEN'S OFFICE,
27th Dec., 1853.

APPENDIX G.

KURRACHEE.—No. 514 of 1854.

To the Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, S D.

SIR,

In returning the Quarter-Master-General's letter, No. 334, of the 3rd instant, received under your memorandum of the 11th idem, I have the honour to acquaint you that the records of this office only extend to 1848; those prior to that date are in charge of the Presidency Commissariat, from whom the Quarter-Master-General can obtain the required information.

Since 1848 there has been only one contract, as per margin, with this department, for the supply of boat tonnage; from 1st November, 1852, it was transferred to the Port Officer. The rates prevailing from 1848 to February 1850, can be obtained from the records of the late Harbour Master.

From February, 1850, to 31st October, 1852, at annas 12·7 per candy, for troops hence to Bombay.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) H. T. VINCENT,

Captain for Adj.-Asst.-Com.-Gen., S.D.

KURRACHEE COMMISSARIAT OFFICE,
13th February, 1854.

NOTES

ON

SIR W. NAPIER'S ADMINISTRATION

OF

SINDE.

By MAJOR JOHN JACOB.

NOTES, ETC.

Page 1.

"Shere Mahomed called the lion."

Shere Mahomed is as common a name as John Smith, although "Shere" does also mean a lion as Smith a worker in iron.

How childish are these nicknames! they also cause confusion.

Page 1.

"The Scindian proper."

The Sindee cultivators were certainly at least as well off under the rule of the Ameers as under the British: they were no more oppressed by the one than they are by the other power; the same amount of revenue is collected from the cultivator in both cases; his condition is scarcely affected by the change of masters, and he was nearly indifferent to the result of the war.

Page 2.

"For Sobdar excepted, &c."

The Ameers did not wish to fight at all, and Sobdar was openly and stedfastly friendly to the British: knowing their irresistible power, and that, as Sir C.

Napier himself had written, a pretext only was wanted to coerce them, he at once surrendered his fortress, from which he had not even removed his family or his treasure.

Page 2.

"Great was the lion's intrepidity, &c."

The example of Meer Roostum prevented the possibility of Shere Mahomed's submission, no course remained to him but resistance, hopeless though it might be. The English general did his utmost to goad the old man into taking up arms or making some show of hostility, but he could not induce Meer Roostum to oppose to his violence anything but prayers and submission.

Whereupon the old Ameer was turned out a houseless wanderer and then imprisoned.

He died in prison. His wife, children, and relatives, were left literally to starve. Ali Morad seized on their private estates. This Ameer was, it seems from the text, ordered to turn them out of the country.

Page 3.

"They were moved to fight by religious hatred."

This is totally untrue—witness their friendly conduct in the hour of our weakness, the Cabool disasters. The Beloochees were moved to fight solely by the terrible injustice inflicted on the venerable Meer of Khyrpoor.

Page 5.

"To the genius of some Governors-General, &c."

Is this indeed all! Sir C. Napier may think thus;

but he who looks a little deeper will soon perceive that the real strength of the British power in the East has been based on the comparative righteousness and good faith of the Company's government.

Sir C. Napier's "adroit and firm policy" forms indeed, a glaring contrast to these.

Page 5.

"This feeling has always led them, &c."

In the last instance for such a trifle as making war for military glory only.

Page 7.

"Spurning such arrogance, &c."

The impertinence and ludicrous untruthfulness of this prevents its insolence from being offensive, it is only laughable, the more so as it comes from one who (vide page 30) knows not a Mussulman from a Hindoo, and who continually styles the natives of India "blacks," thereby showing that all he knows of them is their colour.

Page 8.

"Uncovenanted servants."

Silly; and ridiculously, as well as notoriously untrue.

Page 9.

"For, conscious of their own ferocious design, &c."

Shown especially by their willing and effective aid afforded to us during the Cabool troubles. Cutchee and the frontier were kept quiet with some three hundred men during the year 1842. Sukkur and

Shickarpoor were occupied by single regiments How was it that through this year every one in Sinde behaved in the most friendly manner, and only formed the "ferocious design to massacre every European" after the return of large bodies of our victorious troops from Afghanistan?

Page 11.

"The dulness of Indian official forms, &c."

All this is absurdly false; it could only have been written by one utterly ignorant or regardless of the truth.

Page 12.

"Urging the Beloochees to insurrection, &c."

Sir C. Napier believed, or affected to believe, that the Sepoys read the newspapers, and that even the "Beloochees" were acquainted with their contents. It is hardly necessary to inform educated gentlemen that this was not only impossible but absurdly so.

Page 12.

"Jutts and Khosahs."

The Jutts form a very extensive race of men in Sinde. They are harmless camel-men, and are a cowardly, unwarlike tribe. They very rarely bear arms at all.

The Khosahs form a numerous tribe, a small portion of which lived in the Thurr, and habitually plundered in Sinde, Cutch, and Guzerat. Both the British and Sindee governments had occasionally to send detachments of troops against them in former years.

The Khosahs are very good Beloochees; they are not confined to the Thurr, but are numerous all over Sinde and Cutchee.

Page 13.

"In fine, fifty thousand men would have been required, &c."

Sir C. Napier told Major Jacob on his defeating Shere Mahomed in June, 1843, that he had prevented this insurgent war. This was his thought at the time. He now professes to think differently. The danger is, however, here greatly exaggerated.

Page 13.

"Having full proof."

There was no proof whatever against Meer Shadad; there could be none, for he knew nothing of the murder of Captain Ennis, of which he was no further the instigator than in having, when hostilities commenced at Hyderabad, sent to proclaim war against the British among his distant subjects. As to the wretched man becoming a cherished favourite, he was closely imprisoned in Surat Castle.

Page 14.

"They belonged to him of right, and their aggregate value was great," &c.

The idea of stealing the rich swords of the chiefs, who came to pay their respects to the British government appears, *even to an old Indian*, so unspeakably base, contemptible, and sordid, that it is difficult to imagine such a thought having place in the mind of an English gentleman, however avaricious he might be by nature.

Page 14.

"Cutchee Hills."

This expression is incorrect. "Cutchee" is the country *between* the hills and Sinde. This should be remembered—for it appears from subsequent passages, that the "historian" uses this expression purposely to mislead his readers into the belief that the Jekranees and Doombkees were "Hill-men."

Page 14.

"But with his usual subtle policy, he effected the object of protecting the villagers," &c.

There was no protection at all, the whole border was laid waste, as usual, but not by the "Hill-men."

Page 15.

"The country, which just before the conquest," &c.

This is totally untrue. Up to the arrival of Sir C. Napier, in November 1842, the border country had been protected throughout the period of the Cabool disasters, and peace preserved by the Sinde Irregular Horse, and a body of the Doombkees and Jekranees in our service, all under command of Major Jacob. It was on the "conquest of Sinde," by Sir C. Napier, that the plundering recommenced. At this time the Hill tribes never plundered in Sinde at all. The Doombkees and Jekranees were much too strong under Beejah Khan to allow any plunderers but their own. Indeed, they did the work so effectually themselves, that little or nothing was left for others.

It should be borne in mind that Beejah Khan, with

the whole of the Doombkee and Jekranee tribes, had no connexion with the Hill tribes, but lived wholly in the plain country.

Page 16.

"And a great reduction of taxation."

The taxation was in truth greatly increased, and collected in the most vexatious and annoying manner.

Page 16.

"Regulations in judicial proceedings."

These regulations were a mere form, broken through as often as thought proper, and changed continually. The courts for conducting *civil*, as well as criminal trials, were "military commissions."

Page 17.

"Nevertheless, they did not understand," &c.

These are the people who just before are represented as reading the newspapers.

Page 18.

"His appointment, however," &c.

This is equally false and foolish.

Page 18.

"Nothing was too gross for the polluted pens."

All this is purely imaginary; nothing of the kind was ever said or written by any one but our "historian."

Page 19.

"Luxuriously changing his residence to feed on delicious pulla."

Sir C. Napier was, at all events, never accused of feasting. His table allowance was some 2,000*l.* a-year. This was what "The East India Company" paid him for the express purpose of maintaining such a table as was thought proper for the governor of a province.

The governor expended about sixpence a-day, but *did not* return the balance into the treasury.

Page 19.

"At once his benefactor and his dupe."

How has all this appeared since? He was his accomplice.

Page 19.

"The touch of genius bursted these bubbles."

The bubble burst in the Punjaub.

Page 19.

"A torrent and fury of abuse."

The abuse and thwarting were all purely imaginary, every one was ready and willing to afford aid.

Page 20.

"Through them he had to work."

He had far less work to do than any other man in a similar position, for this plain reason,—that few or no public records were kept, from which much trouble and annoyance ensued after his departure.

Page 21.

"Which in India means a large retinue."

It means no such thing. In this case Sir C. Napier was determined to have no civilians, wherefore he refused these the means of working, and then called them useless.

Page 22.

"Arrears of the political agency neglected by Outram."

This is wholly untrue.

Page 22.

"Partisan warfare from the Hill tribes," &c.

He might as well have expected an invasion of Esquimaux. It was the removal of the Doombkees and Jekranees to Sinde *after the Hill campaign* that opened the road to Sinde to the Hill tribes.

Page 22.

"Soldiers, he said, were instituted to fight declared enemies," &c.

This is good, but merely empty words. It was never acted on. The troops *did* guard the gaols and prisoners on the roads. They were habitually used as criminal police by Sir C. Napier.

Page 23.

"A numerous police, composed chiefly of Scindians."

They were chiefly *Hindustanees*, and the remainder were *Punjaubees* and *Afghans*.

Page 23.

" Giving them a handsome uniform," &c.

This is mere drivel, and, moreover, is not true.

Page 23.

" Plundering Hill tribes."

These were purely imaginary.

Page 26.

" Kardar or head-man, answering to the Cadi of the Arabians."

The Kardar is merely an agent. The Cazee (*Ang.* Cadi) is a judge. The functions of the two are distinct and unlike.

Page 29.

" Already the people of Candahar," &c.

This is untrue and absurd.

Page 29.

" The General at once perceived the extent of their drift," &c.

All this is pure invention. The Meers never thought about the matter at all.

Page 30.

" The Ameers often took, but never borrowed," &c.

Absurdly incorrect.

Page 30.

"I will take you under my protection, and bury you honourably," &c.

This, as addressed to Hindoos, is ridiculous. It shows a most profound ignorance of the habits and religion of the people. Hindoos never *bury* their dead. But the scene never occurred as here described.

Page 33.

"He never augmented punishment."

This is not true.

Page 33.

"Death, however, he inflicted only for murder."

This is not true. He rightly and properly caused men to be executed for treachery in aiding our enemies when serving in our pay, and also for theft in the field. One was thus hanged at Khanghur in 1847, and two at Lharee in 1845.

Page 35.

"He also put down the practice of Suttee."

This is a most complete burlesque, Sinde being a thoroughly Mussulman country, where, undoubtedly, no Suttee took place "then or afterwards," or ever previously.

Page 36.

"To rob an unprotected stranger was a matter of course."

This is untrue. Those who travelled (myself among the number) about Sinde from Wanga Bazaar to Roree,

through the whole length and breadth of the land repeatedly, before Sir C. Napier came to reform the people, can positively declare that no part of the world could have been more free from robbers and thieves than was Sinde at that time under the Ameers. No guard was ever required, and nothing was ever lost. The state of the country at the time showed a remarkable contrast to that of our own provinces of Guzerat and the Deccan in this respect. Since the introduction of British rule, and notwithstanding Sir C.'s "excellent police," robberies have become somewhat more frequent, but they are still very rare.

Page 39.

"This Narra."

After all, a great fuss was made about this, but nothing whatever was done during the five years of Sir C. Napier's administration, or during that of his successor, Mr. Pringle. The present commissioner, Mr. Frere, has *said* little about the matter, but has commenced the work in good earnest. It is progressing well, and an enormous tract of land will soon thereby be reclaimed from the great desert.

Page 40.

"There was, however, a strange obstacle to be overcome."

The whole of this paragraph is totally untrue. There were, and are, in Upper Sinde great numbers of good workmen; and the atrocities here attributed to the Ameers never occurred, nor even the slightest approach to them.

Page 42.

" The fortress of Emaum Ghur, thought by the Beloochees to be impregnable," &c.

It might have been as well to have said that the fort was abandoned, the gates left open, and the place quite empty. The Beloochees never supposed the empty fort to be impregnable.

Page 43.

" In which five thousand Beloochees were killed."

More correctly, two thousand.

Page 43.

" On the 8th, entirely crushed the Lion."

If by the Lion be meant Shere Mahomed, and not some imaginary monster, this is totally untrue.

Shere Mahomed was defeated, and his army dispersed, by Major Jacob at Shadadpoor on the 14th June, 1843.

Page 50.

" Who construct sties," &c.

The magnificent barracks at Hyderabad were constructed on the model of some of these " sties " in Bengal. The buildings are on a superb scale.

Page 50.

" He showed how the Indus might be restrained."

The method here mentioned is a very common expedient of the Sindees; it has been practised by them from time immemorial. But the thick stakes, &c., will not last more than one season, and nothing will effec-

tually keep out the river. However, the stakes and wattle were thus used for many years before Sir C. Napier came to the country, as I have often seen.

Page 51.

" Fine strong animals of Afghann," &c.

This is astonishing! The Afghann horses have for ages past been taken to Bombay for sale, to the number of some two thousand annually, But no one not totally ignorant of the subject could for an instant have dreamt of comparing the Afghann horse to the Arab. The latter sells for about ten times the price of the former, and is very much more than ten times as good.

The idea of the *inferiority* of the Arab horse is sufficiently ludicrous, but seems to be quite on a par with the rest of our author's Oriental knowledge.

All the horses which the Afghanns have to sell were then, and are still, exported to Bombay. The trade had existed for ages before Sir C. Napier's appearance on the scene, and his proceedings had no influence whatever, either in increasing or in diminishing the supply of horses from the north.

Page 52.

" A bund or dike to bar out the inundation," &c.

This bund was the most absurd affair ever projected by man!

Had the work succeeded it would have reduced a large portion of the country to a desert; but, fortunately, the thing was not only silly, but almost impossible successfully to execute. After an enormous expenditure of labour and money on the work, the river

broke through the bank, just as it had occurred to, or rather been brought to the notice of, the conqueror, that water was necessary to render a country habitable; and that, if admitted at all, it must fill the hollows! While this foolish and wasteful expenditure was being incurred, there was no road from Sukkur to Shickarpoor. The country between the two is impassable for four months in the year, and the road is very bad at all other seasons. A portion of the cost of the experiment of the bund would have paid for a good road, with bridges over everything; yet to this day the road has not been made. Sir C. Napier never attempted it. He only talked about roads; but never made them in Sinde.

A road between Sukkur and Shickarpoor has lately (1852) been commenced; and, if properly completed, will prove far more valuable than all that Sir C. Napier did in the way of public works during the whole period of his administration in Sinde.

The Shickarpoor bund is a notable and characteristic example of the style of the conqueror's attempts at public works.

Page 55.

"The English ruler peremptorily rejected remorseless taxation," &c.

This is contrary to the truth Every obsolete tax, however petty or oppressive, was rigidly enforced and collected.

Even the transit duties ordered to be taken off in 1843, were not remitted till December 1845, when import and export duties of the most oppressive nature

were substituted for them (*vide* letters from Captain Rathborne, collector of Hyderabad, annexed).

Page 56.

"The estimated value of the public grain in store was much greater."

Captain Rathborne, collector of Hyderabad, reserved the government grain in store until the selling prices in the bazaars had risen to three times the usual rates.

Then the value of the grain in store was estimated. But when the stores *were opened* at last, a great deal of the grain was found to be spoilt; still the prices immediately fell one-half. The cost of Sinde above its revenue proved, for many years after the conquest, to amount to one million sterling per annum.

Page 56.

"But the most artful assumption," &c.

In consequence of the service in Sinde, two companies were added to each regiment in the army.

Page 57.

"It was said also with as little truth."

The saying, whoever said it, is perfectly true, we have substituted a very weak and exposed frontier for one very strong and difficult to approach. The great desert is now between us and India.

Page 58.

"Valuable as supplying fuel," &c.

They did this always under the rule of the Ameers.

In fact, for several years before the Conquest, *all the resources of the country were as much at our disposal as they were afterwards.*

Page 58.

"Khosahs and Jutts, who abhorring their ancient oppressors, the Beloochees," &c.

This is amusing, the Khosahs themselves being very good Beloochees; those of the Thurr are merely petty robbers; their fire and sword would not be very formidable.

Page 59.

"The Ameers, with a sinister policy," &c.

This is mere nonsense: it is very difficult to have a defined boundary in such a waste of shifting-sands as is the Thurr beyond Omer-Mote.

Page 60.

"Cutchee-hills, &c. in those hills dwelt."

All this is totally untrue, and by the use afterwards made of it, wilfully untrue.

The hills are only called Cutchee-hills by Sir W. Napier.

"Cutchee" is the plain country between the hills and Sinde, divided from Sinde by the Desert, and watered entirely by streams from the hills or by rain.

None of the tribes here mentioned live, or ever did live, in the hills, with the exception of the Murrees and Boogtees. All the rest reside wholly in the plains. The Kujjucks and Muzzarees are always at war with the

hill tribes, the Doombkees and Jekranees were so occasionally only.

Page 61.

"This waste," &c.

All this is totally false: there are no wells in the desert, which is certainly not the *Desert of Kussmore*, for at Kussmore there is no desert.

After their predatory expeditions, the Doomkees and Jekranees retired to their homes at Poolejee and Chuttur.

Page 61.

"Next the Desert of Kussmore, was the country of the Chandikas."

This is nonsensical confusion. There is no desert of Kussmore, and from Chandika to Kussmore is a distance of 170 miles.

Page 62.

"Kelat tribes mountain tribes," &c.

This is mere nonsense. The people of the western hills were and are *Brahooees*, why not call them so?

The tribes inhabiting the hills north of Cutchee are the Murrees and Boogtees; there are no others: this should be remembered.

Page 63.

"Sir C. Napier had trusted entirely to him," &c.

Late events have shown more of the connexion between Sir C. Napier and Ali Morad than perhaps the historian would wish to have known.

Page 64.

"Outram ever asserted."

A large amount of additional territory *was* given to Ali Morad with the turban. This has now been resumed.

Page 64.

"Soon afterwards Meer Roostum renounced," &c.

A precious renunciation! the poor old man was nearly frightened to death, and was driven from house and home by Sir C. Napier.

No. 65.

"The fortress of Emaumghur was in that predicament."

Sir C. Napier might as well have asked Ali Morad's permission to plunder Bombay: the place was not Ali Morad's, but belonged to Mahomed Khan, and was his private property.

Page 65.

"But this example of good faith."

This is a most shameful perversion of language; for the whole transaction of turning out Meer Roostum was as great a piece of injustice and execrable villany as was ever committed in India since Clive cheated Omechund.

Page 67.

"The Thurr Desert between them and India," &c.

What is the use of the Desert, when we have moved India beyond it into Sinde?

Page 68.

"Shickarpoor being close to the Cutchee Hills," &c.

This is curious geography, Shickarpoor is thirty miles from the edge of the Desert, the latter is twenty miles. broad, and from its further border to the nearest hills is forty miles further: total, ninety miles.

The "strong garrison" of Shickarpoor, however, was always in a state of fear and alarm, but never did anything to protect the country.

Page 69.

"Around these stations."

All this was against imaginary foes or poor petty thieves.

Page 69.

"Kurrachee the point," &c.

There never was a shadow of a chance of any insurrection, our power was well known.

Page 70.

"Captain Malcolm," &c.

Captain, or rather Lieutenant, Malcolm, as he then was, had no more to do with the second regiment of S. I. H. than any other subaltern of the corps, and the historian must have known this (*vide* letters appended).

Page 70.

The Camel corps was sent to aid the Cavalry in watching the Cutchee-hill men," &c.

It should be borne in mind that no hill men plun-

dered in *Sinde till after Sir C. Napier's* "Hill Campaign."

The Camel men were armed with excellent musket-bored carbines, which were purchased by Fitzgerald from the Sinde Irregular Horse, Major Jacob having found them too heavy for his men, and procured others from England. They had only lately been received, and were quite new.

The infantry of the Camel corps was armed with excellent percussion fusils, or light infantry muskets. So much for the unserviceable arms cut down, &c. The silly stories of the "fissures," &c. are wholly imaginary.

Page 73.

"The Bombay faction."

This is mere insanity. The author presumes largely on the credulity of his readers when he expects them to believe that the Beloochees read the newspapers, or are acquainted with their contents.

Page 75.

"Outram's imbecile vanity."

This "imbecile vanity" was so *lauded at the time* by Sir C. Napier, that he *promised* to give it a dispatch to itself.

Page 76.

"Ali Ackbar," &c.

There is every reason to believe that Ali Ackbar was in the pay of Meer Ali Morad, and that Sir C. Napier was duped by him throughout.

Page 76.

" Shaik Ali Hoossein, the fast friend of the British."

If this be true it is a great disgrace to the British, for a more detestable traitor than Shaik Ali Hoossein never existed. The proceedings of the commission on Ali Morad at Sukkur throw *curious* light on this part of the text.

Page 78.

" If his numbers be overwhelming," &c.

These instructions were enough to have frightened many ordinary men out of their wits; but all the danger was purely imaginary.

Page 78.

" This warning was a precaution against the lion," &c.

Nonsense! There was actually no enemy any more than there was a lion.

Page 78.

" Securing his own safety in Deejee," &c.

This Dejee is a contemptible place of no real strength.

Page 79.

" General! give the word!"

This is mere drivel; of course, like all Orientals, he soon found out what the general wished him to say.

Page 80.

" To restore Shaik Ali Hoossein, he forced that prince to an entire submission," &c. &c.

This Shaik Ali Hoossein was one of the chief accom-

plices in the forgery which cost Ali Morad his sovereignty. But by what right in law, reason, or justice could this scoundrel be forced as a minister on Meer Ali Morad?

Page 81.

"Believing drink rather than treachery had excited him," &c.

The man was and is sober enough, but employs all his time in shooting tigers, &c.; he almost lives in the jungle, he is a most excellent shot, and an enthusiastic sportsman.

Page 81.

"Colonel Roberts had organized a strong body of irregulars in Cutch, a thing vainly attempted before by the Bombay Political Agent," &c.

This is impudentlyf alse! the detachment of Irregular Horse from Cutch was, in 1839, transferred to form the nucleus of the S. I. H. and the Rao of Cutch, besides, always maintained a considerable body of irregular horsemen. *Roberts himself, when a captain, long commanded and did much service with the Cutch irregular horse!*

Page 83.

"Unless I have security for the Bawulpoor man's faith," &c.

What reason was there to doubt Bawul Khan? The man's interest was with us, and he had always been faithful.

Page 84.

" Sir C. Napier stopped it in Sinde," &c.

Sir C. Napier was alarmed at a phantom of his own creation. There was no conspiracy whatever, and the Sindees knew nothing about Gualior or Maharajpoor.

Page 85.

" In other hands, the massacre," &c.

This is directly opposed to the fact, the only danger was from the entire ignorance of the General as to Oriental affairs.

Page 86.

" As a military frontier, it protects the left flank."

Undoubtedly it does, if you protect Sinde by occupying it, as was then the case, with an army of twenty thousand men or so!

Page 88.

" By that conquest also," &c.

All this is totally untrue. The government of Sinde was never " vehemently hostile." The country was fully occupied by us, and all its resources were at our complete disposal long before the conquest, which gave us no advantage whatever that we did not possess before.

Page 88.

" Whoever commands the watercourses," &c.

This is absolute nonsense; there are no water-courses in the desert at all.

Page 88.

" Kurrachee, independent of its," &c.

This is most imbecile policy, the wretched hill tribes in the Hala mountains think only of their sheep and cattle, and would as soon think of " rushing" on the moon as on Kurrachee.

Fortifications and defensive war are not suited to the position of the British in India. The policy which should have recourse to them would prove ruinous to our Indian empire.

Page 89.

" The plan adopted," &c.

All this is mere insanity. Who is this enemy to be? Persia? If so, a force sent from Bombay to Persia by sea would speedily call the Iranees home. But such an attempt is as likely to be made by the Chinese as by the Persians, or by any one else. All this part of the text appears to be meant only to mystify the English reader.

Page 91.

" Chandia of the Chandikas."

This is equivalent to " English of the country of the English." Chandika is merely the genitive case of Chandia: Ka means—of.

Almost all the places in Sinde are called by the names of the people who live there; thus Chandika means—the country of the Chandias.

Page 92.

" The whole line of boundary is positively defined."

This is wholly contrary to the fact. The boundary

was left by Sir C. Napier totally undefined, and its settlement gave much trouble after Sir C. Napier's departure. The boundary line was at last, after much correspondence, laid down by me under instructions from the Commissioner from the Western hills to the Indus near Kussmore, about 170 miles in length, but the Western boundary is still undetermined.

Page 93.

" In the Delta were discovered," &c.

These beds of salt are close to the Runn, and forty or more miles distant from a drop of fresh water or any habitable spot, so that the bed of salt could not be worked save at ruinous cost.

Page 93.

" But this effort was malignantly frustrated by Bombay officials," &c.

This assertion is " malignantly " false.

Page 95.

" The hill-men's forays."

Not a hill-man was concerned in any of these forays. They were carried on by the Doombkees and Jekranees of Poolejee, Chuttur, &c. It may be well to refer to the map.

Page 95.

" To construct a strong fort there," &c.

This fort was a most silly affair, and as respects any

protection of the frontier, the camel corps might as well have been in Bombay.

Fort Fitzgerald and the camel corps were placed on the south side of the Ghar (the enemy being to the northward) a branch of the Indus some seventy yards wide. It was a week's labour to get the camels across this, for while building forts no one thought of building a bridge.

The best proof of the absurdity of the whole arrangement, and of the total uselessness of the camel corps at Larkana as a guard to the frontier, is found in the fact that in August 1844, when the camel corps was quartered in Fort Fitzgerald, the Doombkees and Jekranees in open day made a descent on the town of Kumbur, only thirteen miles distant from Fort Fitzgerald, burnt and plundered the place, and returned to Poolejee with all their booty in perfect safety. From Poolejee to Kumbur is a distance of 110 miles in a direct line.

Page 97.

"Eighty thousand warriors."

This is ridiculously exaggerated. Of the eighty thousand, at least seventy thousand were "buckram men!"

Page 98.

"The Scindian cavalry."

This was a troop of the Scinde Irregular Horse; and I may here observe, once for all, that there is not a single Scindee, Afghaun, or Belooche in the whole corps. So much for the "Scindian cavalry." Sometimes we are "Moguls!"

Page 99,

" Though not more than six thousand warriors," &c.

Certainly not *more*, for this number is nearly double that of all the male adult inhabitants of the Murree and Boogtee hills. When, however, it suits our author's convenience, the numbers swell to 100,000 or so.

Page 99.

" Terrified all British India."

This is not true. The Government and Sepoys of Bengal were alone terrified. The troops in Cutchee in 1841-42, were full of confidence and zeal.

Page 100.

" He might, however, reasonably have feared."

All this is mere drivel. No one was alarmed, and there was nothing to be alarmed at on our side. There were troops enough present most able and willing to have beaten all the Beloochees ten times over.

Page 101.

" The sword-player, awed by his rank," &c.

Which is the mountebank here?

Page 103.

" Beeja Khan, celebrated for his strength," &c.

None of this is true. Beejah was a handsome man, of venerable aspect, but was never celebrated or any way remarkable for strength of body.

He had a noble presence and bearing, and was a wise and excellent leader in peace as well as in war.

So far from feeling inveterate hatred towards us, Beejah served as one of the Jemadars of my Belooche Horse, all through the Cabool troubles in 1841-42, and throughout that trying period was perfectly true and faithful.

The frontier of Sinde was kept in peace and quiet in 1842 by a handful of men, and it was only through the ignorance and mismanagement of the "Conqueror of Sinde," that it was allowed in 1843 and the following years to fall into such a desperate state of disorder as existed when I took charge of it in January, 1847.

Page 104.

"Action was reluctantly suspended till the cool weather," &c.

The cause here assigned is not the true one. It was *not* the heat of the weather which prevented the frontier from being protected from the Cutchee plunderers.

Nothing could have been more disgraceful or more injurious to the reputation of the British Government than the state of affairs on the Sinde border in 1843-44. But though the country was laid waste, the troops were not the less exposed to the weather, and had not one instant more rest. They were always in a state of alarm and dread, and were continually occupied in making the most absurdly awkward attempts against the plunderers, who only laughed at them.

Sir C. Napier in his General Order in 1844, tells the officers on the frontier posts that they are to "eat, drink, and sleep in the saddle." In 1847 the S. I. H. were

accustomed to be out in the saddle all day, and sometimes for 24 hours together, all through the hottest season. Sir C. Napier made no OBJECTION to this.

Page 105.

" Beeja was not to be taken," &c.

Beejah might have been taken with the greatest ease had a real attack been made on Poolejee, but in reality none was made.

Page 105.

" Lost their way and arrived at eight o'clock in the morning exhausted with fatigue," &c.

They did not lose their way; were not exhausted by fatigue. and not a single man of the Booghees was present anywhere near the place.

Page 106.

" Would have renewed the attack."

There was positively no attack made, the detachment of the camel corps was employed in firing at the walls only.

Page 106.

" An abandoned post in the desert called Chuttar."

Chuttar, here called an abandoned post in the desert, is a considerable town of about five hundred houses; it was then and is still fully inhabited. It is not in the desert, but is distant from the edge of the desert twenty-two miles!

Page 106.

" An uninterrupted march of seventy-five miles."

The distance from Chuttar to Khanghur (now Jacobabad) is just forty-two miles!

Page 106.

" The intrepidity displayed in the attack and the hardihood of the retreat."

This is ludicrous! Poolejee is and was then a contemptible place, and might easily have been taken by one company of infantry. The walls are not more than seven feet high, and at the top only a few inches thick; a man standing at the foot of the wall can put his hand on the top and pull down large pieces, as I have myself often done by way of experiment. The greater part has not even the semblance of a flanking defence, and there are numerous gaps and holes through the wall into the place, slightly stopped with thorns. To attack the gate was quite unnecessary.

Page 107.

" Hearing of the defeat at Poolejee, they proferred their swords to war against Beeja, and against their old master, the Lion."

Who was their master the Lion? Was this *another Lion?* or does the historian intend his readers to believe that the Mugzees and Chandias were ever subjects of Shere Mahomed of Meerpoor! He might as well call them subjects of France.

This story of the Chandias (or Chandikas, as our author calls them) and Mugzees is most characteristic,

and clearly shews the entire ignorance of Sir C. Napier with regard to what was required to ensure safety and protection on the frontier.

It was the practice of private warfare, the existence of perpetual blood feuds caused thereby, and the carrying on of plundering incursions into each other's districts by these border chieftains, which caused all the terrible disorder which prevailed through the country. Yet here we find the Chandias and Mugzees encouraged in plundering and murdering their neighbours, thereby doing everything to perpetuate the evils pretended to be remedied.

The practice of private warfare and the bearing of arms on the frontier, has been for many years put a stop to by Major Jacob, but when he took command of the frontier in January, 1847, he found as many plunderers on our side of the desert as on the other. Our own people were then as much in the habit of joining in predatory excursions as were the Boogtees themselves. This Major Jacob at once put a stop to, but it had been carried on throughout the whole of Sir C. Napier's administration until the arrival of the Sinde Irregular Horse on the border.

It is the business of the troops to protect the people; but in this Poolejee affair we find the troops defeated, and then the peasantry called on to avenge our disgrace by robbery and murder. Truly this is an original plan of quieting a country.

Page 110.

"Because their hope that his career would have been ended by an assassin's knife," &c.

All this is childish nonsense, and totally devoid of truth.

Page 116.

" I detest it upon principle as a Christian."

This is ludicrous, considering the writer—mere cant.

Page 118.

" That the tribes elated by the defeat of the English," &c.

Nothing could tend more to make the British contemptible than these proceedings. Our troops had been beaten by Beejah, but these rascally Chandia robbers were to beat *him*.

They, however, never had any such schemes as are here mentioned, and Beejah had then altogether less than a thousand fighting men of all sorts at his disposal.

The story of the poisoning the wells in the desert is a silly falsehood; there are no wells in the desert,—not one.

Page 119.

" Ali Morad, though he dismissed," &c., " received and entertained with honour four of the exiled Talpoorees."

This is a most infamous misstatement. The poor people were humble suppliants for bread in the land where they had been princes! They were left to *starve!* No provision whatever was made for the family of Meer Roostum, either by Ali Morad or Sir C. Napier. Sir C. took their sovereignty from them, and gave it to Ali Morad, who then seized all their private property also. Meer Roostum's sons, wives, daughters, &c., were left wholly destitute. They were still in this state when I was at Roree in 1852.

The state of Meer Roostum's family was a disgrace to

any civilized government, and an enormous blot on the character of Sir C. Napier. It has lately been brought to the notice of the government of India, and some provision has now been made for them, but it is still inadequate.

Page 120.

"That feeling of attachment to his corps which gives the government such moral power over the army."

This is all totally erroneous. The Sepoy formerly looked on his regiment as his home, because his European officers had power over him for evil or for good; he looked no higher than to the regimental commander. Now the regimental officer is despised by the Sepoy; he laughs at his "passionate young subaltern" or his staid old colonel alike, and appeals to head-quarters. His regiment is no longer his home; he has been taught to look beyond it, and the result is now the total destruction of all healthy discipline in the army of Bengal, and an approach to the same state of things in the other two armies of India.

Page 121.

"The artillery and stores would have been seized," &c.

All this is imaginary, ludicrous, and silly. Nothing of the kind was possible, or could have become so under any circumstances.

Page 122.

"Nearly coincident with the mutiny happened the other disastrous event," &c.

They were *not* led by Beejah Khan, who was now much too old to accompany such parties in person. One

of the principal leaders on this occasion, and several others of inferior note, are now serving in Major Jacob's Beloche Guides, attached to the Sinde Irregular Horse.

The guard of the 6th Irregular Cavalry was dismounted, sleeping or smoking, stripped and unarmed, according to the custom of the Sepoys of Bengal. On the alarm, these men sprung on their horses as they could, and fled, leaving the wretched grass-cutters to their fate. Not a man of the guard so much as drew his sword. There was not a mountain robber with the plunderers, not one! they were all Jekranees and Doombkees, of Poolejee and Chuttur.

Page 123.

"Keeping incessantly on the watch," &c.

The whole of this story regarding Captain McKenzie, &c., is wilfully false, for the statements of the parties giving the true account of what occurred, made on oath before Major Jacob as magistrate, were in the possession of Sir C. Napier before he left Sinde.

The attempt to surprise a hill fort, attributed to McKenzie, is false and absurd; there are no hill forts, and no hills were within his reach.

The men killed and wounded by the 6th Irregular Cavalry on this occasion were our own people, who were murdered in the most barbarous and cowardly manner.

The statements giving the true account of this transaction are appended to these Notes.

The maimed survivors are, and have been since 1848, pensioned by Government.

38.

Page 124.

"Their destruction had a great effect."

It had, indeed!

It gave the greatest possible encouragement to the robbers, while it dismayed and disgusted all honest men. No one *except a robber* was safe.

Page 124.

"The General then offered," &c.

What a state of affairs have we here! The Chandias are British subjects, and are allowed and encouraged to assist the neighbouring tribes in murdering each other! Can anything be imagined more mischievous or more contemptible than the whole of these frontier proceedings.

Page 127.

"But really framed in Bombay," &c.

This is not true. The petitions were the genuine productions of the Ameers themselves, unaided by any European, and their contents were generally founded on truth.

Page 127.

"It has been shown that the regular Indian establishment had not been augmented," &c.

This is not true. Some ten thousand men were added to the regular army in the shape of extra companies to each regiment, expressly to meet the demand for troops caused by the conquest of Sinde.

Page 127.

"To secure the frontiers by well-disposed military works."

The Sinde frontier was not in the least secured by Sir C. Napier's forts, &c. Up to January 1847 our troops were shut up behind walls, the peasantry were sometimes encouraged to commit robbery and murder, and at others were destroyed by our own troops!

These frontier "works" against such enemies as the predatory tribes of the border are most pernicious. They proclaim to the plunderers that we are afraid of them, and invite attack.

Fort Fitzgerald produced the sack of Kumbur in its immediate neighbourhood. Had the troops at Larkana been encamped in open lines in the plain, the border plunderers would never have ventured so near to them.

A frontier cannot be protected from the inroads of predatory tribes of horsemen by defensive works. Unless indeed, like the Romans in Britain, you can afford to build a wall from end to end, stop all communication to and fro, and defend your fortifications as the Romans did their British wall, with some four hundred men for every mile in length!

The forts which Major Jacob found on the frontier he pulled down, and totally razed with the happiest effect. None of the troops since the Sinde Irregular Horse guarded the frontier have been posted behind walls; the smallest detachments have always been encamped in open lines ready at all times to act offensively. This gives confidence to our own people, and the robbers have, ever since the arrival of the Sinde Irregular

Horse, been afraid of them, instead of the contrary being the case as formerly.

Major Jacob's plan has been to protect the country folks by exposing the troops. This plan has been followed by profound tranquillity.

Page 129.

"Kurrachee, the seat of Government, was to be fortified," &c.

Who was to attack it? These fortifications are the veriest absurdities imaginable. We *cannot afford* to act on the *defensive* in India—it would ruin us to do so.

Page 130.

"To connect the port of Kurrachee," &c.

Nothing whatever of all this was done, however, or even attempted.

Page 131.

"A carriage-road from Kurrachee was projected."

Nothing whatever was *done*, however. But, since Sir C. Napier's departure, and that of his successor Mr. Pringle, more roads have been made in Sinde in six months than were "projected" even by Sir C. Napier, for the latter never made any.

Page 131.

"The restoration, strengthening, cleaning," &c.

The fort of Hyderabad is a useless, contemptible place: the money expended on it was absolutely thrown away.

Page 132.

"The works," &c.

Nothing of all this was done, commenced, or attempted.

Page 133.

"Guard the navigation," &c.

There was no one to guard against.

Page 133.

"Cæsar's bridge," &c.

The capricious river would have saved *this* trouble at least, and have taken the bridge to pieces off hand.

Page 133.

"The great bund."

See page 52.

Page 133.

"The river, port, docks," &c.

They were neither commenced nor marked out. There was no progress, fast or slow; the things are all purely imaginary.

Page 133.

"In the Afghaun campaign."

The bridge was of boats, and it was indeed removed, but not by man, having been swept away by the river before my eyes in March, 1839. A flying-bridge was then constructed by me, and a suspension-bridge strongly recommended. This was three years before the advent of Sir C. Napier.

Page 134.

"A scientific scheme."

The scheme proved so "scientific" that it was useless to ordinary mortals. Much money was wasted on a canal department, in which the salaries of officers alone amounted to 10,000 rupees a-month; but agriculture was not in the least aided by these proceedings, though canals were dug and bunds made where *not* required.

Page 134.

"An immense correspondence."

This is mere twaddle.

Page 135.

"Were imputed to avarice."

All this is very amusing, vide page 19.

Page 135.

"The fierce Belooche race would not bear."

They bore tyranny well, it seems, but could not endure law!

Page 136.

"Would have brought forty thousand men."

For "forty" read "two," and for "would" read "might" and it will be nearer the truth.

Page 138.

"A great desert was to be passed."

Twenty miles wide.

Page 138.

"Cold, equally destructive to Sepoys," &c.

All this is mere nonsense.

Page 138.

"All their kindred tribes of Kelat," &c.

The "victorious barbarians" might have been three thousand strong, and the "tribes of Kelat," the Brahooees, were their deadly enemies.

Page 139.

"The Murrees, though warlike, were not ferocious," &c.

The Murrees were and are the most inveterate plunderers of all. Though they never plundered in the direction of Sinde until the removal of the Doombkees and Jekranees opened the road to them.

The Kujjucks are an Afghaun tribe, living in Seebee, *wholly in the plain*, and deadly enemies of the Murrees. The Kujjucks are not a predatory tribe at all, and never made any incursions on their neighbours, far or near. They are, however, a brave, manly, and warlike race, more so than any of the plundering tribes.

Page 139.

"Beeja Khan who was now the avowed chief of the hill confederacy," &c.

There was no hill confederacy, and Beeja had no power over, and little connexion with, any of the hillmen.

Page 141.

"Cutch belonged politically and militarily to Scinde."

This is silly and not true. How did Cutch belong to Sinde politically?

Page 142.

"The great rhin or run of Cutch," &c.

The great run lies between Cutch and Sinde—*vide* any map. This part of the text is absolute nonsense.

Page 142.

"Scinde had been hostile in the extreme, and Bombay friendly," &c.

How, then, was Cutch politically connected with Sinde? But the whole of this about Cutch is perfect absurdity. The General never appears to have thought of the trifling circumstance of Cutch being a Hindoo country, under a Hindoo sovereign, and Sinde a Mussulman country altogether.

Page 143.

"Able to separate the two people," &c.

All this shows the grossest ignorance. The people have never been other than separate since Sinde became a Mussulman country in the eighth century. Is it possible that our author can really suppose that any "geographical relations" could have enabled his hero to "incorporate" Mussulmans and Hindoos? The killing beef is a capital crime in Cutch; but a Sindee is as fond of a beefsteak as is an Englishman.

Page 144.

" There existed no religious bar," &c.

This is most absurdly untrue. As regards the Cutch artificers, they are famous all over India, and are employed by all manner of persons in Guzerat and the Deccan, as well as in Sinde. It was, indeed, and is, extremely difficult to induce them to go to Sinde at all.

Page 145.

" He had recently given Bombay help."

Nothing of the kind here mentioned occurred; and Dr. Buist might, with equal propriety and truth, be accused of causing a deluge with rain-gauges as of influencing the hill tribes.

Page 145.

" Such countries could not be governed."

This is such nonsense and impertinence, that it is impossible to deal with it seriously.

Page 146.

The whole of this and the following page is mere ignorance and folly.

Page 148.

" Beloochee battalions, composed of men said to be his deadly enemies."

This is mere deception. The *Beloochee* battalions were, and are, composed chiefly of Patans and Hindoostanees.

Page 149.

"A congregation of adventurers from every country," &c.

This is wholly untrue. The men of the Sinde Irregular Horse are all Hindoostanees. They are no congregations of adventurers, but as much national soldiers as are any men of the English army.

Page 149.

"The strange region now being explored by the General," &c.

This strange region had been pretty well explored before by the troops which the General insisted on sending there in search of health.

Page 150.

"No parallel in any person's previous experience."

These persons must have been but a very short time in Sinde, then, for such dust-storms are not unfrequent.

Page 150.

"Sir C. Napier found a tribe of Rins."

These Rins are purely imaginary. The people alluded to are a part of the great Beloochee family of Rind, which includes many tribes.

Page 152.

"And no man was more formidable than Aliff Khan."

The whole of this scene is absurd nonsense.

Page 152.

" He had five hundred swordsmen."

For "hundreds," read "tens."

Page 152.

" Which must end in the death of one or other."

Considering that Nobut Khan was immediately hanged, this could not possibly have affected the Chandia chief.

Page 153.

" With forty thousand mountaineers."

The Chandias may muster in all two thousand fighting men: they are not mountaineers at all. These forty thousand were therefore men in Buckram; but Sir C. Napier might have done as he pleased with Wullee Mahomed,—there would have been no rising in his behalf.

Page 158.

" As to send his two sons," &c.

Beejah Khan had but one son.

Page 159.

" He, however, at once showed the foulness of the accusation, &c."

The accusation was in great part well founded.

Page 160.

" He had likewise sent troops to Ahmed Khan," &c.

This is not true, there was more fever at this wretched

place, Ahmed Khan, than elsewhere, and the men were harassed almost to death by the foolish marches to that desolate spot, and all the annoyances there suffered.

Page 161.

" And fifteen Talpour princes."

Wretched persons begging their bread. Their treatment was a disgrace to the English name. Ali Morad hated them, but for very shame he must have supported them, had he not been able to throw the odium of not doing so on the British authorities.

Page 162.

This account of the arrack is only an improvement on Sir C. Napier's absurd stories. About its being made from bhang, &c., the stuff is in truth made from sugar and molasses.

Page 165.

" To chastise the robbers of the hills," &c.

The hill-men were the Murrees and Bhoojtees, of whom Sir C. Napier never touched a man. The Doombkees and Juckranees under Berjah and Durrza Khan, lived wholly in the plains, and had no sort of connexion with the men of the hills.

The hundred thousand uncontrollable warriors are all purely imaginary; the whole of the predatory mountaineers amounted to some four thousand in all, and their courage was not of the most uncontrollable nature.

Why style it the desert of Kusmore? at Kusmore there is no desert. There is no water whatever in the desert, and there are no wells or forts in it, whether with round towers or otherwise: a successful attack on

these forts would certainly be very difficult, for they are verily castles in the air! It is true, however, that British warriors have sometimes been dismayed by a mirage!

The Belooch robbers of the hills were at this time wholly footmen—they had not a horse among them. The people of the plains, again, attached to Beejah, were all horsemen, and were masters of the plain country. While Beejah was in power, no hill-man dared show his face in the plain with hostile intent.

The Beelooch swords are very bad: they are all made, not of steel, but of soft iron, with a little strip of steel down the edge, which is kept very sharp. These are all made at Shickarpoor; the weapons are formidable from their weight and sharpness, but retain any shape to which they may be bent, being no more elastic than an old iron hoop; a good English cast-steel sword will cut one of these swords in two without sustaining any injury itself.

None of the Belooch swords are ever made at Damascus or Cutch!

The difference between the common matchlock and the others is imaginary; the difference is in external ornament only. The Belooch seldom practice with their matchlocks; powder and lead are scarce: with rare exceptions they are contemptible marksmen at any distance beyond 80 yards.

"Wug" means a herd of camels, and has nothing to do with plundered cattle.

Page 168.

"When a foray," &c.

This was true enough under the arrangements made by Sir C. Napier for guarding the frontier; his pet

camel corps was wisely posted at Larkhana, not only out of reach, but with an impassable branch of the Indus between it and the enemy, which it took about a week to get across in boats. The frontier cavalry was posted inside forts, and the effect of all these arrangements was that our troops were held in contempt, and the plunderers every where feared. The country was overrun far and wide, and there was not the least protection for life or property up to the very walls of Shickarpoor. Captain McKenzie never surprised any one except his friend; his men cut up in a shocking manner a great number of our own harmless peasantry, for which Sir Charles gave him great praise in orders, and the mutilated survivors of whom are now receiving pensions from Government, obtained for them by me, some three years after the receipt of their wounds, &c.

The Kelat Government has always been wholly on our side since 1841. Neither it nor any of the Kelat Sirdars have since that time swerved in the least from their allegiance; in fact the wretched people had and have no resource but in our protection.

The remark about Outram is a piece of insolent impertinence, calculated only to raise a smile of contempt at the ignorance or malice of the author.

Page 170.

"Offering him and the Murrees, the Doombkee and Boogtee lands, see page 184, where it is said that these lands were to be given to the Khyheerees! the fact is that nothing of all this is true. I was employed in January and February, 1845, in endeavouring to get some other people to occupy the lands then held by Beejah Khan, and the choice of the tribes was left to me to arrange as I could.

Page 171.

" The infamous arts of Dr. Buist."

This is the very essence of malicious folly! Our author might as well say they fell by the arts of Dean Swift.

Page 174.

" The unceasing efforts of the Bombay faction to excite insurrection."

This is grossly and ridiculously false.

Page 178.

" For not more than 18,000 or 20,000."

Not more, certainly! Divide by six, and the numbers will be about the truth.

Page 184.

" From the same place, also at a fixed time, Jacob's Moguls, 500 strong, were to follow Fitzgerald," &c.

The whole of this account is incorrect and false. Fitzgerald, the camel corps, volunteers, &c., were all placed under the orders of Major Jacob, and all marched under his orders from Larkana.

HEAD QUARTERS, SUKKUR, 12*th January*, 1845.

1.—The troops will take the field on the 13th instant. The following arrangements are made.

LARKHANA.

7.—The Sinde Horse and Camel Corps, with the Volunteers of H. M. 39th Regiment mounted on the

camels of the latter regiment, together with the two mountain guns, are to march from Larkhana on the morning of the 13th, under the orders of Captain Jacob.

SHICKARPOOR.

8.—Captain Mowatt's troop of Horse Artillery is to march from Shickarpoor on the morning of the 14th, to Jaghun, and on the 15th to Khanghur, and await orders.

When at Khanghur, Major-general Hunter, C. B., is to establish temporarily his head-quarters, and push forward each corps to Poolajee as rapidly as he can command carriage, and which can only be done when it is known that the advance-guard under Captain Jacob has found sufficient water. If he has not, the whole of the carriage must be applied to furnish water to the advance-guard—and in order that such accident may be provided for, the pioneers under Lieut. Maxwell are to be pushed on to Poolajee before any other troops, in order to open wells.

KHANGHUR.

Captain Salter will be so good as to assemble the 6th Irregular Cavalry at Khanghur, on the 15th instant, to march on Poolajee under the immediate command of the Governor on the 16th, as the troops will, by that day, be everywhere in movement. Captain Salter need not consider it necessary to leave strong guards, but merely a few men to protect the quarters, and thus the 6th Irregular Cavalry will muster as strong as possible for the advance to support Captain Jacob.

Want of water (the wells at Rojaun never having been cleared out since he left the frontier in 1842) compelled

him to send away all but the Sinde Irregular Horse, not 500 but 800 strong. These horsemen were not distressed so as to prevent their being perfectly efficient, as they immediately proved by marching 37 miles further and taking Shahpoor at the end of the march.

There were and are no wells in the desert.

Poolejee had been abandoned and burnt already before a man moved. *Vide* letter from Sir C. Napier, dated 8th January, 1845. There was no thought of restoring the Khyheerees at this time, it was done afterwards on the recommendation of Major Jacob, who under orders from Sir C. Napier, had first offered these lands to the Chandias and others: when no one could be found to take them, recourse was had to the Khyheerees. *Vide* letters from Sir C. Napier, dated 22nd and 24th January, 1845.

Page 187.

"Rojaun, 14 miles West of Khanghur," &c..

Nine and a-half miles only. The Camel Corps did not precede them, as has been shown above.

There are no wells in the desert.

The S. I. H. lost nine horses, but the rest were so little distressed that Jacob immediately marched to Shahpoor, 37 miles further, and took the place at once, though at first sharply opposed.

It was the Camel Corps and European Infantry that trammelled Jacob. With his own men only he could have gone anywhere and done anything, but the Infantry were helpless and the Camel Corps was found so ill provided for such expeditions that to enable Fitzgerald to draw water for his camels, Jacob

had to supply him with ropes and buckets, which the men of the S. I. H. had carried on their horses.

Page 187.

" He will this night attack Poolajee."

There was no one to attack at Poolejee; the place was a smoking ruin, completely abandoned some days before.

Page 188.

" The distance to Ooch was forty."

The distance from Khanghur to Ooch is exactly twenty-eight miles; from Ooch to Shahpoor, twelve. The march of forty miles over heavy sand of our historian was in truth a march of twenty-eight miles, of which four miles was over heavy sand, and the remaining distance, twenty-four miles, over a hard level plain.

Page 190.

" MacMurdo fell on him, sword in hand," &c.

This is capital! but it is hardly original; there is something very like it in Knickerbocker's 'New York.' *See* the battle between Peter Stuyvesant and the valiant Jan Kisingh.

Page 191.

" Surprised and defeated the hill-men under Wuzzeer Khan," &c.

There was not a hill-man among them—not one!

Page 191.

"His wild Moguls."

Why Moguls? and why wild? The fellows are civilized beings enough!

Page 192.

All this is highly exaggerated, and some of it ridiculous. The distances given are totally erroneous.

Page 192.

"The valiant Chandian had at the same time taken Poolejee."

Poolejee had been deserted and burnt long before the valiant Chandian came near it, there was not a soul in the place, or a roof on a house when he arrived, and when Major Jacob arrived next day, he found the valiant Chandias almost frightened to death, and quite out of all propriety.

Page 194.

"I think is scarcely possible," &c.

It was perfectly possible, and perfectly in accordance with experience.

Yarroo was quite true to us; he was and is one of our very best guides, the information he gave on this occasion was strictly correct. This "double dealer" was perfectly trustworthy, he has always been faithful to us, and has been many times wounded in our service, in which also he has lost a son, killed by the Murrees.

Page 194,

"From some negligence or error."

From the greatest mismanagement and ignorance of

the arrangements requisite in these matters. The General knew nothing of Indian commissariat arrangements.

Page 195.

"So alarmed Bejah," &c.

Beejah was not at Tung (the "Tonge" of the text) at this time, and his flight was imaginary.

Page 196.

"Belooche Khan of Lheree."

This is untrue. From the first in 1839, till the present time, Belooche Khan has always been friendly and submissive to the British.

Page 196.

"The Murrees hem him in on the north," &c.

This was the only chance of capturing Beejah, &c. Had the Murrees not hemmed them in on the north, they never would have been in the slightest danger.

Page 197.

"The mother of Deyrah Khan (properly Duryah Khan) Jekranee," &c.

One would suppose from all this that the Doomkees and Jekranees were strangers to us! yet Beejah, Durrya, and hundreds of their men were in our service years before. They were quite familiar with us, and knew our ways as well as possible.

Page 199.

"The desolate crags of Trukkee their real situation was at this time a mystery."

All is silly and untrue. Major Jacob was often in Trukkee when in the hills in 1839-40. The place appears in "its real situation" in Arrowsmith's Map of Asia (marked "Turuckee"), published in 1842.

Page 203.

"Terrified at this prospect, the camel-men."

This is too absurd to require serious denial. All the *camel-men in Sinde read the 'Bombay Times,' and the 'Delhi Gazette!'*

Page 209.

"Detached Fitzgerald's fighting camel corps."

Precious commissariat arrangements these! Fitzgerald's corps required food as well as other soldiers, and there were one thousand men to feed, with five hundred camels, while in the ordinary way two hundred would have amply sufficed for a guard.

Page 210.

"His troopers, though Moguellaees, had been for a moment panic-struck," &c.

This is not true. McMurdo informed Major Jacob by letter, that the men behaved splendidly, and Sir C. Napier complimented them in Orders by name, but it is now discovered that they were panic-struck.

GENERAL ORDER by SIR C. J. NAPIER, G. C. B., Governor of SINDE, HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP SIBBEE, *9th February*, 1845.

The skilful and courageous conduct this day exhibited by Captain McMurdo and twelve men of the Sinde Irregular Horse, in effecting their retreat from very superior numbers of the enemy, does all that were engaged in this affair the greatest credit, proving them to be good and stalwart soldiers, yielding no ground to the enemy, and though out-numbered, forcing a dangerous pass and carrying off their booty victoriously. The conduct of Sowars Radoo Khan, Nujjoo Khan, and Seedee Ismail, was particularly gallant, and worthy the glorious regiment they belong to.

(Signed) E. GREEN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Page 211.

"Because of McKenzie's action."

This is not true.

Page 211.

"And send in exchange a shower of grape from ten pieces of artillery," &c.

This is empty swagger, or deliberate murder.

Page 215.

"Whence the patrols could communicate with the Murrees by the defile of Surtoof," &c.

As well as they could communicate with England by the overland mail! There is no defile nor anything resembling one at Surtoof.

Page 216.

"Jacob holding the forts of Poolejee, Oolejee, and Lheree."

Major Jacob held the whole country from Burshoree to Lharee, but never thought of occupying the contemptible places which the historian calls forts. The Sinde Irregular Horse always encamped outside in the open plain. The remark about the Kelat tribes is a piece of impertinence; there was no secret hostility, and there are no "Kelat tribes" in or about the Bolaun. The people of the Bolaun are Murrees and Kákurs only, and these are few and wretched.

Page 217.

"There were two Muzzaree tribes," &c.

This is entirely a mistake, the hill Muzzarees are imaginary beings, they have no real existence.

There is but one Muazzree tribe, which resides wholly in the plains about Kussmore, and thence along the right bank of the Indus, northward.

Page 218.

"Hindoo merchants for they, and their followers fought bravely."

The idea of Hindoo merchants in Scinde fighting bravely, or fighting at all for anything, is the very climax of absurdity.

Page 219.

"Ali Shere Khosah."

Ali Shere Khosah never resided within sixty miles of

the hills. He lived at Burshoree, and in that neighbourhood. He was a contemptible knave of no power or consideration, and was never of any note as a border robber.

Page 234.

"From their tent-doors they could see the very places where former expeditions had failed," &c.

This is shamefully false. The place was close to the spot where a fight had occurred between the Boogtees and a detachment of Major Billamore's force in 1839-40, with the most complete and brilliant success to the latter.

Beejah Khan, Durrya Khan, and Mundoo Khan were Jemadars of Belooche Horse under Major Jacob's command all through the year 1842. So far from being unknown, Mundoo was a notorious character from the first, but he was no brother nor near relation of Beejah's.

Page 236.

"Islam Khan escaped with his Boogtees," &c.

Islam Khan and his whole tribe remained perfectly uninjured. They did not become wanderers at all, but returned immediately to Deyra where they resided, and conducted themselves just as heretofore. They were not "a poor remnant," the Boogtee tribe was totally uninjured by Sir C. Napier's campaign save by the loss of a few cattle, which they soon recovered ten-fold from Sinde.

Page 237.

"Had menaced them, and he could now easily reach them."

This is completely misrepresented, and is not true.

Page 223.

" For the habit of poisoning wells," &c.

This is wholly untrue ; such a thing as poisoning the wells was not only never practised, but never heard of in this country, and it is, indeed, directly opposed to the bold character of the Belooche.

Page 224.

" Induced thereto by a previous menacing message."

This is not correct. They were induced thereto by the proceedings of Major Jacob, to whom was entrusted, by Sir C. Napier, the task of bringing the Murrees over to our side. The Wukkeels first came to Major Jacob at Lharee, and were sent by him to Sir C. Napier's camp.

(*Vide* Letters appended.)

The General did not menace the Murrees, but coaxed them, and made them presents and many promises.

The Murrees alone prevented Beejah's escape, and long before this time Major Jacob had been directed to make the offers to the Murrees here mentioned.

The general could only have made war on the Murrees by a breach of faith. He instructed Jacob to do all in his power to induce them to be on our side and to assist us. ... Jacob did so, and was at last successful, otherwise the Doombkees and Jekranees would have been safe. The hot season had almost commenced, and Sir C. Napier could not have remained in the hills many weeks longer, so that the Murrees could not *then* have been reduced by force.

Page 238.

"With less than five thousand men," &c.

All this is either wholly false, or enormously exaggerated. There was positively no line of forts at all, nor any single place worthy of the name of a fort at Ooch, Tullar, &c., &c.; there is not a semblance of a wall of any kind, nor a sign of human habitation. Shahpoor is no fort. Lharee proved friendly, while Poolejee and Chuttur were deserted before our arrival. There are no other places.

The breadth of the desert is just twenty-one miles instead of eighty, as here asserted. Where Sir C. Napier marched (on commencing the campaign), namely, from Khanghur to Ooch, the distance is exactly twenty-eight miles; this distance Sir C. Napier calls forty miles. Our historian doubles it again, and says the desert is eighty miles wide.

Page 242.

"Lharee was given to Belooche Khan."

Lharee had been Belooche Khan's, and his ancestors before him for ages, and was never taken from him.

Page 244.

"Neither was Beejah's complaint of perfidy without weight, for although Captain Postan's," &c.

It appears to have been forgotten that Postan's affair occurred in 1839-40, and that in 1841-42, Beejah Khan, Durrya Khan, Belooche Khan, and Mundoo Khan, were all in British pay, attached to the Sinde Irregular Horse, and that they served faithfully and well under command of Major Jacob through the period of the Cabool disasters. That they ever again took to plundering was solely owing to ignorance and mismanagement on the part of the British authorities in Sinde.

Page 252.

"Though at times British detachments had got through the first passes, they were invariably cut off in the end," &c.

This is wilfully false, for Sir C. Napier was well informed of the truth. Major Billamore's force marched all over these hills in 1839-40, and completely beat the mountaineers in fair fight, without a shadow of failure or disaster. On that occasion many of the Sinde Irregular Horse, Raitt, Clarke, Jacob, and others, were often in this mysterious place—Trukkee.

Page 255.

"Before the hill campaign," &c.

All this is wholly untrue. The country was tolerably quiet only for a few months, and then became one continued scene of rapine and murder.

Page 255.

"The Khan of Kelat's revenue was thus augmented by two lacs and a half," &c.

This is ludicrously untrue; the whole revenue of Cutchee, under the most favourable circumstances, never having amounted to one lac, before then or since.

Page 256.

"The wandering Boogtees," &c.

Why "wandering?" They lived, as before, at Deyra, and *now* plundered in Sinde without any interference from Beejah Khan, who had before reserved this field for his own incursions. The position of the Boogtees was improved, and their power increased since the hill campaign. The Murrees were the most impudent knaves; they plundered all Cutchee, and then abused the wretched Khyheerees, while the General countenanced these robbers, and threatened the honest men.

Page 256.

"But no pains were spared to bring them to a peaceable disposition," &c.

These pains consisted in ordering all Boogtees, wherever found, with their cattle, to be captured or killed, and offering a reward of 10 rupees a-head for the whole tribe! (*Vide* Proclamation).

Page 256.

"He would at once and for always have ended the robber system."

The robber system has now been put an end to by the exertion of a little common sense.

Page 257.

"From the robbers nothing serious was now to be dreaded," &c.

This is wholly incorrect. The worst inroad ever known on the border occurred in December 1846, when some fifteen hundred or more Boogtees and outlaws of all sorts marched in one body from the hills, plundered all the country up to fifteen miles from Shickarpoor, and returned to the hills with all their plunder in perfect safety, a cavalry regiment which came up to them on their retreat thinking them too strong to be attacked. On this occasion the plunder was immense, amounting to some fifteen thousand head of cattle and sheep.

Page 258.

"But it was restored," &c.

This is wholly false. The thing proved a perfect failure; had it succeeded, the country must have become a desert. While all this silly but costly affair of the bund was going on, there was no road from Sukkur to Shickarpoor, and none was made or attempted during the administration of Sir C. Napier, yet this is the most important piece of road in the whole province of Sinde!

Page 261.

"When the enemy's horsemen sweeping, as is their wont," &c.

When was this ever seen? Their wont is to run away.

Page 262.

"They had, indeed, existed nominally," &c.

The matchless impudence of these falsehoods is quite wonderful. In Sir C. Napier's own words, our author "turns out a lie like a man what knows his trade!"

The Sinde Irregular Horse had, indeed, existed, not nominally only, but in stern reality, and had seen some pretty tough work before Sir C. Napier came to India. Captain Jacob, the present Commandant, received command of the corps in December, 1841, which he held all through the time of the Cabool disasters before Sir C. Napier's arrival in Sinde. Captain Jacob was *not* selected by Sir C. Napier, who had nothing whatever to say to the matter, but by Colonel Outram. The baggage corps was a specimen of the most consummate folly.

Page 263.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Outram likewise published in the newspapers such slanders."

This is wilfully and infamously false.

Page 266.

All these stories are false and unfounded.

Page 267.

"Partisan warfare."

This was mere vulgar murder and robbery.

Page 268.

"Instead of hankering after their former vocation."

If this were not practising their former vocation, what was it?

Nothing could have been more absurd or more ruinous to the peace of the country than thus encouraging our own subjects to commit robbery and murder. The moral iniquity of the proceeding it is, of course, useless to allude to; but the whole story—this "consummation of a profound policy," &c.—is an afterthought, and is *false!* (*vide* letters from Sir C. Napier, flatly contradicting the text, wherein he writes to Major Jacob that he, Sir C. Napier, had acted "like an ass" in ever allowing Durrya Khan and his men to bear arms even, and that he had been persuaded to do so against his own opinion!

Page 269.

"As I never put on a tax."

This is untrue.

Page 269.

"One iota of it being true, hanging would have been too good for me."

It was true, however.

Page 270.

"And these accusations were so ingeniously concocted," &c.

This is not true. (See Notes to page 56.)

When Captain Rathborne, by reserving the Government grain, had raised the bazaar prices up to three times their natural rates, the chowdry of Jacob's bazaar sent to buy some boat-loads of grain at Sabrul Mote, in the Bawulpoor territory. This grain was admitted free in Upper Sinde, but, on its arrival at Hyderabad, was seized by the collector, Captain Rathborne, for the import-duty lately imposed by order of Sir C. Napier. (*Vide* letters annexed.) The transit-duties were imposed by Sir C. Napier; that is, in spite of the proclamation of the Governor-general, they were never really taken off. When Major Jacob was in command, and was magistrate at Meerpoor, in 1843, proclamations were sent to him to publish to the effect that all transit-duties were henceforth abolished. He did publish these accordingly; but a short time afterwards the country people complained to him that a man had come to various villages in the Meerpoor district, and was collecting transit-dues on everything, under written orders from Captain Rathborne, collector of Hyderabad. The man was brought before Major Jacob, when he produced orders, signed and sealed by the collector, directing everybody to pay him these transit-duties. Major Jacob, thinking that in the face of the proclamation above mentioned, these orders must be forgeries, detained the man in custody, and informed Captain Rathborne of his proceedings. In reply, the collector informed Major Jacob that the orders were genuine

documents; and that though the proclamations were still being published far and wide, it was not intended to act on them. Comment is unnecessary on this!

Page 273.

"The Bombay councillors complained of the grain being high priced," &c.

The cause was the proceedings of Captain Rathborne, and the motive was the improving the Sinde balance-sheet in appearance. (*Vide* Notes to page 56.)

Page 280.

"Were guarded by a regiment of regular cavalry," &c.

Guarded after a strange fashion! No man was safe; the whole country was plundered, and every one in Upper Sinde in a state of alarm.

Pages 281 to 302.

These pages contain nothing but descriptions of castles in the air, of as great importance as such buildings usually are.

Page 302.

"All are addicted to robbery and murder."

(*Vide* Note to page 36.)

Page 315.

"The conquest of Sinde has not cost a single shilling to the East India Company."

Ten thousand men were added to the army expressly to meet the demand for troops caused by the conquest of Sinde.

The two regiments of Sinde Irregular Horse alone cost 70,000*l.* a-year, and the two Belooche battalions 20,000*l.*

Page 324.

The whole of this page is grossly incorrect. Instead of a camel with merchandize requiring five weeks for the journey from Kurracchee to Shickarpoor, only eighteen days are necessary. I have had many hundreds of camels sent from Kurrachee to Jacobabad (two marches further than Shickarpoor) with all manner of stores, and the animals take just twenty days for the journey; with a proper road, fifteen days would suffice.

Cafilas frequently muster two hundred to three hundred camels, and there is seldom more than *one man to five camels*, instead of two men to each camel as asserted in the text. A camel can be hired from Kurrachee to Jacobabad, carrying 400 lbs., for eight rupees.

The cost of putting the same quantity of goods on board a steamer at Kurrachee, landing it at Sukkur, and bringing it by cart to the frontier, would very nearly amount to this sum, so that if the steamer carried freight for nothing, there would be little advantage gained by using her. But in truth the freight charged was and is *enormous*, while the goods were and are far more injured on board of the steamers than on camels.

The road through Sinde might have been dangerous under Sir C. Napier's administration, but it is *now* perfectly safe, and no guards are ever required or used.

Page 330.

"Because it displayed the truth."

Not so! there is no truth in the "forcible exposition," it is a tissue of falsehood throughout.

Pages 331, 332, 333.

"The miserable Boogtees," &c.

All this is grossly misrepresented. The Boogtees were more formidable than ever by reason of the removal of the Doombkees and Jekranees from Cutchee, whereby the plain country was left open to the incursions of the mountaineers.

This inroad of the Boogtees in December 1846 was by far the most serious invasion of Sinde ever made by the predatory tribes since our first entrance into the country in 1838. The foray of the mountaineers was perfectly successful; they lost but one man, killed by a random shot of a Jekranee! the man who fired it is now serving among the Belooche guides attached to the Sinde Irregular Horse. The invaders secured all their plunder, which was of very large amount, and carried everything to the hills in safety. The Boogtee force on this occasion was certainly not less than a thousand men fully armed with match-locks, &c., and five hundred more half armed. The Boogtees themselves say that they were near two thousand in all.

Notwithstanding the assertion in the text, it is certain that timely notice *was* sent to Shahpoor, and the letter conveying it found among the records of that post is now in my possession. The story about Younghusband is greatly misrepresented. There was no foray, and the wretched Moondranees were living peaceably beyond our border. They were *in their huts with their women and children* when attacked, as Younghusband's report shows. How could they then have been on a foray, or intending one!

Page 333.

"Meanwhile the Boogtees," &c.

All this is untrue. On the very night before Major Jacob and the Sinde Irregular Horse arrived on the frontier, 9th January 1847, the Boogtees made an incursion into Sinde—the last they ever made—and three days before they carried off a number of camels from a party of the baggage corps between Jaghun and Shickarpoor.

Page 333.

"He had torn away their personal ornaments."

This *is true*, a woman kept by an officer was posted at the gate of the fort and employed by the prize-agents to search the women as they went out; large quantities of ornaments were seized in this way, torn from the persons of women. Such was the conqueror's extreme delicacy here boasted of!

Page 333.

"To abstract nearly two millions sterling from the Ameer's public treasury."

This is impudently false. The treasury in the first place never contained half of this sum, and in the next the wretched ladies were glad enough to escape with persons uninjured, for they were frightened almost to death by the brutal proceedings going on around them. Not even the furniture of their bed-rooms, not so much as their work-boxes escaped from the lynx-eyed prize-agents: all was seized and sold.

Page 339.

"The grateful Belooche chiefs."

This sword affair was a piece of clap-trap, got up by Captain Rathborne, collector of Hyderabad.

Page 369.

"The camel baggage corps," &c.

The camel baggage corps was a silly and wasteful absurdity, conceived in ignorance and continued in obstinate folly in spite of common sense, reason, and experience. It has lately been abandoned.

Page 339.

"Destroyed, as far as their power went, every great work."

This is absurdly false. More really useful public works have been sanctioned and *executed* since Sir C. Napier left Scinde than he ever talked about even. With the exception of the mole at Kurrachee, *no public works* of real utility were executed during the whole administration of Sir C. Napier, though enormous sums were thrown away on absurdities.

Page 340.

"The breaking up of the annual mart for horses."

This is impudently false; there is exactly the same horse-mart now as there has been for ages. Nothing whatever was done by Sir C. Napier in the matter, and nothing was required to be done. The Afghauns still, as formerly, bring all the horses they have for sale annually to Bombay, and "en passant" sell as many as

they can in Sinde, but the "fine animals at a cheap rate" is imaginary; the Afghaun horse is the worst of, all the breeds of horses in the East, of course sells at a proportionally low rate, but the animal is not there cheap in reality.

The story of the magazine in Bukkur is not true; a new magazine was built there, at an enormous cost, in 1845, and there it is still.

Page 341.

"Long had Sir C. Napier striven to abate that ferocity and induce them to settle."

By ordering themselves and their cattle to be captured and killed; and by offering 10 rupees a-head for the destruction of the whole tribe! They were ferocious barbarians, indeed, not to be sensible of such kindness.

Page 341.

"Several recent minor defeats in Kelat."

What were these minor defeats in Kelat?

I have served in Sinde, Beloochistan, and Afghaunistan for more than fifteen years, and know of none such.

Page 342.

This and the following page contains nothing but falsehood and misrepresentation. The predatory habits, the practice of private warfare, with murder and robbery, were, by the historian's own showing, encouraged among our own subjects. Until 1847, the Beloochees, along the *British side* of the Sinde frontier, were as great plunderers and as bloodthirsty as those on the other.

They were allowed to bear arms and to use them in private warfare, and were sometimes called on to avenge the disgrace of our troops! All this has long ago been stopped, but *not* by Sir C. Napier. The Doombkees, Jekranees, &c., until the arrival of the Sinde Irregular Horse on the frontier in January, 1847, had never put their hands to anything but weapons of war. These Major Jacob totally deprived them of, and *now*, indeed, they have really taken to the plough and the mattock, and throw into the performance of their agricultural labour, the same superior energy which they formerly displayed in their forays.

Page 369.

"Though they have the advantage of single-handed James Outram."

This impertinent sneer returns with redoubled force on its utterer, for single-handed (say single-hearted) James Outram settled the affairs in no time, and restored all to perfect peace and quiet.

Page 370.

"At once ordered every pillager to be flogged."

What is the meaning of this fuss about a very ordinary affair?

Sir C. Napier merely followed the usual course, and did what every commander in the field has always done.

Page 385.

"The influence of the Ameers nearly crippled my operations."

This is not in accordance with fact.

Page 392.

" General Napier's book written at such a distance as to be beyond the reach of consultation, but it has only been read by me during the last forty-eight hours."

Sir C. Napier received and corrected the proof sheets of the conquest of Sinde, when in the Boogtee hills, six months before the date of this letter! *vide* letter from Sir C. Napier, dated 2nd February, 1845.

Camp, Shikarpoor,
14th February, 1852.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I was very much grieved to read in the papers the letter which I now return (Sir C. Napier's letter to the Governor-General, 3rd August, 1845), because, though certain events have made me doubt what I would feign believe, I cannot conceal from myself that this unhappy letter should never have been written, being in opposition to what I know to be the fact, the proof sheets or manuscript having been seen by many in the Boogtee hills many months before August, 1845. I will say no more on this very painful subject.

Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) EDWARD GREEN.

24th February, 1852.

MY DEAR JACOB,—In reply to your note of the 22nd instant, regarding the proof manuscript of General W. Napier's book, the conquest of Sinde, I cannot hesitate to state that many sheets of the proof manuscript were received by Sir C. Napier, when we were in the

Boogtee hills in 1845. The circumstance I fully recollect, for Fitzgerald was asked to correct, or did correct, some statement in them regarding his personal encounter with some Beloochees, which were incorrectly given in the manuscript, and it was a subject of much conversation among the staff officers employed in the hills at that time.

I mention this as you require information on this point, and there can be no mystery about it.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD GREEN.

Page 409.

"Major Jacob did not succeed to the command of the frontier till 1846."

Major Jacob did not succeed to the command of the frontier the second time till January, 1847, and had no hand in the disorderly proceedings carried on there from 1843 till that date. He held the frontier, however, through the year 1842.

Page 414.

"10,000 Chandias, under Wullee Mahomed,—7,000 under Meer Mahomed Hussain, and 10,000 under Shere Mahomed."

These were most Buckram men,—for 27,000 read 3,000.

PAPERS

REGARDING THE

FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PREDATORY TRIBES OF CUTCHEE IN 1839-40,

AND

AFFAIRS OF THE SINDE FRONTIER.

MAJOR BILLAMORE'S SURVIVING SUBALTERN

versus

SIR WILLIAM NAPIER.

"NON ME TUA FERVIDA TERRENT
DICTA, FEROX."

PAPERS, ETC.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ROBBER TRIBES OF CUTCHEE IN 1839–40.

To the Editor of the Naval and Military Gazette.

Sir,—A series of Letters has lately (November and December, 1852) appeared in your paper under the signature "Elian," commentating in terms of gross and course abuse on a little work "Memoir of the Campaign in the Hills North of Cutchee." It is publicly believed (*vide* "Mitchell on Tactics," page 237) that this "Elian" is Sir William Napier.

The style of these Letters, the recklessness of assertion, the matchless effrontery with which the most palpable mis-statements are put forth, completely confirm this belief, and proclaim the author to be one with the historian of Scinde.

I will not attempt to compete with him in invective. His coarse vulgar violence of language excites no anger, nor any other feelings than pity and contempt. But as you have published in your journal these Letters, containing innumerable untruths regarding Major Jacob of

the Scinde Irregular Horse, and purporting to quote letters from him to Sir C. J. Napier, I shall be obliged by your reading the papers which accompany this letter, which require no comment from me, but which, as you will perceive, contain the most clear and positive refutation of those falsehoods. Nearly every line of "Elian's" Letters contains at least one mis-statement. It is useless, and would be wearisome to detail all of these,—a few will suffice as specimens. "Elian's" remarks regarding "Amiel's Beloochee levy being Bengal troops, the Doomkees and Jekranees being hill tribes," &c., betray such ignorance, or such recklessness, as have seldom been displayed in print, save by the author of "Administration of Scinde." It is impossible for me to hold up to view the ground as it is, a dead level, to prove it not to be hill; but every one who has any personal acquaintance with the country and its people, must at once recognise the fidelity and accuracy of the description given by "Major Billamore's Subaltern;" while surely it cannot be necessary to inform even an English public that wild Beloochee horsemen, hired for a temporary purpose in Eastern Cutchee, are not Bengal troops. The "Subaltern" shows that the Beloochee levy ran away from the Doomkees and Jekranees, and not from the "hill-men," as "Elian" states, and the Beloochee levy was not in any way under the command of Major Billamore.

The "Subaltern" is accused by "Elian" of inconsis-

tency, in having said that up to 1839-40, the mountain tribes seldom infested the plains, while he himself describes their frequent incursions in 1846-7. Where is the inconsistency? The removal of the Doomkees and Jekranees—the warriors of the plains—from Cutchee, undoubtedly enabled the hill-men, both Murrees and Boogtees, to overrun the plain country at their ease, in the absence of proper arrangements for the protection of the Scinde frontier, which arrangements Sir C. Napier has recorded were not made effectually until Major Jacob arrived on the frontier (*vide* "Observations" annexed).

With regard to Poolejee, the description given by the "Subaltern" will be recognised as exact by all who have ever seen the place, and "Fitzgerald" will doubtless tell "Elian," if he asks him, that he did not storm Poolejee, and that the failure before it was "disgraceful." Sir C. Napier appears to have been of the same opinion at the time (*vide* Letter, 30th April, 1844). "Elian" denies that Sir Charles Napier obtained information regarding the hills from Major Jacob; but Sir C. Napier writes (*vide* Letters annexed), that he did so receive the information required:—"Your letter has told me what I wanted to know." As to Truckee, Major Jacob was often in the place in 1840, but there are scores of such places in those hills, and no great importance was attached to that particular spot. Every remarkable rock, even in these hills, has its name. That of this

place, "Turuckee" or Truckee, appears even in Arrowsmith's map of Asia, published in 1842.

With regard to Major Jacob's "cowardice," as displayed when in command of a detached force at Lharee, during Sir Charles Napier's hill campaign, there are Sir C. Napier's orders, giving him high praise for courage as well as conduct in that command, and "Elian" himself accuses him of having at that time wantonly insulted our most formidable enemies, the Murrees, *then in force close to him.* Truth alone is always consistent!

"Elian" asserts that Sir C. Napier first introduced horse batteries into Scinde. He might as well say that his hero invented gunpowder. There were two-horsed field batteries with the Bombay division of Lord Keane's army, which landed in Scinde in 1838, not to mention others with other parts of the army in India and Affghanistan. Moreover, three guns, belonging to a horse battery, were abandoned to the Murrees, after the fight at Nuffoosk, in 1840!

"Elian" asserts that Sir C. Napier treated with the Murrees himself, and employed no one to negotiate with them. It will be seen by the annexed Letters that Major Jacob *was* so employed, and that *he succeeded* in inducing the Murrees to co-operate with Sir C. Napier.

As regards Clibborne's fight at Nuffoosk, "Elian" is entirely in error. The Murrees fled, and did not stop till they were ten miles from the field of the fight. The remarks of the surviving Subaltern on the affair appear

strictly just, as all the survivors can testify. "Elian" would also, it seems, wish to have it believed that all is desert from Shikarpoor to Kundar, &c. But the desert on that road commences at Rojaun (converted by the printer into Mojaim), whence to Burshoree is twenty-nine miles, the breadth of the desert in that direction. Where Sir C. Napier marched on the occasion in question, the desert commenced at Khanghur (now Jacobabad), from which place Sir Charles marched to Ooch, beyond the desert, distant exactly twenty-eight miles.

The shortest road across the desert from Scinde to Cutchee is from Khanghur to Minotee, twenty-one miles, and this of course is the extent of the desert between the two provinces, though Sir W. Napier calls it eighty miles—but then this, "Elian" says, is in another part of his book!

By wandering about in the desert, you might doubtless, as "Elian" wisely points out, make the distance even greater; but "Elian's" method of showing the breadth of the desert by taking the average of a number of distances through various parts of a fine rich country on both sides of the desert, is ingenious and original, to say the least of it.

"Elian" asserts, that Major Jacob recommended the withdrawal of the post of Shahpoor before Merewether's fight with the Boogtees, on the 1st October, 1847. He is in error. Major Jacob was strongly opposed to the withdrawal of the post until long after that date.

He *first* proposed to withdraw it in February, 1848, and did not actually withdraw it till July of the same year.

The ridiculously strong force which "Elian" says was or is maintained under Major Jacob on the Scinde frontier, was and is very much smaller than the force maintained there by Sir C. Napier, while it is certain that the frontier was not really protected at all until the S. I. H. was placed there. Under the former arrangements, a regiment of regular cavalry, two hundred and fifty regular infantry, and the whole of the Scinde Camel Corps (1,000 men and 500 camels), besides strong detachments of police, were posted on the frontier; while the Shikarpoor Brigade, *also under the orders of the frontier commander*, was always on the alert; still there was no safety for the lives and property of the *people* (the *troops* on the outposts were kept safely enough in forts, which Major Jacob has pulled down), while the greater part of the border country, which belonged to Meer Ali Morad, did not then form part of the frontier charge.

Under the arrangements recommended and carried into effect by Major Jacob, the Scinde Horse alone was, and is, posted on the frontier: all other troops, as well as the police, have been long ago withdrawn. Ali Morad's part of the country having been, since 1848, included in the frontier command (although only lately British territory), the frontier charge extends now from

the Western Hills to the river Indus, and all this is kept so as to insure perfect safety to the people by the Scinde Irregular Horse only.

With regard to the rewards offered for killing and capturing Boogtees and their cattle, the proclamation speaks for itself. As to the treatment ordered for the Boogtees who might surrender, the words quoted by "Elian," September, 1847, &c., were written by Sir C. Napier *in consequence* of a remonstrance by Major Jacob against the cruelty and folly of treating the starving Boogtees as enemies, as ordered by Sir C. Napier!! (*Vide* Letters annexed.)

Major Jacob was found fault with by Sir C. Napier, for pointing out that it was quite as necessary "*parcere subjectis,*" as "*debellare superbos.*" But in a few days afterwards, the state of the starving wretches who had been ordered to be treated as enemies being plainly reported to the Lieutenant-General, convinced him of the truth of the Major's words, and of the correctness of his views; and then, and not till then, did the Lieutenant-General write as quoted by "Elian." The Letters in question are annexed, and speak for themselves.

It is painful to proceed further: none of "Elian's" assertions even approach the truth. *All* that he has written, like Sir W. Napier's work on Scinde, is absolutely opposed to the fact.

"Elian's" abuse of dastards cowering behind masks, he himself writing anonymously, and his last silly assertion, that both regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse were

ordered on service to the Punjaub (the *remainder* possibly being left to guard the Scinde frontier), and that Major Jacob, from cowardice, &c., declined going in command of them, are perfect samples of the style and truth of the historian of Scinde, the real character of whose book has been long ago exposed by Major Jacob in print, without any mask or disguise whatever. Five hundred men of the Scinde Irregular Horse were ordered, and went to the Punjaub in 1848, three hundred from the 2nd, and two hundred from the 1st regiment. Major Jacob implored to be allowed to command this detachment; and for pleading and urging his right so to command it too strongly, was severely reprimanded by the Commander-in-Chief. Major Jacob would at the time have given a limb to have been allowed to have gone, but his excellent Lieutenants nobly upheld the honour of their commander and of his corps; and he and they have long ago learned to smile at the praise or blame of the historian of the conqueror of Scinde; with whom, as it suits his purpose, the heroic warrior of one hour is the cowardly knave of the next; while the distances between places vary according to the part of his book in which they may be mentioned, and hill becomes plain, and plain hill, as suits the purposes of the moment.

Your obedient Servant,

THE AUTHOR OF THE

"MEMOIR OF THE FIRST HILL CAMPAIGN."

London, 1*st April*, 1853.

DEFEAT OF MEER SHERE MAHOMED, BY MAJOR JACOB, 14th JUNE, 1843.

Letter from Captain Napier to Major Jacob.

17th June, 1843.

MY DEAR SIR,—The General has received all your letters, and triplicate of your despatch. He congratulates you from his heart on your glorious victory over the Ameer. When we arrived at Nusserpoor, on the evening of the 14th, he intended pushing on himself with the cavalry and artillery to your assistance, as there were reports that you were hard pressed. However, the true reports arrived in the course of the night, and we remained where we were. Next morning the General was attacked by *coup-de-soleil*, and was unable to move. He, however, wrote to you through M'Murdo, and in the evening your despatch arrived, which did him as much good as Dr. Gibbon. He immediately ordered all the Europeans back, and the remainder of the force to follow. Green wrote to you that night to return to Meerpoor, or do as you thought best. We brought the General back the same night, the 15th, in a dooley, and I am happy to say he is out of all danger, and rapidly recovering. To-morrow your despatch goes to Lord Ellenborough.

The 28th lost one officer, and twenty-one were lost in

the expedition, all from apoplexy. They lost eleven in Hydrabad in the same period from the same cause.

The General desires you will give the Brahmin 100 rupees for his services. He is delighted at your victory, and would write himself, but we do not allow him to do much business. One or two days' rest will put him to rights.

Rathborne has information that Shere Mohamed has fled to the desert, finding it impossible to cross the Indus, which is admirably watched by Lieutenant Trushard, who has succeeded Captain Nott.

If this is true, you may catch him; but the General leaves your movements entirely in your own hands, to do as you think best. There is a troop of the 9th cavalry, somewhere near Muttarree, to be under your orders—send to the officer commanding, a native, to give him your orders, as the Adjutant-General's letter to him did not reach him.

Fitzgerald arrived to-day from Sukkur with your field-guns. He starts immediately, either to join you or to look after Shere with some Khyheeree horsemen. Ali Morad will soon be brought to his senses.

I do not think I have anything more to say, except to beg you to excuse this scrawl, but it is late and I am tired.

Very faithfully yours,
(Signed) WILLIAM NAPIER.

Letter from Captain Napier to Major Jacob.

18th June, 1843.

SIR,—The General congratulates you upon the capture of two more guns of Meer Shere Mohamed.

His Excellency wishes you to keep the guns which you took at Meerpoor for the present.

If you think you can spare the infantry, and the two guns attached to your force, you are to send them back to Hydrabad.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) WILLIAM NAPIER,
Captain and A.D.C.

Letter from Captain Napier to Major Jacob.

18th June, 1843.

MY DEAR SIR,—It is confidently believed here, that some of your men have taken Shere Mohamed prisoner. Rathborne has written to you, I believe, upon the subject.

The General leaves your movements entirely to your own judgment, and has caused you to be written to once or twice to that effect. But if you do not want the guns and infantry, you had better send them back.

I am happy to say the General is much better. *Your defeat of Shere Mohamed cured him.*

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WILLIAM NAPIER.

LIBRARY

AFFAIRS OF THE SCINDE FRONTIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

23rd February, 1844.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have yours of the 21st. Your official I have not yet seen, as Green has not been with me, but I cannot wait for that to answer your letter. I think the reduction of your pay so unjust, that I cannot believe the Governor-General knows anything about it, or, if he does, that he knows the real state of the case, because I have never known him unjust to any man, or on any occasion, and therefore I cannot suppose he would order an unjust act towards yourself, whom he has so honoured as to make you his Aide-de-camp, and most deservedly honoured; for I have no hesitation in telling you now, though I never did before, that I consider you one of the best officers I ever met in my life; and it was only a few days ago that, writing to my brother General Napier in Guernsey, I called you the Seidlitz of the Scinde Army. I will write to the Governor-General, and I am confident he will do justice, and that this matter has arisen from some misconception. However, whatever it is, I can tell you *what it is not.* It is not from you having offended Lord Ellenborough; if you had done so, he would have told either yourself or me. I suspect that there must be some regulation of which both we in Scinde and the Auditor-General at Bombay (who has passed all your

accounts, and ought to have known) are ignorant. But this falls very hard upon you, and I will do my best to remedy it, by laying the case before Lord Ellenborough.

Believe me to be, my dear Jacob,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

I cannot express to you how this matter has annoyed me.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

P.S.—Brown has just been here, and tells me he had written to Bombay for copy of all correspondence about you, and I therefore wait till we get this before I write to Lord Ellenborough.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

30th April, 1844.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I will get justice to the Moguls, take my word for it, very soon. It is too bad. This, as well as your case, is all the fault of the gentlemen at Bombay. The letter about you has, I understand, been in the desk of the Secretary to Government. You see that, whoever was in fault, it was not Lord Ellenborough, and as to myself, I will swear I never got the letter. It was at the time we were all cut off before the battle of the 24th. I have not the slightest recollection of it, and we have hunted every letter through; none such is forthcoming; besides, I could not know it, and have bottled it up. I had his Lordship's letter to say you were to command, but no mention of pay. However, there is his present letter to me enclosing the one naming

800; he makes no mention of what he means to do, but I am sure he is too just to make you pay for Willoughby's neglect or oversight. I told Blenkinsop to send you the new Blue Book. How does being poisoned agree with you? I hope you are all right. I cannot get a report of this sad affair at Poolejee; it is the most extraordinary thing that I cannot get a report.

T * * * appears to have lost his head in making the attack;* a *mad attack*, and against my orders: it is very provoking: had you been there, nothing of the kind would have happened.

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

27th December, 1844.

MY DEAR JACOB,—Answer me the following questions if you can:—

1. Is there a road from *Kusmore* (which I believe to be our most northern point) to Deyrah?

2. If so, is it practicable for guns and cavalry? and is there water and supplies to be had?

3. If there is no road from Kusmore, from what point on the right bank *is* there a road?

4. Does the first road, if one exists, and if not, does the second road, run through the Mooltan territory?

5. If you know the road, what style of country does it pass through?

6. What is Deyrah? strong or weak? big or little?

* Attack on Poolejee.

mud or stone? Is the town outside the fort, or inside? Will the folk fight, or not?

7. If I were to offer the Boogtee territory to the Murrees, would they help us by refusing any passage through their lands to Beejah's people?

8. How are the roads from Poolejee to Deyrah?

9. Can I march either by that which runs south or that which runs north? I ought to say as *regards each other*, for by your map they run east and west, but nearly parallel to each other. That which is the most southerly runs by Tayaga (if one can trust to any name in a map); it seems the shortest; are there cross roads between these two?

10. What is the style of country?

11. Is there water?

12. What number of men do you think sufficient to force through it in despite of Beejah Khan? Now just give me replies to these questions as near as you can.

Beejah is said to be in the *hills*, and I think I shall put him to his shifts, and the Boogtees also. Shere Mohamed is, I am inclined to think, with him, or at Kahan with the Murrees. However, whether I plague him or not, a march through this line of country will be of use. I have prepared light guns for some time for you and the camel corps. Practise your twelve artillery-men with those you have, and when we meet I will give you your choice of all we have. My plan of operation is not and cannot be determined on for some days yet; but you will see that the outline is to land at the east end of the Boogtee country, and at the same time enter it by the Tayaga, or western part, and jam the Boogtees, who will fly to their hills; but we may pick up cattle and destroy Deyrah—perhaps catch some within it.

I am sure you will not mention this to any one. I will write to you again when my negotiations with the Khan are over, till then I cannot decide on anything. I wrote very strongly to Hardinge, and pressed the cause of the Scinde Horse as a personal favour. I have offered to give both *regiments* of *cavalry* if he will let *you* form two regiments of Scinde Horse. If it fails I shall be really vexed.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

30th December, 1844.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Your letter of the 27th reached me this evening. There *is a road* from the south-east into the valley of Deyrah, but to get into it you must go much further north than the place marked on the maps "Kusmore."

2. I have no knowledge of this road save from native information collected when we were in the hills in 1839-40.

3. While we were at Deyrah, some people (Bunniahs and others) came there direct from Rojaun and other places on the Indus.

4. There is another road, or rather path, which enters the valley almost directly south from Deyrah, which the marauders made use of, but it is impracticable for loaded camels. I know not where it enters the plain exactly, having only explored some twelve or fifteen miles of it from Deyrah.

5. Except in regard to the supply of water, which is doubtful, the road from Rojaun is certainly practicable for cavalry and camels, but not probably for artillery; indeed, none of the roads in those hills are practicable for artillery, properly speaking; although it may be very possible to transport guns through that country by dint of much previous provision and immense labour.

6. To get into the valley of Deyrah from the south-east it is necessary to go a considerable distance within the Mooltan territory.

7 Deyrah is a small place, a square of about two hundred yards, twenty feet high, with a round tower at each angle, and one gate on the eastern face.

8. It is supplied with water by a small stream which flows from a chasm in the hill, on the north side of the valley, about two miles from the village.

9. The Boogtees will not, I think, attempt to defend the town, which is contemptible, while their hills afford them a sure refuge.

10. There is a very little cultivation near the town, and a little more five or six miles to the westward.

11. Through the chasm whence the water flows is a road into another little valley cultivated and full of cattle. There is another small village in it, called Meerzakeghuree, but there is no water that I could find nearer than the spring above mentioned (about eight miles). Meerzakeghuree is about ten miles from Deyrah.

12. I think that the Murrees might easily be induced to afford us every assistance in their power; they have lately been severely beaten by the Boogtees in more than one fight, and have lost a great number of men. The two tribes have long been at deadly feud, and if the

Murrees were convinced that no harm was intended themselves, they might and would afford valuable assistance to any force acting against the other.

13. The Murrees are honest men enough in their way, and certainly would not allow Beeja to find shelter in, or to pass through their country, if they had promised to the contrary.

14. Teywaugh is the name of a river only from its entering the plain; there is no village of that name.

15. The best road to Deyrah is the northern one of the two laid down in the maps; indeed, I think it is the only one to march a force by.

16. I do not think that there are any cross roads or paths from one to the other; there is an awful range of hills between.

17. There is abundance of water at convenient intervals along the former of the two roads.

18. In all that I have said, I, of course, can only speak of the state of affairs when we were in that country in 1839-40.

19. I do not think that it would be wise to march through the hills with less than one thousand infantry and six guns. If the fellows fight it will be in places where cavalry cannot move. A good body of pioneers will be invaluable, and plenty of artificers should accompany the artillery (I have none with the two guns with me; they were sent back from Kotree).

20. If no regular pioneers are to be had, a company of them might be formed extemporary of lascars, dooley-bearers, and who, if well provided with tools, and with a few sappers to direct them, would answer the purpose tolerably well; the time and trouble saved by these men in such a country is immense.

21. I think that it would be found far better in those hills to have the guns together under an artillery officer or two, instead of their being attached to us; and the camel corps, and ample means of repairing all kinds of damages, should be taken with the battery. The smashes that occur are awful.

22. There is scarcely a blade of forage within the hills, save on a very few favoured spots; and no supplies of any kind are procurable, except perhaps sheep and cattle. The inhabitants bring what grain they consume from the plain country.

23. Beejah Khan formerly had a favourite hiding-place in a ravine about twelve miles east of Poolejee, and another in the hills south of Deyrah, and I think he will be more inclined to remain near the plain country than to attempt to go far into the mountains.

24. He must have with him in his camp a great number of women, followers of all descriptions, camels, and household stuff; to move his family about is no trifling task.

25. If he does occupy any of his old haunts, it is not improbable but that he might be surprised and seized.

26. Indeed he only escaped us before by leaving his hiding-place and surrendering to Mr. Bell.

27. There is no doubt but that by destroying Deyrah and taking cattle, &c., such injury might be done to the Boogtee tribe as might sicken them of plundering within British territory; but after all, the loss of their leaders is the only loss which these predatory tribes severely feel.

28. Good guides will be required; the Khyheeree Abdoolla Khan will be one good man; he was with me in the hills before, and knows them sufficiently well.

29. Pray accept my best thanks for what you say about my regiment. Assimilation with the practice in Bengal will be the ruin of the Bombay Army.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

8th January, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I inclose to you a letter to Fitzgerald. Forward it by Cossid to him at Gheebee Deyrah, or elsewhere,—read it.

Your letter I have to thank you for. It told me what I wanted to know. My plan is to persuade Beejah, if possible, that Wullee marches against him unsupported; and with the hope of getting a large reward from me if he catches him. That the great sickness prevents my going against him with our troops, till next cold season.

The moment Wullee has a fair start of about a day (Fitzgerald will agrèe upon this with the old Chandio chief), do you march with the Scinde Horse and the Camel Corps,—the last is to take the 13th Volunteers, about 195 old warriors, which will give you 500 infantry and 100 armed camel-drivers, or Surwans; take also your guns.

The whole of the commissariat, except what you require, is to move on the same day you do, and it will join me at Janeedera, or such place as I shall hereafter inform Jameson of. When I hear from you that you have started from Larkano, I shall move head-quarters by regular marches (or by forced marches, if you send back to hurry me) to Poolejee.

The necessity for keeping all quiet at present makes

me avoid making much preparation, for all depends on your rapidity.

Settle with Jameson how to carry provisions for the Europeans, for as many days as it will take you to go to Poolejee;—these, of course, must go on the camels. Fitzgerald ought to manage this; he can carry small mortars he told me; he can therefore carry provisions, as he has no mortars. Do not take spirits, it will hamper you; I will send this after. Four or five mountain-guns on mules will follow you up rapidly, with 300 infantry from Shikarpore. This is my outline, as far as I can see my way yet. Ali Morad's rabble I shall, if possible, send across the desert from Shikarpoor to Gundooee. This road leaves ours far to the left, and enters the Boogtee country north of Gundooee, or, in your map, "Sooreekushta." Thus we shall get rid of Ali Morad's people, and yet have the advantage of them in stopping that road.

I have sent for two elephants from Hydrabad. I think they will be of use in the hills,—one at least, if we can feed him; if not, we can send him back from Poolejee. I hope I have been clear.

My *old advance-guard* and its commander will bring the old luck, I hope!

I need scarcely says that, in investing Poolejee, your chief force must occupy the side of the Teyaga, so as to cut the garrison off from the hills.

Believe me, yours faithfully,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

P.S. I would rather that you made no attack till I come up, as I want to prevent bloodshed; but I must leave this to your own discretion, in which I have perfect confidence.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

11th January, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—The enclosed will put you all right. *I know* we shall not catch Beejah at first, and to catch him is a secondary object with me, but there is no harm in trying. I sent the orders you wish for about Khyree Ke Ghurree long ago. All I want from you is to let me know the exact day you march from Larkhana, as *on that day I shall* march from hence, for your move will give the alarm, and mine will not add to it; if you think it will, let me know, and I will move the day after.

Yours, sincerely,

(Signed) C. NAPIER.

You can order any troops on the frontier to advance with you, or to your support.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

Jagun, 7 A.M., 14th January, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I arrived here this morning, and shall be at Khanghur by eight to-morrow. If I find that the enemy is at Shahpoor, I mean to take some cavalry and march upon Ooch, to which I think he will retire when he finds you have advanced from Rojaun into the Desert on his right. To encourage him I will push a small force on *Manootee*. I tell you what may happen if he is at Shahpoor, not else.

I am sorry the Europeans are tired, but it is without remedy.

If you have sufficient conviction against Azim Khan,

that he acted with treachery, you may give him a sound flogging, and still keep him a prisoner for further punishment, for his life is forfeited, but as you did not shoot him at once, I cannot do it now unless your proofs are very clear.

Yours,

(Signed) C. NAPIER.

The robbers are hard at work carrying off grain into the hills, I hear. I am afraid the Mahorum will interfere with Ahmed Khan Mugzy and Vullee Chandia—do you know anything of them.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob, commanding S. I. H.

11th January, 1845.

SIR,—Charged with an especial duty, as you are, and one which admits of no loss of time for reference to higher authority, I hereby invest you with the fullest extent of power which I possess, and all officers of whatever rank or station are to render you whatever assistance you demand. All commissariat arrangements are to be executed as you direct, and you are to be obeyed by everybody to whom you issue orders the same as if I issued them myself up to the date of my joining you, when this authority, given for an especial purpose, shall cease; and this shall be to you, and to all to whom you issue orders, full and sufficient authority.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER,
General, Governor.

28011

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

22nd January, 1845.

My dear Jacob,—Fancy my making a political! yet such I am going to make of you! The matter is just this: my inroad here has been made not to catch Beejah, —that was a very small affair, because a hundred more Beejahs would rise like the men from Cadmus' teeth,— but to make a permanent settlement of this frontier, which I am sure can be done, if I manage my work properly. Now in this I require help, and I want you to assist me in establishing a transfer of property,—the only way by which a change from a state of barbarism to one of greater civilization can be made permanent. All improvement is considered a mischievous innovation by the losing class. This is nature, and Beloochee nature, as well as English and French nature. I want, therefore, to deprive the "losing class" of *power*, or it will soon drive "innovation" away, and the rule of robbery and good old times be restored. The way to do this is to give the land of Lehree, Poolejee, Shahpoor,—in short, all the habitable part of the desert tract,—to *new people*. I consider it necessary to respect the right of sovereignty in the Khan of Kelat; but I claim for us the right of being paid for our expenses, either by a large sum of money, or by the whole of the territory which we have taken from his rebellious subjects, and over whom I have, in writing, his confession, that he has totally lost all authority. The expense of the war he cannot pay; the conquest is, therefore, ours in pledge till he redeems it. All this is strictly just, and in accordance with the laws of nations. But we do not want territory. All we want is to place his subjects on such a footing as will

secure the Sinde frontier from vexation, and ensure to the Khan obedient and peaceable subjects, so that, instead of being a mere puppet in the hands of robber chiefs, he may have a *will* towards the West of his own, and towards us friendship, founded on our support. in ensuring obedience to him in the East, while our frontier will be a refuge for his subjects in Cutchee if he becomes tyrannical. There is no man in India more opposed than I am to the damned nonsense of keeping Indian princes on their thrones within our frontier; but the case wholly changes when you have to deal with those outside your frontier. The old Indians, for whom I confess my contempt as a set of old bitches, whose God is mammon, do not see that the interest of every prince within our frontier is to send us to hell, at which he constantly works, mole fashion, underground; and this is half the mischief, for as we support him, he lays all the iniquities which he inflicts upon his subjects to our door; and though he is unjust in doing this, we desire it. They are at our door for upholding him! Thus his subjects also hate us, and there is a common cause of hatred to us. When we uphold a prince outside our frontier, we act justly if we confine our support merely to insisting on their respecting our frontier, and in supporting his just authority, as I have now done that of the Khan of Kelat. But this support it is also necessary he should pay for in some direct shape. In other ways we support his just authority, by receiving his refugee subjects if he oppresses them. This makes him govern honourably, or have none to govern, as the Supreme Government have left me full power to act as I please on the frontier. I took my own system for my basis I have so far executed it as to punish the rebels and take so much of the country;

and now I want to establish, as I before said, a fresh class of subjects in Lehree, Poolejee, and Shahpoor.

Belooche Khan has, by assisting Beejah, forfeited his claim; but as he afterwards separated from the robber, he has regained a right to some consideration, *if circumstance admits of it;* and thus having explained to you my principle of action, from which nothing can make me swerve one inch, I want you, who are on the spot, to give your opinion. Do you think he will be true to us and obedient to the Khan of Kelat; or is he likely to oblige us to kick him out neck and crop ere a year or two passes? We have now the game in our hands, and must be careful not to let it slip. My wish is to establish Wullee Mahomed Chandio at Lehree or at Poolejee,—I would prefer Lehree, being the strongest post; but he must, if I do this, take the Khyherees under his protection. All this is blent with difficulties, but not with insuperable difficulties; and, like all other things, can be overcome by patience and perseverance. The Khan of Kelat is in the hands of scoundrels; his will is good, but he has no power, and therefore must learn that we are his friends by results and by time. His drivers will not let him believe it now, but I shall keep my course indifferent to the remonstrances which his villains will put in his mouth; but if you can persuade him to believe we are really resolved to give him power and secure him his Cutchee revenue in future, so much the better. This will be all but impossible at present, because it depends on truer views of policy than most barbarians ever take. They cannot believe in a liberality of government which they have never seen; and, in my humble opinion, never did our own conduct appear more feeble than that which was exercised in these countries

under Lord Auckland and his politicals. However, this is but a private and much-vexed opinion, in which all parties hold their own. History will settle who is right and who wrong. My business is, how I exercise the great power now in my hands, and for which I am in the very highest degree responsible. Man in private life is not responsible for error in judgment, it is merely a misfortune; but in public life it is a crime, because if a man feels incompetent, his duty is to say so. For these reasons, I excuse Elphinstone at Cabool. I do not excuse Macnaghten. The first, conscious of his inability, had long and long prayed to be relieved; the last, on the contrary, aspired to higher command. Elphinstone was unfortunate, Macnaghten culpable. Now I have not entered into this long story to alter any opinion of yours, still less to ask what yours are, for whenever I feel unequal to the work intrusted to me by my superiors, I will immediately ask to be relieved in my command. Whoever asks advice from those under his orders, acknowledges his incapacity, and, consequently, his crime in retaining command. I write as I have done that you may see the system I am acting upon; and if I have clearly explained myself, you will know how to assist me in carrying that portion which I trust to you to effect by the means you judge best; for as I like to do the work intrusted to me myself, so I like to leave to those under my command their own work. Now you see clearly that I want you to make arrangements for the occupation of Lehree and Poolejee by fresh people; but that I am willing to leave Belooche Khan, if you think he can be left consistently with the plan I am bent upon.

That I leave you to explain to the Khan of Kelat, if possible, to make him comprehend it, that I am doing

him good service, but that he is immensely in our debt for putting down his rebels, instead of giving him money, which would go into the pockets of his rascally minister, and not one iota to his strength as a prince.

You will also see that one condition of admitting Belooche Khan to favour with the English is his giving up the robbers who have abandoned Beejah; he has only to tell you their names. You, I believe, know that a year's work in chains is all I mean to inflict, and then to form a colony of them.

I now wait for your ideas how all this is to be exeeuted where you are. Brown and I will settle the Boogtee affair, or try to do so; he knows my views, and I shall give him this letter to read.

Yours, &c., &c.,
(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

24th January, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I see our views (except of your own abilities, of which I have, and always have had, the highest opinion) are pretty much the same. About the Chandia, Wullee deserves well at our hands. I send you also an offer just received from the Murrees. The Khan of Kelat has said that they have been loyal; I am always clear for "cutting the Gorgian knot" when it is tied by treachery or trickery, but I am not inclined to do so when there is sufficient honesty in the case (whatever it may be) to put trust in; and in this I know you will coincide with me. Belooche Khan is therefore a stumbling-block. As to the Khan, he is in the hands of his sirdars. I am convinced they forced him to go to

Poolejee for the sake of plundering the country themselves. I am not inclined to be particular with him, *as in the end* all must turn out to his personal interest. As to the Esau Khan, I see nothing for it but do him out of his birthright, as his great namesake was done before. I will give him a jagheer in Scinde as a recompense, if you find it necessary. I have ordered Aliff Khan to you. Pray meet General Simpson at Poolejee; give him all the information you can as to his march; and if you can spare a few days, go with him if he wishes it. I must leave this to you and him, to settle between you.

I send you a letter to the Khan, with full power. If there arises any question of moment that you wish to refer to me, do so; but having given you my general views, you will know what is in that line, and determine all details easily. I am equally pleased to have Murrees or Chandias. Perhaps they would unite? In any case it will, I think, be good to make them take the vagabond Khyheerees under their protection, giving them Minottee or elsewhere. By the way, there is abundance of water at Minottee. How changeable everything is.

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

Lharee, 27th January, 1845.

'MY DEAR GENERAL,—I fear that I shall never make a successful political. I have failed in the present business at the commencement. I had yesterday a long conference with Wullee Mohamed and all his sirdars, touching their settling in this country, when they posi-

tively declined having anything to do with it. Wullee Mohamed said, that he was ready at all times to obey your orders; and that if you ordered him to remain at Poolejee with his men, he would stay there as long as he could; but that as to settling in such a country, that it was impossible; that they should be surrounded by bitter foes; that the country was deserted and laid waste, with twenty more such excuses. At last, I told him to consider over the business with his sirdars, and give me a deliberate and written answer, which he did yesterday evening. It is to this effect:—That if the British Government will give him in free jagheer (that is, paying nothing whatever to any one) all the lands held by Beejah Khan, Poolejee, Chutter, Minottee, Wuzzeera, Sheeall Rumdanee, Kooneree, &c., the Chandias will settle in the country; but the country being deserted, they must be regularly paid during the first year by the British Government. This is of course absurd, and the Chandias know it to be so. I am certain, from what I have now seen of them, that even if *they were* to agree to settle here, they would not and could not do it. The terror with which they look at these Cutcheelootoos and the men of the hills is beyond belief. I am certain that they would all run away immediately our troops were withdrawn from their neighbourhood on the approach, or report of the approach, of the Doomkees, Jekranees, &c. The fellows' dark countenances actually turn pale at the thought of remaining here. I have written to Gamun Khan, the Murree sirdar, to desire him to come to me to arrange about giving this country to the Murrees; but I have great doubts as to their ability to keep it. I do not think that the tribe is now sufficiently numerous to occupy the Boogtee lands and these too.

While I am writing, Wullee Mohamed has sent to me another written paper, to the effect that, if all the lands of Lharee and along the Lharee river be also given to him perfectly free, the Chandias, Mugzees, Oomranees, &c., will join and inhabit them. This is only more absurd than the first proposal, for the lands of Lharee, Chutter, &c., are valuable, and pay a large revenue to the Khan of Kelat. I think that the Murrees are the only people we can manage the business with. We are all well here, but find great difficulty in getting food for the men, though there is plenty of jowaree for the horses.

Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) JOHN JACOB.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

Pass above Deyrah on the south, and above Zurranee on the north, 28th January, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—This pass was not defended. I think my friends are at A. The valley A. is full of water and grass. If they are, I have blocked them in. I think Ali Morad is at Mutt. Great fires were seen last night in that direction. I occupy both passes and Zurranee—the first with infantry, the last with cavalry. Send off to Simpson to force his way to us *as fast as he can*, and if possible, to communicate with the Murrees on his left, and urge them to march down on the east of Deyrah, leaving that place to Simpson. I hope thus to environ the enemy. We saw a great smoke at Deyrah last night, and I think it possible that the

Boogtees have abandoned it, and that the Murrees have burned it.



I hope Simpson will get my letter, to hasten his advance. I said I would be here on the 29th, because I expected a fight for it. Send to tell the Murrees they shall have the Boogtee country if they join me, and help to block up the Boogtees.

Yours truly,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

P.S.—I am sure Simpson can have no force in his front of any importance. They are all in the east of this, and I think south of Deyrah.

Letter from the Secretary to Government, Scinde, to Captain Jacob, commanding S. I. Horse, Lehree.

No. 209 of 1845.

Camp, Zurranee, 31st January, 1845.

SIR,—By direction of his Excellency, the Governor, I have the honour to forward for transmission to Deen

Mohamed, the chief of Murrees, a *purwanah* from his Excellency, which you will have the goodness to send. If there be any Murree chief at Lehree (Gamun Khan was there), his Excellency would wish you to press upon him, that it would be very desirable that a wukkeel, with full powers, should join his Excellency's camp. It will be well, too, if the forty good guides promised by Gamun Khan were also at once sent.

I have, &c., &c.

(Signed) S J. BROWN.

Secretary to Government, Scinde.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

Jummuck Pass, 2nd February, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I yesterday got yours of the 30th ultimo and of the 27th, duplicate. The original I did not receive. I am not a bit out of heart at what you call your failure. Disappointment belongs to man's fate; and, like Sysiphus, we must roll up the stone again. Wullee had better go home, as he won't take a crown! We must throw him overboard as an ally, for his future co-operation would not be worth paying for. As to the Murrees, they have sent no one to me. I suspect they are playing me false; however, I am too strong to care; but I will give them the Boogtee land if they can hold it; and Deyrah is in perfect repair, and I hear McMurdo went over it on the 31st. Now for your letter of the 30th ultimo. Simpson, who is at Deyrah, did not meet a living thing the whole march! None of your emissaries have returned. Now, when I put these things together, I think I see their game.

They let Simpson advance over a road full of passes. They let me advance because they could not oppose me till I got to Jekranee: at this pass they *could*, but did not, because they thought I should be confident in my force to march through to join Simpson. There they intended the old game of barbarians "in every age and clime!" The passes in our rear would be occupied in force, and we might whistle for our provisions!" "Oh, whistle and I'll come to you, my love!" is a good song, but in this case would not bring our supper! I have been, from the first, pretty sure what game they would play, and so when I entered the valley between these two passes of Jummuck and Lallee, instead of passing I pitched my camp, seizing both passes. Jummuck is nothing. I could force it easily if I abandoned it, and wanted to come back. But Lallee is a different affair, so I am fortifying it, and mean to hold firm.



This secures my communication with the plains and the cavalry, and also the secure passage of our supplies. The danger of mountain warfare lies in overconfidence and want of caution in the assailant, who, being the strongest, is fearless till imprudence makes him weakest, and he becomes a victim. I am, therefore, very cautious, going step by step, and will leave no pass in my rear unoccupied. I made an inroad back to Jange the day before yesterday, under John Napier, and he caught 2,000 head of cattle. I mean to make some more of these little underplots; but my great game is to

close in steadily with a safe rear, till they must fly the country or fight. I have received orders from Mooltan, forbidding them leave to enter that territory. Ali Morad is up with his rabble, but I want to shove him a-head. I have ordered the 7th. cavalry up to Khanghur. The whole of the Bundlecund legion are to occupy Shahpoor, Ooch, Sooreekooshta. The troops of Ali will occupy Gundooee, Lallee Pass, and Zurranee, by 200 infantry of our own troops. The 6th Cavalry I shall keep partly at the pass, and push the rest over to Simpson, to sweep all the plain about Deyrah. When all is ready, I shall again move more to the east, say twenty miles, running moveable columns through the hills to catch cattle, and kill, or catch men as they can. I much want the Murrees' assistance in this warfare. You think I undervalue Beejah Khan. Perhaps you are right; but how can I catch him? I will offer 5,000 rupees, and try what they will do: make this known. I do not think barbarians will sell each other. It is not their vice generally, but they will do it sometimes. However, one cannot make war dependent on the chance of getting any one man; it must be founded on a more solid basis. Now I shall be delighted to catch Beejah for 5,000 rupees; but, in the mean time, I will try to starve the Boogtees, and drive them to desperation, if I can: it is difficult. I never doubted that, but I think it practicable. I think you may let Wullee and his men go home: do what you think best in this. I will give them a little cash. How many has he had, and how long have they been in the field? Do not promise him anything, but tell me what you think fair. I told him I would give him two anas a-day for each man actually in the field for the time he remained out He

began on the 15th ultimo, seventeen days; and I think you told me he had not above 600 men. Having given you all my plans, do what you can to transfer the land to any new people; and I suppose we must smoke the pipe of amity with Belooche Khan. What can I do to strengthen the Khan of Kelat? It is a difficult question.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

P.S. The rascals got a dawk,* and in it the proof-sheets of the "War in Sinde." How provoking!

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

Lehree, 3rd February, 1845.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Your letter of the 24th reached me to-day. It is the first communication of any kind which has reached us from head-quarters since your letter of 21st. The Murrees *will* not, I am almost certain, have anything to say to us. They have certainly been affording aid to Beejah and the Boogtees. Mundoo and Durriah Khan visited Deen Mohamed, and the whole business was comfortably arranged between them, as my former letters (if they have reached you) will have fully explained. Parties of Murrees have been marauding in the Seebee country, and about Mull. Many of the Doomkies, professed plunderers, are living in the Murree village of Tullee, which is a nest of thieves and marauders. I should have paid this place, Tullee,

* The dawk was not lost after all, and the proof sheets reached the General in safety.

a visit long ago, but did not like doing so without your express sanction. A party of seven Doomkee horsemen, all known characters, left Tullee some days ago, on a marauding expedition beyond Chachah, in the course of which they killed two men and wounded others. I had parties all about in the hope of falling in with them; and this morning one of these parties, about ten miles from my camp, caught sight of them in the distance, and after a long chace managed to catch one of them. The others, being better mounted, reached the hills and escaped. The man taken I handed over to the Khan's officers, and he was hanged this afternoon. These small marauding parties of five or six horsemen are in the habit of constantly frequenting the plain between Minottee and Chutter, and have committed several robberies near a tomb five miles from Shahpoor (Syud Hussankeekooba), which seems a favourite resort of theirs. They have not, however, been very successful as yet; for in every instance, I believe, my men at Poolejee have got information in time to enable them to pursue and recover the stolen property, although not to prevent the escape of the thieves.

On the 1st instant, forty of my men from Poolejee, with the Khyheeree Itbar Khan, pursued a party of Jekranees from the tomb above mentioned to beyond Kulchat, and nearly to Sooree Kooshtuck, and recovered the camels, bullocks, &c, which they had carried off from some Bunniahs. This is, however, severe work for the horses. We are too few men entirely to keep the whole plains clear. The tomb I speak of is more than twenty miles from Poolejee, and not five miles from Shahpoor; but I suppose the people at Shahpoor have enough to do eastward, otherwise, if they could guard

Minottee and five or six miles to the westward, I could do the rest.

Goolam Nubbee (the head of the Khyheerees) ought to have been here with the whole tribe long ago, but he has not yet made his appearance. I will send in and have them all out at once. Beejah Khan, I suppose, has managed to escape, which will frighten them probably.

You will, I presume, still retain in pay the Khyheeree horsemen now in our service, and desire the Chandias and Mugzees to assist them at their need.

With regard to Deyrah, I think that, even if the Murrees were inclined to occupy the Boogtee lands, they would not care a pin about the village itself: they never attack or defend these places in their *wars* Whatever gunpowder may be given them, they will be likely enough to use against us on the first opportunity. They value Feringee powder highly, and would probably keep it for their most dangerous foes.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

Lharee, 5th February, 1845.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Your letter of the 2nd reached me this morning, to my great joy; for, from the numerous robberies of dawks beyond Ooch, I feared that none of my letters had reached you. Your insight into the mountaineers' intended style of proceeding is, no doubt, minutely accurate, and is exactly in accordance with the former doings of these very people. But I do not think the Boogtees will attempt to fight when reduced to ex-

treme necessity: the tribe will disperse by single families, trusting that they will be able to return to their homes when the storm shall have blown over.

Wullee Mohamed, when I want him to go into the hills, has only 600 men; at other times, 800. I think it would be fair, as they have really been put to considerable inconvenience and dreadfully frightened, to pay for the latter number, that is, 100 rupees a-day; 2,000 rupees in all. I think it would be as well to let them go home at once. They are quite useless.

I have requested Nusseer Khan to give me his ideas touching the quiet settlement of this part of the country, and the tribes most likely to effect our mutual object, but have not yet received his reply. Neither have I as yet heard one word from the Murrees. It appears useless to send any more letters by cossids, and I shall to-day get some one to go to Deen Mohamed, who is known to him, and who will at least return to me. I will publish the offer of a reward for Beejah. It is possible that he may, when greatly distressed, endeavour to take refuge in the Seebee country, and if he do so he will be caught, I think.

Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) J. JACOB.

P.S. A man came to day from Kahun who was with the Cafila lately plundered by the Murrees. He says that all my cossids had arrived, and been detained by the Murree chiefs, who said that the messengers were nothing but spies, and that the offers I made to themselves were evidently intended only to entrap them.

The whole of the inhabitants of Kahun were carrying off their property and leaving the town as quickly

as they could, and Deen Mohamed had said that my messengers should be released when the rest of his people had left the place; many communications had passed between the Murrees and Boogtees; the latter had persuaded the former to forego mutual enmity and make common cause together, for that no sooner had the English destroyed the Boogtees than they would serve the Murrees in the same manner.

I am convinced there is much truth in the above; it agrees exactly with all that I have heard from other quarters. I have just despatched Syud Buchal Shah (a man from the Seebee country, formerly in our service, a great rascal, I believe, but a useful instrument) to go to Kohun with letters from me to the Murree chiefs, and with instructions to endeavour to persuade them to trust to us to send wukkeels to your camp, and attend to all your instructions, and I think he will succeed if any one can. This man Buchal Shah has been useful to us here in various ways; he induced the Bunniahs of this place to return and open their shops, when all my persuasion went for nothing, and we should have been badly off for food without him. He got me excellent guides to go with General Simpson. I have now advanced him 50 rupees, and told him that if he manages this business with the Murrees satisfactorily, you will reward him well, and I think he will deserve it.

There is not a man amongst the Murrees who can read Persian. I have hitherto written in Scindee, in the barbarous character used by the Bunniahs. I have therefore been obliged to get a moonshee to accompany the syud to read my letters, and the one sent me by Brown to be forwarded.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

Lharee, 12th February, 1845.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—My messengers have returned from Kahun; they found the place completely deserted, not a single soul in it, the Murrees had all gone over the mountains on the north side of Kahun, into the next valley, about twenty miles off. There my syuds found them, and had a long interview, with much swearing on the Koran, with Deen Mohamed Gamun Khan, and the rest of the Murree chiefs, and finally returned to me, bringing with them Morad Buxs (nephew of old Doodah), Rahun Khan, and other men of the tribe. They declare that they were all in a dreadful state of alarm, and had been frightened by the people of Lharee and other places continually writing to them that we were coming to destroy them.

They swear that they have made no truce with the Boogtees, and never thought of such a thing; that they are ready to do anything you please, and have merely kept aloof from fear. I explained to them your intention regarding them, and your orders about their sending wukkeels and guides to your camp, and told them that their deserting their town and retiring further into the hills could only be considered by you as a declaration of hostility, &c. Finally, I told Morad Buxs he had better return to Kahun as soon as possible, get all the people to settle quietly in the town again, and, without a moment's delay, get Deen Mohamed himself, or some respectable sirdar, to wait upon you and receive your orders. They will, they say, be delighted to occupy the Boogtee country, if you will give it them, and will take care that there shall be no looting; but that they are

not equal to the occupation of the Poolejee and Chutter lands, and could not undertake it. I gave Morad Buxs a twenty-five-rupee loongee, and sent him away apparently much more pleased than when he came. I think that they will now wait on you, but they are curious people, and it is difficult to understand what is really in their minds. If the Murrees be settled in the Boogtee country, and Beejah be taken or killed (the last is a *sine qua non*), I think that the Khyheerees might, with advantage, be replaced in their old lands; they alone are the rightful owners, and would certainly be the best possible occupants for us, if they could maintain their ground here, which under the circumstances above mentioned they would, I think, easily be able to do. I have been talking to them about it, and they seem rather pleased with the idea, but it is necessary to learn the feelings of the rest of the tribe on the subject; they were a brave enough race, I believe, once, and would probably soon recover their confidence in themselves if they found themselves quietly replaced in their own lands. Please tell me if you approve of this.

Yours, very sincerely,
(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from Captain Jacob to General Sir C. J. Napier.

Lharee, 15th February, 1845.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—I have received a note from Brown to-day, in which he tells me that you intended me to have used my own discretion regarding the matters contained in his letter of the 3rd to me. I wish I had known this before, for I cannot but think that my going

to Hajee, and attempting to seize Mohamed Khan Shawanee, will do much harm, as I before wrote to Brown. But I assure you that, according to the words of Brown's official, I had no option left me. I am, in that letter, plainly and positively directed "to make inquiry and report upon certain statements of Jan Mohamed," and to make prisoners, and hand over to the Khan of Kelat the two chiefs resident at Hajee. The Khan is in great tribulation about the business, and I certainly think myself that his wukkeel, Jan Mohamed, has done him very great and serious injury by representing to you that you wished the two Hajee chiefs to be imprisoned; it will raise against him a host of powerful enemies. Please tell me what to do with Mohamed Khan's son and nephew; the Khan will have nothing to say to them. Ali Ackber is at Bhaugh, but I do not think he is getting many camels. We have had rain here for three days past, and it rained very heavily all last night, and not only here, but in the hills; the river here, which was a dry sandy channel, half a mile broad, has now three feet of water in it, and the country about is one sheet of mud.

I have, &c. &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

16th February, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have yours of the 12th. The fellows are, as you say, a set of such liars that it is almost impossible to get at truth. Our friend Ali Morad has rather a poetical turn that way; he does it so barefacedly and coolly, that it amounts to genius in

his highness's case. I like to look at him as he lies; as the French say, he does it "*en maître;*" and a London tradesman would say, "he turns a lie out of hand like a man what knows his business." The folks here are all dying for want of liquor, and Byng wants beer * * * so much that I think the * * * * * * * * * Green grows thin, and looks as if he were going to be married, and that he was pledged to the lady under a forfeit, like Lord Kean, all for want of moisture. Brown in desperation rode twenty-five miles to Ali's camp, and I suspect looted Malet, for beer came back, but perhaps it came down, like the river, from the mountains. God sent manna once, I don't see why beer should not come next! My dear staff are as good as the rascally Israelites, and just as unhappy for drink as the others for grub. However, Brown's loot will put all right. It is bad making young people unhappy * * *.* * * * * life has not many enjoyments; among those of sixty-three is going to bed, so good night. I will finish this to-morrow at Dooz-Kushta.

21st September.

I have been too busy to finish this sooner. We got pretty close yesterday. They abandoned 150 camel-loads of baggage, and from a hill we saw them *en route;* but after being in saddle twenty-two hours, we were not in trim to overtake them—especially as there was a desperate pass, which, if defended, might have bothered us; and it was near sunset when we got sight from top of a high hill. However, I will be after them when sun sets to-night. Do all you can to persuade the Murrees to take the Boogtee country. We are now north-east of Deyrah, and I shall be at Deyrah to-morrow. Order Ali Ackber to join us as soon as he can. He will dawdle

doing ambassador, I fear, for vanity is strong in his composition. He will be useful to me in negotiating with the Murrees.

Yours truly,
(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

P.S. As the Khan don't want the people he induced us to seize, let then out, and tell them we did it at his request, and not of our own accord.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Captain Jacob.

5th March, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have yours of the 25th ultimo, which reached me yesterday. Our proceedings are these :—

I imagined the enemy to be somewhere about A, for intelligence *was not to be* got well. I held the line from Deyrah to Goojroo. I nearly surprised him at Goojroo, and tracked him in the direction A. I left the legion to guard this pass of Goojroo, and crossed the head-quarters to my left, and occupied Deyrah in force,



putting Ali Morad at Lootee. I there waited supplies, and had arranged an advance from the three points—Deyrah, and Lootee, and Tomb; for, while waiting provisions, I occupied Tomb and Koombee, and the pass.

I left Partur free, in case the enemy was fool enough to bag himself in Truckkee; but thinking him too skilful, however, I stopped up the valley of Illiassee below Truckkee, at Tomb, to oppose his going west, and yet leave Truckkee open. I was to march on 1st, but on 28th our convoy, going to Tomb with provisions, was attacked near camp, three miles distant. I mounted my horse, and we pursued the enemy (about fifty horsemen) into Truckkee. By this bold attack, and the road they retreated, I guessed my friends had done foolishly; and, blocking the entrance with the cavalry, I sent off three companies of foot, and so *shut the enemy* up there. On returning to camp, I found the Murree chiefs had arrived. They said all the robber chiefs were in Truckkee, that Mundoo had been to the Murrees to ask them for peace, that they had refused, and that the rebels went into Truckkee. The day before I moved my camp before daybreak to Truckkee, and ordered Ali Morad (*who did not go of course*) to block the other entrance; but I also sent the Bundlecund legion and camel corps, who did go, and are there. The chiefs all came to my tent yesterday. I gave them my terms: they went back and sent other terms, which did not suit my book, and I would not even hear them. Durriah Khan alone accepted, and is in my camp; and as soon as his people are all out of this strong place, I shall proceed to business. This is our whole story up to 5th March. All you have done at Lharee appears to be

right. Whatever you do, I sanction. I think we can support the Khyheerees by the alliance of a weak tribe under Shere Ali, of Bashoree. I have him here: he surrendered, and must obey orders; but do you act as you judge best. I think the Chandias or Mugzees might help the Khyheerees to hold Poolejee. I mean to occupy Shahpoor with our troops for the next year, at all events.

Yours truly,
(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Truckkee is a devil of a place, but I think I can manage it too.

Letter from Majar Jacob to Colonel Shaw.

Khanghur, 25 August, 1847.

MY DEAR COLONEL.—In my opinion, the interfering with these people at Poolejee, &c. too much, will be very injudicious. So long as these Boogtees do not come near our territory, nor annoy us in any way whatever, we only do harm by troubling ourselves about them. Why should we not allow them to buy food from the Khan's territory? If peace, quiet, and security be our object, we ought to leave them alone. My imprisoning these Jekranee lootoos, and having completely put a stop to plundering by our own people, which was systematically carried on before, has done more to keep this country quiet than anything else I can think of. It is spoken of through the hills as a piece of even-handed justice, which must be more effectual in establishing the Sirkar's authority than the cutting up with the sword half of the lootoos in the country.

This is what I think, and others say about it almost in so many words, and I am certain they are right. I would never interfere with any of these people so long as they remained quiet, peaceable, and well-behaved; but in case of the slightest misconduct, would treat them with the greatest severity.

Indiscriminate persecution of whole tribes only does harm, and makes men desperate, although they perfectly appreciate just punishment. If you and the General will leave me to go my own way to work, I will engage that everything shall go on in a satisfactory manner, and that this frontier shall be as little disturbed as any part of the world; but I hope that reports regarding our proceedings, by the police or others, will not be attended to.

Yours very sincerely,
(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from Major Jacob to Colonel Shaw.

No. 144 of 1847.

Khanghur 26th August, 1847.

SIR, — I have the honour to report that eleven Boogtee men, half armed, with some cattle, &c., who had come to visit the town of Poolejee, were, on the 25th instant, seized by Shabaz Khan Khyheeree, and sent in prisoners to Shahpoor. I request that I may be favoured with your intructions regarding the disposal of these men. They were of perfectly peaceable demeanour, and not within British territory, nor near it.

I shall be obliged also if you will inform me whether you wish me to exert any direct authority over the

Khyheerees living at Poolejee, Chutter, &c., not being in British pay, nor residing within our territory; or whether, in case of misconduct on the part of these people, I should apply to the officers of the Kelat government to punish them. Nothing else of importance has occurred within my command during the past week.

I have, &c. &c.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding S.I. Horse.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to Colonel Shaw.

Khanghur, 26th August, 1847.

MY DEAR COLONEL,—I wish, if you have no objection, that you would forward to the Governor my demi-official with the accompanying weekly reports. Sir C. Napier misled and made uneasy by nonsensical reports sent him by Aliff Khan, &c., but nothing can be more satisfactory than the state of the country at present; and you may rely on it to be successful. it is quite as necessary "*parcere subjectis*" as "*debellare superbis.*"

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. JACOB.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier, in answer to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw's letter of the 27th August, enclosing one from the officer commanding the frontier posts.

No. 747 of 1847.

3rd September, 1847.

1st The Boogtees made prisoners on the 25th ultimo

by Shabaz Khan Khyheeree, eleven in number, are to be sent to Shikarpoor as prisoners of war. All Boogtees are to be seized, wherever they are found, No Boogtees are to be treated in any other way than as enemies, who have insulted the British territories, and do so whenever they have an opportunity. Major Jacob must know this perfectly; and that if their demeanour was peaceful, it was for the simple reason that they are trying to establish an intimacy* with the Khyheerees; while I remain in Scinde this shall not be, if I can prevent it. The Boogtees shall either submit, like the other robber tribes, or take the consequences of continuing hostilities.

2nd. Major Jacob *is* to exercise direct authority over the Khyheerees as far as the safety and protection of his frontier command requires the exercise of such authority. They were placed in their old territories by me, with the distinct understanding that they were to oppose the Boogtees, over whom the Khan of Kelat claims sovereignty, as he is sovereign of the Khyheerees also; they have no right to entertain those whom their sovereign deems rebels: they received back their territory with this agreement. I give to Major Jacob this power, under Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, of course, but I did not give it to the officer who preceeded Major Jacob, as I did not consider that his predecessor had sufficient experience.

3rd. No application is ever to be made to a foreign chief unless through the Scinde Government, except in

* All this was purely imaginary; the Boogtees in question were poor herdsmen from the hills, who came to sell their cattle in the plains of Cutchee, fifty miles beyond the British boundary, in the territory of the Khan of Kelat.

case of emergency, in which case it is immediately to be reported.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.
Lieutenant General commanding.

[True copy.]

(Signed) J. HARVEY,
Officiating Staff Officer.

No. 154 of 1847.

Khanghur, 8th September, 1847.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that, on the morning of the 5th instant, as already reported to you demi-officially, a party of Boogtees, consisting of six men, seven women, and ten children, came to Khanghur, and threw themselves before me, to beg for food; they had come from Punnian during the night before, a distance of thirty-two miles, and appeared to be in extreme want; one of the women is extremely old and feeble, and the children are of ages varying from three months to seven years. Famine and misery were strongly marked on every face, and I have seldom seen a more pitiable sight. When food was given them they could not wait to cook it, but devoured the flour raw by handfuls. As I have already reported, I placed the poor creatures at Janadeyra, Durya Khan having offered to take care of them until I should receive orders as to their disposal.

I have also the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a minute by his Excellency the Governor on the subject of the Boogtees, which I herewith return. The Governor, I fear, thinks me silly for attributing any but evil motives to these Boogtees, whose chiefs certainly deserve

no mercy at the hands of the British Government; but had his Excellency seen the persons above mentioned as they came before me, I am certain he would have thought differently.

With regard to the third paragraph of H. E.'s minute, I presume it is not intended to rescind the permission to correspond with the officers of H.H. the Khan of Kelat, on minor points of frontier arrangements, given to me by his Excellency, as per demi-official letter from the secretary to Government of Scinde, No. 1377, dated 19th May, 1847, which permission is calculated to save much trouble about trifles. The Boogtee prisoners shall, of course, be sent to Shikarpoor forthwith, as also any others who may come in or be captured.

I have, &c. &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding S.I. Horse.

Extract from General Orders, by His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., commanding the troops in Scinde.

Head Quarters, Kurrachee, 16th Sept., 1847.

No. 3. Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw has forwarded a report made by Major Jacob, of an attack made by 210 Boogtees upon a Khyheeree village beyond the Scinde frontier. The villagers repulsed the Boogtees, and the hill robbers went off. Major Jacob states, that Lieutenant Merewether's conduct has been so watchful and active, that he attributes the spirit shown by the Khyheerees to have been instilled by that officer.

The Lieutenant-General therefore takes the oppor-

tunity of expressing his satisfaction with the conduct of Lieutenant Merewhether, and also of saying he extends the praise to Major Jacob himself, whose services on the frontier have been what the Lieutenant-General expected from an officer of Major Jacob's zeal and abilities.

The Lieutenant-General has directed a loongee to be presented to Wullee Mohamed Khyheeree, for his bold conduct in defending his village.

The Lieutenant-General directs that every assistance may be given to the Boogtees who come in and make their obedience to the English. Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw is in communicantion with the collector, to see that this order is carried into effect promptly. The Boogtee tribe have been deceived by their own folly, but all who surrender shall be treated with the same kindness that has been shown to those who saved themselves by an early submission.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding the troops at Scinde.

[True extract.]

(Signed) EDWARD GREEN, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 195 of 1847.

Khanghur, 15th October, 1847.

SIR,—In reply to your letter of the 14th October, 1847, to my address, calling for my opinion with regard to the propriety of withdrawing the post from Shahpore, I beg leave to state that I consider that post for the

present, and probably for some years to come, absolutely necessary to the safety and quiet of the frontier, and that to withdraw it now would be an act of madness. Were we to withdraw our protection from the peaceable and well-disposed Khyheerees at present, they would very soon be driven out of their country, and would fly to Scinde; their places would speedily be occupied by predatory tribes, as before, and we should have all our work to begin over again.

The Murrees only abstain from looting the Khyheerees because they are known to be under our protection; withdraw this protection, and that part of the country would soon again, as formerly, be a scene of confusion, bloodshed, and robbery, which would speedily extend to our own territory. The Boogtee tribe will not have power to do harm for many years to come, probably; possibly they may never again have that power; but if we relaxed our exertions and vigilance, if idleness took the place of activity, the whole country would soon be as bad as ever. All the Jekranees, Doomkees, &c., settled in our territory on the frontier, are the most inveterate marauders in the whole country, hill or plains; and, in truth, our own people have done as much to keep this country in disorder as the hill-men. There are plenty more plunderers in the hills; the Murrees themselves are the worst of all; though they abstain from annoying us at present, from fear of consequences, they have been looting all over Cutchee. The infantry of the post at Meerpoor should be withdrawn, but every other post should in my opinion, be maintained as it is, and everything go on as usual, notwithstanding the destruction of these Boogtees.

It is not an occasional blow, however violent, that

will keep this country quiet for some years to come; peace and quietness can only be ensured here by daily and hourly labour, and untiring watchfulness.

I have the honour, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding Scinde Irregular Horse.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant Colonel Shaw.
No. 200 of 1847.

Khanghur, 28th October, 1847.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th October, 1487, to my address with accompaniments, herewith returned, and in reply to state that the wells for which I have applied will, in my opinion, permanently suffice for the frontier posts, but, of course, periodical cleanings and repairs will always be requisite; and with regard to the post at Shahpoor, where the wells are necessarily all "Cutcha," new wells must be dug occasionally, as the old ones fall in and become filled up; the expense of this, however trifling, being about twenty rupees only for each well. These wells last in a sound state from twelve months to two years generally at Khanghur Khyreeghurree. The pucka wells being necessarily sunk deep into the soil of the desert, it is requisite, in order to insure a due supply of fresh water, to turn the Indus water into the wells during the inundation, and to keep them full as long as possible; unless this be done the water soon becomes brackish, and sometimes fails altogether. The practice above alluded to is found successful, but of

course renders a more extensive clearing out and repairing of the wells necessary, after the subsiding of the Indus water, than would otherwise be required. All this is best done by persons residing on the spot, and the work should be executed by the officer commanding the frontier, Bills on honour as usual being passed for the necessary outlay. The same will probably be the case with the wells at Dilmorad Keghurree, but until the wells shall be sunk, and the quality and quantity of the water obtainable ascertained, I cannot speak positively on this point. At Rojaun the wells will require the usual periodical cleaning, &c.; but the Indus water never reaches them. Hereafter should the chain of frontier posts be made to extend through Boordika to the river, two more wells may be required between Hussan-Keghurree and Kusmore, and this arrangement of having the whole frontier from the Indus to Khyree-Keghurree under one system, and under the command of one man, will, I am convinced, be found the best which can be made, and will be eventually adopted by Government. One of my regiments with one company of infantry at Shahpoor, will be sufficient to guard the whole extent from east to west. I would withdraw the infantry altogether from Meerpoor, and move the post of horse to Hussan-Keghurree so soon as there may be a sufficient supply of water at the latter place.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding Scinde Irregular Horse.

P.S. When I mention that one of my regiments will suffice effectually to guard this frontier from east to west, I mean that the Belooche and Khyheeree horse-

men now attached to us as guides, &c., are to remain so.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding Scinde Irregular Horse.

Letter from Major Jacob to Captain Browne, Secretary to Government of Scinde.

23rd February, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 339 of 1848, to my address with accompaniments. In compliance with instructions contained therein, I have to-day received political charge of this frontier from Major Goldney.

With regard to our relations with the Khyheerees in Cutchee, I have the honour to forward herewith all the letters I can find in my possession relative to the subject. They perhaps only suffice to show that the settlement of the Khyheeree tribe was intrusted to me by his Excellency Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., Governor of Scinde; some correspondence between me and H. H. the Khan of Kelat took place on the subject at the time, but I have no copies of it; all regarding the matter was settled by me personally with his Excellency the Governor and the Khyheeree tribe. The latter distinctly and repeatedly asserted that they could not possibly remain in Cutchee with British protection, and on my explaining this to his Excellency, he directed me to inform them that he would protect them, at least so long as it should appear to him necessary to do so, by keeping a detachment at Shahpoor (Chutter was proposed by me, but Shahpoor

preferred by Sir Charles), and by retaining in British pay eighty of the Khyheeree horsemen, allowing the latter to remain in their own villages. All this I fully explained to the Khyheeree tribe, and when they understood that they are still to be under British protection, and not till then, they collected their wives, children, &c., from considerable distances, and regularly settled on their old lands.

From the terms of their settlement as explained to them by me, and approved of by his Excellency the Governor (though there be no formal agreement in the matter), there would be (it appears to me) some unfairness and even breach of faith in our not affording sufficient protection to these people to enable them to remain in safety where they are, so long as they themselves honestly endeavour to carry out the purpose for which they were placed in that country by the British. At all events such, I think, would ascuredly be the feeling and opinion of the people of this country. But it is for my superiors to decide this point. The manner of affording, and the nature of such protection is a different question, and it appears to me that it would be quite sufficient to continue a certain number of the tribe in British pay, leaving them to live at their own villages, and to recommend them to the consideration of the Government of Kelat, strongly advising the latter not to adopt such measures as would involve them in interminable quarrels and blood-feuds with the tribe around them. The Khyheerees might be informed that this measure of assistance and protection was considered by the British Government as a full performance of its promises (and it would, I think, be so considered by all), but that they are the

subjects of Kelat, and are to look wholly to the Khan as their lord and master. If this arrangement meet the approval of the Commissioner, I beg leave to recommend that our troops be withdrawn wholly from Cutchee, the Shahpoor post being abandoned. With the post along our border side arranged already, recommended by me to Colonel the Honourable H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the troops in Scinde, and the two regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse, with one hundred Belooche horsemen permanently retained on the frontier, I am certain that I shall be able successfully to maintain profound peace and tranquillity within our own territory, although the Cutchee side might be a scene of violence and disorder. The Khyheerees in our pay at Poolejee, &c., would always be able to give timely information as to any intended inroad into the British territory, which we should then take care to prevent, and the marauders, hopeless of success, would abstain from attempts on our territory. I beg leave to recommend that the Boogtees lately located in Scinde be discouraged or prevented as much as possible from communicating with their brethren in the hills. The latter are still plundering their neighbours as heretofore, and only a few days ago, a party of them carried off forty camels from the neighbourhood of Shahpoor; the permitting free intercourse between that part of the tribe lately become British subjects and their lawless and predatory brethren, will tend more than anything to prevent the former from settling down in peaceful habits.

In conclusion, having stated my own opinions, and the facts of the case within my own knowledge, I beg that you will assure the Commissioner that whatever may be the arrangements determined on by Government with

regard to this frontier, no endeavour of mine shall be wanting to carry them into effect successfully.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

To Captain Browne, Secretary to
Government of Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

25th February, 1848.

SIR,—Consequent on having been placed in command of the whole of the north-west frontier of Scinde towards Cutchee, and according to instructions received, I have the honour to report, for the information of Colonel the Honourable H. Dundas, commanding in Scinde, that I have minutely examined the country from Hussan Keghurree to Kusmore, with a view to the establishing of the posts on that side necessary to complete the frontier chain.

I beg leave to forward herewith a rough sketch of the line of country above mentioned, whence it will be seen that the most convenient places for the posts are Tungwanee, Kundkote, and Buddanee: these places are at convenient distances from each other, and there is a sufficiency of water at all of them. Tungwanee is entirely uninhabited,—indeed, there was never a village there, but merely a number of Cutcha wells in the middle of a forest. There is no cultivation nor a sign of an inhabitant from Hussan Keghurree to Kundkote save a few *Jutts*, who have, within the last month or so, erected some huts and dug a well at a place about four miles north-west of Kundkote, called Ghubbee. Kund-

kote itself was once a large and populous town, but is now nearly deserted, as indeed is the whole of this line, owing to the continual incursions of the hill robbers. There are now but eleven families at Kundkote, not mustering in all above fifty souls; yet there are still at this place, in various stages of repair or of decay, no less than 140 pucka wells, many of them still containing excellent water. Buddanee was also formerly a large town, but is now miserably decayed. There is a very little cultivation about Kundkote and Buddanee, and from Kundkote to Kusmore abundance of grass-land. There are no other spots than those above mentioned, along the line, at which a sufficiency of fresh water could be found. The country is generally overgrown with jungle. It will be necessary to sink a pucka well at Tungwanee, and to make a road from Hussan Keghurree to Kusmore, as also cuts through the jungle northward from each post into the desert, as at present cavalry can with difficulty get through a great part of the jungle in single file. The cost of this road will be very trifling, about 1,200 rupees, and its advantages are very great. Lines will be required to be built for the detachments at all the frontier posts, with the exception of Dilmorad Keghurree, at which place they were erected by me last year. The cost of these will be about fifteen rupees per man and horse. If these arrangements be approved of, I beg leave to suggest that after their adoption the post at Shahpoor be withdrawn altogether, the Kusmore detachment being considerably increased (*vide* return attached), that eighty of the Khyheeree horsemen be retained in British pay, but allowed to reside at their own villages, according to the arrangement made in 1845. By these means I shall be always sure of timely

information with regard to everything going on in Cutchee and the hills, and without directly interfering with anything beyond our own boundary. We shall still retain the principal advantages accruing hitherto from the Shahpoor post. One hundred Belooche horsemen will be required as guides, scouts, &c., to be attached to the Scinde Irregular Horse, and posted with the various detachments along the frontier line.

These men I should be allowed to enlist from the various Belooche tribes as I find best, so as to ensure having none but properly-qualified individuals. It would not be necessary under these arrangements to add a man to the number of those now in British pay in this country, for the Khyheerees would remain as formerly under the original arrangement of Sir Charles Napier; and as an equivalent of the hundred Belooche Horse placed under my orders, an equal number of the Belooche Horse, Chandias, Jekranees, Doomkees, &c. &c. belonging to the police, and heretofore employed on frontier duties, would be no longer required; such of these as possess the necessary personal qualifications would be re-engaged for service under me, and the remainder might be discharged.

I understand that H. H. Meer Ali Morad objects to our occupying the posts within his country, and considers their establishment injurious to it. H. H. is in this very greatly mistaken: there is nothing which could be imagined more calculated to improve this part of his territory, to recover it from the miserable state into which it has fallen, and to make it again flourishing, than protection to life and property afforded the inhabitants by these posts. The little bazaars also of the detachments, and the money expended in the country in

purchasing provisions for man and horse, are of very material advantage to such very poor Zemindars as these are.

The establishing of these posts is most undoubtedly of the greatest profit and advantage to the Khypoor government, but were it otherwise I beg leave to point out that the territories of the different powers are so mixed together along the whole line, that if we are to guard this frontier at all we must necessarily occupy the best spots for our purpose, without regard to the lord of the soil, whose rights are never interfered with in the least by the arrangement. For example, Rojaun belongs to Kelat, and Khanghur itself, as well as Janadeyrah, is claimed by Meer Ali Morad. Were we to have no posts on lands not our own we could have but one, namely, Dilmorad Keghurree, on the whole line from Khyra Keghurree to Kusmore, a distance of 120 miles. I beg leave also to observe, that could the squadron of the Scinde Irregular Horse at Hydrabad be placed at my disposal, and the whole of the two regiments employed on the frontier, I should recommend that the posts of Koombee, Dost Ali, and Shadadpoor, now occupied by detachments of the Scinde Camel Corps, be held by the Scinde Horse, and the whole frontier from end to end guarded by the latter corps alone.

The Camel Corps then being entirely relieved from frontier duty, would be available for other purposes, for which perhaps it may be better adapted, as it is certain that the horsemen are far more efficient for the frontier outposts than the best infantry can be.

With regard to the building of lines and other works required, I beg leave to state that if the arrangement be approved of, I shall be happy to execute them myself on

the necessary outlay and advances being sanctioned; and, from local circumstances, I think that the work would be performed in this manner better, more quickly, and more cheaply than it would probably be done by the executive engineer. Whether this suggestion be acted on or not, it is very advisable that our lines should be commenced upon without delay, for exposure to the extreme heat of this climate in the hot season without shelter is very trying to the men.

I have, &c. &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding Frontier.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to Captain Browne.

No. 144 of 1848.

Khanghur, 22nd June, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that the frontier under my command has been undisturbed since the date of my last report on the subject.

A few trifling cases of cattle lifting have occurred at Ooch and other places on the border far beyond the British boundary.

On the 20th instant a cossid from the hills was met by one of my patrols in the desert, and on being questioned, the man stated that he had been sent by Islam Khan with a letter to me; he was brought to me at Khanghur, when he produced the letter herewith forwarded, sealed by both Islam Khan and Allum Khan. The man denied having any other letters in his possession, but on search-

ing his person the two Scinde letters also sent herewith were found on him.

The object of these letters from the Boogtee chiefs is of course to establish a communication with their friends in the police and at the colony near Larkana, which it appears to me would be likely to do mischief. I have acquainted the lieutenant of police at Shikarpoor with the contents of these letters. To the cossid I gave no answer whatever, neither was he allowed to speak to any one. I had him escorted to the foot of the hills and there let go. Great efforts are being made by the rebel Dewan Moolraj to get the Murree tribe to assist him, and to induce them to make inroads on the British frontier. Moolraj, I am informed, lately sent 40,000 rupees to Deen Mohamed Murree, and frequent messengers have gone to him from Mooltan, to beg him to send men to join the Dewan. The Murrees report to me that they have positively refused all these offers, and that they are true to the British interest, but I am very doubtful about their good faith, at least so long as Moolraj may have the means of paying them well for their services. I have the honour to forward herewith letters received yesterday from the Murree chiefs.

I beg leave again to point out that under the present frontier arrangements it would be very advantageous to allow the Khyheerees in British pay to reside at their own villages, according to the original arrangement of his Excellency the Governor of Scinde, continuing to enjoy their pay, to allow me to entertain 100 Belooche guides for the frontier service, and to withdraw our troops entirely from Cutchee.

The necessity of maintaining the post at Shahpoor, in my opinion, no longer exists; the Khyheerees being now

entirely freed from their most inveterate enemies, the Boogtees, and enjoying the advantage of regular pay to a body of their horsemen, would be able to maintain themselves without further interference on our part, while, by entirely withdrawing from Cutchee, we should place the desert between us and the disorderly tribes of hill and plain on the Cutchee border, having no further concern with all their petty feuds, quarrels, and plunderings.

I have, &c. &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB,

Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

To Captain Browne, Secretary to the Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Commissioner in Scinde.

No. 91 of 1849.

Khanghur, 8th April, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that early yesterday morning the post of Kusmore, under command of Naib Russuldar Shaik Allaoodeen, was attacked by a large body of plunderers, consisting of Murrees, Khetranees, Boogtees, &c., from the hills. The party of the Scinde Irregular Horse at Kusmore, forty of all ranks, was relieved by a similar party on the 6th instant; the relieved party, under command of Naib Russuldar Kurrum Ali Khan, marched from Kusmore towards Koomree about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, and had only departed about one hour when the party at Kusmore, which had not yet gone into the lines, but was encamped

outside, was surrounded, and vigorously attacked on all sides. A duffedar going his rounds first fell in with the enemy, and was killed; the mountaineers, immensely out-numbering the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, then rushed in among the horses, and a desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued, which, after a violent struggle, ended in the enemy being beaten off with severe loss, leaving a great number of dead on the ground. On our side the loss was as follows:—

SCINDE IRREGULAR HORSE.

One duffedar, three sowars, and four horses killed.
Four sowars very severely wounded.

BELOOCHE GUIDES.

One sowar killed.
One sowar mortally wounded.

While the attack commenced on the party at Kusmore, Naib Russuldar Kurrum Ali Khan was about four miles distant, on the road towards Koomree; hearing firing in the direction of Kusmore, he galloped back with his party towards that place. As he approached Kusmore he came on a body of 300 or 400 horsemen, who were driving off nearly 1,000 camels. Naib Russuldar Kurrum Ali Khan instantly charged and dispersed the enemy, killed a great many of them, and, following them up a considerable distance, recovered and brought back the whole of the plunder they were carrying off. He then returned to Kusmore. The mountain robbers on this inroad were led by Meer Hadjee Khetranee and Allum Khan Boogtee, both of whom were seen and recognised during the attack on the party at Kusmore

by some of my Beloochee guides. I purpose proceeding at noon to-day along the frontier towards Kusmore.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB,

Political Superintendent and Commandant on the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

To the Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob.

No. 96 of 1849.

Hussan Keghurree, 12th April, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you, that on my way to Kusmore, on which I had proceeded as already reported, I last night received information of the assembly of a large body of mountaineers for hostile purposes to the westward. In consequence, after reinforcing the post of Kusmore, and making such other arrangements as appeared conducive to the safety of this part of the frontier, I made a forced march back to this place, Hussan Keghurree, and it is my intention to march to-night straight to Shahpoor with a troop of the Scinde Irregular Horse, directing another troop to join me at that place from Khanghur.

On my arrival at this post, I received information that a body of Murrees and other mountaineers, to the number of 2,000 men, mostly horsemen, had assembled near Lharee for the purpose of attacking the Khyheeree villages in Cutchee, and then making a descent on the British territory. I hope to be in time to prevent this, and to punish the invaders.

The number of men at my disposal on the frontier is

now small, but will, I have every reason to believe, suffice for its protection, though the labour will be severe.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,

Political Superintendent on the Frontier.

To the Officer commanding in Upper Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob.

No. 97 of 1849.

Hussan Keghurree, 12th April, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to report further particulars regarding the attack made by the mountain tribes on the detachment of the Scinde Irregular Horse, at Kusmore, reported in my letter to your address of the 8th instant.

A week before the attack took place, I was aware that the mountaineers were mustering in the hills for some evil purpose; many circumstances induced me to suppose that their object would be the plunder of the Khyheeree villages in Cutchee, and such I still have reason to believe to have been their intention, though finding that they were expected in that quarter, they suddenly changed the direction of their march, and made an unexpected descent on Kusmore, which, had it not been for the readiness, bravery, and excellent conduct of the officers and men on the frontier posts in that neighbourhood, would certainly have proved as successful as it has turned out to be disastrous to the invaders; for the surprise was perfect, the hill-men in this instance having stolen a march on me, and deceived, in regard to their real intentions, all my most experienced guides, &c.—themselves old and noted border-riders.

No extraordinary precautions were taken by me towards Kusmore, but the system of patrols, &c., was carried on as usual day and night, and the watering-places likely to be frequented by marauding parties from the hills, to a distance of twenty-five miles from Kusmore, were duly visited on the 6th instant, but no sign of an enemy was perceived anywhere.

The mountaineers, however, having assembled in the Murrow valley to the number of 500 horsemen and some foot (number unknown), left the hills after sunset on the 6th instant *viâ* Goojroo, and Shore made one march to Kusmore, avoiding all the usual routes, and attacked the detachment at that place, as reported in my letter of the 8th. The detachment having been relieved that day, the relieved party had just marched off, and men, horses, and camels were moving about all night, which prevented the approach of the enemy being perceived so quickly as it would otherwise have been. When challenged, the enemy answered our people (*upna a log*), and immediately the duffedar on duty was killed, and the rest of the guard killed or cut down; forty or fifty of the enemy (dismounted and holding their mares by long ropes) then rushed to the native officer's house, with the intention of first killing him, but the party of the Scinde Irregular Horse not having yet entered the lines, the house was unoccupied. The duffedar on duty as he fell gave the alarm, and the enemy having been delayed a few moments in the empty lines, Duffedar Kishen Sing, with Sirwars Mohamed Gool, Khan Gool, Neaz Gool (father and two sons), Shaik Abia Ali, Mosem Sing, and Mohamed Zummah Khan had time to turn out and oppose the rush which the enemy soon made on the detachment; they did this most gallantly, and when

the enemy broke in among the horses from all sides, Naib Russuldar Shaik Allaoodeen and his whole party were up in arms to meet them ; the result has already been reported in my letter of the 8th instant, and it was owing to the readiness and courage of Duffedar Kishen Sing and his comrades above mentioned that the whole party was not destroyed to a man. There were but forty men of the Scinde Irregular Horse in all, and the surprise and immense disparity of numbers might have appalled even brave men. The conduct of Naib Russeldar Kurrum Ali Khan, already reported, is worthy of the highest praise ; he left eight men with the baggage of his party, and galloped back with the remaining thirty-two. With his small party he did not hesitate to charge more than ten times his number of enemies, who from the boldness of the attack, and the imperfect light concealing the great disparity of numbers, were defeated with the loss of many men and the whole of their plunder.

Naib Russuldar Abdoolla Khan and Bahadoor Khan, from the posts of Koomree and Kundkote, immediately on the alarm reaching them, proceeded in pursuit of the enemy, and were in time to fall in with some of the horse just before they reached the hills, when several of the enemy were killed, and some mares taken. Altogether the loss of the enemy on this occasion amounts to forty men killed, and probably more than an equal number wounded ; a great number of their mares also have been killed, wounded, and taken (six of these were found next day straying in the jungle near Kusmore).

The well-known mare of Alim Khan, the noted Kulpur chief, was killed in the attack on Kusmore, and left on the ground. One of the chief leaders of the

mountaineers was also killed; a struggle took place for the possession of his body, which the enemy at last tied on to the back of a mare and carried off. They did the same with others of their dead and desperately wounded. The enemy obtained no plunder whatever, not even a single head of cattle.

The loss on our side was considerable;—

KILLED.

One duffedar, three sowars, two syces, and four horses, of the Scinde Irregular Horse; two sowars of the Belooche Guides, and two putts.

WOUNDED.

Four sowars of the Scinde Irregular Horse, very severely; five horses of the S. I. H. mortally, since dead. Two of the enemy were brought in mortally wounded; just before their deaths they stated that their horsemen in this raid numbered five short of five hundred, and that the Sirdars mentioned in my former letter were with them, as also a Murree chief, by name Gool Gawur, first cousin of Deen Mohamed, the head of the tribe.

I have the honour to request that you will be good enough to bring to the notice, in the proper quarter, the conduct of Naib Russuldar Kurrum Ali Khan, Naib Russuldar Shaik Allaoodeen, Duffedar Kishen Sing, and the sowars mentioned above, with a view to their obtaining the distinction of the Order of Merit, which they appear to me richly to deserve. Also several of the men who were with the party of Naib Russuldar Kurrum Ali Khan, and were distinguished by their bravery and success in personal combat, in the charge on the enemy's

horsemen; the names of these men will be forwarded as soon as possible.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

To the Officer commanding in Upper Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Commissioner.

No. 106 of 1849.

Khanghur, 18th April, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward the accompanying copies of letters, which will show what has taken place on this frontier during the past week. I returned to Khanghur on the morning of the 16th instant. The Murrees had entirely broken up and dispersed to their homes in the hills, in consequence of hearing a false report of my having entered the hills from Kusmore, but it does not appear that they had the least knowledge of my countermarch to Shahpoor.

I have this morning heard of another assembly of mountain plunderers, on the south side of the "Zeen," but their numbers are small, about 120, and their proceedings not likely to be of any importance.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

To the Commissioner in Scinde, Kurrachee.

Letter from Major Goldney to Major Jacob.

No. 173 of 1848.

23rd September, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a copy of a requisition from the Assistant Resident with the Mooltan Field Force.

Were the Scinde Horse immediately under the control of the officer commanding Upper Scinde, I should not hesitate to request immediate compliance with Captain Edward's request, but under the circumstances of your being in an independent political charge of the frontier, for the protection of which these cavalry are especially stationed in Upper Scinde, I have the honour to refer the movements of these the only horse in this part of the province, to you.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) PHILLIP GOLDNEY, Major,
Collector.

To Major Jacob, in Political Charge of Frontier.

Letter from Lieutenant Herbert B. Edwards to Lieut.-Colonel Shaw.

No. 69 of 1848

Mooltan, 20th September, 1848.

SIR,—The sudden defection of the Seikh force under Rajah Shere Sing, and the general insurrection of the Khalsa soldiery which will naturally follow, having obliged Major-General Whish, C. B., to raise the siege of Mooltan, at the very moment when he had thrust forward a parallel and heavy battery to within 600 yards of the city, the British force had been compelled to assume a dignified attitude of defence west of the city, wherein to wait for reinforcements.

2. I have felt it my duty to call on the Government of Scinde for such assistance as it can render, and in like manner I now write to acquaint you that the majority of the revolted Seikh force which joined Moolraj were cavalry, an arm in which the British force, equipped with reference to siege operations alone, came to Mooltan most ill provided.

3. The evil of this is so serious that I have no hesitation in applying to you for the services of Major Jacob's Irregular Horse, now I understand at Kusmore, on the frontier of Scinde and the Seikh Trans-Indus territory.

4. The considerate promptitude with which you sent up steamers on the first outbreak of the Mooltan rebellion encourages me to believe that, should the state of the frontier permit it, you will readily render them assistance, which I assure you is much wanted, and will be highly valued.

5. I enclose a purwannah on the Kardars between Kusmore and Deyra Ghazee Khan and the Indus and Mooltan, to supply everything which may be required by the cavalry on their march.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) HERBERT B. EDWARDS,
Assistant Resident.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in Upper Scinde, Shikarpore.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw to Major Jacob.

No. 639 of 1848.

Shikarpoor, 24th September, 1848.

SIR,—With reference to my letter of this day's date, sent by express to you, I beg to make you aware of the

fact that the Dewan Moolraj is sending strong detachments* to Deyra Ghazee Khan and Liea.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding in U. S.

To Major Jacob, commanding the Frontier, Khanghur.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw to Major Jacob.

No. 536 of 1848.

24th September, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit the purwannah forwarded by the Assistant Resident, in case you may deem the route suggested by that authority to be entirely safe. I have had some hesitation in respect to it, that I find the Collector of Shikapoor does not coincide with me. Your information and prolonged acquaintance entitle your opinion to weight, and you are at liberty to choose the route, should you consider that troops can be spared from the frontier.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel.
Commanding in U. S.

To Major Jacob, commanding the Frontier, Khanghur.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw to Major Jacob.

No. 541 of 1848.

24th September, 1848.

SIR,—In supercession of all letters from me upon the following subject, I have the honour to request that you

* Two thousand men to each place.

will direct the march of a detachment of your regiments upon Bhawulpoor, instructing the officer in command of it to place himself in communication with the Major-General commanding the Mooltan Field Force.

I have to request that the strength of the above detachment may, if possible, amount to five hundred sabres, in consequence of which from eighty to one hundred sabres of the mounted police of this district will be placed at your disposal.

I have the honour to request that the above detachment may be crossed to the Bhawulpoor side at the most convenient point from Khanghur.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding in U. S.

To Major Jacob, commanding
the Frontier, Khanghur.

I have the honour to observe that your important position upon the frontier precludes the possibility of your movingwith the detachment proceeding to Bhawulpoor.

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding in U. S.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 191 of 1848.

Khanghur, 25th September, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 23rd and 24th September, 1848, also of your letter No. 541, of the 24th September, 1848, superseding the instructions contained in the former letters, and conveying other orders.

In compliance therewith I have the honour to report, that a detachment of the strength mentioned in the accompanying margin* will march to-night from Khanghur *en route* to Kusmore, at which place I purpose that the detachment should cross the Indus.

I shall be obliged by your ordering arrangements to be made for having boats in readiness at Kusmore for the detachment. Major Goldney has sent me a "purwannah" on the Kardar of Kusmore to provide boats, but from my personal knowledge of the Kardar, I fear that unless other means be employed few boats will be forthcoming.

I beg leave to bring to your notice that my first regiment being without its medical officer, none can be sent with the detachment from this place, wherefore you perhaps may think proper to order a medical officer to be sent to join it *en route*.

It appears right to remark, that I should observe that the withdrawal of so large a detachment from the frontier may possibly be attended with danger to the peace of the frontier. The predatory hill tribes appear to be recovering their activity. The Murrees have been plundering all Cutchee, and have now made friends with the remains of the Boogtee tribe. Several parties of plunderers have, within the last few days, been fallen in with by my patrols in the desert, not very far from the British border; on one of these occasions, the 21st instant, one of these robbers, a brother of the notorious Sunjur Rind, was overtaken by the patrol, and, offering resistance, was killed. On the 22nd, another party of marauders, headed by Alim Khan Kulpur, was seen by

* Five hundred sabres.

a patrol beyond Hooddoo, and pursued so closely that the marauding chief was fully recognised, and had to throw away his saddle-bags and everything else he had about him in his flight, escaping to the hills at last by the speed of his mare.

The miserably disordered state of Cutchee and state of affairs at Mooltan have certainly produced some effect already, and will probably render the attempts of these plunderers on the British border more bold and frequent than they have been of late; wherefore it may perhaps be thought proper, if it can be spared from Lower Scinde, to order the squadron at Hydrabad to proceed to the frontier.

I beg leave also to request that the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, now on duty with the Camel Department at Shikarpoor, be ordered to join me.

At the same time that I feel it my duty to report to you as above, with regard to the state of this frontier, I beg to state that I am of opinion, that with the assistance of the party of mounted police mentioned by you as having been ordered to join me, the force remaining on the frontier will be sufficient to preserve peace and quiet in the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the
Frontier of Upper Scinde.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, commanding
in Upper Scinde.

Letter from Lieutenant Phayre.

No. 861 of 1848.

Kurrachee, 24th September, 1848.

SIR,—In anticipation of the immediate assembly of a field force at Roree to co-operate with the British troops now in Mooltan, I have the honour, by direction, to request you will be pleased to call upon Major Jacob, commanding Scinde Irregular Horse on the north-west frontier, to state, for Colonel Dundas's information, whether he could spare three, or, if possible, four squadrons of his horse to compose part of that force, and if so, whether he considers any alteration in the present disposition of his troops on the frontier posts would be necessary.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) B. PHAYRE, Lieutenant,

Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General.

To the Officer commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

[True copy.]

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Commanding in U. S.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw to Major Jacob.

No. 558 of 1848.

Shikarpoor, 28th September, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter from the Assistant Quartermaster-General in Scinde,

No. 861, dated 24th September, and to request your replies thereto.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) M. M. SHAW, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding in U. S.

To Major Jacob, commanding
the Frontier, Khanghur.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 196 of 1848.

Khanghur, 29th September, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 550, of the 28th September, 1848, to my address, with accompaniment from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, and, in reply, have the honour to state that unless arrangements can be made to replace them by other troops, it would not, I think, be advisable to withdraw from the frontier under my command any men in addition to the detachment, 500 strong, which proceeded, under command of Lieutenant Merewether, *en route* to Bhawulpoor, on the 26th instant. I am of opinion that an alteration in the disposition of the troops on this frontier might be made so as with safety to allow of about 1,000 men altogether of the Scinde Irregular Horse being, as a temporary measure, withdrawn for other service. The arrangements I should propose are as follow:—The Scinde Camel Corps to move from Larkana to Khanghur, making the latter place its temporary head-quarters, and relieving the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse from the various outposts along the frontier line; 200 men of the Scinde Irregular Horse, and the 100 Belooche guides

lately enlisted by me, also remaining on the frontier; the latter disposed of as at present, a small party at each post, and the former kept chiefly in hand at Khanghur, so as to be ready to move instantly upon any point threatened. The police horsemen, from 80 to 100, which you have informed me will be available for service on this frontier, would also be very useful. The road lately completed by me along the whole frontier line, with the posts established at regular distances on it, and the other arrangements lately carried into effect, have so facilitated communication and simplified the business of guarding the frontier generally, that I have no doubt whatever but the above-mentioned force and arrangements would be found quite sufficient for the effective temporary protection of this frontier.

I have the honour to append a memorandum, showing roughly how the troops might be disposed of along the frontier under the arrangement above mentioned.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of U. S.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding
in U. S., Shikarpoor.

Letter from W. J. Surtees, Esq., to Major Jacob.

No 2,621 of 1848.

2nd October. 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour, by direction, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, with inclosures, No. 70, dated the 25th ultimo, and, in reply, to refer you to the instructions, forwarded by express to Major Goldney,

countermanding the advance of the detachment of your horse, copy of which will doubtless have been communicated by that officer to you before this can reach.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. SURTEES,
Assistant Secretary to the Commissioner.

To Major Jacob, Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 169 of 1848.

Khanghur, 5th October, 1848.

SIR,—With reference to the subject of letter No. 861 of 1848, from Lieutenant Phayre, Assistant Quarter-master-General, forwarded to me with your letter No. 558 of 1848, to my address, and in continuation of my reply thereto, I have the honour to state that the men of the Scinde Irregular Horse having been relieved by mounted police at the post of Khyree Ghurree and Rojaun, I find that sufficient men can be spared, without danger to the safety of the frontier, to complete the detachment under Lieutenant Merewether to the strength of three full squadrons, which arrangement I request that I may be allowed to make. This will in no way affect the arrangement proposed by me in my reply to your letter of the 28th September, which may be carried into effect or not, as higher authority shall determine; but I beg leave also to request that in any case I may myself be allowed to proceed at once in command of this detachment, giving over temporary command of the frontier to

Lieutenant Collier, I having been informed by the Brigadier commanding that he leaves it to me to go or to stay, as I think best for the good of the service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of U. S.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding
in U. S., Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Secretary to the Commissioner.

No. 203 of 1848.

Khanghur, 6th October, 1848.

SIR,—A strong detachment of the Scinde Irregular Horse having been marked to join the troop proceeding to Mooltan on the field service, I hope that the Commissioner will not object to my proceeding in command of the party, and I have the honour to request that I may be allowed to do so at once, handing over temporary command of this frontier to Lieutenant Collier, Scinde Irregular Horse. This military arrangement for the safe keeping of the frontier during my absence, for which a sufficient force will, in my opinion, still remain, will, I presume, be communicated to the Commissioner by the officer commanding the troops in Scinde.

Having permission from the military authorities to proceed in command of the detachment above mentioned, it is my intention to proceed to join it at Roree, in anticipation of the Commissioners sanctioning the arrangement; as if, my going be disapproved of, orders

for my remaining will reach me at Sukkur, I can return at once; while, on the other hand, much time would be lost by my remaining here.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of U. S.

To the Secretary to the Commissioner
in Scinde, Kurrachee.

Letter from Lieutenant Phayre.

No. 936 of 1848.

Kurrachee, 7th October, 1848.

SIR,—I have had the honour of submitting your letter No. 562 of 1848, dated 30th September, and accompaniments from Major Jacob, commanding the north-west frontier, to Brigadier the Hon. H. Dundas, C.B., commanding the Scinde division, and in reply, am to acquaint you that Colonel Dundas, having personally communicated with the Commissioner in Scinde on the advisabilty of completing to 1,000 sabres the 500 that have already been withdrawn from the frontier for field service in Mooltan, has decided that with the force at present allowed by Government for the occupation of Scinde, that measure, however much to be wished for, is not practicable, inasmuch as the squadron of that regiment now in central Scinde cannot be withdrawn for the purpose indicated by Major Jacob; nor is the Scinde Camel Corps sufficiently strong to undertake the duties proposed for it at Khanghur and the outposts, in addition to those at present performed by it at Larkana.

The project, therefore, of taking so strong a body of cavalry as proposed by Major Jacob in his letter No. 173 of 1848, has been reluctantly abandoned—not only from the want of means to replace them, as above adverted to, but from the tenor of paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Major Jacob's letter (No. 179, 1848, of 25th ultimo, forwarded to the Assistant Adjutant-General, and a copy of which was transferred to this office), which proves that the north-western frontier arrangement should at the present juncture remain as much as possible unaltered.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) R. THAYRE, Lieutenant,
Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General.

To the Officer commanding
in Upper Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Secretary to the Commissioner.

No. 208 of 1848.

Khanghur, 8th October, 1848.

SIR,—With reference to the subject of my letter No. 180, of the 6th October, 1848, to your address, I have the honour to report, that I find that the prospect of my leaving this frontier is unsettling the minds of the people on the border, and the state of the country also beyond the British boundary not being satisfactory, that I shall not, under any circumstances, quit my post on this frontier until I receive the full permission of the Commissioner to do so.

I should only be deceiving myself and my superiors, did I attempt, after what I have observed during the last three days, to persuade them that the peace of this

frontier can be preserved at present without the most constant care and watchful labour: but I trust that, if the Commissioner can make any satisfactory arrangement to set me free to take command of the squadrons of my regiments proceeding on service to the Punjab, that he will do so, as it is a source of unspeakable mortification to me, as well as of injury to the corps, that for the first time during the seven years I have had the honour to command the Scinde Irregular Horse, my men should proceed to active warfare without their commandant at their head.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the
Frontier of U. S.

To the Secretary to the Commissioner
in Scinde, Kurrachee.

Letter from W. J. Surtees, Esq., to Major Jacob.

No. 2,767 of 1848.

16th October, 1848.

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters Nos. 180 and 208, dated respectively the 5th and 8th instant.

2. The Commissioner fully enters into your anxiety to accompany any detachment of your regiment which may proceed beyond the frontier on field service, and is not insensible to the advantage of your presence with them as regards that service. At the same time he would at any time, but more especially in times such as the present, feel considerable hesitation in giving his assent to your absence from the superintendence of the

frontier; and in the state of affairs represented in the last of your letters under acknowledgment, he fully recognises the propriety of your resolution to remain at your post, an opinion in which he has the concurrence of the Brigadier commanding the division, with whom he has communicated on the subject.

3. The Commissioner will await with some anxiety your further report of the state of affairs on the frontier, and relies on your vigilance for adopting every needful precaution for its security.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) W. J. SURTEES,
Assistant Secretary to the Commissioner in Scinde.

To Major Jacob, in Political and Military charge of the Frontier, Khanghur.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 176 of 1848.

24th October, 1848.

SIR,—Having been informed by Lieutenant Malcolm, second in command of 2nd regiment Scinde Irregular Horse, that orders have been issued for him to join the field force about to proceed on service beyond the frontier in command of four squadrons, or as many as can be spared, and the head-quarters of the 2nd regiment Scinde Irregular Horse, I beg leave to point out that the detachment of five hundred men lately withdrawn from the frontier, and now at Subzulkote, under command of Lieutenant Merewether, is as great a number of men as it would be prudent to withdraw under present circumstances from this frontier, and that the departure of

three hundred more men to complete that detachment of four squadrons would be attended with great danger to the peace of the country, unless the squadron of the Scinde Irregular Horse now at Hydrabad could be spared for frontier service, or some other troops be sent to supply the place of those proceeding to join the Mooltan force.

I also beg leave to point out that the detachment at Subzulkote being already across the Indus, and so far on its road, complete and ready in every respect, it may be thought advisable to take it on as it stands, instead of sending back the officers and men of the 1st Scinde Irregular Horse, and relieving them by those of the 2nd.

As it appears to be intended that the head-quarters of one of the regiments of Scinde Irregular Horse should join the Mooltan army, and as an experienced officer is now available for the charge of this frontier, I beg leave most earnestly to request that I may be allowed to take command of that part of the Scinde Irregular Horse proceeding to Mooltan. I have worked hard, long, and successfully in this country; I have never been absent a day from the Scinde Irregular Horse during the seven years I have commanded it, and it appears unfair to me, as it will assuredly appear to the public as a censure on my conduct, that one of my subalterns, whatever his merit, be recalled when about to embark on sick certificate for Europe, and remanded to the corps, with orders to supersede me in the command of one of my regiments.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN Jacob, Major,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

To Colonel Shaw, Commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 242 of 1848.

Khanghur, 6th November, 1848.

SIR,—In continuation of the subject of my letter, No. 237, of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that there is little doubt of the mountaineers having assembled in considerable numbers for hostile purposes, as already reported, but they have not as yet left the hills, and it is very uncertain in what direction they may proceed, or whether any attempt will be made by them at all on the British border: an inroad, or attempt at one, appears no more likely to take place towards Kusmore than on any other part of the frontier line, but it is necessary for me to watch and guard all points. Wherefore it would, I think, be advisable to have one squadron in hand at Khanghur, while I may be out to the eastward with another. This would, in all probability, ensure the safety of the whole of this frontier line. The number of men I have now at my disposal would be more than sufficient to meet all these robber tribes combined, if we knew exactly always where to find them, but as they can suddenly attack any point, we must be prepared on all, or run some risk of allowing the mountaineers to make a profitable raid; while the least approach to a successful foray on their part in the way of plunder would do incalculable mischief to the country along the British border, and again introduce fear and disorder in place of the tranquillity now so happily prevailing. This risk may indeed be

small, but if it can be done without inconvenience, it is better to guard against accident as much as possible. Wherefore, perhaps it may be thought as well to send back to this frontier one troop of the First Scinde Irregular Horse now at Subzulkote, leaving two squadrons of 400 men with Lieuts. Merewether and Green to accompany the Mooltan force.

The Khan of Kelat has assembled a force which he is about to send into the hills against the Murrees, who have been laying waste his country; and, after all, it is very likely that this general assembly of the mountain tribes is merely for the purpose of repelling that attack; again, it is very possible that the predatory tribes are feigning an inroad in the direction of Kusmore to draw off my attention to that quarter, while their real attack is to take place to the westward, on the Khyheeree villages, in Cutchee.

It is also certainly possible that the inroad on Kusmore may be really intended, owing to the influence of the Dewan of Mooltan, although it is very unlikely that it will be carried into effect, when it is known that we are in the neighbourhood and on the watch for the marauders, who have only become open to Mooltan persuasion and assumed the appearance of an intention to invade the British territory, after hearing that Lieut. Merewether, with a great part of the border force, had left the frontier, and that I was about to follow with more.

It is my duty to lay all the circumstances set forth above before my superiors. At the same time, I have little doubt but that with the force I have at present at my disposal, the British territory will be preserved

inviolate under any circumstances, though it may be hard work for the men.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the Frontier of U. S.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Major Jacob to Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw.

No. 245 of 1848.

Kusmore, 10th November, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that I having received a communication from Lieutenant Green, with copy of a letter from General Whish, to the effect that his troops were being attacked in their camp, his allies going over to the enemy, and that the General was urgent for immediate reinforcement; that under these circumstances Major Hallet was marching to the assistance of General Whish, with the 3rd regiment Native Infantry, and detachment of the Scinde Irregular Horse, and that Lieutenant Malcolm was still many marches distant.

I have, therefore, considering the case as one of great emergency, and that the presence of Lieutenant Merewether would be far more required with the detachment under Major Hallet than with me on this frontier,

ordered Lieutenant Merewether to rejoin with speed the detachment proceeding towards Mooltan.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Political Superintendent on the
Frontier of U. S.

To Colonel Shaw, commanding in
Upper Scinde, Shikarpoor.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Hancock to Major-General Auchmuty.

No. 2,150 of 1848.

Bombay, 18th, November, 1848.

SIR,—I have submitted to the Commander-in-Chief Brigadier, the Hon. H. Dundas's letter, No. 1,272, of the 2nd instant, with accompaniment from Major Jacob, No. 176, dated 24th ultimo, to which I am instructed to reply as follows:—

Under the circumstances therein represented, his Excellency approves of Colonel Dundas's proposed arrangement to limit the detachment of the Scinde Horse which is to accompany the Field to the 500 men now at Subzulkote, but directs that the head-quarters of the 2nd regiment be attached to the same, agreeably to General Orders, No. 3, of the 11th ultimo, and that the whole be under the orders of Lieutenant Malcolm, Lieutenant Green being also attached, as directed in my letter to your address of the 7th ultimo. His Excellency leaves it to Major Jacob to arrange the distribution of

the other European officers as he may deem most expedient.

With regard to Major Jacob's solicitation to be permitted to proceed in command of that portion of his corps proceeding to Mooltan, I am to request you will furnish that officer with a copy of second paragraph of Mr. Secretary Mallet's letter, No. 446, of 14th instant, to the address of the Commissioner in Scinde, and acquaint him that, but for the urgent necessity which exists for his services being retained at this juncture in his present command on the Scinde frontier, it would have afforded his Excellency the greatest pleasure to have complied with his request, and to have recommended it to the favourable consideration of Government.

It is, I am to add, with much regret his Excellency is compelled to notice with his disapprobation the tenor and style of the concluding paragraph of Major Jacob's letter under acknowledgment.

It was, I am to observe, for the Commander-in-Chief and the Government alone to judge whether that officer's services would most properly be retained for the command of the Scinde frontier, or more available for that of the Scinde Horse proceeding with the field force, and and it was for Major Jacob to defer to his Excellency's orders, and not to cavil and allow his mind to be swayed by considerations of what the public might think of the matter, than which no course, I am to state, could be more unmilitary. It is, I am to remark, only the opinion of his military superiors and of Goverment that can be rightly made the object of an officer's solicitude, and his Excellency is sorry in having occasion to point

this out to an officer of Major Jacob's rank and standing in the service.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) H. HANCOCK, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

To Major-General Auchmuty,
commanding the troops in
Scinde, Sukkur.

Letter from the Commissioner in Scinde to the Right Honourable Viscount Falkland, Governor and President in Council, Bombay.

No. 2,977 of 1848.—Secret Department.

Kurrachee, 3rd November, 1848.

MY LORD,—In transmitting for the consideration of your Lordship in Council the accompanying copy of a letter, No. 175, dated the 24th ultimo, from Major Jacob, in political and military charge of the frontier, I beg to refer to the correspondence forwarded with my letters, Nos. 2,742 and 2,768, dated respectively the 13th and 16th ultimo, as containing my opinion on the subject to which he relates; to which I have only to add, with reference to the withdrawal of the squadron of Scinde Irregular Horse, now at Hydrabad for frontier service, that I consider it would be attended with risk, as that is the locality, if any within the province, where disaffection is to be apprehended.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) R. W. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from A. Malet, Esq., Chief Secretary to Government, to R. W. Pringle, Esq., Commissioner in Scinde.

No. 446 of 1848.—Secret Department.

Bombay Castle, 14th November, 1848.

SIR,—I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letters Nos. 2,742, 2,768 and 2,977, dated the 13th and 16th ultimo, and the 3rd instant.

2. In reply, I am desired to inform you that it would, in the opinion of Government, be highly unadvisable to permit Major Jacob to proceed to the siege of Mooltan.

3. His Lordship in Council concurs with you in opinion that the detachment of Scinde Horse now at Hydrabad should not be removed from thence.

4. Whether the officers and men of the 1st regiment now with the detachment at Subzulkote should proceed with that detachment, or be relieved by an equal number of officers and men of the 2nd regiment, is a point which should be determined by yourself and Major Jacob.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

[True Copy.]

(Signed) J. F. LESTER,
Assistant Commissioner
in Scinde.

Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, Bombay, to the Honourable J. P. Willoughby.

Dated 14th November, 1848.

MY DEAR WILLOUGHBY,—Relative to the Scinde affairs at present, every arrangement has gone on well. Had Major Jacob not been wanted so urgently on the frontier, of course he could have gone with Dundas; but he is too good an officer, and so perfectly understands the tribes, that he cannot possibly be spared.

No news from the north-west.

Ever yours truly,

WILLOUGHBY COTTON.

Letter from R. W. Pringle, Esq., to Major Jacob.

No. 3,206 of 1848.—Secret Department.

Kurrachee, 28th November, 1848.

SIR,—With reference to your Letter, No. 175, dated the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit for your information and guidance, copy of my letter No. 2,977, dated the 3rd instant, and of Mr. Chief Secretary Malet's reply, No. 446, dated 14th instant.

2. By a letter dated the 10th instant, from Brigadier the Honourable H. Dundas, I am led to believe that a troop of Scinde Horse has already joined you from Hydrabad, but on this point I beg to be informed.

3. I also request you will favour me with your opinion on the subject of the concluding paragraph of Mr. Malet's letter, if the point to which it relates has not already been disposed of, as seems probable, by the course of events, so as not conveniently to admit of modification.

I have, &c.

(Signed) R. W. PRINGLE,

Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Captain Tallet to Lieut.-Colonel Shaw.

No. 1,377 of 1848.

Assistant Adjutant-General's Office, Camp, Sukkur,
29th November, 1848.

SIR,—I am instructed by Major-General Auchmuty, C.B. to forward the annexed copies of letters regarding the inexpediency of permitting Major Jacob, under existing circumstances to proceed to Mooltan, and to desire that the same be made known to the Major.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) T. TALLET, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant-General, S.H.B.

Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw, commanding
in Upper Scinde, Sukkur.

Letter from Lieut.-Colonel Hancock to Major-General Auchmuty.

No. 2,146.

Adjutant-General's Office, Bombay,
18th November, 1848.

SIR,—I am instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to transmit for your information the enclosed transcript of a letter from the Secretary to Government, in the Secret Department (No. 447), dated the 14th instant, with copy of its accompaniments, relative to the inexpediency of permitting Major Jacob under existing circumstances to proceed with the Scinde Horse to the siege of Mooltan, and the removal of the detachment of that corps now at Hydrabad.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. HANCOCK, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

To Major-General S. B. Auchmuty, C.B.,
commanding the troops in Upper Scinde.

Letter from A. Malet, Esq., to Lieut.-Colonel Hancock.

No. 447 of 1848.—Secret Department.

Bombay Castle, 14th November, 1848.

SIR,—I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit to you for submission to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of my letter of this date to the Commissioner in Scinde, relative to the inexpediency of Major Jacob proceeding towards Mooltan, and the detachment of the Scinde Horse now at Hydrabad being removed from thence. The point noticed in the concluding paragragh has probably already been communicated to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief by the officer commanding in Scinde.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Commissioner in Scinde.

17th January, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 80, of the 10th of January, 1849, with accompaniments.

With reference to the contents of the extracts from a letter, No. 31, dated 20th September, 1848, from the Honourable the Court of Directors, I beg leave to point out that many erroneous impressions appear to exist with regard to the various tribes on this frontier, wherefore, with a view to a correct understanding of this matter, it may be proper for me to explain that the

Khyheerees never were a plundering tribe,—they are not even Belooches,—never were our enemies in any way, were never subdued by Sir Charles Napier, and were never induced by his Excellency to settle in Scinde. The Khyheerees formerly, up to about the year 1827, held the lands which they now oocupy, and the sunuds for these lands, granted to them by the old Nusseer Khan of Kelat, are still in their possession, and acknowledged to be genuine by the present Khan.

About 1827-28 the Khyheerees, who had long maintained a struggle against the Belooche tribes around them, were at last, by a general coalition of the predatory tribes, of whom the Doomkees and Jekranees were the chief, entirely expelled from Cutchee, and they then took refuge in Scinde; where they were quietly and peaceably settled when we came to the country in 1838-39.

In 1839 British troops were sent against the robber tribes then occupying the lands of the Khyheerees in the plains of Cutchee; the marauders fled and took refuge in the hills. After Major Billamore's successful expedition into the mountains in 1839-40 (in the course of which the hill tribe were really encountered and beaten), the Khyheerees were replaced by Mr. Ross Bell, then resident in Scinde, on the lands of their fathers. The same officer afterwards again rejected them, and restored the lands to the Doomkees and Jekranees under Beejah Khan and Durrya Khan, the Khyheerees returning to Scinde.

The Doomkees and Jekranees quietly occupied the lands in question, and abstained from plundering during the year 1842, when I held military and political charge of this frontier.

But no sooner had the British troops totally evacuated Cutchee, than these marauders resumed their old habits, and by reason of their incursions and those of the hill tribes, the whole border was laid waste, and the most dreadful injuries inflicted on the peaceable inhabitants of the country on both sides of the desert. This state of affairs continued after the conquest of Scinde by the British. No efficient protection was afforded to our subjects on the border, and to increase the evil, our wretched peasantry, when they attempted to protect themselves and their homes from the daring and cruel marauders, were sometimes destroyed by the British troops placed for their protection. As in the instance which occurred in 1844, when the 6th regiment of Bengal Irregular Cavalry cut up in a shocking manner more than sixty of our own people, besides about an equal number of the peaceable subjects of H. H. Meer Ali Morad, who, the former at least, offered no resistance, even throwing away their arms when ordered, and who had turned out to protect their property from the robbers. Government is already acquainted with the circumstances of this case, and some of the survivors who were severely wounded on that occasion, are now receiving pensions from the British Government.

This affair did an immense amount of injury on this frontier, and was the greatest possible encouragement and assistance to the robbers. It was, however, unfortunately never rightly understood at head-quarters until, in 1847, the truth of the matter was reported by me to Sir Charles Napier, and the depositions on oath before me, as magistrate, of the wounded men and others forwarded. So little was known of the real merits of the case, that it appears by the Bengal General Orders,

that the 6th regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry were presented with musketoons for their conduct on this occasion. After this followed the plundering and burning of Kumber by the marauders, and the unsuccessful attack by the British on the village of Poolijee, then in the possession of Beejah Khan Doomkee.

By the end of the year 1844, nothing could have been worse than the state of this frontier. Sir Charles Napier's expedition into the hills in 1845 terminated in the surrender of the greater part of the men from the plains who had taken refuge in the mountains, namely, the Doomkee, Jekranee, &c.; but none of the hill-men, with the exception of Meer Hussan Nootanee, surrendered or were captured; neither were the hill-tribes injured in the least, save perhaps by the loss of a few cattle.

The Doomkees and Jekranees were, according to the conditions of their surrender, transported from Cutchee, with their wives, families, and property, and settled in Scinde; but the Boogtees remained as troublesome as ever, becoming even more daring than before in their incursions, although the Government of Scinde offered a reward for each man of the tribe who might be anyhow taken prisoner; and every individual of the Boogtees was ordered to be treated as an enemy wherever found. The new settlers, the Doomkees and Jekranees, who were supposed to have become peaceable subjects, aided by the Kosahs and others in Scinde, were not less active robbers, from the British side of the border, than were the hill-men on the other. Such was the state of disorder, and such boldness on the part of the robber tribes was induced, that in December, 1846, a body of about 1,200 men of the Boogtees,* from the hills nearly all of

* Since ascertained from Islam Khan Alim Khan and the other

them on foot, marched in open day far into the British territory, plundered all the country about Meerpoor, to within sixteen miles of the city of Shikarpoor, and returned within their hills, a distance of some seventy miles, uninjured, with all their booty in perfect safety.

In January, 1847, the Scinde Irregular Horse arrived on the frontier, and Government is acquainted with what has occurred on the frontier since that time. My honourable masters may rest assured, that no unnecessary violence has been or ever will be made use of by me. It is, however, impossible to conciliate an enemy with advantage when he believes that you are weak, more especially an Asiatic enemy; and the above hasty but true sketch of the affairs of this frontier from 1843 to 1846 inclusive, shows that the robber tribes had little reason to believe us strong.

Every man, woman, and child in the country, including the very Boogtees themselves, fully acquiesce in the justice and mercy shown in the punishment of those determined murderers and robbers of the Boogtee tribe, on the 1st October, 1847. But the effect of such blows is merely temporary, and chiefly valuable as giving time and opportunity to carry into effect the measures best adapted to afford permanent relief. This has been my aim from the first. There have been, and are still, many obstacles to success, but none of them insuperable. I have succeeded in establishing among the people a perfect confidence in the power and will of the Government

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Boogtee leaders, that the number was about 2,000; each private man received a cow or bullock and five sheep and goats as his share of the plunder. The total number of head of cattle carried off on this occasion amounted to about 15,000.

to protect them. The habit of making war on private account has been broken, and almost completely put a stop to. The people on the border have been disarmed, as throughout the rest of Scinde.

I have every reason to hope that the system of family death-feuds, hitherto the cause of so much bloodshed, will gradually cease to be acted on, even if it be not in time forgotten; and that the practice of bloodshed and robbery, no longer being found to lead to honour or profit, will cease to be looked upon as manly and respectable.

Already along the borders the change is great; lands which have laid waste for half a century are being now cultivated; old canals, long choked, re-opened, and new ones dug; new villages are springing up, and people go about everywhere unarmed and in perfect safety.

I am informed by the officers of H. H. Meer Ali Morad, that by reason of the quiet established on this border during the last two years, the revenue of the district of Boordika has more than doubled. The revenue paid to H. H. Ali Morad for the lands about Khanghur, watered from the Noorwah Canal, amounted in 1846 to about 5,000 rupees, and this was considered a fair produce; these lands now yield the Government about 30,000 rupees a-year, and the amount will in all probability continue greatly to increase.

With regard to the difficulty of the position of the Khyheerees, as subjects of the Khan of Kelat, it cannot be denied that the circumstances are somewhat embarrassing, or, at least, may become so. Hitherto all has gone smoothly enough; and, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the post maintained since 1845 at Sharpoor, in Cutchee, I have, chiefly by moral influence, been able to

afford sufficient protection to the Khyheerees. So long as peaceable and quiet people occupy that part of Cutchee now held by them, the British frontier will be but little liable to incursions by any marauders from the plains of Cutchee. The annoyances from the hill people will be chiefly confined to the side of Boordika, and, with proper frontier arrangements, may cease altogether. On the other hand, we might withdraw our protection from the Khyheerees altogether; in which case, I conceive that the British Government would be bound to provide for them in Scinde, for they would assuredly be speedily driven out of Cutchee. I am not prepared to say that this might not be the best policy in the end, but their places in Cutchee would very soon be filled by plundering tribes, who, like their predecessors the Doomkees and Jekranees, would not be in the smallest degree under the control of the feeble Government of Kelat; they would certainly re-establish a state of predatory warfare, and give much trouble along the British border: and though it is exceedingly probable that our frontier would still be efficiently protected, the greatest vigilance and activity on the part of a considerable border force would be requisite to maintain peace and quietness, which most certainly no conciliatory efforts alone would secure. Indeed, unless by any means the Government of Kelat were to recover sufficient vigour to enable it to control its turbulent subjects, all attempts at conciliating the robbers would only make matters worse.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major.
Commanding Frontier, Upper Scinde.

To the Commissioner in Scinde.

Observations by General Sir C. J. Napier.

2nd February, 1847.

Major-General Hunter encloses a Report from Captain Jacob. I beg to call to General Hunter's notice, that I, perfectly knowing these men, warned him on the 8th May (eight months ago) what would happen in the following letter:—

(EXTRACT.)

8th May, 1846.

"You must look out for your convoys to Shahpoor; depend upon it the robbers mean to have a touch at them. Now, mark, I suspect the Jekranees are raising a talk, and mean to plunder some convoy *themselves*, and lay it on the Boogtees. This, you will say, is a deep scheme, but it is just what such chaps are dabs at, and the only thing is to be up to their tricks. I suspect them hugely, however, and warn you to keep a sharp look out on them."

That General Hunter sent this warning, which I gave him, to the police and to the outposts I have no doubt, and therefore I have much to complain of. No experience of these robbers was required, either by Lieutenant Hamilton or Lieutenant Younghusband, or the officer commanding outposts. Robbers are alike in all ages and in all countries: to deal with them only needs activity and *reflection;* neither seem to have been employed till Captain Jacob arrived, though the above caution and common *resolution* in officers at outposts ought to have prevented all this inconvenience which has taken place on the frontier. The details stated by Captain Jacob of the proceedings adopted by the Jekranees are exactly those which I fully expected, and to prevent which I

placed Lieutenant Hamilton where he is. The Jekranees never should have been allowed to carry arms, and their horses were positively ordered by me to be sold. It was reported to me that they *had* been sold by auction, and the difference between their value and what they sold for *was paid* to the owners by *Government*. I have no papers by me to refer to, as Captain Browne is gone, but the transaction is very clear in my memory. Captain Jacob says he "believes" the system of robbery has been carried on without being suspected. It was very natural to believe so, but it was not the case, for my letter shows that I *more* than suspected it, and warned General Hunter eight months ago. I do not know what Lieutenant Hamilton imagines he was placed where he is for; I knew from the first moment that these things were inevitable, unless a British officer by his *zeal and activity on the spot* prevented them, and I knew he could do so if he did his duty; and unless he can explain his conduct in a satisfactory manner to Major-General Hunter, it will be my duty to request the Governor-General to recall him, and place another officer in his position. My original orders are to be rigidly put in force, that, 1st. No man is to carry arms without a special permission in writing from lieutenant of police, &c. 2nd. No man is to quit the station of Janeederah without leave. 3rd. No man is to keep a horse, except, which I now add, by permission, for agricultural purposes, unless it be the chief Duryah Khan, and his must in future be registered, as well as every horse kept for agriculture, and this register must be kept in the Jekranee officer's own writing, that he may know and muster all the horses at any moment, and confiscate any that are absent at such muster, besides punishing the owner in any other

way which the commanding officer of the frontier thinks proper, and which may be within his competence to inflict. As a magistrate, which Captain Jacob is, I leave it to Captain Jacob to carry through those rules at his discretion, for as there has been great neglect, to say the least of it, regarding these thieves, it would be unfair to be suddenly harsh without admonition being duly given and explained to men so wild, and that I will hang them if they go out plundering. But I repeat it, my determination is to make an example of those who refuse obedience. This renders it necessary that the Jekranees should clearly understand their position; and I desire Captain Jacob to explain this to them personally, which will be satisfactory both to himself and to me. It is impossible for me to do more than give general directions in minor points. The officer on the frontier must act on his own discretion, reporting what he does. Lieutenant-Colonel Stack and his regiment had the outposts, and they seem not to have been aware of that which is the chief duty of a regiment of light cavalry, or what has taken place could not, in my opinion, have happened; but I attribute the mischief much more to Lieutenant Hamilton than to the officer commanding the cavalry outposts. I know that had there not been much neglect, what has taken place, according to Captain Jacob's report, could not have occurred.

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER, Lieutenant-General.

Major-General Hunter to Major Jacob.

MY DEAR JACOB,—Here is a letter from the Secretary with the Governor's remarks on your late report. It is

rather hard to reflect on me, who never knew one order that was given to Lieut. Hamilton; neither did I know from your report that the mares and horses had been ordered to be sold: all I know is, the extract of his letter to me is correct. I mentioned it to Goldney and Younghusband: they did not suspect Jekranees, and as to Mr. Hamilton, he never would allow it. I am and have been often told that a Jakranee could do no wrong. You have now the sole command of the frontier, and can give your own orders. I only hope Sir Charles won't, in one of his wild moments, write an order to some one under your command to act in some contrary manner. Orders given to so many plays Old Harry. Send me back these observations sharp after taking a copy, which will guide you in future very clearly without reference to any one. I may have to reply to them before I go, which I intend on the 17th.

Yours, in haste,
(Signed) G. HUNTER.

From Sir C. Napier to Major Jacob.

Kurrachee, February 1, 1847.

DEAR JACOB,—I have yours of the 25th instant, which has perfectly astonished me. What have Forbes, Younghusband, and Hamilton been about! Against my own opinion I was persuaded, like an ass, to allow the Jekranees to be armed. I *long* ago ordered their horses to be taken from them and sold.

I have written to Hunter. I long to get his official on the subject. I have told him to put the Jekranees and

Lieutenant Hamilton under your orders. They are bold fellows, and you will turn them to some account.

The English mail has just been signalled, and I leave this for Hyderabad to-morrow, so I am too busy to say more.

Very faithfully,

C. J. NAPIER.

Major-General Hunter to Major Jacob.

January 24, 1847.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I was very much delighted with the success of your people against a party of Boogtees, which I have sent off to the Governor. For the last year, I believe, the 3rd Cavalry never sent out a patrol: no wonder Lootoos came in every direction; but I feel quite satisfied they will now give over troubling our frontier, let them go elsewhere if they please. I feel so confident that your arrangements and activity will give peace to the country, that I begin to regret my time of departure is so near. Under the 3rd Cavalry management of the frontier, as I think I told you before, it was necessary to arm both Kosahs and Jakranees; but I never approved of their being so. I have written to the Governor for permission to cancel that leave, and not even at Janadeyra to allow arms to be carried; that you will guarantee them protection if so is ordered: those chaps, if allowed matchlocks and horses, will go across the desert and plunder, or try to do so, leaving alone the cultivation of the soil.

I have ordered out your detachment from Shikarpoor, on the reasons you have urged: by the end of the month

the 18th will be up, and then Shikarpoor will be well guarded; but I myself never had fear of any attempt being made on our cantonment, though it was the fashion at one time to make it appear a probable event; but *we are on another tack now.*

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

Sunday, 4 P. M. (Signed) G. HUNTER.

(Extract.)

From Major Jacob to the officer commanding in Upper Sinde.

No. 209 of 1847.

Khanghur, 4th November, 1847.

PRACTICALLY, however, I was made, by his Excellency the Governor, the sole authority, military and political, as far as related to the safe keeping of the border, throughout that part of the frontier of Scinde and Cutchee which was placed under my command.

With regard to the system of policy pursued by me on this frontier, the best way of explaining it perhaps will be to state, as shortly as possible, what actually have been my proceedings, and the facts which have taken place.

On the 9th January, 1847, I arrived at Khanghur, and received command of the frontier out-posts: at this time I found the whole country in a state of the greatest disorder, which had become much worse since the successful raid of the Boogtee tribe, in November 1846, when the mountaineers came down in force to within 15 miles of Shikarpoor, and returned uninjured to the hills.

In fact the whole of the country on the border, and for a considerable distance within it, was one continued scene of terror and alarm on the night before we arrived at Khanghur. Alum Khan himself, with a body of predatory horse, was plundering on the road between Janadeyra and Jagner, whence he carried off a number of camels of the baggage corps. The next night horsemen from the hills carried off camels from Rojaun, and this appeared to be the normal state of affairs. There was no peace or quiet anywhere on this frontier, and General Hunter himself told me, and has expressed the same in one of those letters now forwarded, that they were always expecting Shikarpoor to be attacked. The people of the country had not the slightest confidence in British protection. As everybody carried arms, it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and the inhabitants of our own territory were quite as much given to marauding, and did quite as much to keep up disorder and bloodshed, as the robbers from the hills; in fact, a system of private warfare was constantly carried on by both parties, to an almost incredible extent. On the side of Boordicka, in the territory of H. H. Meer Ali Morad, matters were if possible even worse.

To remedy this state of affairs, it appeared to me that the first thing to be done was to put a stop to all marauding on the part of our own subjects, and to give the well-disposed portion of them reasonable confidence in our ability to protect them. I therefore proceeded to establish a system of daily and nightly patrols of horse along the whole frontier, on both sides of the desert, and into Boordicka and Cutchee. These patrols instantly went to Ooch, Punian, Hoodoo, Gorenaree, &c., &c., and notwithstanding the long distance and want of water,

this daily labour was persevered in throughout the hot season (with what effect is well known). Having thus provided against disturbance from without, I endeavoured to remedy internal disorder—as soon therefore as my patrolling arrangements were established, I proceeded to disarm every man in the country not having especial permission to carry arms. This having been done, it was no longer difficult to distinguish a robber from a true man.

The horses and mares of the Jekranees and Janadeyra had been taken from them and sold a year before by order of His Excellency the Governor; but I soon discovered that the sale was fictitious, and that their horses had been merely placed for safe keeping with various Zemeendars all over the country, and all this was quite unknown to Government. Whenever the Jeckranees wished to proceed on a predatory excursion, the horses, and all also required, were immediately forthcoming; the men, mounted and armed, assembled one by one, at some convenient place of rendezvous, and on their return, disposed of the plunder among their Zemeendar friends, and returned singly to their houses, secretly as they went out.

I warned the Jekranees at Janadeyra, and others, that if I found them still carrying on these predatory excursions, I should imprison them, and they would be hanged, but long impunity had made them bold, and having great confidence in their own native cunning, they fancied they could still conceal their deeds from my knowledge; until on the 28th January, a large party of them was seized by one of my patrols, near Thool, mounted, armed, and with a number of stolen cattle in their possession—their swords were covered with fresh

blood, and the culprits themselves boasted of having killed six men, whom they had found with the cattle they had carried off. I deprived these robbers of their horses and arms, and sent the men to prison at Shikarpoor. The effect of this proceeding was great and excellent: the Zemeendars feared any longer to connect themselves with these secret expeditions, which, indeed, ceased to be profitable, they having on this occasion lost their horses, arms, and plunder. The well-disposed people acquired confidence in Government, and the measures above mentioned being steadily continued, in a few months the country settled down into the most profound tranquillity, which has not since been disturbed by the appearance of a single marauder within the British territory.

Having completely put a stop to plundering on the border, whether from our side or from without, and caused the mountaineers themselves to look on further attempts by small parties to invade our territory as hopeless, I proceeded to endeavour to render these hillmen powerless for evil in future. Their chiefs, Islam Khan, Alim Khan, &c., positively refused to submit to the British Government — to acknowledge its supremacy — or to forego their lawless life, thinking themselves safe and quite out of reach in their mountain fastnesses. However, I soon discovered that they were in great measure dependent for food on supplies from the plains, principally from our own territory, and from Boordicka. These supplies, with some difficulty, I almost entirely put a stop to, thereby reducing the plundering tribes to distress. Having cut off their food from Scinde, I proceeded to the same on the Cutchee side, and succeeded in doing so, with the exception that occasional convoys

reached them from Lharree. They were soon reduced to extremity, but though the poorer families of the Boogtees were suffering from starvation and misery, and came in to surrender to me in an almost famished state, yet their chiefs, in spite of the entreaties of their starving followers, obstinately refused to surrender, and preferred continuing their robber-life. At last the famine could no longer be borne; no alternative remained but to submit or to obtain food by force: they preferred the latter course, and, assembling as many fighting men as they could, made three separate inroads into that part of Cutchee inhabited by the Khyheerees under our protection. In their assaults on the town of Poolejee, &c. they were repulsed, and on the occasion of the third inroad, they were attacked and almost wholly destroyed, by Lieutenant Merewether: after this they still endeavoured to make one more effort, but without success. Their friends, so soon as they knew the fearful extent of the disaster which had befallen them, left them to their fate; still the Boogtee chief did not surrender, and the reports of the robbers again making head for another inroad, although evidently without foundation, in truth, did harm, by causing alarm among the people in the plain. I therefore proceeded to bring matters to a crisis, and managed to have it believed that I was proceeding at once to Deyrah, to seize Islam Khan, &c. This news was carried to Deyrah *by their own spies*, who reported to Islam Khan that they had seen me in full march towards Deyrah. When this intelligence reached him, the Boogtee at once made up his mind to surrender, but having been informed by a treacherous message from Janadeyra that he ought not to come into me, as I had determined on imprisoning him, and being advised by

these Jekrannees and other parties to surrender to the police at Kusmore, Islam Khan, &c., immediately proceeded to Kusmore, and gave himself up to the Russuldar of Police, Aliff Khan.

The system of policy by which my proceedings have been regulated may be comprised in three or four words, common sense, hard labour, perseverance, and watchfulness. These I have at least endeavoured to practice, and the result has been that our own people are perfectly protected from injury to person and property, and also completely prevented from injuring their neighbours. Not an armed man, save the soldiers and policemen of the state, is now ever seen on the border: people go about backwards and forwards between Sinde and Cutchee, even with much valuable property or camels, &c., without a single armed attendant, without fear, and perfectly unmolested. This state of affairs may, I am certain, be perpetuated, with a proper arrangement for guarding the frontier; but if it be neglected or mismanaged, things will in a very few years be as bad as ever. The Jekrannees at Janadeyra are inveterate marauders: it is an error to suppose that they have really been as yet changed in the least since they have become British subjects; they continually pine after the stormy and lawless freedom they have lost, and are always on the watch for a renewal of the joys of a robber's life. Many of the Kosahs about are not much better, and the whole, if not carefully watched and strongly controlled, would soon re-establish the systematic plundering which so long kept this country in a ferment, and reduced some of the most fertile parts of it to a desert. To maintain the peace and quiet now so happily established on this frontier, it appears to me

almost necessary that the control of it should be in one man's hands, and should be his sole, or at least his principal, duties: he should have the command from Kusmore in the Indus, to the extreme Western boundary, the police being wholly withdrawn from the posts, or, if kept there, placed entirely under the orders of the officer commanding the frontier. The frontier officer should have political authority concerning such matters as relate to the safe guarding of the frontier. Magisterial powers over our own subjects to the same extent, and should be the sole channel of communication with the frontier tribes in our immediate neighbourhood. The post of commanding on the frontier is no sinecure, its duties will be quite sufficient to occupy the time of any man, however active of mind and body, and cannot be efficiently performed by the collector or other officer similarly situated, having already a sufficiency of work to perform in his own peculiar line.

I have, &c., &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

To Colonel Shaw,
Commanding in U. S., Shickarpoor.

Letter from Lieut.-Col. Outram, C.B., to Major Jacob.

9th November, 1842.

SIR,— I cannot depart from Sinde without performing my duty to yourself and the corps you command in acknowledging the great obligations I am under to you, to Lieutenants Malcolm and Fitzgerald, and to the Native officers and men of the Sinde Irregular Russalla.

For the first time within the memory of man, Cutchee and Upper Sinde have been for a whole year entirely free from the irruptions of the hill-tribes, by which villages were annually destroyed, lives and property sacrificed, and the whole country kept in a state of fever.

During the past year the emissaries of our enemies had been unremitting in their exertions to instigate the northern hill-tribes to resume their marauding habits, with a view to disturb our communication with Affghanistan through Sinde and Cutchee; and so far succeeded that large bands of freebooters were at one time assembled for the purpose, under some of the most noted of their former leaders; but in vain they strove to effect this object, which were solely counteracted by the indomitable zeal with which you, your officers and men, so constantly exposed yourselves, especially throughout the hot months, whereby every attempt of the marauders to enter the plains was baffled. The extraordinary vigilance you have exerted, and strict discipline you have maintained, not merely in the Sinde Russuldar, but also among the quotas of Belooch Horse which were under your orders, have deterred the northern tribes from committing themselves in hostility during the late exciting period, in dread of the corps you so ably command.

I am bound accordingly to attribute to the Sinde Irregular Horse the profound tranquillity which has been preserved in Upper Sinde and Cutchee; and I beg you will accept yourself, and convey to your officers and men, my grateful thanks.

I have the honour to annex an extract (paragraph 11) from a despatch I addressed to Mr. Secretary Maddox

on the 9th ultimo, expressing my obligations to you personally.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. OUTRAM,
Pol., Agent in S. and B.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Major Jacob.

6th February, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—Send home the Chandias with all sorts of butter. As there are no *parsnips* in Sinde, fair words must do for the present. As the money and parsnips are together, what I give Wullee I must take from the Khan, *pro tem.* At least send a letter to me by the Teywahg, to tell me the 5,000 cavalry and infantry are coming up as soon as the camels can be hired. Make your moonshee or Alif Khan write this also to Brown's moonshee: add, that the 7th Cavalry arrived at Khanghur on any day convenient. Send this to get into the Boogtee hands; and in your letter—the Persian being a translation of the English only, as if from a different person—make any remarks you think right on the great fortification I am going to construct at Deyra, and in this pass, when the troops arrive, unless the Boogtees make salam; expatiate largely on my benevolence and my wishes not to extirpate them. I really do feel very benevolent in that way since the rascally camel-men failed me. I am sadly bothered, and I shall be glad to make honourable terms, especially with Deyra Khan, who is a good fellow with a bad calling, like the apothecary in 'Romeo and Juliet.'

The Murrees have just sent me a letter in answer to one of mine, that they are ready to join me and attack the Boogtees. I do not think the letter you make up

for the Boogtees will do any good. They have been once tricked and forewarned, but it may give them alarm, and produce good effect, and can do no harm, except five rupees to a cossid.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) C. NAPIER.

To Major Jacob.

Letter from Major Jacob to Captain Browne.

24th February, 1845.

SIR,—I have the honour to report that the two thieves mentioned in my letter of the 19th February to your address, were hanged yesterday by order of his Highness the Khan of Kelat.

I have also the honour to report that several small parties of marauders from the hills have lately made their appearance about Shahpoor; and on the afternoon of the 2nd instant, a party of these men—Jekrannees Boogtees—carried off twenty bullocks loaded with grain from the neighbourhood of Syude Hussan Ka Koobah, five miles from Shahpoor. The marauders were pursued by a party of horse from Shahpoor, I believe, without success, but information as to the road the robbers had taken reaching the Poolejee post at night, a party from thence followed them into the hills, came up to them at Kulchat, and recovered the bullocks, with the grain and four buniahs, whom the thieves had carried off. The robbers effected their escape unhurt.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Captain,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

To Captain Browne,
Secretary to Government.

5th July, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I regret, unpleasant as the thing was, the Chuprassee was only doing his duty. General Simpson has, of course, notified to you as well as to the rest of the troops, the duties now leviable on things brought by Sahibs and Sepoys, as they were before on purchases by Sindees; not a rupee's worth of anything can consequently be taken from the town without first settling with the tax-gatherer, either on the spot or at the custom-station, as may be required by the said gentleman.

All your man has to do, therefore, is to go to the custom serai, pay the dues, and release the tin.

I have no moonshee here to-day, or would send a note with him; but it is immaterial, as on paying the duty the tin will be given up.

I hope now all, both high and low, will be compelled to taste the bitterness of this damned system. The thing will be soon knocked on the head; indeed, the abolition is now under Sir Charles's consideration, though it is extended to camps meanwhile.

Yours truly,

(Signed) A. B. RATHBORNE.

Letter from Captain Rathborne to Major Jacob.

6th December, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—Government have *now* abolished all internal duties, substituting duties import and export into and out of Sinde, as elsewhere in India, with the exception of foreign grain, which, though free in Bombay,

pays in Sinde. This man has brought grain from Subzulkote foreign territory, and is charged duties for it which is quite correct.

Yours truly,

(Signed) A. B. RATHBORNE.

MEM. Proclamation was made in April 1843, by order of Lord Ellenborough, that all transit duties were henceforth abolished; but this was not acted on, and when in December 1845, they were abolished, other duties were imposed in their place, as appears from this Note.

MEM. The price of grain at Hyderabad having been raised to 16 seers per rupee, or nearly three times the usual price of Jowaree at that place, the chowderee of the Sinde Irregular Horse Bazaar, brought a number of boat-loads of grain from Subzulcote (Bhawulpoor territory), they were passed free by the collector, &c., at Sukkur, but at Hyderabad were seized by Captain Rathborne and made to pay import duty.

Letter from Captain Rathborne, Collector of Hyderabad, to the Secretary to Government of Sinde.

No 791 of 1845.

18th October, 1845.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 2,633, forwarding copy of a complaint from Captain Jacob, commanding Sinde Irregular Horse, regarding the levy of taxes at Hyderabad on clothes to be made up into augricas, horse-cloths, and ropes.

Regarding the complaint, I beg to report that, as long

as town duties exist at Hyderabad, the tax demanded is payable. The conduct of the tax-gatherer, therefore, was correct, and the decision of the deputy collector, Lieutenant Stack, in strict accordance with the law.

Whether duty might, as Captain Jacob says, with equal propriety be demanded for the coats on the men's backs, as for the cloth they have purchased to make new ones, is a question which it forms no part of my business to enter into; but with reference to it, I may mention, that it does happen to be the case, that in England and on the Continent, and in India, and at Kurrachee, as well as at Hyderabad, and every town in Sinde, custom-duties are invariably levied on such materials as clothing may be, which are not made up, whether they be for private use or for sale. While customs are not levied on the coats on gentlemen's, or the dresses on ladies', backs in any of these places.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. RATHBORNE,
Collector and Magistrate.

Hyderabad, 12th October, 1845.

NOTE.—It will be seen from this letter of Captain Rathborne's that, although transit duties were ordered to be abolished by Ellenborough in Sinde, in 1843, they were "invariably levied at every town in Sinde," up to the end of 1845; and that goods purchased at Kurrachee, on which heavy duties were paid at that place, were again made to pay duty at Hyderabad and at every other town in Sinde.

Captain Rathborne calls the tax in this instance complained of "town duties," but the things seized not only were never taken into the town of Hyderabad, but were never even near it, having been seized at the entrenched camp four miles distant from the town.

These taxes were first imposed, by order of Sir C. Napier, in July, 1845.

Letter from Major Jacob to Captain Younghusband, Major of Brigade, Hyderabad.

7th July, 1845.

SIR,—I have the honour to request that you will represent to General Simpson, with a view to its being brought to the notice of the Government of Sinde, the extreme inconvenience, injury, and oppression, caused to officers and men at Hyderabad by the operation of the tax imposed some days since on everything sold in the various bazaars. In the first place, the price of grain, &c., was already nearly at a famine rate, so that the men could ill bear the burden of this extra tax; but this is as nothing compared to the evils accruing from the *manner of collecting* it, the same amount might be collected wholesale from the sellers of grain, and other shopkeepers, without one-thousandth part of the vexatious injury caused to individuals by the mode of collecting it now adopted, which I feel certain cannot have been ordered by his Excellency the Governor;* the tax has been farmed out, and every purchaser, be it only of one halfpenny worth of spinage or a single mango, has to proceed to the custom serai—pay a per centage on the price, or is seized by the farmer's servants. By this method of proceeding every private servant of the farmer (or any rascal calling himself such, for in general they are not distinguished in any way), has the power of searching the person of every individual who may purchase anything in the bazaar, or whom he may choose to suppose to have done so. Some of my Sepoys have taken a little wheat into the town to be ground after having paid the tax on the purchase of the grain in the first instance, paid the tax again on

* It was, however, expressly ordered by Sir C. Napier.

entering the town, and after the wheat has been ground, the flour has been seized by the farmer, and only released on a third payment on the same individual article. I know several instances of robberies having been committed by men pretending to be the farmer's servants since this tax came into operation, and the excessive vexation und trouble to which it gives rise are evident. It is enough to drive men frantic, and I am certain the evil only required to be brought to the notice of his Excellency the Governor to be remedied immediately.

My native officers and men tell me that our horses got no grain yesterday, the buniahs having shut up their shops in consequence of the proceedings of the tax-farmer and his servants.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB,
Captain of Artillery
Commanding S. I. Horse.

(Copy.)

Letter from Major Jacob to the Major of Brigade, Hyderabad.

Hyderabad, 2nd October, 1845.

SIR,—I have the honour to request that you will bring to the notice of General Simpson (with a view to the prevention of such proceeding in future), the following case which appears to be one of great hardship towards the men of my regiments, the wife of a duffedar, by name, Goolameer Khan, returned from Kurrachee, brought with her for her husband's use, and that of his three bhargheers, some cloth for making regimental augricas, some horse-thools, and some head-and-heel ropes.

On the arrival of the woman in the entrenched camp yesterday, these things were seized, and a tax demanded for them in default of paying which the kit was taken away from her and carried off to the town. On my causing the circumstances to be made known to the collector Lieutenant Stack, he replied, that the tax must be paid, which has accordingly been done; but it appears to me that the collector's decision is unjust, and the goods purchased in the Kurrachee bazaar, not being brought by her for sale, that duty might, with equal propriety, be demanded for the men's coats on their backs, as for the cloth which they have purchased to make them, or for their horses' clothing and head-and-heel ropes.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB,
Captain of Artillery,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Major Jacob.

24th August, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have forwarded your scheme, and backed it up; but not as regards the European officers. It is bad to have officers posted just as a corps is ordered on service, and worse in an irregular corps than in any other. I have recommended that the full complement of officers should be posted, viz., 2 adjutants, 2 subalterns, and 2 assistant surgeons. I have no objections to the 2nd in command taking command of the 2nd regiment when detached; on the contrary, I think it good, and better than 2nd in commandants, and a commandant-in-chief, which is inconvenient to the

service when troops are collected in large bodies. I have, therefore, made no change in this, as my view will add to the cost: I daresay yours will be preferred. I dislike half-officering a corps; I have had too much experience in forming corps not to know that it is bad; but, having said so, I did not press my own view upon Sir Henry, because you are likely to outstay me in Sinde, and while you command the regiment, I do not care how it is constituted; but these things ought to be arranged, not as expedient for the moment, but on a sound basis as to the increased expense. I think that which is most complete is the most economical when speaking of troops. I hope they will give Malcolm the increased pay.

Yours, &c.,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from General Sir C. J. Napier to Major Jacob.

28th November, 1845.

MY DEAR JACOB,—The Governor-General, in a letter which I received two days ago, says, speaking of the Scinde Horse:—

"The 2nd regiment of Scinde Irregular Horse must be a separate regiment, we cannot legalize in Governor-General's Orders such an anomaly as one regiment of eight squadrons of 1,600 swords, but I see no objection to name *Major* Jacob" (I wish he would make it so as they do 12 o'clock on board ship) "as commandant of the 1st and 2nd regiments of Scinde Local Horse, giving him a 2nd in command to each regiment, one adjutant, and one assistant-surgeon to each regiment. Thus there would be *one* European officer less than on the ordinary establishment of Bengal, and whenever Major Jacob ceases to command the two regiments, a

cammandant would be appointed to each. I pay Major Jacob this compliment on your opinion of his high merits. In every other respect the two regiments, will be organized in strict assimilation of the Bengal Irregular Cavalry. The 2nd regiment will be raised for local service in Scinde, and the variations now existing in the 1st regiment, as compared with a regiment of Bengal Irregular Horse, will be got rid of in a great degree by supplying the officers and non-commissioned officers required for the 2nd regiment by promoting the most deserving characters in the 1st regiment. The various ranks and rates of pay in both the regiments shall be exactly those of the Bengal system, each officer, irregular commanding officer, and soldier, and staff, receiving in Scinde the same pay and allowances as the Bengal Irregular Horse now receive under the late Governor-General's orders, relating to increased pay for Scinde.

"In the few cases where native officers may now be in the receipt of higher pay than the Bengal rates, the excess will continue to be paid as a separate item in the pay-lists, until such officer be otherwise disposed of. Faith will be kept, and this regiment will receive a reward in the monopoly of promotion, which will render all these arrangements perfectly easy. For instance, six Russuldars and two Jemadars will have their salaries raised, the first, from 150 rupees to 200 rupees, and the latter from 75 rupees to 200 rupees. The Jemadars will also get three steps of rank, as they will pass over the Russaidars and Naib Russuldars, and will at once be made Russuldars. Eight other Jemadars will be made Russaidars with 107 rupees instead of 75 rupees. I have already alluded to the cases of exception, and the Russuldar Major on a salary of 250,

will remain a supernumerary, until he vacates his rank when no successor will be appointed."

So this affair is settled—both are to be *local corps*, and he is very much afraid of their families joining them, he says the Madras regiments have between *five and six thousand women* with each regiment; when I say women, I mean relatives of the soldiers—wives, children, sisters, &c. I do not see any fear of this while you are with the regiment, but I quite agree with the Governor-General that this evil may grow up in the Bombay army, as well as in that of Madras, and as it renders an army useless, it should be watched. But I have answered this by saying, that, by the Scinde Horse families being at Hyderabad as their fixed head-quarters, the regiment can and always will move without women. He says in a postscript:

"As this additional regiment of Scinde Horse will be on the Bombay establishment, I must communicate with the Bombay Government before I put it in orders."

If you can enlist your men, I think if they send us anywhere, you will have a good command of cavalry before 1846 is out. You are now the real commander of the *whole*, and everything centres in you, in fact the two regiments form the two wings of one regiment which takes all its orders from the chief. You should give nothing to the 2nd except as *the* 2nd in command, and when detached, *then* make over detachment to him, but hold all in your own hands *till* then, and resume it on his return. By doing this *at once* there can be no trouble: do not give up your regimental command or you may create ill-feeling in retaking it; but none can exist if you keep your present ground exactly as you are. I should go further—I would order your two seconds to fall in sometimes in command of one regi-

ment, sometimes of another, by which the corps would be only two regiments in name. Number your "troops" right through from 1 to 16, and fall in thus mixed, so if you choose you can easily keep it as one regiment in reality, though two in name, and if you like to give more unity, I will order them to be called "Jacob's Scinde Horse," which, in fact, is correct, for they are not to be united except while under you. I am half inclined to order you to recruit at once * * * * *

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) C. J. NAPIER.

Letter from Capt. Goldney to Lieut.-Col. Forbes.

8th August, 1846.

SIR,—I beg to report, for your information, that in obedience to His Excellency's instructions, I have issued notices that a reward of 10 rupees will be paid for every Boogtee prisoner delivered to your frontier posts.

May I request that you will intimate the same to the officers commanding the outposts, both native and European, lest any untoward circumstance should occur in the receipt of the prisoners or the payment or certificate for payment of the stipulated reward to damp the zeal of our borderers.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) P. GOLDNEY, Captain,
Collector and Magistrate.

[True copy.] (Signed) J. HUNTER,
Lieutenant and Staff Officer.

[True copy.] (Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding Frontier of Upper Sinde.



[TRANSLATION.]

Proclamation by Major Goldney, Collector and Magistrate, Shikarpoor Depôt.

8th August, 1846.

KNOW all men, living in the British territory of Sinde, that it has become necessary to make arrangements for keeping off the Boogtees, and other mountain robbers, and putting a stop to their robberies.

Wherefore it is hereby ordered that whoever will sieze any of the Boogtee mountaineers and deliver them to the British horsemen shall receive a reward of ten rupees for each man of the mountaineers so seized and delivered up.

Letter from General Hunter to Major Jacob.

19th January 1487.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have had both your letters: the first I answered through Forbes, I hope to your satisfaction. That received to-day I will answer by sending you a letter—rather a few remarks—by the Governor, on what you had written to me, which I made known to His Excellency. I am writing about the Kosahs, and others on the frontier, going about armed. I never approved of that measure, but there was so bad a look-out kept by the officers on the outposts since the third cavalry has been there, that it was absolutely necessary for the protection of the inhabitants that they should be armed. I am aware it led to many evils, and gave the people a wandering inclination after plunder which greatly induced the Boogtees to disturb us. I will now propose the old order of things, that no one shall carry arms, and that those found shall be forfeited, your arrangements being quite enough to protect the cultivators and others if they do not cross the desert.

The murder you mention is horrid, but I don't know that we can interfere in it, however, we shall have the Governor's notion on the point very shortly. I am sure he will be very angry at the report sent in of the loss of the camels, and not without reason. The fact is, these parties have been moving so often that there seemed no end of guards, and they were given up; but that was very wrong; some arrangements ought to have been made to render fewer escorts necessary.

I am suffering still a deal of pain from my arm, and know not what to do with it, twenty-one years past

yesterday since I was hurt, and still to be bothered is worth the pension I get.

Believe me yours,

(Signed) G. HUNTER.

As soon as the 18th get up to Shikarpoor I will send your party out to you, but don't like to have so few men at that post, though I dare say no one will get there; yet a few horsemen will be useful, the 7th have so many men detached.

Send me a return of the strength of all posts as you have now fixed them.

(Signed) G. HUNTER.

Letter from General Hunter to Captain Goldney.

25th November, 1846.

SIR,—I have been furnished by the Secretary to the Government of Sinde with a copy of Lieutenant Hamilton's report No. 86, of the 12th ultimo, to you of certain Jekranees and Kosahs having crossed the desert on a foray against the Boogtees in direct opposition to the orders given by you. His Excellency the Governor has directed me to dispose of this matter as I may deem best.

You are aware of my objections to those people returning to their old habits of a wandering life, from which no good can come. I will therefore thank you to have made known to their chiefs that this time I will not visit their disobedience of orders with any punishment, but to warn them if such conduct is again brought to my notice, the arms will be taken from their tribe, and those found guilty will be immediately seized and sent prisoners to Kurrachee.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. HUNTER.

Letter from General Hunter to Major Jacob.

28th January, 1847.

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have yours of the 25th, in which you don't seem to blame Durryah Khan for the bad conduct of his people as you do in your note to Forbes of the same date, which he received here yesterday, though I only got mine to-day, with one of the 24th, supposing your conference with Durryah had changed, your opinion as to his guilt. I have not sent on that letter to Forbes. Sir Charles put yours to my address, which clearly brings out what I have always said, that these chaps should not cross the desert, or to have their own habitation at Janadeyra. I shall not wait longer for permission to disarm the Jekranees and Kosahs, and authorize you immediately to do so, and secure all that you can of those now out, and send them here prisoners. This has been a sore subject to me for long, as you will observe by a copy of a letter I wrote to Captain Goldney in November, Where Mr. Hamilton is, or whatever he does,—I am not aware, he is under the collector, so I have no direct communication with him; but his post is Janadeyra, and there he is not, so I shall report him.

I am quite satisfied with your arrangement for the outposts, and hope before the hot weather commences all will be quiet, that you may not have to turn out much. The seizing a lot of those disobedient Lootoo Jekranees, and sending them to Kurrachee, will do a great deal to restore peace to the frontier, because the others will keep quiet. I have a great deal of writing just now—all the inspection of reports, &c., so excuse this and

Believe me yours, &c.

(Signed) G. HUNTER.

Send the Jekrannees in the first place in irons to Younghusband (he has a good jail), till I can get arrangements made for their future disposal.

(Signed) G. HUNTER.

Letter from General Hunter to Major Jacob.

January 31, 1847

MY DEAR JACOB,—I have both yours of this day, and I am really glad that you have caught these fifteen chaps; their remaining in gaól till I hear from Sir Charles will be a lesson to the others of the tribe. Since I have commanded here I have always considered that we have been more plundered by our own subjects along the frontier, and the people of Boordeka, than we have ever been by the Boogtees, or Jekranees, and Doomkees under Beejah Khan, and really since the two latter tribes have become our subjects, I doubt if their hands have been a bit less occupied in their trade of picking and stealing than when they were our enemies. Do you warn them that the same order will be out as two years ago in Captain Salter's time, when I directed every suspicious chap, Kosah, or any other, to be sent into Bukkur fort, when they had half filled it—all was quiet on the frontier.

I am well aware of the sad wickedness at Thool, and through the whole of Ali Morad's country, on which subject I wrote to Sir Charles a few days ago. Do with the mares and arms as you please. I wish you to give it out that if any one will prove the sheep and cattle to be his, they will be restored. I think it not at all unlikely that they were plundered in either our own or Ali Morad's country, there were several trials in Mr.

Hamilton's court, in the hot weather, on Boordees, who had stolen Jekranees cattle in their possession, who were bound to give them up; and should also be restored if the proper owners are found.

I have not got your official yet, but will, I suppose, to-morrow, the Governor writes to me he is not to be Commander-in-Chief of Bombay.

Believe me,
Yours, &c.,
(Signed) G. HUNTER.

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May, 1848.

IN the year 1844 a great number of poor people,—peasantry—residing in the villages on the frontier,—British subjects—and those of H. H. Meer Ali Moorad, were unfortunately killed and wounded by the 6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry, then stationed at Khanghur, on the frontier of Upper Sinde, who mistook them for enemies.

In the year 1847, some of the surviving sufferers complained to Major Jacob, who took their depositions (made on oath before him as magistrate), and brought the matter to the notice of Government, with a view to the granting of pensions to the poor people who had been wounded.

In May, 1848, the reply of Government was received, and the pensions applied for were granted.

The following papers show details of this business:—

Major Jacob to Colonel Shaw.

September 16, 1847.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward the accompanying petition from Meerub and Yaroo, two Kosah Sowars in British pay, begging for some compensation from Government for a number of relations of theirs who were disabled by wounds received from British troops, who mistook them for robbers. I also beg leave to forward herewith the statement of some of the parties concerned as to what happened on that occasion.

I beg leave to observe that I was very unwilling to have anything to say to this business, but, as it appears to me that these people have a right to petition Government on the subject in question, I did not feel justified in refusing to receive their statements with regard to the matter, more especially as unless something be done for them before the departure of his Excellency our Governor, it is not likely that any provision will be made for them, or their claims attended to hereafter.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding S. I. H.

To Colonel Shaw,
Commanding in U. Sinde.

STATEMENT of certain Kosah husbandmen, claiming some compensation from Government for injuries received from men of the 6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry when stationed at Khanghur, made on oath at the request of the deponents at Khanghur, on the 13th September, 1847, before Major Jacob, magistrate, in Sinde.

Meerul Kosah being duly sworn, stated, that about three years ago Captain Mackenzie, then commanding the Russala (6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry) at Khanghur, sent for him and ordered him to go out and get information about "Lootoos:" witness went out and found a number of Doomkee and Jekranee robbers at Doodaika, this he immediately reported to Captain Mackenzie, who rode forth with his regiment.

Witness and Yaroo Kosah accompanying him as guides, witness found the Lootoos on the Jamree and Bumbool Nullahs, and pointed them out to Captain Mackenzie. Abdoola Khan Khyheeree, with thirty Kosah friends and relations of witness, inhabitants of the village of Goonia, &c., at this time had come near where the "Lootoos" were collected for the purpose of receiving their cattle, which had been carried off by the robbers, and were firing at them, when Captain Mackenzie and the Sirkars horsemen approached: the robbers ran away. They, the robbers, were in number about 500, all mounted, Jakranee, Doomkies, and Boogtees. Abdoola Khan Khyheere left the Kosahs and went with Captain Mackenzie, who proceeded in pursuit of the robbers; shortly afterwards Captain Mackenzie's rear-guard, consisting of forty or fifty Sowars, came up and charged the thirty Kosahs and thirty-one Jutts, sixty-one in all, who had come out to recover their cattle; the Kosahs, &c., called out they were the Sirkars, poor ryots, on which the Sowars ordered them to throw away their arms, which they did. When every weapon had been thrown away, the Sowars ordered the men to sit down: they were then ordered by the Sowars to lie down, which was also complied with, when the Sowars began killing them all with

swords, spears, and guns; when all were supposed to be dead, the Sowars came among the bodies and asked if any one was alive, and called on them if so, to speak, and they should be saved and taken care of; two or three men, hearing this, raised themselves up, but immediately had their throats cut by the Sowars; thirty-one men were killed outright; but thirty, who were all dreadfully wounded, lay still, were supposed to be dead, and are now alive although crippled for life.

Witness did not see all this himself, having been on in advance with Captain Mackenzie: twenty of the wounded men are relations of witnesses living in his village, twelve of them are now present outside.

While this was going on, all the Lootoos had fled out of sight; but Captain Mackenzie fell in with a body of about one hundred and fifty Boordees and other subjects of Meer Ali Morad, who on hearing the alarm of Lootoos, had come out from Goolamee and other neighbouring villages to assist in repelling the robbers; on seeing the Sowars troops were out and the robbers gone, these Boordees, &c., were returning towards their homes, they had reached the village of Goolamee, and had gone into or among their houses and huts, when Captain Mackenzie came up and ordered the Sowars to kill them in their huts, and killed sixty-four men and wounded others. The Sowars then carried off all the property they could find, and departed. Witness was present and saw what happened with the party which Captain Mackenzie commanded in person. When the killing of the Boordees was finished, some Khyheerees came up from the rear and told witness that Sowars had been killing his (witness's) brethren, the Kosahs. Witness described what had been told him to Captain Mackenzie,

who ordered him not to speak in that way—that the men who were killed were Lootoos. Witness replied, that not one Lootoo had been killed; that they had all fled long before, and that Captain Mackenzie and his men had been killing none but honest men, the Sirkar's ryots. Witness then went back to the place where the Kosahs and Jutts had been killed, and removed the wounded men who were still alive, to their homes, afterwards burying the dead.

(*Witness withdraws.*)

Lall Bux, has four severe wounds, cuts on his hand and body.

Baug Ali, wounded in eighteen places, quite disabled and crippled for life; lost the use of one arm, and one leg, both nearly cut off.

Neehall, has nine severe wounds with sword and spear.

Jummiall, wounded in three places.

Mullicdad, wounded in six places.

Summana, wounded in eight places.

Syad Khan, wounded in four places.

Beyda, wounded in two places.

Moreed, wounded in two places.

Jarroo, wounded in two places.

Mussoo, wounded in two places.

Hyroo Khan, eleven bad wounds, open and very painful.

These men are all Kosahs, inhabitants of Meeru Kagote, near Meerpoor, and are British subjects.

The men whose names are given above are those stated by Meerul Kosah to be waiting outside; they

were examined each separately on oath by Major Jacob, at Khanghur, on the 13th September, 1847.

All their depositions were alike, and agree with the statement of Meerul Kosah; they state that they belonged to the party of Kosahs and Jutts, who were cut up by the rear-guard of the 6th Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and each man's narrative given separately on oath, exactly agrees in substance with the statement made by Meerul Kosah, given above. The men are wounded as mentioned opposite their respective names, and are all more or less crippled, some of them dreadfully so.

Deposed on oath before me, at Khanghur, on the 13th September, 1847.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Magistrate.

Letter from Captain Browne to the Officer commanding in Upper Sinde.

27th September, 1847.

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 463, of the 18th instant, and enclosures; and, in reply, to inform you that his Excellency the Governor would wish you, after serving the parties you refer to, to report what amount of subsistence or compensation, with reference to the nature of the injuries sustained by them, you consider should be granted to them by Government.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. BROWNE,
Secretary to Sinde Government.

Letter from Captain Browne to Major Jacob.

3rd May, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour, by direction of the Commissioner, to transmit copy of a despatch from the Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 1,661, dated the 24th ultimo, relative to the claim preferred on behalf of certain subjects of the British Government, who were wounded by a detachment of British troops, in the year 1844, under the wrong impression that they were enemies; and to request you will state what the scale laid down for Irregular Cavalry is; and whether that or the one recommended by you for these parties is more liberal.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. BROWNE,

Secretary to Government.

Letter from Secretary Malet to the Commissioner in Sinde.

24th April, 1848.

SIR,—With reference to your letter dated the 17th January last, No. 109, relative to the grant of compensation to certain Kosahs stated to have been disabled by wounds received in 1844 in an engagement with British troops, who mistook them for enemies, I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in council to transmit, for your information and guidance, copy of my letter to the address of the Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 17th ultimo, No. 51, together with that

officer's reply, dated the 7th instant, No. 87, on the subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

Letter from Secretary Malet to Secretary Elliot.

17th March, 1848.

SIR,—I am directed by the Honourable the Governor in Council to transmit to you, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, copy of a letter from the Commissioner in Sinde, dated the 30th October last, No. 3,241, relative to a claim for compensation preferred on behalf of certain parties stated to have been disabled by wounds received, in the year 1844, in an engagement with British troops, who mistook them for enemies.

2nd. It having been considered that Major Jacob, commanding Sinde Irregular Horse would, from his position and knowledge of the circumstances of this unfortunate case, be the party most competent to advise Government as to the nature and amount of compensation which it might be proper to afford to these claimants, the Commissioner in Sinde was requested to call upon that officer for his opinion on the question; and a copy of the statement submitted by Major Jacob, with reference to the above call, is herewith forwarded.

3rd. In soliciting the instructions of his Lordship in Council on this application, I am directed to state, that the grant of pensions to these Kosahs, according to the

scale laid down for Irregular Cavalry, will, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, be sufficient.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

Letter from Secretary Elliot to the Chief Secretary.

7th April, 1848.

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 17th ultimo, No. 51, relative to a claim for compensation preferred on behalf of certain subjects of the British Government and of Ali Morad, who were wounded by a detachment of British, in the year 1844, under the wrong impression that they were enemies; and with reference to the inquiry as to the scale of pensions to be granted to these men, I have the honour to inform you, that of two scales proposed—namely, Major Jacob's and the scale laid down for Irregular Cavalry—the Governor-General in Council sanctions the adoption of the most liberal.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India.

[True copy.]

(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

[True copies.]

(Signed) G. BROWNE,
Secretary to the Government of Sinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to Captain Browne.

10th May, 1848.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1,164, of the 3rd May, 1848, to my address, with accompaniment. In reply, I have the honour to state that I am not aware of any scale of pension established for men of the Irregular Cavalry under the circumstances. In the regulations of the Bombay Army there is no scale of pension laid down for men of the Irregular Cavalry, with the exception of those who belonged to Colonel Skinner's original Hindostanee Russalla. For these the pension allowed is seven rupees a-month for a private Silidar, and five for a Bhargheer.

Pensions for wounds hitherto granted to men of the Irregular Cavalry of the Bombay army have been, I believe, always granted as special cases. I am, therefore, quite unable to say whether the scale of pensions recommended by me for the wounded Kosahs be more liberal than that laid down for Irregular Cavalry. From the allusion to pensions to Irregular Cavalry, it appears to me that possibly Government may have supposed that the Kosahs cut up by the 6th Irregulars, now petitioning for pension, were horsemen of some kind in British employ; but if this impression exists, it is erroneous: the men were the common peasantry of the country; and the rates of pension recommended by me were proportioned to the degree in which the injuries received by each individual appeared to prevent him from earning his bread by daily labour, and to the price of the necessaries of life in the country.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Pol. Sup. on the Frontier of U. Sinde.

Letter from Secretary Courtney to the Commissioner in Sinde.

28th March, 1849.

SIR,—I am desired to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 31st January last, No. 253, and to inform you that under the authority of the Government of India, the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is pleased to grant Beyla Khan Khyheeree a life-pension of four rupees per mensem, in consideration of the wounds received by him in 1844, from a detachment of British troops under a wrong impression.

2. The payment of the pension in question is to commence from the same date as that granted to the Kosahs under the same circumstances as recommended by Major Jacob.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) W. COURTNEY,
Acting Secretary to Government.

(True copy.)

(Signed) PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Major Goldney to Major Jacob.

25th August, 1848.

SIR,—I do myself the honour to enclose herewith a letter from the Secretary to the Commissioner, regarding an allowance to certain wounded Kosahs, as recommended by yourself.

2. I should feel greatly obliged, as you are acquainted with the parties, if you would be kind enough to ascertain if all those mentioned in the original list are alive, and by your causing them to assemble at Khanghur, in

order that they may be identified by the Kardar who has been directed to attend on you whenever you should require him to do so.

3. After these men have been once identified, it will be necessary for them to proceed on the 5th of each month to the Kardar who has instructions to disburse to them on that date their allowance for the preceding month.

4. Be good enough to return the enclosures now forwarded.

5. The allowance of these pensioners will commence from the 1st instant.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) P. GOLDNEY, Major,
Collector.

Referred to in the annexed certificate (original herewith appended), certified that Hyroo-Kosah is now under my charge for the cure of a severe wound of long standing; he is not in a fit state to be moved from the hospital, and is in fact almost helpless from the effect of this and other wounds said by him to have been received at the same time.

(Signed) S. M. PELLY,
Assistant Surgeon, 1st Regiment S. I. H.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding S. I. Horse.

Names of certain Kosahs wounded by mistake, by a detachment of the British Troops, with description of their wounds, and the compensation recommended to be granted to the sufferers by Government.

Khanghur, 23rd December, 1849.

Names.	Number and Description of Wounds.	Compensation recommended by Major Jacob, commanding Sinde Irregular Horse.
Beddah . .	One sabre cut on the head, and one on the thumb.	Pension for life at 4 rups. per month.
Samanah .	One sabre cut on the head, and two on the left shoulder.	Ditto.
Lall Bux .	Two sabre cuts on the left shoulder, one on the nose and one on the left knee.	Ditto.
Mallikaar .	Four sabre cuts on the left part of theback and on the right ankle.	Ditto.
Nehall . .	Four sabre cuts on the right arm, one on the back and one on the right temple.	Ditto.
Moreed . .	One sabre cut on the left shoulder, and one on the right arm.	Ditto.
Suggah . .	One sabre cut on the left shoulder, three on the back and one on the neck.	Ditto.
Syedhoo .	One sabre cut on the back of the neck, and one on the left knee.	Ditto.
Jamaul . .	Three sabre cuts on the left shoulder.	Ditto.
Jaddah . .	One sabre cut on the left shoulder, and one on wrist of left arm : is entirely disabled and lost to the man.	Ditto, 7 ditto.
Jamoo . .	A very severe cut on the head, and one on the right shoulder.	Ditto, 4 ditto.
Dulleel . .	One gun-shot through the right shoulder, and one sabre cut on left shoulder, and on left wrist.	Ditto.
Bagaw . .	One sabre cut on the head, one on wrist, and one on right leg: rendered quite crawling cripple.	Ditto, 7 ditto.
Shere Khan.	One sabre cut on the left arm .	Ditto, 4 ditto.
Pandahee .	Gun-shot through the side, and one sabre cut on the forehead; fingers of the left hand ruined.	Ditto, 7 ditto.
Mussoo . .	One sabre cut on the left elbow, and one on the head.	Ditto, 4 ditto.
Kamroo .	One gun-shot wound through the left knee.	Ditto.
Jaiwo . .	One sabre cut on the left wrist, one slight on the head.	Ditto.

Letter from Commissioner Pringle to Major Jacob.

11th April, 1849.

SIR,—With advertance to your letter, No. 29, of the 28th January last, recommending the grant of pension to Beyla Khyheeree, in consideration of the wounds received by him in 1844 from a detachment of British troops under a wrong impression, I have the honour to transmit for your information copy of a letter, No. 1,350, of the 28th March, 1849, from Mr. Acting Secretary Courtney, containing the sanction of Government to a life-pension of rupees, four per mensem, to the party in question, to commence from the same date as the pensions granted to the Kosahs under the same circumstances.

You will be good enough to communicate to Beyla Khan the decision of Government in his favour.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. K. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

24th April, 1849.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that, as recommended in your letter, No. 102 of the 17th instant, the collector of Shikarpoor has been directed to disburse the monthly amount of pension payable to Beyla Khan Khyheeree from his treasury, and to forward the same regularly to you for transmission to the parties.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. K. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

28th January, 1850.

SIR,—I have the honour to request that you will state, for the information of Government, from what date the pensions to the Khyheerees and Kosah husbandmen, who were cut up by the 6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry, near Khanghur in 1844, have been paid, whether from the date of their receiving their wounds or from the date of the Government sanction to the payments.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. K. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Major Jacob to the Commissioner in Sinde.

2nd February, 1850.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 108, of the 28th January, 1850, to my address, and in reply to state that the payment of the pensions to the men in question commenced from the 1st August, 1848, after the receipt of the orders of Government on the subject by the collector of Shikarpoor.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Commanding Scinde Irregular Horse.

Letter from Commissioner Malet to Sir R. K. Pringle.

15th March, 1850.

SIR,—In acknowledging the receipt of your letter, No. 267, dated the 11th ultimo, I am directed to inform you that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council authorizes payment of the pensions of the Kosah sufferers therein alluded to from the 24th March, 1844, the date on which it became due.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) A. MALET,
Chief Secretary.

21st March, 1850, Pol. Department.

FORWARDED, for the information and guidance of the Political Superintendent on the Frontier of Upper Sinde, with reference to his letter, No. 21, dated 2nd ultimo.

(Signed) R. K. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Scinde.

Letter from Lieutenant Farrington to Major Jacob.

2nd April, 1850.

SIR,—With reference to your letter, No. 48, of 1850, I do myself the honour to inform you that the arrears due to the Kosah pensioners have been paid up to this day in my presence.

2. The amount due to Beyla Khan Khyheeree is

still with me, he not having made his appearance; may I request the favour of your causing his attendance.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) FARRINGTON, Lieut.
Officiating Collector in Upper Scinde.

14th June, 1850.

SIR,—With reference to your letter, No. 88, dated the 7th instant, with accompaniments on the subject of a petition from certain persons who had been cut up by mistake by our troops, I have the honour to request you will have the goodness to inform me whether this was on the same occasion as gave rise to the claim of those persons for whom pensions were sanctioned in Mr. Chief Secretary Malet's letter, No. 2,575, dated 23rd June, 1848, and, if so, that you will favour me with your opinion as to the amount of compensation which should be assigned to the present claimants.

It would also be desirable to prevent a repetition of applications of this nature, that inquiries should be instituted as to the whole number of sufferers on the occasion referred to, in order that any cases which may still remain may receive consideration at the same time as these.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. K. PRINGLE,
Commissioner in Sinde.

7th June, 1850.

Sherma, wife of Seeram Boordee, formerly living near Goolamee in British territory. Nurverdee, wife of Sungur Boordee, formerly living near Goolamee in British territory.

Doombah	living on the Pucka Nulla, near Goolamee.
Suddoora	
Mehrab	
Kurrum Khan	
Kahooree	
Saheedad	
Nawaub	
Janee	

The persons above mentioned appeared before Major Jacob, Political Superintendent on the frontier of Upper Sinde, at Khanghur, on the 7th June, 1850, and being examined, state, that about 6 years ago, when Captain Mackenzie was at Khanghur with his Russala, the 6th Bengal Irregular Cavalry, a large party of mounted robbers came and carried off much cattle from the neighbourhood of Pucka, Goolamee, &c.

The villagers took arms and pursued, to endeavour to recover their property. They were about 38, in all 36 men, and 2 women, had proceeded accordingly about two coss from Goolamee, when Captain Mackenzie's horsemen, who were out in pursuit of the robbers, came up to them, and called out to them to throw down their arms, which they immediately did, the horsemen then fell on them, killed fifteen of the men, and severely wounded the eight men and two women now present: three men of the party, not now present, ran away, and escaped unhurt.

The women had accompanied the party to carry water

for the men: all the persons above mentioned agree in this statement.

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Pol. Sup. on the Frontier of U. S.

Letter from Major Jacob to Sir R. K. Pringle.

25th June, 1850.

SIR,—In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter, No. 1638, of the 14th June, 1850, to my address, I have the honour to report, that I caused it to be notified through the district of Mobaruckpoor, &c., that all persons having claim on the British Government, for compensation for wounds received from our troops, on the occasion referred to, in August, 1844, should appear before me to prefer their petitions.

The persons are mentioned in the accompanying list accordingly, and these comprise, as far as I can learn, the whole of the remaining sufferers on the occasion in question.

The statement of all these persons agree, as to the circumstances, time, and manner, in which their wounds were received, and these statements are exactly similar to those formerly made by the Kosahs and others now enjoying pensions from Government, wherefore it is, I presume, unnecessary to repeat them here.

With regard to the amount of pension to be granted to these poor people, I should recommend that they receive a monthly allowance, as specified opposite each man's name in the accompanying roll.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. JACOB, Major,
Pol. Sup. on the Frontier of Upper Sinde.

Certified that I have examined the persons whose names are borne on this roll, and find that they have been wounded as specified opposite their respective names.

(Signed) J. G. MACKENZIE,
Assistant Surgeon, 1st Regiment, S. I. Horse.

2nd October, 1850.

SIR,—I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1,447, dated the 7th ultimo, and to inform you that the Right Honourable the Governor in Council sanctions the payment of the additional pensions to the Kosah sufferers, enumerated in the list submitted with your previous communication, dated the 3rd ult., No. 1,282, from the 24th March, 1844, the date on which they became due, amounting in the aggregate to eleven hundred and forty rupees per mensem.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. G. LUMSDEN,
Secretary to Government.

List of persons who appeared before Major Jacob, Political Superintendent, on the Frontier of Upper Sinde, at Khanghur, on the 25th June 1850, *to petition for Pension from the British Government, on account of wounds received in August* 1844, *from men of the 6th Regiment Bengal Irregular Cavalry, who mistook them for enemies.*

Names.	Residence.	Age.	Amount of Monthly Pension recommended. £.	s.	d.	Nature of injuries received.
Wulleea .	Mobaruck-poor.	25	2	0	0	Presents several cicatrices, as of sword wounds—no impairment of function.
Wurrea .	Ditto . .	30	3	0	0	Cicatrice of sword wound on right shoulder and arm—partial loss of function of the limb.
Brahim .	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	One wound on the right hand—no loss of motion, &c.
Sahibdad .	Ditto . .	30	4	0	0	Received severe sword cut over right shoulder and scalp—partial loss of right upper extremity.
Pullea .	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	Received slight flesh wound on right fore arm.
Izzut . .	Ditto . .	35	2	0	0	Received a sword cut on the back of the right thigh, but slight impairment of the function of the limb.
Dahim .	Ditto . .	25	1	0	0	Cicatrice of a sword cut on the outside of right arm—no loss of motion.
Suddeek .	Ditto . .	25	2	0	0	Wound of right hand—partial loss of use of two fingers.
Datum .	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	Wound of scalp, and on the inside of the right leg—no appreciable loss of motion, &c.
Hyat . .	Ditto . .	50	4	0	0	Presents three deep cicatrices on the back of left shoulder—partial loss of motion of the left upper extremity.
Kurrum .	Ditto . .	40	1	0	0	Cicatrix of gun-shot wound over right knee joint—suffers no impairment of motion of the limb.
Buksha .	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	Cicatrix of sword cut over right fore-arm—no loss of motion.

List of Persons who petitioned for Pensions, &c.—continued.)

Names.	Residence.	Age.	Amount of Monthly Pension recommended. £.	s.	d.	Nature of injuries received.
Noor . .	Mobaruck-poor.	30	2	0	0	Gun-shot wound of the left leg—partial loss of the use of the limb.
Dinna .	Ditto . .	60	1	0	0	Slight wound of the neck and left upper extremity —no lesion of function.
Wuzzeer .	Meyah-ke-Gote.	40	1	0	0	Spear wound of right leg— no loss of motion.
Saidoo .	Mobaruck-poor.	35	4	0	0	Wounds of right arm and hand — function of the wounded part unimpaired.
Soda . .	Ditto . .	60	4	0	0	Received severe wound of left shoulder and arm— extremity of the right thumb amputated by sword cut — partial loss of motion of left hand and right arm.
Azmut .	Ditto . .	45	2	0	0	Slight wound of the chest and left fore-arm—partial lesion of function of the left hand.
Peer Mahomed.	Ditto . .	40	1	0	0	Slight wound of left leg.
Meerza .	Ditto . .	35	1	0	0	Received a wound on left fore-arm.
Pukkeea .	Goonea .	60	4	0	0	Severe wound of right fore-arm—loss of motion of the right hand.
Deenoo .	Mobaruck-poor.	50	2	0	0	Wound of left forefinger— partial loss of motion.
Deengana	Ditto . .	31	1	0	0	Wound on left fore-arm.
Jam . .	Ditto . .	45	4	0	0	Dislocation of left elbow joint—arm useless.
Summa .	Ditto . .	30	3	0	0	Wound of the left fore-arm —gun-shot wound of both thighs — partial loss of function.
Hoormut .	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	Wounded over right arm— gun-shot wound of right thigh — no lesion of the function of the part.
Sawun .	Goonea .	30	1	0	0	Slight wound over left arm and scalp.
Mahomed	Ditto . .	30	1	0	0	Very slight flesh wound on left forefinger, and the right heel.

(Signed) JOHN JACOB, Major,
Commanding Frontier of Upper Sinde.

INDIA:

ITS GOVERNMENT

UNDER A BUREAUCRACY.

INDIA:

ITS GOVERNMENT

UNDER A BUREAUCRACY.

Phl·3

BY

JOHN DICKINSON, JUN., M.R.A.S., M.R.GEOG.S.

"Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto."—TER.

LONDON:
SAUNDERS AND STANFORD,
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1853

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PREFACE.

FREQUENT intercourse with men possessing great experience in the administration of Indian affairs, induced me to give my earnest attention to the investigation of the subject, and has eventually led me to lay the result of my inquiries before the public. My principal authorities have been :—

Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons, in 1848, on the growth of Cotton in India.

Report of Expenditure on Public Works for 10 years, printed by order of the House of Commons, in 1851.

Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Territories in June, 1852.

Report of the Bombay Cotton Committee, in 1847.

Letters on the Cotton and Commerce of Western India, reprinted from the "Times."

Files of the "Friend of India," for 1850-51-52.

Files of the "Bombay Times."

Reports, Books and Pamphlets on Scinde.

Mill and Wilson's History of India.

Briggs' Land-tax in India.

Kaye's Affghanistan.

Campbell's Modern India.

Chapman's Cotton and Commerce of India.

Royle's Culture of Cotton in India.

Shore's Indian Notes.

Grant's Bombay Cotton and Indian Railways.

Lecture on Cotton, delivered at the Society of Arts, before H.R.H. Prince Albert, by the President of the Chamber of Commerce at Manchester.

Letters on the Renewal of the East India Company's Charter, by Lieut.-General Briggs, published in the "Indian News."
Remarks on the Affairs of India, by J. Sullivan, Esq.
Debates in the Court of Proprietors in 1848-49.
Sundry Pamphlets: and various authorities referred to in the text.

Besides the above, I have been indebted to Indian friends for an immense deal of information, advice and active assistance, without which I could not have composed this work.

I am prepared to see a portion of the English press contrast my warmth of expression in the following pages, with the cooler tone of certain petitioners from a particular Presidency. However, any one, who attentively considers the grievances I have pointed out, will see that a body of merchants residing in the capital of a Presidency, were not the men who suffered most from them, and did not even feel some of them at all. Moreover, during nearly three years that I have been occupied with the subject, I have seen no prospect of support until quite lately, but on the contrary, a very clear prospect of great political parties uniting to oppose any reform in our Indian administration. Under such circumstances, although it might have shewn more philosophy to describe the abuses of the present system and its national danger with indifference, it was perhaps natural for a man who loved his country, to feel and speak more warmly.

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INDIA.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

REASONS FOR WRITING—EFFECTS PRODUCED ON THE PUBLIC BY OFFICAL SECRECY AND MISREPRESENTATION.

DID the public ever hear of an absentee landlord neglecting his estate, and consigning it to middle-men, which ensured rack-renting, poverty, crime, and disaffection, among his tenantry, and ended by ruining himself? Does the public know that its neglect of India has had the same distressing effects, and is likely to have the same fatal end? I am sure few people are aware of the real nature of our Indian Administration: and it is high time that somebody should let the country know the truth about it; although I should never have ventured to attempt such a task, if my entreaties could have prevailed on men of ability and experience to tell the public as much as they told me. This is the reason, and the only one, for my writing this book; that I could not get better men to

speak out with that uncompromising plainness of tone which this crisis of the Charter requires; and though the case will lose much from my manner of telling it, I hope the public will recollect that a man may be a blundering stupid witness, whose evidence is nevertheless material to the trial of a cause; and I hope that to the readers of this book, the importance of its facts will compensate for its defects of style. I have omitted many details, and some entire subjects; for a mere abstract of the reforms needed in India, from a single Indian journal, for the last two years, would alone fill one or two volumes; and the journals do not contain every thing; therefore I have been forced to limit my choice of materials, and confine myself to illustrating one single point, viz. the necessity of making the Home Government of India trustworthy and responsible.

It is the fashion with those who criticise this Home Government, to add, in the very same breath with which they point out its abuses, a set of routine compliments to its motives. As I have not complied with this fashion,—as I have, on the contrary, expressed, without reserve, my unfavourable opinion of the Home Government,—I must explain to the reader that it is no want of charity which impelled me to do this. Charity is a discriminating virtue: not one which treats the good and the bad alike: the charity that allowed a robber and murderer to escape, would be a denial of charity to the honest portion of society who suffered from his crimes: and it is not charity

that allows a body of public men to wear a mask which enables them to perpetuate the misgovernment of millions of our fellow-creatures, it is a pusillanimous want of charity for the masses who are suffering because we allow these men to wear a mask. Therefore, I have done what I could to strip off the drapery of "good intentions" that shrouds the rotten system of the Home Government, and to shew how "private suits do putrify the public good." I have done this from pity for the natives of India, and from alarm for the safety of England. And why is it that the public have known so little, and been deceived so much, about the Home Government? There are two reasons for it, which are, a system of secrecy, and a system of mystification. The first of these, the system of secrecy, is alone sufficient to account for what Lord William Bentinck characterized as "the shameful apathy and indifference of Great Britain to the concerns of India." It did not occur to his Lordship that it was hardly fair to accuse the public of "shameful apathy and indifference," when the truth could not reach them. Yet, how stands the case? I am one of the public; I was indifferent while I knew little of the subject; but now let the reader look at my seventh or eighth chapters, and say whether they betoken "shameful apathy and indifference?" And my case is the case of every one of the public; they cannot, without the accident of private information, get at the truth; without knowing it, how can they be otherwise than indifferent? and while those who can, will not speak out, is it the indifference

of the public which is "shameful," or the system of secrecy which keeps the truth from them?

The state of British opinion on Indian affairs was admirably described by an article in the Times of Dec. 4, 1851, as being one of listless "security," *confounding the absence of anxiety with freedom from danger*, and this is entirely due to the suppression of information by the authorities. Now as the system of secrecy has been denied it is worth remarking that it has been affirmed by a late member of the Bombay Government, in the evidence of last session; by a late high functionary of the Madras Government, in an article of the "Calcutta Review," quoted in my chapter on Public Works; by a member of the Bengal Government in a report quoted in the same chapter; by other official men, and by "the Friend of India;" which praises the Company's Government whenever it can, and is often said to be a Government paper, for which reason I will give some extracts from it on this point.

May 21, 1851, the *Friend* answered the abovementioned denial that information was withheld from the public; by printing a letter, refusing such information, even for a period anterior to the year 1820, signed by the very same functionary who assured the House of Commons a few days afterwards, that the system of secrecy was quite a mistake;—and the *Friend* added, "the Government of India is a govern-
"ment of secrecy in a stronger sense than any other
"Government now in existence. The first principle at

"the India House is to conceal every thing—every "thing past, present, or future—from the public, that "it has the power of withholding."

July 17, 1851, the *Friend* says, "it is the perpetual "aim of the Court of Directors to throw a veil of "profound secrecy around all their counsels and "measures;" adding, that any disclosure by any of the functionaries of the State is "severely resented and "condemned in no measured terms," and giving a description of the consequences for which my own experience has furnished an exact parallel: "the "whole public service in India trembles at the idea of "being detected in conveying any intelligence to the "press, however interesting to the public, and however "beneficial to the public service. We have scores of "letters from officers of high official distinction, who "have given us valuable and important facts, but "always with the strictest injunction that their names "might in no case be permitted to transpire."

Sept. 30, 1852, the *Friend* says, that "the great "principle of mystery which pervades all the thoughts, "feelings, and actions of public men in India, has its "origin in Leadenhall Street." It adds, "Every thing of "which a public servant may become cognizant through "his official position, however trivial or insignificant, "is *a secret*:" and again, "The extraordinary anxiety "which the Court manifests to keep every public "transaction, and every official document as under a "seal of confession, and its determination to visit with "condign punishment any allusion which may be made

" to them, indicates no desire to promote the interests
" of the community, and is simply an exhibition of
" that morbid fondness for secrecy which belongs to
" all corporations."

And this is the real state of the case: the Government of India is a government of secrecy in a stronger sense than any other Government now in existence; the footprint on the sand was not more alarming to Robinson Crusoe than a trace of inquiry into the mysteries of their administration is to the Authorities of India, and of course while a despotic Government maintains this " system of secrecy," its servants who can, will not speak out, and as an inevitable consequence, the public, who cannot get at the truth, become " apathetic and indifferent to the concerns of India." And this is not all: besides the system of secrecy, there is a system of mystification, of eternally deceiving the public, by flattering pictures of the condition of the natives; which is of as old a date as that irresponsible government which I denounce as the bane of India. The historian Mill continually adverts to this practice. He remarks, that it is always the interest of the Minister of the day " to prevent inspection; to lull
" suspicion asleep; to ward off inquiry; to inspire a
" blind confidence; to praise incessantly the manage-
" ment of affairs in India; and by the irresistible force
" of his influence, make other men praise it:" and he adds, that by the interest of the Minister, " complaint
" is extinguished, and the voice of praise raised in its
" stead"—and all parties in turn get committed to

this system by the changes of ministry. On one occasion, after noticing a rebuke administered to the Indian Authorities by the House of Commons for this system of deception, the historian says they only followed the beaten common track of misrepresentation which the instruments of Government are seldom without a motive to tread; and farther on, "nothing is more "remarkable than the propensity of all sorts of persons "connected with the Indian Government, to infer from "any thing and every thing, the *flourishing state of* "*the country.*" On another occasion, he notices "the "unintermitting concert of praises, sung from year to "year, upon the Indian Government, and upon the "increasing happiness of the Indian people, while they "were all the while sinking into deeper poverty and "wretchedness." Elsewhere he points out the ease with which the results of Indian administration can be misrepresented in this country, and warns the public that they are by no means sufficiently on their guard against the deception. Now I have endeavoured to shew in my seventh chapter, what were the effects of this deception, in the passing of the last three Charters; and in my fifth and sixth chapters, to shew the way in which it is going on now; and when I consider that it is employed to resist the strongest conceivable claims on our justice; to say nothing of our humanity; and to perpetuate the "nightmare oppression lying heavy on many million hearts" in India; this system of mystification appears to me perfectly shocking!—it seems to call for a judgment on the nation that employs

it. It is written: "The Lord shall root out all deceit-
" ful lips: and the tongue that speaketh proud things;
" which have said, With our tongue will we prevail:
" we are they that ought to speak, who is lord over
" us?—Now for the comfortless troubles' sake of the
" needy; and because of the deep sighing of the poor;
" —I will up, saith the Lord, and will help every one
" from him that swelleth against him. . . . ."

Aye, reader! there are many signs and warnings in India at this moment, and if the present system is allowed to go on, it will soon expose our empire to a greater peril than it has ever yet encountered.

On reading the list of official appointments in the present Ministry, I contemplated for an instant the altering or even suppressing this work, which was then in the press. On second thoughts, however, I determined to publish it as it was, because my quarrel is not so much with particular men as with a particular system—a system which makes all who are drawn into its vortex either the accomplices, the dupes, or the tools of mis-government. And until the Ministry announce some intention of changing such a system, it would be at least premature to relax in my efforts to obtain justice for India from any confidence inspired by names alone.

CHAPTER II.

THE THEORY IN CANNON ROW.

On the second of April in the present year, the Prime Minister told the House of Lords, that "in "the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole "administration of the affairs of India rests." This was the truth; and a truth whose incalculably important consequences are not appreciated by the people of this country. However, those who have an interest in keeping things as they are, and preventing any change in the actual system of Government, were exceedingly disconcerted by Lord Derby's plain speaking, and have been labouring ever since to persuade the public not to believe the truths disclosed by him. For this purpose the old fable of a double Government and a balance of power has been repeated to the world by every channel of publicity which official influence could command; and it has been asserted with the utmost confidence, that the control of the finances and the management of administrative details is in the hands of the Court of Directors. Let us see then whether there is anything to corroborate Lord Derby's statement? The Chairman of the Court of Directors

stated in his place in Parliament, on the 19th of April last, that all letters and despatches come to the Directors, and that when they have come to a resolution on the business in hand, they send their despatch to the Board of Control, "who either approve or disapprove of it;" but that the Directors have a right to call upon the Board to give their reasons for their alterations of it, if the Board think it their duty to insist upon them. We learn from this that the Board of Control can "disapprove and alter" the government of the Court of Directors: but it appears to me, that if the Board has the power to alter the spirit and letter of the Directors' despatches, and uses such a power, the Directors are no more independent of the President of the Board of Control, than the clerks of the Foreign, Colonial, and War Offices, are independent of the Secretaries for those departments; and that the Directors must perform much the same functions as the head clerks of Government offices. Moreover, the statement of the Chairman, that all letters and despatches come to the Directors, is inconsistent with the following evidence from still better authority. In the Committee on Official Salaries, which sat last year, the President of the Board of Control was asked—"Do you correspond with the Governor-general of "India, and other high functionaries, the Governors "of Madras and Bombay, directly, without the in-"tervention of the Chairman of the India House?" Answer—"Of course I do, privately." Here then I submit are strong grounds for presuming that Lord

Derby told the simple truth when he informed the House of Lords, that "in the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India rests." But, besides this presumptive evidence, the letter of the law clearly gives the Board the power of conducting the whole administration, by investing it with "full power and authority to superintend, direct, and control all acts, operations, and concerns of the said Company, which in any wise relate to or concern the Government, *or revenues*, of the said territories . . .;" again, by prohibiting the Directors "from issuing any orders, instructions, despatches, official letters, or communications whatever, relating to India, or to the Government thereof, until the same shall have been sanctioned by the Board . . .;" and further, by compelling the Directors either to prepare instructions and orders, upon any subject whatever, at fourteen days' notice from the Board, or else to transmit the orders of the Board on the subject to India; which gives the power of initiative to the Board whenever it likes to use it. Moreover, it was distinctly admitted by the creators of the Board, that they had transferred to it the whole power of administration. Mr. Pitt said, "there was no one step that could have been taken previous to the passing of the Act of 1784, by the Court of Directors, that the Board of Control had not now a right to take by virtue of the power and authority vested in it by that Act." Mr. Dundas said, "Without *the whole powers of Government* the Board of

"Control would be a nugatory institution." Lord Grenville, one of its first members, said, "The whole "authority of the Government was actually committed "to the Board; and the carrying on the Government "in the name of the Company was only what the "Company had done themselves, in the case of Indian "princes whose rule they had superseded." Finally, a former President of the Board of Control said, in 1833, "In that Board for the last fifty years has the "real effective Government of India resided." I think this is sufficient evidence that Lord Derby's statement in the House of Lords was not a misrepresentation, and that the real state of the case was correctly defined by the historian Mill, who says, "The real, sole "governing power in India is the Board of Control; "and it only makes use of the Court of Directors "as an instrument, as a subordinate officer for the "management of details, and the preparation of busi- "ness for the cognizance of the superior power."

If this definition be correct, it is evident that the power of the Directors must depend entirely upon the degree to which the Board allows them to manage the business of detail, and such a power manifestly corresponds to that of the head clerks in Government offices. In fact, the only distinction I can perceive between the functions of Directors and those of Government clerks, is in the privilege of the former to protest in writing against the measures of the Board; but if it be true, as I have heard and believe, that the Directors' protests are treated with very little ceremony, and

habitually disregarded by the Board; and because these protests cannot exercise the slightest influence on the Parliament or the public, from whom they are concealed, I do not see that such a distinction makes any real difference between the power of the Directors and that of the head clerks of the Treasury, or Colonial Office. But the reader may say, supposing that the Directors are no more than clerks of the Board of Control, what is the harm of it? The harm is this: it may happen, as it does at this moment, that a President and two Secretaries who are new to the affairs of India, and have none of them ever set foot in the country, are invested with the secret, irresponsible despotism over an empire as large as the whole of Europe, comprised of different nations who are frequently high-spirited and warlike races, and containing within it such an abundance of inflammable materials as to have induced the writers and statesmen who have had most experience, and are the highest authorities on the subject, to declare unanimously, that without a knowledge of the institutions, habits, feelings, and prejudices of the natives of India, their European masters are always liable to make mistakes which may produce a conflagration, and place the empire in peril. For instance, let it be supposed that an ignorant President of the Board of Control decides on some measure which is a climax of iniquity and impolicy; a Director, saturated with information on the subject, writes a protest against it, clearly exposing by the light of his experience the characteristic bearings of

the question, and exhibiting the series of evils which must ensue from the adoption of the Board's measure; of course, if the President were responsible to Parliament, he would be forced to think twice before he acted in defiance of such a protest as this; but as it is, considering the Director as no better than a clerk, he tosses the protest into a wilderness of records, and pursues his plan without modification;—let it be supposed that an Affghan war is the consequence, the conclusions of the Director are verified to the letter, until, after the sacrifice of a British army and a frightful waste of human life and treasure, it turns out that the Board's measure has been as impolitic as it was iniquitous, and has converted a host of neighbouring nations who were previously disposed to be friends into implacable enemies, while it has robbed one or more generations of our native fellow-subjects of the local expenditure and attention to their social progress which was due to them from British justice, and has saddled themselves and their posterity with a crushing burthen of debt.

When all this is the natural consequence of investing an ignorant Minister with the secret irresponsible despotism over a vast empire, can the reader ask what is the harm of a system which exposes us every day to a recurrence of dangers, similar in kind to the above, while they may be next time infinitely greater in degree? Surely, if Lord Derby's statement was correct that, "in the Board of Control, practically speaking, the whole administration of the affairs of India

" rests," and if the Board must exercise " *the whole* " *powers of government,*" it will be prudent to provide for the responsibility of this depository of supreme power. But besides the proofs already furnished of the truth of Lord Derby's description, it has been entirely confirmed since by the evidence of Lord Ellenborough. His Lordship said that, " the President of the Board of Control can now over-rule the Directors;" that, " they can do no more than express an opinion;" and that " they have in fact, no authority." He said that, with a Court of Directors at one end of the system, and a President of the Board of Control, with a large body of intelligent clerks, at the other, he could not say how the government was conducted; but added, " I know that when I was at the Board of Control, I conducted the government, there is no doubt about that." So then the power is in the hands of the President of the Board of Control; and if he does not know how to use it, he may ask his ignorant secretaries and intelligent clerks; and we shall see presently what these gentlemen make of the irresponsible despotism of India.

CHAPTER III.

THE PRACTICE IN LEADENHALL STREET.

THE body in which supreme power originally resided, and which still gives its name to the Government, is the East India Company; that is, the Court of Proprietors. As the description of this body given by Lord Derby in his speech of April 2nd, was very clear and correct, I will again quote his words. "With "that Act of 1833, the Court of Proprietors ceased to "have any control or interest whatever in the affairs "of India. The whole business of the Court of Pro- "prietors at this moment consists in receiving the "dividends upon their stock, and in electing the mem- "bers of the Court of Directors. Further than that "they have no function whatever to perform. It is "true they may meet and discuss together, but with "regard to the legislation of India, any decision or "vote of the whole Court of Proprietors need not ex- "ercise the slightest influence over the conduct of the "government." As this statement was literally true, and the Court of Proprietors has long been notoriously and entirely subservient to the Court of Directors, I will at once pass on to the description of this Corporation. The Court of Directors consists of twenty-four members, whose qualification is the possession of £1000.

stock; but as one-fourth of this body go out of office every four years, and must remain out for twelve months, the permanent number of Directors is really thirty, of whom twenty-four form the Court, while six remain a year out of office until it is their turn to be re-elected. This re-election is a matter of course, because since the Directors prefer to hold their places for life, and always support their former colleagues on a re-election, the entirely subservient constituency go on electing them for life, and in many instances long after they are unfit to attend to the affairs of India. This Court has, with a few reservations the nominal and generally the substantial power of making the Home appointments in the Indian Civil Service. The composition of this Corporation is at present exceedingly defective, for although there are some warm and enlightened friends of India among the Directors, such men are always of necessity a very small minority in the Court. The reasons for this are, firstly, that the disgusting incidents of a canvass for the Direction, deter almost all the distinguished servants of Government, who return from India, from being candidates for the office, although frequently in the prime of their faculties, and capable of doing many years hard work in this country; secondly, that the value of the patronage draws many men into the Direction, and keeps them in it, who are from various causes unfit for its duties, such as bankers, merchants, and directors of companies, whose business in the Indian government is simply the distribution of patronage, and a certain

number of worn-out old men, who are incapable of managing, and some even of understanding the business they are supposed to transact. This Court forms annually three Committees, besides the secret Committee consisting of the Chairman, Deputy-Chairman, and senior member of the Court. The Chairs hold the same rank *ex officio* in the three Committees, which are, 1. political and military; 2. finance and home; 3. revenue, judicial, and legislative. It may be as well to explain here what the business is which is transacted by the Court.

It must be remembered that England governs an Empire in India, as large as the whole of Europe, inhabited by as many different races, and containing provinces as extensive as European kingdoms, and as densely peopled: for instance, the population of the Bengal Presidency, is larger than that of France, the population of the Agra Presidency larger than that of Great Britain, and so on; and as the business of this Empire is referred down to minute details to the Home Government, so that nothing should escape its supervision, it is difficult to give the reader an idea of the vast mass of correspondence which comes home to England from India. When the reader considers, that many despatches are accompanied by such a mass of documents as "cannot be even examined without considerable labour and time—that they amount to 2, 3, 4, 5, and occasionally 20,000 pages," he may conceive the tons of papers which the Home Government is supposed to go through. In Lord Broughton's evidence before the Official Salaries Com-

mittee, he stated that with one single despatch 45,000 pages of "collections" were sent. The first great evil of this system is, that the administration of India is clogged and impeded in a most mischievous degree, —in a degree which reduces to despair the most zealous and able of the Company's servants, and after all a good deal of business is unavoidably slurred over, and either pretended to be done, or not done at all. I saw the same thing happen in France during the reign of the late King Louis Philippe. The abuse of centralization had drawn the mass of administrative details to Paris, and of course the business of the country was ruinously delayed, and either badly done, or left undone. While the Prefects would not take responsibility on themselves, because they were likely to be reprimanded, and have their measures reversed by a central Government (or rather by its irresponsible clerks!) which could not possibly understand the grounds of their decisions half so well as themselves, the supreme Government by its bureaucratic, "paper-assier" spirit, and passion for governing in details, left the country in fact either without an administration or with a wretchedly bad one. This was one main cause of the revolution of 1848 in France, and St. Simon points out in his memoirs that a similar weakness of Louis XIV. for governing in details, was a main cause of the ruin of France under his reign. One of the wisest acts of the present Ruler of France has been to restore specifically the mass of the local

administration to the Prefects, investing them with real power and proportionate responsibility, and depriving the Paris bureaucracy of its authority.

A similar reform is now most urgently required in our Indian administration, for the second great evil of referring such a mass of details to the Home Government is that it throws the real power into the hands of an irresponsible Bureaucracy. This is the class which Burke denounced as "the creatures of the "desk, and the creatures of favour," and which he described in the following passage:—"The tribe "of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species. "There is no trade so vile and mechanical as govern- "ment in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. "They are out of themselves in any course of con- "duct recommended only by conscience and glory. A "large, liberal, and prospective view of the interest "of States, passes with them for romance; and the "principles that recommend it, for the wanderings of "a disordered imagination. The calculators compute "them out of their senses. The jesters and buffoons "shame them out of everything grand and elevated. "Littleness in object and in means, to them appears "soundness and sobriety." Now, on examining into the details of the measures pursued in India, we shall find that they bear the stamp of the "vulgar politicians" described by Burke, and the reader will not wonder at the extraordinary mal-administration described in the following chapters, if he bears it in mind that "the creatures of the desk and the

creatures of favour," are really governing India, and the Home Government is at bottom a Bureaucracy.

But such is the fact: from the sheer physical impossibility of an Indian Minister or Director examining the shiploads of business referred from India, even if they were disposed to do so, it is necessary to maintain a large establishment of clerks to do the work for them, with departments at the India House and Board of Control, corresponding to the departments of the Government abroad, and entailing an expense of £160,000 a-year on the people of India, while the result of the system is to throw the real work of preparing the despatches into the hands of the clerks at the India House, and that of altering them into the hands of the clerks at the Board of Control. The reader will see this from the mode of transacting the business. When a despatch arrives from India, it is referred in the first instance to the Examiner's department to which it belongs, after which the Chairs confer with the official in charge of that department, and settle with him the tenor of a reply, and transmit a draft of this reply to the Indian Minister, in what is technically called "P. C.;" that is to say, "previous communication."

Now it is evident that, partly from the annual rotation in the functions of the Directors, and every fourth year in the men themselves, and principally from the mass of the business the Chairs must, in this preliminary stage of P. C. depend mainly on the clerks who are permanently in office, for information, advice, and

assistance. Nay, such is this dependence, that even in a discussion in the Court of Proprietors, after previous notice, it is pitiable to see the Chairman referring to a secretary who sits by his side, and keeps on whispering, and prompting, and stopping him, as if he were a mere puppet; and probably the Minister at the other end of the system is in the same predicament. However, in this stage of "P. C." if there is a difference of opinion on the draft, it is discussed, and almost invariably settled in friendly communication between the Minister and the Chairs. Finally, the draft is returned by the Minister either adopted or altered; and then it is submitted to the Committee of Directors superintending the department to which it belongs, with all the papers bearing on the case, to be considered, and discussed, and adopted or altered; and afterwards it is exposed to the same process in the aggregate Court, and then goes, for the first time as an official communication, to the Minister. Now, Messrs. Melville and Shepherd are delighted with the success of this system of "previous communication," in bringing about an agreement between the Minister and the Chairs,—in facilitating business, and saving time. No doubt it does all this, but how does it do it? by stripping the Directors' Committees of all their importance and usefulness! for when once the draft is settled, what chance have the dissentient members of any Committee of resisting the Minister, the Chairs, their majority in the aggregate Court, and the bureaucracy? —All they can do is to complain to their friends in

private, and to record a protest, which is of no earthly use, except to shew that it is in vain for them to prove to demonstration that the Government is going wrong, when once the irresponsible bureaucracy has decided its course. I ask if this is not an intolerable abuse? Is it not evident that this "previous communication" system is reversing the first intention, and the whole scope and purpose of the Directors' official existence? Is it not plain that if the opinion of the Directors is to be of any use to the Minister at all, it should go to him, not *after* his mind is made up by the opinion of "intelligent clerks," not *after* he has decided on the matter in hand, but *before?* Does it not stand to reason that if it be worth while for Indian business to go through a Committee and an aggregate Court of Directors, who are presumed to sift it thoroughly, and express a deliberate opinion upon it, all this should be done before the first communication goes to the Minister, and not after "intelligent clerks" on both sides have superficially examined and decided the question? It is not that the Directors should govern: the Indian Minister must of course govern; *as he does now;* and as every Minister ought to do in his department; but he should receive the Directors' deliberate counsel before he makes up his mind, and not after; he should be bound, *as he is now*, to state his reasons in writing, if he disapproved of the policy advised by the Directors; and instead of the "previous communication," there should be an "after communication" with the Chairs, in case of a difference of opinion and

the Minister's adhering to his own views. The Directors would thus be some check upon the Indian Minister, particularly if they were the efficient and experienced body that they ought to be; at least they would be an invaluable Council to him, for the only real check that can be imposed upon him is parliamentary responsibility, for which I have proposed a very simple plan in my seventh chapter. As it is now, the Court of Directors are a mere cloak for the "irresponsible despotism" of the Minister; and they are a source of injury to India and danger to England, by the grasping spirit of the majority of their members for patronage. Before I touch on this point I must remark, that there is on the face of it something wrong in a system by which, as it is said, "the Directors are paid in patronage"—that "their salaries are only £300 a-year, because they are paid in patronage." We ought to cut down a mischievous bureaucracy, and save enough by the reduction to give the Directors competent salaries, like all other public servants, and so get rid of the very improper phrase now employed, that "the Directors are paid in patronage." Why, in this matter-of-fact country, such language naturally puts it into the heads of Directors that their patronage may be used in a way that will pay them—pay well too!—and it is notorious that the managers of banks and companies who take so much trouble to get into the Direction, are "wise in their generation." Under the present system there are two fatal consequences of the Directors being "paid in patronage:"—1st, it

enslaves the Directors to the Indian Minister, by their fear that if they oppose him he may use his parliamentary omnipotence to strip them of their patronage; 2ndly, it gives the majority of the Court an insatiable spirit of grasping; of grasping territory, and grasping all the valuable Indian appointments for their European nominees, in spite of the emphatic condemnation of this system by our greatest Indian statesmen, which passion of the Directors is doing incalculable mischief in India, and makes our Government hated by the educated classes of the natives. It is therefore indispensable to reform the present abuses in the composition of this Court—to exclude the superannuated old men, by opening the elections on the annual retirement of one-fourth of the members—to exclude those who belong to any other profession or occupation, and who only enter the Direction to use their patronage for the interest of their private banks and companies—and to abolish a canvass, which costs about £4000, and often extends over a period of seven years, so as to make a Director's personal experience of Indian administration seven years in arrear of its actual state when he is elected—to abolish this canvass, which deters nearly all the fittest men, the most efficient and experienced in Indian affairs, from becoming candidates for the Direction, by adopting the plan suggested by Colonel Sykes; and finally, to provide expressly that a certain number of the Directors shall have served upwards of twelve years in India.

I will conclude this part of my subject by a notice

of the present value and mode of distributing the patronage. When the number of appointments for the year is ascertained, the whole are divided into 28 equal parts, of which two are allotted to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, two to the President of the Board of Control, and one to each of the Directors. Taking the average of seventeen years since the Charter of 1833, there have been sent out about 28 writers, and as many assistant surgeons, and chaplains or other officers, independent of from 250 to 300 cadets annually, affording to each Director a patronage which, if sold at the rate of a cadetship actually proved to be purchased in 1849 at £1,050, and a writership at £3000, the annual value of a single share of patronage would not fall short of £14,000 or £15,000, and that of the Chairs and the Indian Minister from £28,000 to £30,000 per annum. Besides his patronage as above, the President of the Board of Control directs the expenditure to any extent of "secret service" money, which as such is not accounted for on the books, and has on some occasions exceeded £100,000 in one year. How differently do we deal with the poor ryot's money and our own! The Secretary for Foreign Affairs is only permitted to disburse as much as £10,000 in one year, and is obliged at the end of it to swear that whatever has been expended was absolutely necessary for the public service. Here then is the great bribe of patronage! appointments of the value of nearly £400,000 per annum, distributed every year, and year after year, among the upper

classes of this country, and in which hardly any respectable English family is not directly or indirectly interested! This is indeed heavy odds thrown into the scale against justice to India; for it would be shutting my eyes to the light of day to pretend not to see the proofs all round me of the influence of this patronage in recruiting adherents to the present system of Government, and suppressing evidence against its abuses. However, though I will not attempt to deny that to reform the abuses of the present Government, especially of the Court of Directors, would gradually and greatly reduce this patronage, for, as a rule, all the Directors of ripe Indian experience, who have lived in the interior, and known the natives well, and seen the foundations on which our empire rests, all these men are as strongly opposed to the grasping system as I am, and as much convinced of its iniquity and impolicy, and to give them a preponderance in the Court would at once begin to cut down the patronage; still, I shall endeavour to shew that the abuses which best serve our private interests are directly contrary to the national interest—that "private suits do putrefy the public good"—and that the present system is not only ruining and degrading the natives of India, but is bringing our empire into a more critical situation every day. And besides the dangers I shall point out hereafter, there are one or two which I will briefly notice here. The "free press" is beginning to do its work in India—the Parsee merchants, the Zemindars, the native heads

of castes, are beginning to feel their power, to combine, and to ask for redress of grievances; some of them are violent, and these do not alarm me; but some are remarkably temperate, and I confess that, knowing the strength of their case, of which I will endeavour to give the reader an idea in the following chapters, I fear the men who begin so temperately, and have reason entirely on their side. So the Americans began, and we all know how it ended. Let not these moderate claims be neglected, when, as I will shew, there is matter enough to swell them into an avalanche. Let not the incipient opposition of the natives be despised because it is feeble now. No doubt we can now accept or reject the opportunity of doing justice to India; but it may be doubted whether, if we reject it, we shall ever have the opportunity again. When Julian marched against Persia, he remarked of the Goths, "Hostes quærere se meliores;" in less than fifteen years, says Gibbon, these Goths had overthrown the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RYOTWAR SYSTEM.

THE reader must not suppose, as we too practical Englishmen are apt to do, that the theory on which men act is of little consequence provided they mean to do their duty. While our neighbours the French, have shewn too little attention to facts in forming theories, we frequently run into the other extreme, and pay too little attention to theory; which is sometimes as fatal an error. We shall see the importance of acting on a correct theory if we reflect that, crime is the act itself, and not the intention; and to make the crime consist in the intention is that pestilent heresy of the Jesuits denounced in the "Lettres Provinciales;" and of which I can say from personal observation, that the same doctrines of making the crime consist in the intention are still demoralising large portions of continental society; utterly confounding their notions of right and wrong; and leaving them no fixed moral principles. To shew the importance of an error in theory, it has been admitted by one of the historians who sympathised most deeply with the afflictions of his fellow-creatures, that the crusaders who followed Simon de Montfort, were probably not

worse than other men; only they *had a mistaken idea of their duties;* and the massacre of the Albigenses was the consequence. I have said this much about the duty of forming correct theories; because while the conclusions of this and my 6th chapter will be that we have for many years allowed a bureaucratic Government to act on vicious principles of taxation in India, principles which our common sense at once repudiates when we think of applying them to ourselves, and which have caused extreme pain and injury to our native fellow-subjects, it really seems to me a very weak set-off against all the people of India have suffered, to say that our intentions were good.

I have now to shew the consequences to Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, of the Government's adopting a wrong theory with regard to its proprietary right to the land in India; and to examine whether there is any justification for the assertion of this theory to the present day.

As the true theory has long since been proved and acted upon successfully in the North-west Provinces, and has been entirely confirmed since by our experience of the Punjaub, and our observation of the practice in native states, I shall refer the reader to a valuable and delightful work on "Modern India," by Mr. Campbell, giving a very clear and graphic description of his experience of the working of this theory in the above province.

I will now state the wrong theory of the land-tax, quoting one or two modern authorities for it, and point

out the mischief it has done in Madras and Bombay, reserving a notice of Bengal for another chapter. The first great authority who asserted that the rent of land in India belonged to the Government, was, I am sorry to say, that amiable man Lord Cornwallis. Forty years afterwards Mr. Mill repeated this doctrine to the Commons Committee of 1831, adding that "a country "wherein *the whole rent* is paid to the State, is in a "most happy condition, seeing that such rent would "suffice for all the wants of the Government, and the "people would then be untaxed." When pressed upon the means of collecting the Indian land revenue, so that no more than the "rent" should be taken, he admitted that this would be a difficulty for any European collector; with an imperfect knowledge of the natives, their language, and circumstances; with a swarm of ill-paid and corrupt servants; with perhaps 10,000 square miles of country to look after, and 150,000 tenants to settle with individually; but he had no doubt *means would be found of limiting the demand to the rent*, "and then the prosperity of the "country will be as fully secured as it can be," (poor country!)—He continued: "if the land-tax "were limited *to the rent only*, then the revenue "system of India is the best in the world"—finally, "as soon as that point is attained when *the rent of* "*land* will be adequate to all the exigencies of the Go-"vernment, then all the other taxes may be abolished, "and India will be a country *wholly untaxed.*" Mr. Mangles, a Director, and also a Director of that New

Zealand Company of which we have heard a good deal lately, reiterated the above doctrine to the Commons' Committee of 1848, assuring them that the claim of the Government in India to that which constitutes "rent," in other parts of the world, was perfectly legitimate, and therefore this was the very best system of taxation in the world, because so far as the rent sufficed, the people were *wholly untaxed.* So another witness, Mr. Sullivan, told this Committee that the land revenue system was "an excellent "system and of great advantage to the country, in- "asmuch as what goes into the pockets of indivi- "duals in this country, goes there into the coffers of "the State, and the country is *pro tanto exempt from* "*taxation.*" Now, as I will shew that the Government never had any more right to touch the "rent" in India, than they have in England, I should like to know how gentlemen in the House of Commons would like it themselves, if a Government, backed by an overwhelming army, undertook to *wholly untax* the people of this country, by simply taking the rent of land? It might be urged, as in the case of the massacre of the Albigenses, that men were no worse perhaps than their contemporaries, if their error was one of mere theory; but when I can shew that the fatal consequences of applying the ryotwar theory were distinctly proved *before* it was definitively adopted by the Indian Government; that, after the long practice of this theory in one Presidency had shewn its dreadful effects in confiscating the capital of the people, it was deli-

berately applied to another Presidency; that to this day its evils are not redressed, although the true theory has long been established by historians, and adopted with success in some of our own provinces, then I do say that the Bureaucracy have been guilty of a degree of oppression towards the natives of India which would make it a national sin for us to prorogue their irresponsible depotism for another twenty years. However, the theory having once been adopted that the rent of land belonged to the Government, the great bait of the ryotwar system, or annual settlement with individual cultivators, was what was called its "discovery of concealed cultivation;" and consequent increase of revenue, for, of course, it began with raising the revenue by confiscating the property of the landlords, though as such a system was "cutting open the hen that laid the golden eggs," by destroying the capitalists of the country, the ryotwar system always ended, as a rule, by swamping the whole population in one dead level of pauperism. There was another mistake made by the originators of the ryotwar settlements, which was to assume that all who were designated "ryots" belonged to the same class; the fact is, that the word in its primitive sense only means subject, and it is applicable alike to a landlord or a tenant—as well to the proprietor of five thousand acres, as to the tenant-at-will of one. In the districts of Madras, where this system was first applied, the Government officers adopted the rates of assessmeut of preceding native Governments, which were from 45 to 50 per cent of

the gross produce; but these rates had been paid under the native or village system, and it did not occur to the English collectors that the people *could not possibly have paid such rates,* at least not without being ruined as we ruined them, unless there had been something more than met the eye in the system, which made the real very different from the seeming burthen, and made the *nominal* taxation often more than double its actual amount! However, under the native system the land was held by a very peculiar tenure, not then understood by the English, which has certainly prevailed all over India, and is at this day in full operation in the native States, as well as in *our* north-west provinces and *our* Punjaub, and in short wherever we have not ignorantly destroyed it. It was this: the whole landed property of the village was divided into a certain number of shares, which might be again subdivided in families, but were always kept distinct for municipal purposes, and the owners of these shares were the only real landed proprietors in the village, the only ones responsible for the Government tax, the rest of the inhabitants being lease-holders, tenants-at-will, &c. under them.

Now, although the introducers of ryotwar settlements were ignorant of the above facts, they ought to have known, that the native Governments which immediately preceded us, that such men as Hyder Ali, had taken all the revenue the people could pay; short of paying their capital; therefore, when they found that, after measuring and classing every field, and assessing

the individual cultivators of it at 45 or 50 per cent of the gross produce, it produced a great increase of revenue, they ought to have felt that there must be some mistake in their principles. Instead of this, the great triumph of ryotwar collectors for many years was, to find out what they called "concealed cultivation." Nevertheless, when this system was established, its operation in ruining the cultivators was so rapid, that years before it was definitively adopted by the Home Government, its most famous advocates had discovered its evils, not from theory, but from practice. Colonel Read, its originator, had declared that "it involved the necessity of ousting all between the Government and the cultivator." Colonel Monro had declared that, unless the assessment were reduced from 25 to 33 per cent, the land would go out of cultivation.

Finally, the Madras Board of Revenue had recorded the following strong opinion against ryotwar settlements:—"Ignorant of the true resources of the newly-"acquired countries, as of the precise nature of their "landed tenures, we find a small band of foreign con-"querors no sooner obtaining possession of a vast "extent of territory, peopled by various nations differ-"ing from each other in language, customs, and habits, "than they attempt what would be termed an Her-"culean task, or rather a visionary project, even in "the most civilized countries of Europe, of which "every statistical information is possessed, and of "which the Government and people are one, viz. *to*

"*fix a land-rent*—not on each province, district, or "country, nor on each estate or farm, but on *every* "*separate field* in their dominions. In pursuit of this "supposed improvement, we find them unintentionally "dissolving the ancient tie which united the republic "of each Hindoo village, and, by a kind of agrarian "law, newly assessing and parcelling out the lands "which from time immemorial had belonged to the "village community collectively, not only among the "individual members of the privileged order, but even "among the inferior tenantry; we observe them igno- "rantly denying, and by their denial abolishing *private* "*property in the land;* professing to limit their de- "mand on each field, and, in fact, by establishing for "such limit an unattainable maximum, *assessing the* "*ryot at discretion;* and, like the Mussulman Govern- "ment which preceded them (Hyder Ali), binding the "cultivator by force to the plough; compelling him "to till land acknowledged to be over assessed; drag- "ging him back if he absconded; deferring their "demand upon him until his crop came to maturity; "then taking from him all that could be obtained, "and leaving to him nothing but his bullocks and "seed-grain; nay, perhaps, obliged to supply him "even with these, in order to enable him to resume "his melancholy task of toiling for others."

Such was a literally true description of the practice of this ryotwar theory; and it was *after* having officially received all the above representations, that, in 1812, the Home Government definitively adopted this

system of assessing "every separate field" in the Madras Presidency "at an unattainable maximum," and settling annually with the individual cultivators. The ruinous effects of such a system may be conceived, and one of them was, that the revenue began at length to decrease till it fell to *considerably below what it was* when Colonel Monro proposed his reductions; and this, I believe, more than anything else at length convinced the Home Government of the absolute necessity of making some change in such a system—and, accordingly, Sir Thomas Monro was allowed to carry out, as Governor of Madras, in 1827, the reductions of from 25 to 33 per cent in the assessment which he had recommended so many years before. I say the reader may conceive what the people of Madras must have suffered during this interval! and he will perhaps remember "the unintermitting concert of praises sung "from year to year upon the Indian Government, and "the increasing happiness of the Indian people, all "the while they were sinking into deeper poverty and "wretchedness." As the same mystification goes on at this day, I should think with greater intensity than ever, and it will go on as long as the existing system of Home Government is tolerated, I will now quote some extracts from Mr. Campbell's book, to shew the present operation of the ryotwar system in Madras. "I must therefore describe a ryotwar settlement, or "rather absence of settlement, as it exists at Madras. "For the distinguishing feature of the ryotwar system "is simply that no settlement is concluded at all, but "the revenue is made the most of from year to year,

"without settlement . . . ." "The assessment is rather "fieldwar than ryotwar. The Government deals "directly, not only with each ryot, but with each field. "Instead of assessing each village it assesses each "plot of ground. A field is not, in India, a large "piece of land fenced and hedged, but a minute por- "tion, suited to the minute tenantry, divided from the "rest by a little gathering together of the earth about "six inches high. Fencing is not common, and in a "dry flat plain containing thousands of such fields "side by side, it may be supposed that boundaries are "only permanent when the fields belong to different "owners on the spot, with different interests. More- "over instead of assessing at a fixed sum for a series "of years, there is fixed on each *field* a maximum "rent to be paid for good seasons and good crops; "and it is undertaken, not as an incidental indulgence, "but as an essential part of the system," that this rent shall be annually reduced when necessary. "To effect "then the commutation of the share of grain into "money rates, all the land was surveyed according to "the native mode of measurement .... there were no "maps."

No! and it has been recently stated publicly, by a former member of the Madras Government, that not a single district in the Presidency possesses a scientific or accurate survey; and in most, either no survey has ever been made, or it was known to have been hastily and carelessly done, and to have been *extensively tampered with afterwards.*

But to return to Mr. Campbell, "for the manage-

" ment of the village, the headman and accountant are " made altogether Government servants, paid by " Government;" and " for the prevention of fraud on " the part of these functionaries, reliance is placed on " *informers*. Fifty per cent of the assessment is " allowed as a reward to any informer of concealed " cultivation, &c., and it is stated that there are in " almost every village dismissed accountants desirous " of being re-employed, and unemployed servants who " wish to bring themselves to notice, whose services as " *informers* can be relied on." Before the rains the native collector makes " a statement preparatory to " settlement. But this is by no means *the* settlement. " When the crops are nearly ripe, the collector goes " out into the district to look at them, and make his " annual settlement. The village accountant makes " out a statement, shewing the cultivation of each ryot, " his crops and circumstances, the number of his cattle, " sheep, and children... At this time, all who think " they should not pay full rent, apply for reduction. " All these cases are settled, and *then only* does the " collector make up his annual settlement, grant formal " leases, and take formal engagements for the crop, " which by this time is *past*, and generally *paid for*. " The settlement is not made up till *after* the crop is " ripe, in fact generally does not reach the collector's " office till *after* most of the money has already got " there, and after making all the remissions and re- " ductions of the season from the standard assessment." Yet this settlement is appealed to by the Bureaucracy

at home as a proof of the regularity with which the assessment is collected in ryotwar districts!—Mr. Campbell goes on: "that the result of the ryotwar "system in Madras is most unfavourable all parties "seem to admit. The Madras men to whom I have "talked candidly admit that at the present moment "the state of things is most unsatisfactory—that the "people are wretchedly poor, the land of little value— "that the difficulty is to get people to cultivate it on "any terms—and that the cultivation is kept up by "forcing, by Government advances, &c. &c. And, "indeed, no one who has any experience of these mat- "ters can wonder that it should be so. The idea of "the British Government undertaking to perform the "duties of immediate landlord throughout a great "country, discarding all the assistance of the system "which we found, the self-contained communities, and "dealing singly with each wretched cultivator, is, to "one who knows the trouble and difficulty of manag- "ing in this way but two or three villages, quite "absurd. All experience, as well as all reason, is "against it. Any indigo planter who has a village or "two could tell the weary work, the coaxing and bar- "gaining, and the management, the favourable leases "given to some cultivators, the bad debts left by "others, the thousand and one details of managing a "village on this system; and the idea of one man so "managing a couple of thousand villages is perfectly "monstrous. . . . Only imagine one collector dealing "directly with 150,000 tenants, not one of whom has

" a lease, but each pays *according as he cultivates and* " *gets a crop, and with reference to his cattle, sheep,* " *and children,* and each of whom gets a reduction if " he can make out a sufficiently good case.... it is " generally agreed that the abuses of the whole " system, and especially that of remission, is something " frightful; and that the opportunities of extortion, " peculation, chicanery, and intrigue of all kinds are " unbounded; while the reliance of the Madras col- " lector on *informers* by no means mends the matter." This, reader, is the " *excellent revenue system! of* " *great advantage to India, inasmuch as what goes into* " *the pockets of individuals in this country goes there* " *into the coffers of the State, and the country is* pro " tanto *exempt from taxation!*" Now from such excellent revenue systems, may the Lord deliver us! I have said that the true theory was established at last; but it was not a new theory—correct views had been held by individuals even before Lord Cornwallis's "Perpetual Settlement," and had been proclaimed by authority before the adoption of the ryotwar system in Madras. But it was reserved for one eminent man to collect into a focus all the scattered proofs which existed of the real nature of the Indian land-tax, and to establish the true theory on a basis which has never since been shaken, by a book published in 1830. This author, Lieut.-General Briggs, after having been the confidential assistant of Mr. Elphinstone, in all the difficulties of the second Mahratta war, was employed at its close to settle large districts of the Peishwa's

country, which gave him an unusual insight into the details of native administration; he afterwards enjoyed opportunities of extending and maturing his observations as Resident at various Native Courts, and during a mission to Persia, and he brought to his task not merely the resources of a first-rate Oriental scholar, but the experience of a practised administrator and the caution of a diplomatist. The method pursued in his work was to travel bit by bit, over the whole surface of India, illustrating the true theory by an immense mass of historical testimony, Native and European; which no writer has ever attempted to answer. I have not space to go into the details of this work, but the sum of its proofs was as follows:—1st. That the integrity of private property in land had been recognised in every village in India. 2nd. That Government had no right whatever to the land, but only to a share in its produce, that is to a tax, which did not affect the proprietary rights any more than the land-tax affects our rights in England. 3rd. That the Government share or tax was so *defined and limited* both by Hindoo and Mahommedan law, that Government had no title or precedent (except revolutionary ones) for taxing the people at discretion, and no more right to claim the property of the land and take its "rent," than a tithe-owner has to claim another man's estate because it pays him tithe. 4th. That the Native institutions themselves, afforded a broad basis for our administration, and the only one on which we could establish a durable empire. A series of articles by the

same author, adding new proofs of the correctness of the above views, have recently been published in the "*Indian News*" journal, Nos. 227 to 233. The above work produced a strong impression on the mind of one of the most illustrious politicians of that day, Lord Wm. Bentinck, who at length saw, happily for some of the natives, that the land in India was held in exactly the same conditions as those on which a man possesses a house, or a horse, or a dog, or land, or any other property in England, namely, that the Government might assess it to pay a settled tax, and attach to sell it if the tax was not paid; but that this tax was no more "rent" in India than it is in England. The fact is that *tax* and *rent* are two things different in their nature, and acted upon inversely by given circumstances; for instance, *rent*, or the annual premium paid for the use of land, increases per head with the increase of population—*tax*, or the annual contribution to the expenses of the State, as a rule diminishes per head with the increase of population; and in this way the taxes of England have been very much lightened per head in the last half century. But to return to Lord Wm. Bentinck; this enlightened and sincere friend of the natives, when Governor-General of India, took the first opportunity of embodying the recommendations of the above work in a series of regulations, which he sent to General Briggs, then Resident at Nagpore, for correction, and which were the foundation of the North Western Settlements. I must refer the reader to Mr. Campbell's book for the

details, but the principle of these settlements was to ascertain and define first, the extent, nature, and value of the lands, and the rights of their owners, and then, securing the rights of these owners, to settle the tax on a moderate assessment for a term of thirty years, liable to a fixed decennial increase if a certain quantity of fresh land is brought into cultivation, at the same time carefully preserving the native institutions, that is to say *the village system, working through that,* and collecting the tax from the representatives of the different villages. And now, what does the reader think of the Government forcing its Madras system upon Bombay, not only in spite of Mr. Elphinstone's strong opposition, but in spite of his strongly expressed opinion in favour of the village system (for he anticipated long before the conclusions of Lord Wm. Bentinck), and let the reader think of the Government doing this about the time when it was compelled to avow the ruinous consequences of the "excellent revenue system," in Madras! However, such was the case; and although Mr. Elphinstone's great name enabled him to resist ryotwar settlements as long as he was Governor, the doom of the ryots was sealed when he went home, and the "excellent revenue system" was soon after introduced in Bombay. Of course this method of "wholly untaxing" the people by taking their rent, soon reduced them to a state of pauperism in Bombay, as it had done in Madras, and not until they were so reduced, did the Government agree to any reduction in the assessment.

A revision of the assessment is now going on in Bombay, but has only yet gone over the southern portion of the Presidency, and it is stated in the *Friend of India*, of October 21, 1852, that before this revision, "no ryot ever knew one year what he might "have to pay the next, and whatever he paid, or "whatever exertions he might be induced to make, he "still found an unaccountable amount of arrears "hanging over his head. There were no rich land-"holders to stand between him and the Government, "no capitalist to bear the first pressure of a bad "season, but he just scrambled on from year to year, "and took to flight when the grievance became too "great to bear. The collection was in fact, based "upon the same principle as that which to this day "governs taxation in Egypt, viz.: to take from the "peasant everything that can be squeezed out of him "and then to make a merit of remitting the remainder." With regard to "rich landholders" and "capitalists," I have alluded to the progressive destruction of the native aristocracy in my sixth chapter; and the ruin of the country gentlemen and principal farmers by our over assessment is noticed in Mr. Giberne's evidence before the Commons' Committee of 1848; also in a letter dated 1849, from a gentleman high in the Company's service, quoted by Mr. Bright, in the House of Commons, saying "*many of the best fami-*"*lies in the provinces who were rich and well to do* "*when we came into Guzerat, in* 1807, *have now* "*scarcely clothes to their backs, &c. &c.*" I will conclude this chapter by exposing the stupid fallacy,

worthy of a bureaucratic Government, which assumes that a land-tax is the best of all taxes, and the Indian revenue must depend upon it. In the first place it cannot depend upon it, for it is notorious that the Government cannot tax the land any more, and the Indian finances are now in a state of the most dangerous embarrassment from the insufficiency of the revenue. In the second place, a land tax is not the best of all taxes, not only because Adam Smith and others have shewn that a money tax on land must soon become unequal, but because it is a direct tax on produce, which is always the form of taxation least productive to the Government and most oppressive to the people. To say that it is "best" to raise three-fourths of the revenue by a direct tax on produce in India, while we only raise one-fifth of the revenue by direct taxation in England, is a gross and glaring contradiction. Yet, conceive our adopting the "best" principle and attempting to raise three-fourths of our own revenue by a direct tax on the land? Why, the Customs alone pay above twenty-two millions of our net revenue! so that the system is evidently absurd in our own case, or that of any other civilized nation, which a Bureaucracy calls best in India; though it is really quite as absurd there as anywhere else—and it has led to the cruel over-assessment of the people, and the perpetual grasping of the Government for more direct revenue, by confiscating Native States and the landed properties of the Native aristocracy, without saving the Indian finances after all from falling into a situation of extreme peril.

How different is this result from that obtained by a Native Government which encouraged the commerce of its subjects. General Briggs has shewn that one of the wealthiest Native States, before our time, that of Malabar, had no land-tax at all, and had a very large revenue without one. Yet the Bureaucracy, as I will endeavour to shew in my 6th chapter, have done everything to destroy, and nothing to help the commerce of the natives. I am reminded by the subject of this chapter, of one of the effects which would ensue, if commerce was possible, to the natives of India. It is notorious that they have a passion for wearing gold ornaments, and to such a degree, that these used to be a sort of criterion of their family wealth; and it is stated in a pamphlet by a late member of the Bombay Government, and has been confirmed to me by several old Indians, that under the operation of the "excellent revenue system," which ground them down, till it was reported by a Revenue Commissioner before the late revision of the assessment, that "the straits "to which the cultivators were reduced, were not "merely those of the most coarse and homely fare, "but he believed the far greater proportion could not "afford for themselves one daily plentiful meal, of any "sort of grain, throughout the year:"—under this process, of course, their gold ornaments and every atom of gold has disappeared from among them. Now, the consequence of a considerable reduction of the assessment in the South of Bombay has been to cause a vast increase of cultivation and a glut of pro-

duce, which absolutely rots in the interior for want of a market, and brings back the old difficulty of finding money to meet the assessment. Yet if commerce was possible to these people, and I will endeavour to shew in my 6th chapter that it is impossible, not only could they sell their produce but they would get back all their family treasures, and absorb millions upon millions of the gold which is pouring in from Australia, &c.

However, it is hopeless to ask the Home Government to encourage the commerce of the natives. It is impossible for any man to judge of the unfitness of a Bureaucracy to comprehend the interests or conduct the affairs of a great empire, without having had to deal with the Home Government of India. Burke's description of the statesmanship of a Bureaucracy is not in the least exaggerated: "there "is no trade so vile and mechanical as Government in "their hands. A large, liberal, and prospective view "of the interests of states, passes with them for "romance; and the principles that recommend it, for "the wanderings of a disordered imagination. Little-"ness in object and in means to them appears "soundness and sobriety." It is in vain to ask such a class as this for any enlightened measures of Government. It is in vain to prove to them, year after year, that such a return of part of the taxes in public works, as is the undoubted right of the people who have been "wholly untaxed" by taking their "rent," that this would produce an increase in

the Indian revenues, of which no man could foresee the end—that it would re-establish the finances; relieve the cultivators; restore the capital we have exhausted; and replace the trade we have destroyed. All such appeals, either in private or in the Court of Proprietors, are rejected as a romance, and resented as an intrusion.

> "I'll have my bond; I will not hear thee speak;
> "I'll not be made a soft and dull-eyed fool,
> "To shake the head, relent, and sigh, and yield
> "To Christian intercessors. Follow not;
> "I'll have no speaking; I will have my bond."

So they will indeed! they are now goading on the Bombay Government to seize the Enams in that Presidency; they have taken away many of these estates which had been in the same families for centuries; and as I shew in my 6th chapter, they are in a course of confiscating the territories of Native Princes, whose dynasties date certainly from 2000 years back, and whose ancestors resisted Alexander the Great.

To bring these things home to the reader, let me suggest a parallel case in England, to what we do in India. Our "great Duke," and our only one, has just passed away from amongst us. I leave his services to the record of history and the praises of posterity; my business is only with a certain estate given to the Duke and his heirs by the nation, to reward those services. Now I propose to my countrymen, to shew our national gratitude, by pauperising

the present Duke and Duchess of Wellington; and to shew our honour and good faith by confiscating Strathfieldsaye. Is the reader shocked at such an idea? but it does not shock our Indian Government in the least. Does the reader think the present Duke's title to his property is something sacred? but so is a native gentleman's title to his Enam. Does the reader think the confiscation of Strathfieldsaye would be a very meagre addition to our revenue, after all? but we see in India that a number of estates taken in this way, do something. Can the reader still hesitate? has he yet another scruple? will he say that no empire can be durable which is not just? why then, in God's name, let him help to stop the injustice of our Indian Government!

CHAPTER V.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.

It was one of the greatest evils of the Ryotwar settlements, that they subverted the indigenous municipal institutions of the country. These institutions had formed the basis of every successive empire in India for ages; and they were so rooted in the hearts of the people, that when allowed to retain their cherished privilege of local self-government, they were comparatively indifferent to the title, or creed, or nationality of their rulers, and indisposed to political combination, because they enjoyed a simple and satisfactory administration of civil and criminal law. However, the English, who first acquired territory in the most disorganized part of India, and were then entirely ignorant of the systematic structure of native society —the English rashly assumed that an ancient, long-civilized people, possessing the elaborate mechanism of old governments, suited to their manners and domestic circumstances, grown into a second nature by custom, and to this day working admirably under good rulers—that such a people were a race of barbarians who had never known what justice was until we came among them, and that the best thing we could do for

them was to upset all their institutions as fast as we could, and among others their judicial system, and give them instead a copy of our legal models at home. Models, be it remembered, against which we have been inveighing for at least a century and a half, and which have at length become so odious that we have radically changed a great part of them, and may possibly condemn still more. But even if the technical system of English law had worked well at home, it would have been the grossest political empiricism to force it on a people so different from ourselves as every Oriental people are; and considering that it did not work well, even at home, the reader may conceive the irreparable mischief it has done in India. It is lamentable to contemplate the pictures given us of its demoralization of the natives; and the more so, because this demoralization is progressive, so that the worst results are found in our oldest possessions. There was some excuse for the Government which introduced this system of "artificial technicalities," in its profound ignorance of every native institution, including those rational methods of dispensing justice peculiar to the country. But nothing can excuse the Government of the present day for maintaining such an abuse; nothing can even account for such mal-administration, except the fact, that the Home Government is an irresponsible Bureaucracy. What makes this disregard of the rights of the natives (their right to be well governed) more flagrant in the present instance, is the fact that ample information has long since been supplied to the Government of the evils of its own judicial system and the

merits of the native one. Indeed this last has been retained, and is working with complete success in the latest of our territorial acquisitions; for somehow or other we always know how to give the native good government, when we have strong motives for doing so: as in the Punjaub, where it is our interest to conciliate a martial people, newly brought under our sway; and in Mysore, where it is our interest to reconcile them to the prospect of absorption. But, says Mr. Campbell, the Punjaub "having had the benefit "of our previous experience, the best systems have been "introduced." This is no excuse for the Government, but an aggravation of its injustice. Equity would require that the unfortunate people at whose expense our experience has been gained, should be among the first to benefit by it. For it has cost our old provinces dear, this experience! We have experimented upon their population, as if in animâ vili, while we were finding out what were "the best systems;" and now we have found them out, we do not give these unfortunate people the benefit of them. However, I object to the word "introduced" in the above sentence. Mr. Campbell's partiality for the Civil Service leads him to speak of our successful administration of the Punjaub, as if the Civil Service had invented a revenue and judicial system which we have only adopted, and which is some centuries older than our empire in India. Long before we knew anything of India, the fabric of native society had been characterized by some peculiar and excellent institutions, viz., by a municipal organi-

zation, providing a most efficient police for the administration of criminal law, while the civil law was worked by a simple process of arbitration, which either prevented litigation, or else ensured prompt and substantial justice to the litigants. It may be worth while to add some details on the subject of these institutions.

The village was the germ of the whole political system of native States. The constitution of a village was the model of that of a town consisting of more than one parish; and so on, till the village became a city; each branch of the municipality increasing as the community enlarged, until the single smith or carpenter of the village was represented by the guild of his trade in the city; and in every case the freeholders forming a corporation which managed the municipal revenues and police, and was the organ through which the Government transacted its business with the people. As a rule, all over India, there were three classes of ryots or cultivators in every village: 1st, the freeholders or proprietors of the soil; 2nd, a class like copyholders, who rented of the first, but could not sell nor be turned out of their holdings while they performed their engagements; 3rd, a class of tenants-at-will; the mechanics, police, &c., were paid partly by tax-free lands, and partly by a fixed portion of the produce of each field. Of the above, the landlord class alone was responsible to the Government for the taxes, which were assessed on each member of this body by its elective council, and the surplus

rent, after paying Government dues and municipal expenses, was divided among the freeholders, in proportion to their share, large or small, of the property: but there was nothing like "communism" in this division, except the sort of communism we have in many parishes in England, viz., a freeholder's right of pasturage on the village common, where there happened to be such a thing. The two most useful functionaries in this municipality were the head-man and the record-keeper; both generally hereditary officers, but requiring the confirmation of Government. The head-man was the village magistrate, tax-gatherer, coroner, &c., and had a limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, though in the village council, he was simply "primus inter pares." The record-keeper was quite as important an officer as the first, for nowhere in the world were the records kept with more accuracy and statistical detail than in India. The village books contained a register of every field, with dimensions, names of owners, crops sown, &c., with every particular of the possession or alienation of real property by sale, heritage, or transfer, and as the sale of land was one of the most formal processes in all the native institutions, and every circumstance of the transaction was recorded, it was comparatively easy to ascertain the truth in cases of disputed right. Finally, the village chief and record-keeper were represented by corresponding functionaries at the head of each native district or county, who thus connected the local with the general administration, and were the

organs of communication between the Government and the people. For instance, in the imposition of any new tax, the native Governments always took care to obtain first the assent of the local authorities; stimulating their self-interest on such occasions, and profiting by their influence over the people. Whereas, our Government has sometimes goaded the natives into open resistance, by making them feel that they were neither represented nor consulted in its arbitrary imposition of new taxes. It was the county chiefs spoken of above, whom Lord Cornwallis mistook for great landowners; though they were really only great tax-gatherers; and to whom he transferred the landed property of their districts by his Perpetual Settlement.

But certain conditions were exacted from these municipalities under the native system in return for the privilege of self-government. Each community was responsible for a due performance of its police duties, under heavy penalties; as were formerly the "Hundreds," in England. They were bound to produce or trace the perpetrators of robberies or outrages committed within their limits, or else to make good the amount lost, or submit to a fine imposed by the Government: and partly owing to this responsibility, partly to the peculiar fitness for their employment of the Aborigines who fulfilled the Police duties, there was no part of the municipal institutions of an Indian village more perfect than its police system. Marvellous stories are related of the sagacity of this native police, who have been known to trace

criminals from one county to another, sometimes for weeks together, until they succeeded in apprehending them, and wherever we have destroyed the native institutions and disorganised this force, a great increase of crime has been the consequence. Bengal is a melancholy case in point; and I must continually direct the reader's attention to the fact that wherever we have upset the native institutions, and put inventions of our own in their place, it has produced a great and progressive increase of crime. But it was in the administration of civil law that the merits of the native system were most conspicuous. The Judges were appointed by the King, and sat as his representatives, and the central courts in the capital, and local courts in the districts, corresponded to the old European model: with this difference, that as there were no set of functionaries in the Native Courts, as attorneys and special pleaders, whose livelihood depended on their practice, the Indian judges had a motive for suppressing litigation, and they maintained a system of arbitration, comparatively inexpensive to the litigants, greatly facilitated by the exact and minute record of real property, and scarcely ever leading to appeals to a higher Court.

It is worth while to add a sketch of the forms in Native Civil Courts; as they are still existing and working to admiration, wherever we have not destroyed the native institutions and introduced our system of "artificial technicalities." After the plaintiff's petition is received by the judge, he must

attend when it is read in court, to answer any interrogatories the judge chooses to put to him. The defendant is then summoned and required to answer in writing, and it is the duty of the judge, at this stage of the proceedings, to endeavour to effect an arrangement or compromise, and obtain from the parties mutual releases; in which case, this first process is final. Failing in this, the judge proposes to them an arbitration of friends, generally accepted when the parties are dealing fairly with one another—and then the forms of a regular trial are enforced by an officer of the court, who has power to compel the attendance of witnesses, the production of papers, &c.; the award is made a rule of Court, and this second process is final too. When one or both parties refuse this method, they are required to give securities, the one to prosecute, the other to defend the case. The Court then summons a number of individuals of the same profession or rank as the parties, out of whom a certain number are selected, any of whom the plaintiff or defendant has a right to challenge; the Court deciding on the validity of objection. The parties are then required to sign an instrument agreeing to submit their cause to this jury, and pay a certain fine to Government if they appeal against the decision (this meaning appeal costs), and after the hearing of the cause, before the decree is passed, they are required to sign an affirmation of the fairness of the proceedings. An officer of the Court attends to regulate the forms, as in the Arbitration Courts, and

in this way several suits may be conducted simultaneously in the same Court. When the decree is given, the judge awards their costs to jurors, witnesses, &c., and decides who is to pay them. In the event of an appeal, the appellant must enter into recognizances to pay the expences, but an appeal beyond the district seems to be unheard of, and this simple mode of dispensing justice, minus English law and attorneys and special pleaders, is to this day completely successful. It is not that lawyers do not exist in Native States, but that the Court alone can summon them, if it requires their advice or assistance; the parties cannot hire them under the native system, as they do under our system, to defeat the ends of justice.

Such then is the native judicial administration as it still exists in many parts of India, and did exist everywhere; and so well did it work, that Mr. Elphinstone can only account for "the flourishing state of the Mahratta country," in spite of the obvious defects in its Government, by attributing it to the judicial part of the native institutions. And now, in lieu of this simple and rational mode of dispensing justice, we have given the natives an obscure, complicated, pedantic system of English law, full of "artificial technicalities," which disable the candidates for justice from any longer pleading their own cause, and force them to have recourse to a swarm of attorneys and special pleaders, that is of *professional rogues*, according to Mr. Campbell, to conduct their cases, by which means we have taught an ingenious people to refine upon the quibbles

and fictions of English lawyers, and become such adepts in the science, that the course of justice, civil as well as criminal, is utterly confounded in a maze of artifice and fraud, and the natives, both high and low, are becoming more and more demoralized, as they become more dexterous in applying all the "sharp practice" of English law.

I had copied a series of extracts from "Modern India" to illustrate all this, but I now find their volume so great, that I cannot possibly insert them; although Mr. Campbell's description is full of graphic details, of which I cannot give the effect in a condensed statement. I must, therefore, recommend the reader to buy the book, as the outline of its revelations, which is all I can find room for, will not give a sufficient idea of the injury which our judicial system is doing to the natives. This author says that some men go out from Haileybury, who are not, and never can be, fit for the duties of the Civil Service; that in the course of promotion, men are changed from one department to another with a totally different set of duties at every step — frequently posted to different parts of the country where they do not understand the language of the people; and that they only hold the same office on an average for two or three years without interruption, which gives little opportunity for acquiring the local knowledge necessary for administrative duties. As the rule, promotion goes by seniority, and so the most indifferent officers attain a certain rank in time, and the higher appointments are

sometimes long blocked up by elderly men, never brilliant and now inefficient, worn out in body, mind, or temper, yet who cannot or will not retire.

When a collector is old enough, he is made a judge—and to this step there is almost no exception if it is wished for. "It seems to be considered, that if at this "time of life a man is fit for anything at all, he is fit "for a judge; and if he is fit for nothing, better make "him a judge and get rid of him; for once in that "office, he has no *claim* to farther promotion by mere se-"niority alone." Altogether, it happens that few above mediocrity remain to be judges, and of those who do, many are disappointed men; and in both divisions of the Bengal Presidency they are promoted to be judges late in life, with no previous experience whatever of the principal portion of their duties, civil justice.

These judges are nervous, captious, and timid; disposed to overstrain forms and exaggerate technicalities, and to rush into the extreme of legal niceties and quibbles; they are unwilling to convict on reasonable evidence—some, unable to make up their minds, and thinking acquittal the safest course—some, considering themselves charged with the interests of the prisoner as opposed to the magistrate, and seeking for every argument for acquittal, substantial or technical; and finally, they are prone to feel that their consequence depends upon actively interfering with and checking the magistrates, and to give prisoners the benefit of every doubt on their minds, reasonable or unreasonable, rather than face the responsibility of convicting them. "Trans-

"ferred to the superintendence of a large judicial "machinery, after having spent the best of their years "and energies in other employments, it is hardly to "be expected that they would well perform so diffi-"cult a task." Such being the judges, let us see what are the laws.

The criminal law is a patchwork, made up of pieces engrafted at all times and seasons on a groundwork of native codes, nearly covered and obliterated; in fact, by practice and continual emendations, there has grown up a system of our own; and the Sudder Court, composed of the judges described above, are in the habit of issuing authoritative "constructions" of regulations and points of practice: but successive judges pretty often vary their constructions. In the civil law the Government has scarcely interfered at all in the laws regulating property; but precedents and "constructions" have swelled out into a large and complicated legal system, quite undigested and unarranged, and the judges of one day are constantly altering the constructions of their predecessors. Such then being the judges, and such the laws, and the police being inefficient, except in the Punjaub, where "the wholesome ancient system is more exactly adhered to," let us see how the system works, and first in criminal law? It appears that the magistrate has greater facilities for eliciting the truth than the judge; by questioning the witnesses, whose evidence is all taken down in writing, and ascertaining that they understand what is recorded, and the author

hardly ever knew evidence to be at all perverted where the parties, the magistrate, and the witnesses all spoke and understood the same language. Moreover, in the new territories there is a habit of confessing among the people; though this is exchanged for a habit of denial in the clearest cases when they find out the many judicial chances of escape under our system. Altogether in new territories, an efficient and experienced official can very well get at the truth in most cases; but there is a great deterioration in the course of time, from which the author infers that lying and perjury are quite as much due to our judicial institutions as to the people. It appears that the judge prefers deliberate statements as the best legal evidence; while the magistrate can to some extent ascertain the character and history of the witnesses, and does a good deal towards weighing them properly. But still experienced criminals, and especially the professional attorneys about the Courts do much to baffle him, witnesses are sent up well crammed and cautioned to tell a connected story, and not to tell too much; and when the case after a long interval goes to the judge, the evidence is worth literally nothing. All the witnesses are thoroughly well up in a thrice-told tale. Nothing is to be made of strings of such witnesses directly contradicting one another. The judge can get little more out of them. To him a witness is a witness, and he knows nothing else about him. "The "civil courts are the great schools for perjury, and in "our older possessions false witnesses for criminal

"trials can easily be procured from thence." At the trial one of the magistrate's clerks does the mechanical duties of a prosecutor, and nothing more. The prisoner may produce any number of fresh witnesses he pleases, and has a right to counsel; although there is none for the prosecution, and "the professional advocates are the most unscrupulous of men." Finally, though the form of a jury is preserved, the judge generally puts into the box some of the pleaders, and such people about the Court, intimates to them very broadly his opinion, they always agree with him, and there is no more trouble. Under this system there is a great increase of crime; most marked in our oldest possessions; and "the Dacoits have now got the better of the laws." It would be very odd if it were otherwise!

Now let us see what is the system in civil law. When the plaint is lodged, which is generally long, rambling, circumstantial, exceedingly exaggerated, and full of irrelevant matter, a notice is served on the defendant, or stuck up in the village where he is supposed to reside, requiring him to file an answer in a certain number of days. If he does so, the plaintiff is called upon for a replication, the defendant for a rejoinder, and so on, each paper containing all kinds of assertions, accusations, and technical objections, and refusing to admit the plainest facts. This being completed, issue is supposed to be joined, that is to say, the judge has before him a mass of the most prodigious contradictions which unscrupulous subtilty can deliberately prepare in writing, and great quantities of irrelevant

matter, and then he appoints a day for trial. Issues of law and fact are all joined at the same time. In the trial the judge is not permitted himself to make any effort towards the discovery of the truth. Every thing is left entirely to the management of the parties and their professional advisers, who avail themselves of every weapon, fair and unfair. Perjury, forgery, and fraud, are altogether rampant in the civil courts; in fact the whole system is one of highly perfected fencing with such weapons. The parties marshal up their own prepared witnesses, produce their own documents, and apply for reference to particular records. The judge would not on any account refer to the records of his own or the collector's office, except on special application from one of the parties. He scrupulously restricts himself to the *worst* evidence, and having heard that, he decides as he best may. If either party commit any error of form, it is fatal to his cause. If the defendant does not appear in the manner required, the decree goes against him by default, and the first he hears of it is in the seizure of his lands and goods, after which he has no legal remedy. In execution of decrees personal property is destrained, &c. Against the possessor of landed rights the process is exceedingly simple. They are at once sold by auction without reserve to the highest bidder in satisfaction of the decree; or if certain rights are decreed, they are at once made over by precept addressed to the collector, who must implicitly obey, however inequitable he may know the decision to be, and however inconsistent with the rights

of others. Such then is the system of civil law, and the worst of it is, we have succeeded in giving the natives a taste for this system of "artificial technicalities," which thrives amazingly; and as most people are frequently involved in litigation in some shape or other, the whole country is demoralized by it, and the lowest villagers are becoming up to many "dodges" of the law. Finally, our author says, "the judicial oath as it is "used, does not in the very least affect the evidence. "And yet this is not because the religious sanction of "an oath is unknown to the people. On the contrary "it *was* nowhere stronger, and this is another of the "changes caused by our system. In a new country "I found that a solemn oath was astonishingly bind- "ing, not gabbled out lightly as an every day matter "in the courts of justice, but taken on rare occasions, "after the fashion of the people themselves. But such "binding oaths do not exist in our older provinces. "The judicial oath is much too common-place an "affair to carry weight, and the people seeing per- "jury practised with impunity, become used to it. "The longer we possess any province the more com- "mon and grave does perjury become."

Such then are our judges, and laws, and administration of what is called civil and criminal justice in India. And the maintenance of this demoralizing system is the more iniquitous that Government is aware of the evil, and conscious of the remedy. That remedy has been applied in the Punjaub, and the reason for adopting it is thus stated by Mr. Campbell. "After a long

" trial of the working of the old courts, it may be sup-
" posed that the Government was little inclined to
" extend their operation, and the system was so radi-
" cally vicious that there was no amending it except by
" altogether sweeping it away and commencing *de*
" *novo*." He then gives the details of the Punjaub administration which the reader will find is the same native system described in the beginning of this chapter. The remedy then, and the only one, is to return to that local self-government, and simple mode of administering justice, indigenous to the country, and congenial to the manners of its inhabitants. A remarkable instance of the success of returning to native principles is given by the historian, Professor Wilson, where he relates how a Bengal magistrate succeeded in putting down gang robbery in the district of Burdwan. He says, " the instruments employed were
" the neglected and under-valued institutions of the
" country, animated by skilful superintendence and
" encouragement. The landowners and head-men of
" the villages and of various trades, were called upon
" to enter into engagements for the performance of
" those duties, which it was personally explained to
" them they were expected to fulfil, and the village
" watchmen were punished for neglect or connivance,
" and rewarded for courage and good conduct. At-
" tempts to deprive them of their service lands were
" sedulously resisted, and the villagers were encou-
" raged to give them more liberal subsistence. In
" this instance it was unequivocally shewn that the

" co-operation of the people was to be had, and that " when had it was efficacious. Notwithstanding this " evidence of the feasibility of a different system, no " attempt was made to act upon it on a more exten- " sive scale." No! instead of that, in spite of every evidence, and warning, and remonstrance from the most competent authorities, the Government has deliberately gone on breaking up the native system all over the country, except in the North-west Provinces and the Punjaub, and yet, owing partly, to the short date of our Empire in the greater part of India, and partly, to the extraordinary tenacity with which the people cling to the most characteristic parts of their social structure, although we have subverted the fabric, we have nowhere succeeded in destroying the elements of their institutions. The utter destruction of a village, says Sir John Malcolm, and dispersion of its inhabitants for hundreds of miles, and for thirty years at a time, cannot prevent its instant re-establishment when force is withdrawn. At that signal the people at once reappear, the lost records are recovered, every field is recognized and claimed, the hereditary village officers, even when infants, are reinstated, and the little municipality resumes its place and reasserts its nature. The village institutions, he says elsewhere, will after the scenes they have survived, be indestructible, unless the strong hand of power breaks up establishments which have for ages formed the basis of all Indian Governments. Yet this is what the strong hand of English power continues to do in our old provinces;

to break up establishments which ensured the natives a good administration of civil and criminal law, and to maintain the shocking abuse of justice exposed by Mr. Campbell. For I ask the reader whether such a judicial system as this author describes be not an offence to God and man? It seems contrived on purpose, not merely to render person and property insecure, and to stop the means of encouraging every kind of industry, but to force, as in a hot-bed, every evil tendency of the native mind; to paralyse confidence between man and man; and to deprave a whole people as much as it is possible for laws to deprave them. And after the abuses of this judicial system have been notorious for about half a century, especially since the Commons' Committee Report of 1810, can Parliament pretend to believe that the bureaucratic Government which has maintained them, has done its duty to the people of India? Can Parliament venture to prolong the secret, irresponsible despotism of such a Government, for another twenty years?

CHAPTER VI.

FINANCE AND PUBLIC WORKS.

SOME of the most sagacious of princes, such as Diocletian and Queen Elizabeth, have complained that it was next to impossible for even a wise and good Ruler to find out the truth, when it was the interest of his ministers to combine together to deceive their sovereign. Never was this more strikingly exemplified than by the mystification of England with regard to the condition of the natives of India, by the bureaucratic Government to which England commits her authority over them. Never was it more true that, "what flatters the sovereign generally forms the misery "of the people;" as we shall see when I examine what those "blessings of the British Rule," which England imagines she confers upon India, really are? The most curious thing is, that although the imposture of the day is invariably exposed afterwards, the exposure never seems to reach the mass of the people of this country, but the next grand deception of the Indian Government is just as successful as any former one. This reminds me of the following remarks of Machiavelli on the Borgia Pope: "So simple are men, and so "prone to obey any impulse from without, that who-

" ever is willing to deceive them will always find those " who are willing to be deceived. Alexander the 6th " never did any thing else than deceive men, nor " thought of any thing else, and none ever asserted " more confidently, or swore to promises better and " kept them less, than he did, nevertheless his decep- " tions always succeeded to a wish, because he under- " stood that part of the business of life thoroughly." And this is the only part of the business of life which the Bureaucracy seems to understand; however, if the reader has the patience to go through this chapter, I will shew him that unless we entirely and immediately change our system, and relieve India from the incubus of a bureaucratic Government, our affairs in that country cannot be saved from utter ruin: indeed it will be no easy matter to save them now! As the Home Authorities always treat the question of public works as one of finance, I will take a leaf out of their book, and consider the subject in a financial point of view. What is it that now renders the state of the Indian finances dangerous and unsafe, and far more so than they were in 1842, when Sir Robert Peel strongly expressed his alarm about them? It is the steady increase of debt; the almost invariable deficit; the non-increase, the decrease in some instances, of the taxpaying power of the people; coupled with the unhealthy symptom of an unnatural weakness in this taxpaying power, and the confession of the Indian Government after it has tried taxes on everything susceptible of an impost, that it cannot carry taxation any further. Is

not such a condition of the finances of a great empire enough to alarm any foreseeing statesman? One source of revenue has indeed increased, and just in time to save us from adding several millions more to the debt, but as this source of revenue is one which forms no test of the general ability of the people to pay taxes, although it now contributes about one-eighth of the net receipt of the Indian Exchequer, it adds to the danger of our situation, that this duty on opium is liable to great fluctuations, and might any day be immediately and finally extinguished (one-eighth of the net revenue!) by an act of common sense on the part of the Chinese Government; viz. by its permitting the cultivation of the poppy at home. Surely, when the reader considers the actual embarrassment of the Indian finances, the yearly peril of losing one-eighth of the net revenue, and the confessed inability of the Government to impose more taxes, he must feel how deeply our own interests are involved in placing the finances of India on a sounder footing; for as the case stands, although it would ruin England to lose her empire in India, it is threatening our own finances with ruin to be obliged to keep it. The most startling point to English eyes is the small taxpaying power of the people. A comparison with our own happier land will shew the significance of this fact. In England the people pay on an average £2. per head of population annually in taxes; yet so far from the industry of the country's being crushed by such a burthen, the people never were so prosperous before; in case of war they could evidently

raise a much larger sum for the service of the State, and in peace the yield of the taxes increases with such regularity that a Chancellor of the Exchequer may calculate on a surplus of about two millions sterling every year. In India the people pay only 5*s* 4*d* per head, and deducting the opium monopoly and about half a million of tribute from foreign States, the natives literally pay only 4*s* 5*d* per head of population annually in taxes; and yet by its own admission the Government cannot raise any larger sum in case of an emergency, and so far from the yield of the Indian taxes regularly increasing and affording a surplus nearly four times as large as that of England, in proportion to the number of the people, the Indian revenue would be actual declining at this moment without an increase of territory which brings a corresponding increase of charges. Is it not clear that there must be something radically wrong, something completely rotten in such a state of things as this? The people are described by Mr. Campbell and others, as being full of industrial energy, and "well fitted to accumulate capital." Why then are they so wretchedly poor? What has become and does now become of their productive capital? For it is evidently stationary at an unnaturally low ebb, if it be not even diminishing. Aye! we must ask it sooner or later, and the longer we delay the greater becomes our own danger, what has become of the productive capital of India? I am sorry to say the question opens a dark page of English history, for it is impossible to investigate this subject

without recognising the effect of foreign mal-administration in draining away the capital of the natives of India. Independent of the illegitimate gains of the last century, of the enormous sums of money abstracted from the country in the good old times, when it was possible for a young Englishman to go out with nothing at all, and return at the age of thirty-four with a fortune of a million sterling (vide the histories of Clive, Paul Benfield, and scores of obscure "Nabobs"), independent of the savings of English officials, who monopolize the most lucrative employments in the State, and go home, of course, when they have realized a fortune—independent of the "resumptions" of landed estates and the gradual extinction of the Native Princes who spend their incomes in the country, to make room for more English officials, in other words, to provide more patronage for the Home Government, independent of all this, there is a regular drain in hard cash every year of about three millions sterling from India, for claims in England designated "the Home Charges."

Now, it has been said by the historian, Professor Wilson, that the transfer of surplus revenue to England is "an exhausting drain upon the resources of the "country, the issue of which is replaced by no reflux "it is an extraction of the life-blood from the veins of "national industry, which no subsequent introduction "of nourishment is furnished to restore;" and some such effects must result from the annual transfer of so large a proportion of the produce of Indian taxes to

England. To bring the case home to our own feelings, let us conceive ourselves to be subjugated and obliged to ship off annually, without one farthing of return, the same proportion of our taxes, which would be more than eight millions sterling, to some foreign country; to see besides, foreigners occupying all the valuable appointments in our public service, and going home with their fortunes, and our great landed estates in a course of gradual "resumption" by the Government; how would our productive capital stand such a drain and such a system as this? Should we not, at least, expect when we remitted our eight millions, to have a good administration in return for our money? We might be sure our foreign masters would keep the peace in the country for their own sakes, but should we not expect them to do something for ours? particularly if they prided themselves on being a very Christian people, much superior in morality to ourselves? Should we not expect then to have an equitable revenue system, and a salutary administration of justice, and above all, considering our heavy tribute, to have our means of production encouraged and assisted? or at the very least, that our foreign rulers would not crush us to the earth by throwing cruel and wanton obstructions in the way of our industry? Well, modest as these expectations may seem, they have all been disappointed by the Government of an English Bureaucracy in India!

I have shewn what sort of revenue and judicial systems have been vouchsafed to the natives, and

will now shew what has been done for their trade. But first, in order to appreciate the obstacles which have mocked the hopes of the natives and doomed their industry and skill and the natural blessings of their soil to the curse of unfruitfulness, it is necessary to understand clearly that trade is the instrument of production. This point is so important, that I must be excused for dwelling upon it a little.

The reason that trade, in other words, commerce, (*commutatio mercium*) or exchange, is the instrument of production, is this: exchange permits that *division of labour* which alone gives value to labour, by enabling different men to obtain articles of utility or luxury, which they perhaps could not produce at all, or could only produce with great difficulty and loss of time—in return for other things which, from their education or genius, or soil or climate, they can produce with ease. Until, therefore, commerce or exchange is introduced into a country, and as long as everybody is obliged to produce and manufacture everything he requires for his own consumption, men remain of necessity in a state of barbarism and extreme poverty, from which they can only emerge in proportion to the division of labour effected by their progress in commerce. And in the state of barbarism or non-exchange, men are inclined to be idle because they can get no reward for being industrious; but when commerce or exchange introduces the division of labour, and gives a value to labour, by offering men what they covet in exchange for their own productions,

then the idleness of the savage is gradually transformed into the industry of civilized man. It has, therefore, been laid down as an axiom that "facility of exchange is the vivifying principle, the very soul of industry."

But, when it is clearly understood that exchange or commerce is the instrument of production, it becomes evident that whatever in any country renders this instrument too expensive to be used, is so far mortal to that country's industry, and that in any country where goods cannot be brought to market without an enormous waste of time and money in carrying them hundreds of miles over "mere tracks," then, in the same degree that the want of roads in such a country deprives the people of the instrument of production, viz. commerce or exchange, to the same extent it must forbid progress; it must ensure poverty; it must stop industry, and prevent the division of labour; it must neutralize God's blessing on the soil, and tend to keep the inhabitants barbarians and paupers. In applying this conclusion to India, I must remind the reader that as trade is the instrument of production, every unnecessary obstacle to the trade of the natives, which the Government has either thrown in their way or else neglected to remove in fulfilment of its acknowledged duty, has been so much positive repression of their means of production, and so much destruction of their capital. Yet I undertake to prove that the Government has inflicted both these injuries on the people of India; it has at one time thrown the

most ruinous obstacles in the way of their trade, and at another time declined to remove obstacles when admitting that it was its duty to do so: nay, incredible as it may appear, it has even prevented others from doing so. And the consequence is, that at this day the trade of India is but a miserable fraction of what it ought to be, and the pauperized natives cannot afford to pay taxes enough to keep the finances in safety, to the danger and discredit of England. As an example of this, it is worth noticing that the total estimated receipts from the land and sea customs of India for 1850-51, are only one million nine hundred odd thousand pounds (including six hundred odd thousand pounds for salt which, since the reduction of duty, is fast underselling and superseding the Government manufacture, and annihilating the revenue from the salt monopoly.) Now, here is a great fact! the customs of a mighty empire, abounding in noble rivers and fine harbours; possessing thousands of miles of coast; and rich in natural products; in cotton, tobacco, coffee, tea, silk, sugar, sandal-wood, linseed, flax, rice, tallow, wool, nutmeg, cinnamon, pepper, indigo, and a vast number of grains and fruits; and containing a naturally intelligent and industrious population, larger than that of all Europe, once indeed containing hundreds of thousands of merchants, manufacturers, and country gentlemen in the interior of the country, whom we have ruined,—the total customs of such an Empire only yield £1,974,556! (And at the same time it is said that England is

paying twenty millions sterling a-year more than necessary for supplies which she could obtain at a cheaper rate from India). I know it is asserted in answer to the above "great fact," that no considerable increase in the customs revenue of India is possible, for the following reasons—that, the native is contented with a little rice for his food, and scanty clothing for his dress, and his *few wants* do not dispose him to profit by the advantages of commerce. I should not answer such drivelling as this, if I had not observed that no mystification is too gross to be imposed on unthinking people with regard to the natives of India; as, however, everything must be answered, I will remark—1stly, That if the native were so easily *contented,* he would be different from all the rest of the human race. 2ndly, That the assertion is contradicted by our experience; for whenever the natives in our employment, or in private occupations, gain more than the mass of the people, they immediately indulge in better food, better clothing, finery of all sorts, equipages, if they can, and vying with one another in ostentatious entertainments, which are rather astonishing in a people of *few wants;* in short, they go on like the rest of the world. 3rdly, I believe that the passions of vanity and sensuality are much more common to men, I say nothing about women, than the passion of avarice, which is always the vice of the smaller number, and the Indians might be reproached for extravagance on high feasts and holidays, but not for avarice. Perhaps I may as well give one example,

out of many, to shew that the *few wants* of the natives are all moonshine.

The scene of the following occurrence, cited by Mr. Chapman, was a district inhabited by the most uncivilized tribe in India. Mr. Fenwick says :—"Our "speculations in the country threw in a circulation of "about one lac of rupees (£10,000) yearly; the effect "of this on the condition, appearance, and comfort of "the Ghonds was remarkable within the first year, "and continued to improve. Those who were seen "with a piece of cloth scarce covering their nakedness, "were hardly to be recognized with decent 'dhatus,' "good 'dooputas,' &c. Some even carried this so far "as to rival the gayest of the civilized who came there "with us. The Zemindars and others were glad to buy, "when they could afford it, chintz handkerchiefs, or a "piece of red broad-cloth. Penknives, pocket-knives, "and scissors, became much in demand. The men led "the way, but the women soon began to fancy a "'sarree' and a 'chowlee' would not display their "charms to less advantage."

From this it appears that among uncivilized people men are vainer than women (how civilization alters us!) and that the natives are ready enough to profit when they can by the advantages of commerce. In fact, India has been famous for her commerce all through history, till the reign of a Bureaucracy, and the traces of former wealth, and even luxury, are visible all over the country. After all, this is an old story that the commerce of India is not susceptible of in-

crease. When it was proposed to throw open the monopoly of the Indian trade in 1813, the organs of the Bureaucracy vehemently asserted, among other pleasant things, to wit, that the destruction of the monopoly would "subvert our Indian Empire," "sacrifice the happiness of the natives," and "imminently endanger the British Constitution!" Besides these cheerful views, they insisted upon it that the experience of two centuries had proved that the Indian trade *could not increase.* Well, the export of the Company was then about one million sterling, and Parliament faced the above terrors so far as to allow private traders to compete with the Company.

In 1832, the export had risen to nearly four millions, and the Company's share of it had dwindled to £149,193! On this Parliament took another step in advance, and suspended the Company's right to trade, when, without visibly "endangering the British Constitution," the export rose rapidly to six millions and a half, about which average it has stopped for the last ten years, shewing that a new limit has been reached, where we are again told that the Indian trade *cannot increase.*

However, having gone so far, I may as well mention what the new limit is, and after explaining it, I shall, although very nervous at the idea of "imminently endangering the British Constitution," I shall venture to propose the removal of an obstacle which prevents the expansion of Indian trade to about eight times its present amount. Mr. Chapman has shewn

it to be a general statistical law that the consumption of our manufactures by the various civilized countries of the world, is in the proportion of our facilities of communication with the localities where those manufactures are consumed. Thus the consumption of our cotton manufactures by the British West Indies is of the value of about 14*s* per head of the population per annum; by Chili 9*s* 3*d*; by Brazil 6*s* 5*d*; by Cuba 6*s* 2*d*; by Peru 5*s* 7*d*; by Central America 10*d*; by India about 9*d*; and by Mexico, a country as roadless as India, and not possessing natural advantages corresponding to the navigable rivers of Bengal, by Mexico 8*d* per head per annum. Moreover, Mr. Chapman has shewn that even of this small average for India, the natives supplied through Bombay only take one-half, because they want the means of communication, which, to some extent, nature has afforded to Bengal and Agra by their rivers.

The unavoidable inference from the above is that our Indian trade is at present limited to the coasts and shores of one or two rivers, in that great Empire, and that we can hardly be said to have a trade with the interior, owing to want of means of transit and of tolerable communications, all over India, and in every one of the Presidencies, not excepting Bengal and Agra, as I will shew by and by. This, then, the want of roads, the want of *cheap carriage*, this is the new limit to the trade of India—this is the only reason why it *cannot increase*, and why a people described by Mr. Campbell as industrious and intelligent, and whose

"native capitalists eagerly embark in all kinds of enterprises," and why they are "contented with a little rice for their food," &c. &c. &c.; because it is at present physically impossible for them to avail themselves of commerce for want of means of transit.

I may as well notice here the obligations of the Government with respect to public works in India. I have already observed that common humanity should induce us to encourage and assist the means of production among a people from whom we drain so large a proportion of their capital, and I have shewn how the want of roads in any country tends to keep its inhabitants barbarians and paupers.

I must now remark that in India, where not only the princes but the native aristocracy, who used from religious motives to be most liberal in executing public works, are fast disappearing under the influence of our dominion, in India as in China, it has been the immemorial usage for the State to construct many indispensable public works for the people. In India it is recognized as an historical fact that part of the revenue is received by the Government as trustee for the people, to be disbursed in public works; and not only was this duty inculcated in the institutes of Tamerlane, and discharged by all good Mogul and Hindoo Sovereigns, so that the country is covered with the ruins of works executed by them, but its obligation to fulfil this duty has all along been admitted by the British Government in theory, though not reduced to practice. Nevertheless, one of the

witnesses who most distinctly admitted this obligation before the Committee of 1848, offered some excuses for the neglect of public works by the Government, and I must now shew what they are worth. Mr. Mangles stated, that the means of constructing roads, &c. could not be raised as in England by local taxation; and added on the prompting of Sir James Hogg, that "with reference to the indisposition of the natives to "anything that is new, tolls could not well be levied "on roads and canals as a means of reimbursement." Well, supposing they could not, the Government has always been repaid indirectly for any such work, by the "magical effect," as Mr. Williamson Ramsay called it, of a new road in creating wealth in India. I will give one of the instances cited to the above Committee by General Briggs, of the effect of opening a new ghaut on the Comptah road: "incomplete as "the road was, the traffic of the port of Comptah "during three years had increased from £160,000 to "£400,000, and the customs had also increased from "£4,662 to £18,015, within the same period." But why could not tolls be levied? Mr. Mangles said, "the Indian strenuously resists any effort at new "taxation;" and cited the resistance of Bareilly to a police tax to prove the fact. Now Mr. Mangles ought to have known that the sedition of Bareilly was caused by the brutal tyranny of a low overbearing native, who was placed at the head of the police by the British authorities, and empowered to introduce a law which should supersede the old self-government of the city;

although this ruffian had notoriously been guilty of many acts of oppression and extortion, and was at that very time a public defaulter himself who for four years had set the collector at defiance. And when Mr. Mangles said that similar measures of the Government were "always resisted à l'outrance," he ought to have known that the very same measure which was resisted at Bareilly was adopted without the slightest resistance in Bengal (as in other places), because there the Government conformed to the custom of the country, and introduced the measure through the agency of the natural chiefs and representatives of the people; and it is worth remarking that the effect of this Government measure of substituting its own police for the old local and municipal police, has been the almost utter privation of protection and safety to person, property, or honour, throughout Bengal. It is not the case therefore that Government cannot impose new taxes if it introduces them according to the custom of the country, and allows the people to feel that their representatives have been consulted previously; the only real difficulty is to conceive any tax that would be new in India! for everything has been taxed already, down to shops and implements, down to such things as fishermen's nets, workmen's tools, and barber's utensils! and this odious tax is still levied in Madras. It is no doubt true that public works cannot now be constructed by local taxation in most parts of India, because the Government has drained the people of their capital by its vicious revenue system, and

deprived them of the power of voluntary effort for a while. But if public works were constructed they could be maintained by local taxation; which is now doing and has done a good deal in India. For instance, the Indian press has for some time past noticed the fact of large towns such as Kurrachee, Surat, Mussoorie, Shahjehanpore, several others under the Agra Government, and Lahore, Broach, Belgaum, Poonah, &c., coming forward one after another to avail themselves of enactments permitting them to levy local rates for sanitary and municipal purposes. Again, when Lieut.-General Briggs was administering the province of Candeish, he actually began making roads at a time when the ryots were better off by purely voluntary local contributions; and I have known the same thing done elsewhere. Another gentleman who had succeeded his father as a landowner in India, told the Committee in 1848, with reference to the co-operation of the natives in making roads, "you can do any-"thing with them if you only reason with them and "shew them you mean it for their benefit, and not for "a fresh subject of taxation." He added that local taxation might be resorted to for the maintenance of roads and bridges, and instanced a case where he had made a road and established a ferry, assigning the toll of the ferry to the maintenance of the road; but subsequently the Government had doubled the toll on the ferry, and refused to give anything for the repairs of the road: and he said that in his experience a very large fund raised from the tolls on ferries in Malabar,

was appropriated as surplus revenue (contrary to an express law), and not applied to the making or repairing of roads. The same complaint is made to this day in Madras, and I find a similar statement in the *Friend of India*, for 1852, to the effect that the tolls on the rivers in Bengal, which are, it says, "a heavy burthen on the commerce of the country," and are levied nominally to facilitate the navigation of the rivers, are really assigned to the credit of the State, and form a *bonâ fide* item of the public revenue. With regard to the natural disposition of the natives to contribute to public works, it is worth noticing that the Indian journals in the different Presidencies regularly publish an annual list of the public works constructed by private individuals among the natives; and one opulent Parsee merchant of Bombay has actually spent in this way, on roads, bridges, tanks, wells, caravanserais, schools, hospitals, religious edifices, &c., the enormous sum of £130,000 sterling. On a former occasion, March, 1850, in noticing the fact that the anxiety of a rich native to build some public work was often frustrated by the want of a small addition to the sum he could devote to it, and in vainly recommending the Government to encourage this spirit by making up the deficiency, *The Friend* quotes the following passage from Colonel Sleeman: "The respectable merchants lay out their accumulated "wealth in the formation of those works which shall "secure for them from generation to generation, the "blessing of the people of the towns in which they "have resided and those of the country around."

But to return to Mr. Mangles, I have shewn that this gentleman was under a mistake when he stated that the natives "resist à l'outrance" every attempt to impose a new tax; but when he added that "owing to their "indisposition to anything that is new, tolls cannot "well be levied," he made a very considerable mistake indeed for an old Secretary of the Board of Revenue and an East India Director. In the first place tolls on the roads, under the name of transit duties, but real *bonâ fide* tolls, have existed from time immemorial in India, and we have always levied such tolls. In the second place, tolls on the ferries were established by the Ferry Act of 1819, which provided that the surplus profits, after paying the expenses of the ferry, should be applied to the making and repairing of roads, bridges, &c. &c., and I have shewn how the Government violates this law. In the third place, tolls on the public roads, passed by local Acts, have been in operation in the Bombay Presidency for more than a quarter of a century, and the following result of experience will shew whether tolls cannot be looked to as a means of reimbursement. The Government have made in all Western India but one bit of bridged and macadamized road into the interior, 72 miles long, and this is a road made for purely military objects, and leading not to any great mart for commerce, but to the garrison town at Poonah. Nevertheless, one toll on this road which yielded in the first year £400, now yields regularly about £4000 per annum, and on the strength of such a receipt a Company was formed at Bombay for the

purpose of making roads in the interior as a private speculation, if the Government would allow them to levy tolls, whose amount it was to fix itself; which offer, with the characteristic jealousy of a bureaucratic despotism, the Government refused! But the most unaccountable mistake of Mr. Mangles was in asserting that our transit duties were such duties as had always existed in Native States. This renders it necessary for me to re-establish the facts of the case, not merely to prove that the Native transit duties were simply tolls, but to shew that the Government has done all it could to destroy the trade of India, and we are bound to make the natives all the reparation we can for such injuries. The only authority I will refer to is Mr. Trevelyan's Report, mentioned in terms of praise by Mr. Mangles. This report says, that as the transit duties came to us, they were merely tolls on quantities, paid by instalments, according to the distance travelled, just like English turnpike tolls; so light that no one thought of evading them, and requiring no forms or permits, so that every one could come up to the toll-bar without fear; and though different kinds of articles might sometimes be charged at different rates, the utmost the turnpike-man could do was to ask a slight additional toll, and on its payment let them proceed, without search or detention under any circumstances. The Report thus describes what the Government made of these duties; after having in its own phrase "consolidated" them, that is, taken for their standard the

whole amount of tolls levied on goods going the greatest distance (so that a Kensington gardener bringing a few potatoes to London, would have to pay as much as if he took them from Land's End to Edinburgh) Government enacted that the toll was not to be levied at the toll-bar, but only at the Custom-houses. At these Custom-houses, which were comparatively few in number, and frequently a hundred miles off, the tolls were to be paid and permits granted for the transport of goods, when the Collector was at home to sign them; though as this functionary was often away on what he considered much more important business, and the clerks required feeing to hurry them, and there were legions of applicants, permits were not always to be had under several days—(so that the Kensington gardener would have to go and wait a few days at Birmingham for a permit to bring his potatoes to London).—"That such should be the "state of our Customs regulations," says Mr. Trevelyan, "is a remarkable historical fact which "will not easily be credited by the next generation." After the permits were granted, at the rate of 10 per cent for metals, and 5 to 10 per cent for other articles, with 5 per cent extra for what were supposed to be the principal towns, and 15 per cent *more on Indian than English* piece goods, and 10 per cent *more on Indian than English* metals; after the permits were granted, and the goods reached their destination, nothing more was required than to send

to the nearest Custom-house and take out "divided permits" for their distribution. "This," says Mr. Trevelyan, "is a fact worthy of being recorded for the "information of posterity. If we were to encourage "swamps, or accumulate mountains between the dif- "ferent districts of our country, we could not paralyse "their industry so effectually as we are doing by this "scheme of finance." However, when once the permits were obtained, the goods were as free as air, and the men at the toll-bars, happily named "Chokeys," had nothing more to do with them than simply to ascertain their exact identity, that they were neither more, nor less, nor other, nor superior in value to, nor packed in a different way from, the goods specified in the permits; to search them if they had a doubt on one of these points; to confiscate them if they could prove any difference; but if they merely thought so, "which they can always do," says the Report, only to detain them till they could or would write to the collector perhaps a hundred miles off, in a roadless country, and get instructions on the subject. "If," says Mr. Trevelyan, "it were desired to depress the productive power "of Indian industry to the greatest possible extent, "could any scheme be devised for the purpose more "effectual than this? Although we have now ocular "demonstration of its existence, yet when it has once "been abolished, the world will find it difficult to believe "that such a system could have been tolerated by us "*for the better part of a century.*" Remember that, reader, *for the better part of a century!*

But as these men at the Chokeys evidently had the power to choke the whole trade of the country, what sort of men did the Government provide for the purpose? Wonderful to relate! although they had in fact no salary, for their pay, less than that of many workmen, was entirely swallowed up by the necessary expenses of their office in stationery, &c.; although there never was a service, says the Report, in such a state of utter degradation; although these functionaries were universally hated and despised, they could not accept their places without forfeiting all pretensions to character, and their name was synonymous with that of rogue; yet their post commanded a high saleable price, and a place in the Customs was looked upon as a certain fortune. Forced, according to the Report, to get their living by extortion, their brutal tyranny and insults to women were almost certain of impunity; the merchant would not complain, for he dreaded nothing so much as their simply doing their duty, and acting up to the letter of the law, by which they could at any time stop the trade of the country; and the Native travellers and pilgrims, though loud enough in private complaint, could not afford the time and money necessary to go back to the spot and identify and prosecute a culprit. The consequence was that the trade, the very existence of the people, could only be maintained by an universal system of fraud and smuggling; the rich were obliged to carry on their business in collusion with the chokeymen; the poor were their daily victims; and thus, by the agency

of these scoundrels, supported by the range of patrols, did the Government "convert the whole surface of the country into one chokey," and a monstrous system of universal excise subjected the industrious part of the community to the most cruel penalties.

"The truly barbarous and destructive state of things "above described," says Mr. Trevelyan, "had no "existence under the Native system;" and he reiterates that "it will appear almost incredible in another "age that a system which belongs only to times of "barbarism should have been deliberately established "and obstinately persevered in by us." And while the Reporter insists again and again on the "utterly barbarous" and trade-destroying effects of this system, he is quite as much shocked by its "pernicious effect on the national morals." He says, "this system may be said to be productive of universal crime,"—"it is a great moral pest,"—and he explains how it corrupts the whole body of the people. Here I cannot help exclaiming, shall we for ever be content to listen to "the annual concert of praises, sung from year to year, upon the Indian Government, and the increasing happiness of the Indian people, when they are all the while sinking into deeper poverty and wretchedness?" shall we for ever be satisfied with the solemn plausibilities of *public* despatches and Haileybury addresses, when it invariably turns out afterwards that the natives have been cruelly oppressed? Will the English heart never beat for India, a country that has con-

tributed so largely to our wealth and greatness, and to which a generous people owe so much protection, and kindness, and justice?

To resume: Mr. Mangles took credit to the Government for having abolished the transit duties, "in consequence of Mr. Trevelyan's Report." I find as usual that Mr. Mangles was under a mistake. In the first place, unless such a true friend of the natives as Lord William Bentinck, backed by a high reputation, and a strong political connexion at home, had ventured to call for this Report, the transit duties might have gone on to this day. In the second place, it was not the Report but the public scandal, and the weekly reprobation by the Indian journals of this "curse of the country;" it was, as the *Friend of India* has said, the constant and reiterated remonstrances of the press which at length forced the reluctant Government to repeal these duties. The reader may judge by the dates: the Report was dated January 1st, 1834, and these duties were not abolished for two years afterwards in Bengal, four years afterwards in Bombay, and ten years afterwards in Madras, where there was actually greater oppression than I have described, ten years after such a Report as Mr. Trevelyan's! Moreover, judging from the habitual insensibility of the Bureaucracy to the welfare of the natives, shewn by protracted over-assessments and other things, I believe it was not merely the public scandal in the press which caused the abolition of the transit duties, but the

argument of their assailants, that, owing to the efforts of trade to escape from such trammels, and the multiplication of chokeymen to prevent it, and its destruction of other sources of revenue, the system was ending by entailing a loss of money on the Government. And now is it not shocking to feel the proved impossibility of getting any such grievance as this redressed by Parliament? This is proved by experience to be the present state of the case. The only chance of the natives to get any bad system altered is that the Bureaucracy may themselves think at length that they are losing money by it; but it always requires years to get any change made in the strongest cases: and mean while, until after the change, the public in this country are kept entirely in the dark as to the existence of the grievance, and mystified as usual; and it is hopeless to complain to the House of Commons. In that House, any accusation against the Indian Government, though backed by as much presumptive evidence as is required for any grand jury presentment, is sure to be voted a bore and treated as a calumny. It is sufficient for one or two official men to get up and cite every occasion on which the Government has done right, omitting to mention the long previous pressure from without which forced it to leave off doing wrong; then to admit that there may be some trifles in which the Indian administration is not quite perfect yet, though with regard to the particular grievance complained of, "all the stories "about that are without foundation;" and, with re-

gard to the other trifles, really Government is going ahead as fast as it can, and doing everything to make everybody happy and comfortable; and on this sort of routine explanation, the few Members who are left, just enough to make a House, these few decide that the official is right and the complainant is wrong, and get rid of the subject with a precipitation which shews that India is the bugbear of Members of Parliament.

I appeal to the debate of June, 1850, for proof of what I say: considering the excessive and all but insuperable difficulty of finding out anything about maladministration in India, considering that no information can be procured except from such unwilling witnesses as the servants and dependents of Government itself, it was evident, on the occasion I refer to, that where so much was proved, in spite of every difficulty, the accusation could be fully proved if a fair trial were allowed, and yet the House at once refused a fair trial. And what is the consequence? That as the Bureaucracy feel that no amount of injury to the natives, and no degree of danger to the interests of England will induce Parliament to interfere, "it takes "years of private reports, and then years of public "notoriety and scandal, to get any grievance re-"dressed in India." Such has been the case in instances of the most cruel over-assessment, of the non-employment of the natives, of the judicial system, the transit duties, and various other things, and so it promises to be in the case of public works.

I will pause here to mark the progress of my argument. I began by shewing why the natives might expect to have their means of production encouraged and assisted by their foreign rulers, and why, exchange being the instrument of production, they might expect that our Government would do everything to help their trade, and nothing to repress their industry, and prevent the accumulation of their capital when it had to support the annual drain to England. Nevertheless, I undertook to shew that because the Government had thrown some obstacles in the way of their trade, and not done its duty in removing others, the capital of India had been lost, its commerce wasted away, its finances involved, and its people broken in spirit and in fortunes. I have therefore shewn, first, what the Government has done to destroy the commerce of India by transit duties, "deliberately established and obsti-" nately persevered in, for the better part of a century," and only recently and reluctantly abolished; and I will now shew what injuries the Government has inflicted by not making roads, &c.

It may be as well to begin by giving an example, as the illustration, not the measure, of this injury in the history of a particular branch of commerce, because the reader will then understand better what an oppression this bureaucratic Government is to the producers of India, and because there is no question in which it is more necessary to expose the mystifications of the Home authorities than the one of Indian cotton. I will notice in passing the magnitude of our national interest in this

question. Our cotton manufacture now employs one-eighth of the population of the United Kingdom, and contributes one-fourth of the whole national revenue, or more than twelve millions sterling per annum. And such a manufacture is now dangerously limited to one foreign source of supply, and exposed under immense and increasing competition, to the risk of a short crop in the one country of supply, from which cause a loss of eleven millions sterling was suffered by our manufacturers in 1850, besides the curtailing of employment and falling off of consumption on such occasions. Moreover, the monopoly of supply by America not only raises the price, but, from the possibility of war, slave emancipation, &c. exposes us to the risk of a cotton famine in some unlucky year; and, after what I have stated above, the reader may imagine the awful, the possibly fatal, effects of such a catastrophe in England,—and all this while India might, though she could not do it at a moment's notice, send us plenty of cotton, and is only prevented from doing so by mal-administration. Now to put a stop to the trick of doubling back from one exploded argument to another, by which the organs of the Bureaucracy have made the debate endless, I will here recapitulate and answer categorically the different excuses made by the Government advocates for the scanty supply of Indian cotton; at the same time I will cite good authorities to shew what a supply of cotton India might send to this country, and to shew that the sole cause of her not doing so is the neglect of its acknowledged duties by the Government.

The latest excuse turns on freight. It is said that the reason why Indian cotton cannot compete with American, is the greater distance and excess of freight from India. An eminent politician told me, on official authority, that "the fact was, freight had more to do "with the question than anything else; and the reduc- "tion of a halfpenny a pound or so in the freight "would make all the difference." Now admitting, for the sake of argument, that a halfpenny a pound would make all the difference, I should like to know, considering that the freight from India is always less, and often much less than a halfpenny a pound, whether our men-of-war are to be employed in importing the cotton, or what other means we have of reducing the cost of freight to less than nothing? Besides, when politicians believe that the reduction of a halfpenny a pound would make all the difference, what do they think of the fact that the Bombay Cotton Committee, composed of Government officers as well as merchants, estimated the loss arising from the present defective mode of inland transit, caused by the want of roads and bridges, as an addition to the cost of Indian cotton of a penny a pound? Do they not think that if the reduction of a halfpenny a pound *in freight* would make all the difference, the reduction of a penny a pound *in carriage* would have pretty nearly as good an effect? Not that I dislike the idea of reducing the cost of freight to less than nothing, but I cannot recommend it till I know how it can be done; meanwhile, as I do know how the cost of carriage can

be enormously reduced, I confine myself to recommending the construction of roads, bridges, canals, quays, &c. &c.

I have one final difficulty about making a difference of a halfpenny a pound in freight between India and America. There lies before me a report from a large importing house, dated Sept. 27th, 1852, on the average rates of freight on cotton for the preceding twelve months, from India and America, and these rates are as follows:—

Bombay—$\frac{1}{32}$nds of a penny per lb.

New Orleans—$\frac{13}{32}$nds of a penny per lb.

I now come to the excuse of "residence." The Government organs have repeatedly asserted that it was the fault of the merchants themselves that the trade in Indian cotton did not progress satisfactorily, because they would not establish resident agents in the cotton districts. In a book published last year on "the Culture of Cotton in India," by a Leadenhall-street authority, this step of establishing residents is more than ever recommended as being the *sine quâ non* of success in the Indian cotton trade. Now, I might answer that it is "the nuisance of our civil courts, and "the revenue system we have established," and the difficulty of making out a title in the present defective state of our laws, which, according to the *Friend of India* for July 29, 1852, most effectually prevent any European from embarking his capital in land. However, let us see what the merchants have said themselves, when thus charged, in fact, with incapacity or

ill-will by the Government for not establishing residents. Their answer has been, that they have tried it on several occasions, and found it did not pay. This ought to be conclusive, for it narrows the debate to a matter of fact, and one would think that to such a fact there could be no reply. Nevertheless, the Government does attempt to answer and disprove this fact, by entering the market itself as a purchaser, and making speculations in cotton, which are proclaimed with great triumph in the book above-mentioned, to persuade the public of this country that it would pay to establish residents, and not only pay, but yield a profit of something like 50 per cent. Now, it may seem very good-natured of the Government to go out of its way and engage in commercial transactions, on purpose to teach the Bombay merchants their business; the more good-natured, because by so doing the Government violates a stringent provision of the law, and incurs a penalty which would be very serious, if it were not understood that its responsibility to Parliament is only a fiction of the law: for the law prohibits any commercial transactions by the Company's Government, on the penalty of forfeiting the charter. However, the good-nature of a Bureaucracy is not a thing to trust to; and there is something which Lord Bacon calls "the turning of the cat in the pan" at the bottom of it, which I must now explain. The reader, then, who admires the pains taken by the Government to teach the Bombay merchants the necessity of establishing residents in the cotton districts, the innocent reader will be surprised

to hear that this necessity was first proclaimed by the merchants themselves, and urged by them in a letter from the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to the Government eleven years ago, which not only explained the importance of this step to the success of the cotton trade, pointing out the great benefits which had resulted from the residence of Europeans in the interior of Ceylon, but clearly described those obstacles to its adoption which it was in the power of Government to remove, which it was its duty to remove, and which nevertheless remain in full force to this day. One of these obstacles was that want of roads, &c., which I shall presently notice. Another arose from Government regulations, framed apparently on purpose to prevent the residence of Europeans in the interior, on the pretence of controlling them. For although it is supposed in England that Europeans may now freely settle everywhere in the interior of India, nothing can be more contrary to the fact; but the real state of the case, as it remains to this day, is explained in the above letter, from which it appears that Europeans can only settle in the cotton districts by permission of the Government, on a short lease, and under the liability of *being any day turned out of the country at once by a Government officer, and having their property confiscated, without any judicial appeal being allowed!* It is on such security as this that men of business are recommended to invest their capital in expensive establishments, which would require the certainty of a long term of possession to offer the prospect of paying.

From the date, then, of this letter, for eleven years at least, the Government has been aware of insurmountable obstacles to the residence of Europeans in the cotton-districts, which it might, at any time, but will not, remove. The Government is also aware that it conveys no real information about the profits or loss of agency, by the assertion that its functionaries, already in the districts, maintained there at charges and risks which are an "unknown quantity," and possessing an influence and other advantages which no mercantile agent could ever enjoy—that these functionaries occasionally make successful speculations in a few hundred bales of cotton. Why, then, does the Government go on boasting of speculations which prove nothing, and inculcating the advantage of establishing residents, as if there were no difficulty in the matter, except that of teaching the merchants their own interest? For this reason—such language is not meant for the merchants who thoroughly despise its hypocrisy, but it is meant for the public of this country; yes, the people of England must be systematically deceived and "mystified," as usual, in order that, instead of seeing in the want of European residents in the interior, another proof of bureaucratic mal-administration, they may actually pity the Government which prevents such residence, for its want of support by the merchants, and blame the merchants who have fruitlessly attempted residence under the existing obstacles, for their incapacity or ill-will—such are the artifices required to defend a bad cause!

A new attempt is now being made by Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart to establish a resident in Candeish, towards the Berar valley, where Mr. Fenwick failed a few years before, for want of means of transport. It remains to be seen whether this attempt will be persevered in as long as Mr. Fenwick's was; meanwhile the successive market reports of Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart will shew the gradual results of their experience.

The first dated July, 1851, asserts that, "*progress* (they print the word in italics), "*progress* is wholly "out of the question until we have improved means of "transport from the interior." The second, dated December, 1851, says, "We have repeatedly before "remarked upon the want of good roads as being the "fatal bar to any material increase of trade in other "parts of the Bombay Presidency (*other* applies to "Scinde), and nowhere else in the world, probably, "would this want of means of transit, to, from, and "within regions of great natural resources be tolerated. "We have but one made road worthy of the name, "that through Candeish to Agra, and even it is in some "parts almost impassable for laden carts, yet from this "road branch off those bullock tracks by which the "bulk of the produce of the fertile valley of Berar finds "its way to Bombay, and our own province of "Candeish yields a gross revenue of nearly a quarter "million sterling, of which so small a pittance is "allowed for outlay on roads, that it has been insuf- "ficient even to keep in repair those fair-weather tracks "which have from time to time been made."

The last report, dated June 25, 1852, says, "Another season has elapsed without anything whatever "having been attempted towards the improvement of "our means of communication with the interior. No "previous season has shewn more palpably how seriously the want of roads impedes the trade of the "country. Berar, for instance, has produced this year "the finest cotton crop we have seen for many years, if "ever; the quality of much of it is superior to the best "Broach, and the cultivation of such cotton can be "almost indefinitely increased in that province; but to "what purpose, so long as it cannot be conveyed to "the coast where alone it can be converted into money. "A large portion of the crop is still in the districts, "and will not reach Bombay until November, and, "therefore, much of it, in fact, will not be dispatched "until the following crop is being picked, owing "to the difficulties of transport over the wretched "bullock-tracks, which alone are available for two-"thirds to three-fourths of the journey to Bombay. "Even the high-road, which serves for the remainder "of the distance, is in many parts in a disgraceful state, "and in a very interesting report by Captain Wingate, "Revenue Survey Commissioner, just printed by the "Government, that officer describes it as the frightful "and thoroughly execrable road from the Thul Ghaut "through the Concan."

I now pass from the excuse of residence, to that of assessment. The Government organs say, firstly, That over-assessment can no more prevent the cultivation of

cotton than that of grain—the ryot will naturally grow what pays him best. Yes, but we know practically that wherever cultivators are reduced to the verge of pauperism, they always prefer to grow the most prolific vegetable food; potatoes in Ireland; rice in China; coarse grain in India; and the injury done by over-assessment has been to prevent the improvement of cultivation in the whole course and series of production; not in cotton alone, but in every crop requiring labour and capital.

Secondly, It is said that Government is revising the assessment. Aye, did anybody ever hear of an abuse in India without hearing this sort of excuse for it? They come down from Charter to Charter, the old abuses, ryotwar, judicial, zemindary, public works, &c. &c., and yet Government is always doing something to reform them. The "intelligent clerks" in Cannon-row and Leadenhall-street, continue to be in the act of reforming a notorious abuse, and yet the natives continue to be its victims from one generation to another—such is the rule of a Bureaucracy! It appears now by the following extract from the market report last quoted, that this revision of the assessment is not even commenced this summer in the largest, richest, and most productive portion of the Bombay Presidency, and Mr. Campbell does not scruple to insinuate, p. 374, that the delay is intentional, and arises from the desire to keep the revenue screwed up to its present amount. Here are the words of Messrs. Ritchie and Stuart's circular: "This Report of Captain

"Wingate, to which we allude, has reference to a "contemplated survey and re-assessment of the Pro- "vince of Candeish, which is contiguous to Berar. "The vast importance of this measure will be judged "of from the following statistics which we extract "from the Report, and which will probably not be "deemed out of place here, nor fail to be of interest, "as shewing how truly our trade with the interior "may be said to be yet in its infancy. The whole "province of Candeish contains 12,078 square miles, "of which it is intimated that the arable portion is "9772. Of this *arable* area 1413 square miles are "cultivated, and 8359 are lying waste. The popula- "tion of the whole province was 785,991, according "to a census taken in 1851. The number of villages "in the whole province is 3837, of which 1079 are "now uninhabited. The soil of Candeish is stated to "be superior in fertility to, and yields heavier crops "than that of the Deccan and southern Mahratta "country. Although so much of the country now lies "in waste, the traces of a former industry are to be "seen in the mango and tamarind trees, and the many "ruined wells which are still to be met with in the "neighbourhood of almost every village. Of the five- "sixths of the arable land, the five millions of square "acres now lying waste, Captain Wingate farther re- "marks, nearly the whole is comparatively fertile, and "suitable to the growth of exportable products, such "as cotton, oil-seeds," &c.

I have two more points to notice before I quit this

subject of assessment. In the ryotwar districts it is usual for the native money-lenders to make advances to the pauperized ryots (at usurious rates which no European could ask), and the necessity of the ryots is thus asserted by the Report of the Cotton Committee of 1848. "They are indebted to the money-lender or "banker of the village, for the means wherewith to "procure the seed, and to carry on even the most im-"perfect cultivation. They give him security for these "loans on the growing crops, which at maturity "they frequently dispose of to him, at prices re-"gulated rather by his will, than by the standard "of an open market. It is asserted that the rate of "interest paid by these unfortunate ryots is often forty "or fifty per cent." Besides these loans, it is customary for the Government to advance a part of the expense of cultivation, and whenever it makes such an advance, it secures repayment, not by exacting an exorbitant interest, but by a summary process of recovery, which works well in practice, and insures it against any serious loss. Under these circumstances, the merchants who wish to promote the cotton cultivation, and can only do so by making advances to the cultivators, have asked the Government to give them the benefit of the summary process as being the only legitimate means, according to its own experience, of avoiding heavy losses; and the Government, which professes such a desire to see residents in the cotton districts, the Government has refused their request.

Again, not only have the poor cultivators had to

suffer from over-assessment, never revised in any district until the population were reduced to pauperism, but up to within a few months they have suffered from the oppressive mode of collecting the land-tax. They were obliged to deposit the cotton-seed when picked, in damp pits, from six to ten feet deep, where it remained without protection, exposed to the night-dews, dust, &c., until the revenue was settled, and then it was taken out of the pit so much deteriorated in colour, strength, and cleanliness, that no process could repair the mischief. This pernicious practice, as the merchants called it, has been persisted in by a Government professing anxiety to promote the Indian cotton-trade, until the very eve of the Charter discussions, shewing that the fear of Parliamentary responsibility is the only motive which can force the Government to do its duty.

The last excuse I have to notice is that Government is now, and has long been, conducting experiments with a view to improve and extend the cotton cultivation of India. On this I must observe that, one experiment the Government has not tried, viz. the one which produced the desired effect in America. For Mr. Chapman has shewn that only thirty years ago American cotton was as dirty and deficient in staple as Indian cotton is now, and that it was the ordinary inducements of free commercial interchange, which stimulated the American cultivator into increasing the supply, and improving the quality of his cotton, to what we see it now; because no Government de-

stroyed his capital by claiming the rent of land, and ruined his commerce by "transit duties." If, therefore, while the Bureaucracy was depriving the ryot of any interest in extending and improving cultivation by rack-renting him, and leaving him roadless, without the means of freely exchanging his produce with foreigners, if at this very time it had really expected to effect supernaturally by "the exotic attempts of a few Government officers," that development of the cotton trade which was effected naturally in a rival country, by the stimulus of free interchange acting on self-interest, then the very insanity of such an expectation would save it from a serious answer. However, it is not the folly but the hypocrisy of the above excuse, which I have to expose, and my answer to it will be very short.

The author of the book on "the culture of cotton in India," although he gives us hundreds of pages about these Government experiments, admits that they "have "never had any permanent effect in improving the "cotton from India." He also admits that the trade in Indian cotton is a "question of price;" that it is capable of indefinite extension; and that its great evils arise from its not being a regular trade, but a small irregular demand upon the China and home markets for dirty cotton. These facts are admitted by the Government apologist himself; well then, because the Government continues to use means, its experiments, which are certain not to produce the desired effect, and refuses to use means, making roads, bridges,

ports, and piers, which in *a question of price* are certain to produce the desired effect, therefore I say the Government is doing nothing really to promote the cotton trade, but is continuing its experiments, with the usual object of mystifying the public of this country, to divert attention from the mischief it has done to the cotton trade of India by leaving the ryots without the means of that commerce or exchange which is the instrument of production. And while the necessity of giving the cultivators means of transport has been urged on the Government for the last thirty years without effect, it is worth noticing, with particular reference to the cotton trade, some of the representations made by various parties during the present Charter, and first by the Asiatic Society.

One of the original objects of the Asiatic Society was to discover and develope the vegetable, mineral, and other resources of India; and the Society's "Agricultural Committee" had the advantage at starting of possessing a very active secretary, intent on progress, who procured sundry excellent papers for his Committee, describing the valuable products of the soil and the difficulty of turning them to account for want of roads. At this time, 1837, the Committee published Mr. Ashburner's letter on the carriage of cotton on bullock's backs from Berar: a paper which for powers of graphic description has never been surpassed, and has inspired all succeeding writers and speakers on the subject. At the same period the Committee proclaimed that if the Government would

only make roads, it might expect to see the export of cotton alone, to say nothing of other articles of commerce; swelling at the rate of 100,000 bales per annum, and probably soon amounting to a million of bales, while the effect on the salt trade was certain to be equally great. Unfortunately, this Agricultural Committee, which was beginning to know so much, and what was a still greater offence, to tell the public so much about India, alarmed the jealousy of a bureaucratic Despotism, which determined to silence it at any price. The first thing was to find or make a good place for the secretary, and stop his mouth; and accordingly this votary of progress one morning took his colleagues by surprise (of whom one or two never spoke to him afterwards), by announcing his promotion to a government appointment.

After this blow the Agricultural Committee withered away under the frowns of Government, and the Asiatic Society found it expedient to confine itself to the most harmless antiquarian researches for the future. It is hardly necessary to add that as Government did not make the roads, the export of cotton did not swell at the rate of 100,000 bales per annum, as the Committee had anticipated; but, instead of this, the average export to England and China of the last seven years, as compared with that of the preceding seven years, has only increased 25,620 bales, and the average export from Berar has positively diminished. This result is indeed grievous: this single fact is enough to shew the consequences of neglecting public

works in India. But I cannot help being rather amused to see the quondam secretary of the Agricultural Committee, now translated into the honourable Botanist of the Hon. Company, publish a book on the eve of the Charter discussions, to inform us that "roads *however bad* can form no impediment to cotton "cultivation in Western India, because the country is "everywhere near rivers or the sea." Why, as it was said by a correspondent of the "Times," this "must make the credulous reader shudder to think of "the sums of money wasted on roads in this country, "considering that we are almost everywhere nearer to "rivers or the sea than they are in the country "spoken of by Dr. Royle, with the extra advantage "of having *our* rivers *navigable*. Yet we have in "England and Wales 36 canals and 4000 miles of "railway and 20,000 miles of paved streets and "turnpike roads, and 95,000 miles of cross roads, "against 72 miles of 'real road,' and 400 miles of "unstoned and unbridged clay roads, in a much "greater extent of Western India! However I think "the credulous reader may take courage; I think "if we broke up our roads, and obliged our farmers "and manufacturers to transport their produce on "pack-bullocks over 'mere tracks' only passable a "few months in the year, that we should not be "better off than we are now; if the public thinks "differently, it can easily petition the Legislature to "destroy our roads, and place the population of these "isles in the advantageous position of the Hindoos!"

And now that I have gone through the stock excuses of the Bureaucracy, under the several heads of freight, residence, assessment, and experiments, I ask whether any of these furnish an answer to the following facts? In the year 1837 a memorial was sent home to Government from the merchants in Bombay, certifying that ruinous and intolerable expenses were entailed on every sort of commerce, specifically including the cotton trade, by the want of roads, bridges, &c. &c. This was backed by a strong appeal from the Governor, then Sir Robert Grant, and it is worth remarking that every eminent Governor of Bombay has tried his utmost to get something done for its communications. From the year 1837 to the present time similar complaints have been reiterated by the merchants, of which I need only remind the reader of two examples, the Trade Reports I have already quoted, and the memorial to the Governor-General in 1850, stating that many valuable articles were often left to perish on the fields, and others enhanced in price 200 per cent owing to the miserably inadequate communications through the country. Again, in the year 1838, the Home Authorities, *i. e.* the President of the Board of Control, and the Company of Directors, distinctly admitted the necessity of making the roads, bridges, ports, and piers, prayed for by a deputation of cotton manufacturers from Manchester, and emphatically promised that they should forthwith be constructed. Finally, in the year 1848 the Cotton Committee of the House of Commons report

that the witnesses, with scarcely an exception, "concur "in describing the means of internal communication "throughout India, as totally inadequate for the re- "quirements of commerce." The Committee add, "Pro- "duce from the interior being frequently transported "hundreds of miles on the backs of bullocks, great "damage thereby arises to merchandize, and particu- "larly to cotton." Government, therefore, has long been aware that the great obstacle to the cotton trade of Western India, was the want of means of transport, and has long ago promised to remove that obstacle. Now then, I have before me a detailed report of the state of the roads throughout the Bombay Presidency in the year 1851. I shall not repeat the details because a series of letters addressed to "*The Times*" in 1850-51, rather understating than overstating the case, have already made the public familiar with the facts, therefore it will be sufficient for me to state generally the sum of this Report which is as follows:—Except the road to Poonah, of 72 miles in length, still very imperfect in some respects, and constructed before the present Charter, except this, there have not been made up to the present time, twenty miles of stoned and bridged road in any part of the Bombay Presidency; there are no made roads in Guzerat; no piers or jetties at the cotton ports; not one good and complete line of communication with the interior all down the country from north to south; not one of the clay roads, the fair weather roads, which *do not deserve the name of roads*

according to Colonel Grant of the Bombay engineers, not one of these even which is properly drained and bridged, and is not, as Captain Wingate says, "thoroughly execrable," for a considerable part of its course; and in short the Government has not fulfilled its promises to supply that want of roads, &c., which is to its knowledge the great obstacle to commerce in this Presidency; it has prevented speculators from doing so; it has left the Natives without tolerable means of transport to this day; and the country will require the construction of about a thousand miles of "real road," in Colonel Grant's phrase, before the cotton trade of India can even be said to have had a chance of success.

And now I must remind the reader, that I promised to give this example of the cotton trade as an illustration, not a measure, of the injury inflicted on the natives by neglecting the communications of the country. Perhaps after all the most lamentable instance of the effect of a want of roads is exhibited in the periodical local famines to which the Government leaves the people exposed, and by which as Mr. Chapman says, the agricultural population are so totally ruined and thrown into the hands of the money-lenders that they have, roughly speaking, to begin the world afresh every ten or twelve years. Let the reader imagine one of these cases cited to the Committee of 1848, when grain was selling at 6s. to 8s. a quarter in Candeish, and 64s. to 70s. in Poonah, where the people were dying in the streets of famine,

without the possibility of getting supplies from Candeish, because the clay roads are impracticable in the rains: and let the reader remember that the same famine might happen again next year!

> " . . . . . O, we have ta'en
> " Too little care of this! take physic, pomp;
> " Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel;"

I often hear people talk of the liberality of the Court of Directors; and many instances of this liberality to their servants and friends, and relations, or connexions, have come to my knowledge: a liberality visible in hard cash, and paid for with the ryot's money. But I confess I should like to see some exercise of this liberality to save these poor people from dying of famines. What with over-assessing them, and destroying their aristocracy, merchants, and manufacturers, we have reduced them to a low ebb; and the liberality of the Court of Directors would be well employed in saving them from local famines. Before the passing of the last Charter, the Court of Directors were accused of regularly securing the vote and interest of one or two powerful politicians by their "liberality," to prepare for the Charter discussion. I know not how far a late Governor-General of India may have been the unconscious object of a manœuvre of this sort, but when I saw a pension of £5000 a year for life so readily granted to him, for having been present at a battle where he was not Commander-

in-Chief, while the destitution of the poor ryots who supply the means of this liberality excites no corresponding sympathy, I fear such a system will end fatally. It reminds me of the prodigality of the French Court, in spite of the distress of the people, before the great revolution in France; and when I hear in society of "the liberality of the Court of Directors," I remember the famous phrase "la Reine est si bonne!" What a comment on their liberality are these local famines, to which so many of the former aristocracy of the country fall victims. Conceive one father of a family, who "was rich "and well to do when we came into the province, "but has now scarcely clothes to his back," with his crying children round him, perhaps, reader, of an age and form so like your own, perishing of a local famine! Conceive the stony gaze on vacancy, the tearless, terrible despair of that man, when he feels that the children must die; and thinks of the government of the stranger that has done this! Conceive his boys suppressing their torments to spare their father's heart, and his witnessing the death-struggle of all the beings he has loved, one after another, before he is starved himself! Would I could believe that Providence holds us guiltless of these things, and that we may allow a Bureaucracy to misgovern India, with impunity! But I cannot think it—I am speaking of no imaginary inhabitants of another planet, but of our native fellow-subjects, to whom we owe so much of our

wealth and greatness, and to whom we owe protection by all our claims to a higher civilization and a purer morality.

Yet Bombay is not the only Presidency where the Government thinks it sufficient to give up a one-hundredth, or some years a two-hundredth part of the revenue to "public works;" an item which includes a variety of civil buildings, and improvements in the immediate neighbourhood of European stations, and of no service whatever to the commerce of the interior. I will now cite the case of Madras, and then of Bengal and Agra, to shew that every part of our old territory is suffering from this criminal neglect of the communications —criminal, because so deeply injurious to the Natives; so great a dereliction of our duty towards them; and so evidently the cause of financial embarrassment in India, and the consequent peril of England. The system pursued with regard to public works in Madras is clearly explained in an article of the *Calcutta Review*, for December, 1851. The writer shews that while a large part of the Madras revenue is derived from irrigated lands, the constant outlay necessary to keep such works of irrigation in repair, was originally provided for under the Native Princes, by a special assessment distinct from the land revenue, called "tank fees." He shews that these repairs being as much an essential condition of receiving the revenue as the ryot's expenses of cultivation, it is no more reasonable to have absorbed this special assessment into the land revenue, and to put down these repairs as expenditure from revenue on public works, than it

would be to put down the ryot's gross produce as revenue, and call his expenses for seed, manure, labour, &c. expenditure out of revenue. He also shews that such works, which are never undertaken except as a pecuniary speculation, certain to return an usurious interest for the money expended of from thirty to fifty per cent; that such works are not to be placed in the same category as public works, like roads and bridges, which benefit the public without being of the same direct advantage to their authors; particularly because such works of irrigation do not diminish but rather increase the necessity for roads, while at the same time they create an abundant capital for their formation. The writer therefore excludes from the table of nine years' expenditure on public works, published by one of the Directors, the expenses of irrigation works, and proves that on all the rest, roads, bridges, ports, piers, ferries, canals, embankments, &c. &c. there has only been expended about the half of one per cent of the revenue annually, during the said term of nine years. He then notices the results of thus starving the most indispensable public works of the Presidency, and I will quote one of his examples in his own words.

"The Cuddapah collectorate is a large district "measuring 13,000 square miles, nearly twice the "size of the whole of Wales. A large part of the "surface of this district is cotton soil, very productive, "but the worst of all materials for roads: other parts "are wild and mountainous. It does not appear that "any considerable outlay has ever been made on the

" roads of this extensive tract during the last half " century that it has been under British rule, though, " during that period, fully fourteen millions sterling " have been drawn from it in direct revenue. The " consequences may be supposed. Roads cannot be " said to exist; in the cotton soil a little rain makes " the tracks impassable, and everywhere carts, when " used at all, are only able to carry half the load, " and to travel half the distance in a day, that they " could on a made road. Nor is this all: the road " from this extensive district to the Presidency is in " no better state. It is, in short, proverbially bad, " even among Madras roads, and there is one part of " it which is literally used by the Military Board as a " trial ground to test the powers of new gun-carriages, " which are pronounced safe if they pass this severe " ordeal! Cuddapah is a rich and productive tract; " its indigo is celebrated, and it is one of the finest " cotton-fields in South India, but it is needless to say " that its prosperity is dreadfully impeded and kept " down by the disgraceful state of its internal roads, " and of its communication with the natural outlet for " its produce." The writer adds, that the zealous and active are impatient and indignant to see the enterprise and industry of the natives repressed by the wretched and disgraceful intercommunications of the country; but he says that the Madras authorities, from the Governor down to the collectors and engineers, are most unwilling to propose any improvement to the Supreme Government (which is forced to obey orders

from a Bureaucracy at home), because such proposals are always received with disfavour, and almost always refused; and this has since been confirmed by the evidence of Lord Elphinstone, late Governor of Madras, before the Committee of last Session. The writer gives an instance of such a refusal, which shews the spirit of bureaucratic administration. "Colonel Arthur "Cotton, that able and zealous engineer officer, was "very anxious that the noble means of inland water "communication, afforded by the Godavery River, "should be no longer neglected; and having satisfied "himself by local inquiries that there was reasonable "ground for believing that the river might be navi- "gated by steam for nearly 400 miles from the sea, "and into the very heart of the valley of Berar, the "finest cotton country in India, he applied to the "Madras Government for a small grant of money to "enable him personally to explore the river in a small "steamer, which he had himself constructed for the "Gadavery Anicut, and to clear away slight impedi- "ments. The Madras Government solicited the sanc- "tion of the Indian Government to devote a sum not "exceeding £1000 to that very important object, but "this application was refused." The object was to open an inland navigation 400 miles in length, and thus to effect a communication between a vast cotton-field and the Manchester manufacturers, and to give the grain-producing districts in the delta of the Godavery access to the vast markets for food which would be created by the extended culture of cotton in Berar. I

have before me a letter from a Madras engineer on this subject, in which he says that "*cheap carriage* is "the grand desideratum for India," and that "the "navigation of the Godavery would open up a vast "field for commercial enterprise, that whole tract "having been almost hermetically sealed hitherto." He adds, that "for Berar cotton to be conveyed 300 "miles by land to Bombay, when it can be brought "down at one-tenth of that expense by the river, to a "safe port on this side, in a few days, is a disgrace to "Englishmen." The letter concludes by saying that "*nothing but the continual pressure of public opinion* "*in England* will ensure anything being effected in "India." I hope this public opinion will not be appealed to in vain!

I will give one more example from the Government Blue Book of 1851, to shew the contrast between the situation of the people in a well-managed native state and that of the inhabitants of one of our Madras districts which suffered the longest from over-assessment. "The roads in this district (of "Bellary) are in a wretched state. Excellent roads, "feasible not only for the common country carts, but "for spring carriages, have been made in many direc- "tions throughout the Mysore country, which borders "for a distance of about 200 miles on the south "boundary of Bellary, but there are *no corresponding* "*roads to meet them* in that district, and consequently "not only the town of Bellary, but the whole district "is cut off from the advantages which are offered by

" an open and easy communication with the Mysore " territories." However, an excuse is given for starving the public works of Madras, which is characteristic of a Bureaucracy, viz., that the Presidency does not pay its expenses. On this plea it has been the constant practice to press retrenchment and economy on this unfortunate Presidency, and to refuse it the means of improvement. On this plea the transit duties were retained, and other most injurious taxes are still retained. On this plea the Madras Collector has an amount of work thrown upon him, from the size of the districts, which it is physically impossible for him to perform, so that he is compelled to neglect parts of it. On this plea no revenue survey is granted to Madras, although in every district of the Presidency either no survey has ever been made, or it is known to have been hastily and carelessly done, and extensively tampered with afterwards; and it is admitted that an accurate survey is the only possible basis of an equitable assessment, particularly with the minute holdings under the Ryotwar system. And after all, the reviewer proves that this excuse of the Presidency's not paying its expenses is only supported by a juggle in the accounts, by which Madras is charged with the military expenditure for countries whose revenues are paid to Bengal. The same excuse is made for starving the public works of Bombay, and supported in the same way, by " cooking" the accounts, and debiting this Presidency with many heavy expenses, which have nothing on earth to do with it. And it is by such

contemptible tricks as this that the Bureaucracy defend their destructive policy towards the population of these two Presidencies; they begin by destroying the commerce and prosperity of the natives on a false plea of their not paying their expenses, and then point to their pauperized condition as a ground for refusing every improvement that would enable them to pay a higher revenue. This is adding insult to injury. But let us go deeper into this; not only because the excuse of a Presidency's not paying its expenses is the strongest possible admission of the misgovernment of that Presidency, but because this excuse is, in fact, applied to the whole of India; and when the Bureaucracy say they have not money for public works and other reforms in India, they do but say in other words that India does not pay its expenses. I will therefore quote an extract on this point from the letter of a Madras engineer; a letter hastily written, and not meant for publication, but which I like all the better for it. I think the writer's natural expression, coming from the heart, will go to the heart, more than any deliberate statement would do; but the reader shall judge for himself: here is the extract. "Lord * * * "speaks of the Court not having been able to provide "money for public works, while they were struggling "for existence in India, although they could for wars "which they were compelled to carry on at all risks. "But this begs the whole question, which is, were "they, by neglecting the public works, enabled to carry "on their wars, or were they so miserably poor and

"swamped in their means because they neglected the "public works? They are two very different things, "the carrying on new and extensive improvements, "and the keeping old works in repair. We will first "take up the latter. To say they could not find money "for *them* is nonsense. The works themselves pro- "vided money from year to year, and if the repairs "were not executed the works did not yield their pro- "per returns. Now, Tanjore was the only district in "this Presidency where the works were kept in tho- "rough repair. To give you some idea of the extent "to which this neglect was carried, the large irrigation "works in this district were never cleared out for "thirty or forty years, by which an entire district was "half ruined. My predecessor cleared out one mile "at a cost of 7000 rupees (£700), and the revenue of "the Talook (county) rose immediately from 70,000 "rupees to much above a lac (£7000 to £10,000). "Probably 500 rupees a-year (£50) would have kept "the channels clear; and for want of this, 30,000 or "40,000 rupees a-year were lost (£3000 or £4000). "This has been the state of things. In 1827, I found a "channel that entered two Talooks filled up six feet, "so that when it ought to have had eight feet of water "in it, it had only two. The revenue had fallen from "three or four lacs to one lac: when it was cleared "out, the revenue rose in two or three years about one "and a half lac of rupees. One or two thousand ru- "pees would have kept this clear. Thousands of "works are at this moment out of repair, the repairs

" of which would not have cost one year's increase of " revenue, though they have been neglected so many " years. This has been the state of things: what " nonsense it is to talk of their not being able to find " money. But their own acts answer the question. " All buildings are kept in repair. How could they " find money for this? And how did they find money " for Tanjore? About 40,000 rupees a-year were " spent in keeping up the works. Where did the " money come from? Of course, from the district " itself. If they had not spent the 40,000 rupees, " they would have lost two or three lacs; but farther, " they spent steadily in Tanjore about 40,000 rupees " in improvements, by which, on an average, they just " about obtained a permanent increase of revenue of " 40,000 rupees per annum. Thus no outlay at all " was required for keeping these works in repair, nor " even for a constant course of improvement. *Why* " *should not this have been done in every district?* " The fact is, that the Company were without money " for their wars, because they neglected to keep " in repair the old works upon which the revenue " depended. But they might and ought to have " gone much further than this; for without a very " large expenditure at once, a system of improvement " might have been kept up, as in Tanjore, that would " have steadily yielded from 50 to 100 per cent. To " confound such a proceeding with the outlay of a vast " capital, which, after a few years, will return 5 per " cent, and then say the Company could not spend

" money for public works, is merely throwing dust " in their own and other people's eyes. But this " is not the strongest point of the case. They did " not take the least pains to prevent famine. To " say nothing of the death of a quarter of a million " of people in Guntoor, the Public Works Committee, " in their Report, calculate that the loss in money " by the Guntoor famine was 216 lacs, more than two " millions sterling. If they could find money to supply " these losses they could have found a hundredth part " of the sum to prevent them. But now with respect to " works of actual improvement of considerable extent. " These works have much more than paid their own " way; not a rupee has been taken from the general " treasury, but on the contrary seven lacs paid into it. " A schedule of various new works executed of late " years has just been printed, the average return from " which has been 50 per cent, *counting from the first* " *execution* of the works, though of course in the first " year or two their full effects were not developed, and " this in direct revenue. Of course the indirect re- " venues are increased also; and the increase of private " property far exceeds that gained by Government. " But just look at this case, the saleable value of land " in Tanjore has increased much more than a million " sterling since the Anicuts were built—the land is " now saleable at about 50 rupees an acre. The land " in this delta has as yet been unsaleable; it is much " richer than that of Tanjore, much better supplied " with water by its river, and has a fine safe port, so

" that when our works are in full operation, and the " population has filled up, which it will do with great " rapidity, the lands ought to be worth at least 60 " rupees an acre, or seven millions sterling for the whole " irrigated tract: this will give you some idea of what " public works are here. Let us take another case, " viz. transit. On the western road from Madras, say " for sixty miles before the roads divide, there is now " a traffic of about 500 tons a day, I believe 180,000 " a year, it costs 30,000 rupees a mile, or about 18 " lacs a year. This might be carried on a canal for one " lac, here are 17 lacs a year lost in 60 miles of transit, " and *this is going on throughout the Presidency!* Is " it surprising that on such a system of managing the " country, the people are poor, and the Government " poor; how could it be otherwise? I am certain that " if 50 lacs a year had been spent in public works here, " there would have been all along an immense addi- " tional increase of revenue, and the country would by " this time have been a complete contrast to what it " now is. Lord * * * thinks it would be better not to " blame the Government; how can we possibly point " out how improvement can be made without proving " that there has been neglect before? If such immense " sums can be obtained, there must have been some " stupid, merciless system before." (Remember that, reader! that phrase is written by one of the most distinguished men in India.) " What inconceivable folly " it is to shut our eyes to facts, and not to take advan- " tage of discovery, because if we do, it would imply

" that those who went before us committed blunders. " The discovery of gold in California and Sydney " proves strange blindness in those who had been " living so many years in those localities, but that does " not prevent men digging it up now. The mine " which exists in this country will bear competition " with those gold discoveries. An expenditure of thirty " or forty thousand pounds in Tanjore, besides the enor- " mous increase in direct revenue, has added much " more than a million sterling to the property of the " Province. If a man who could earn £30. a year in " other ways, went to the diggings and there obtained " gold to the value of £900. a year, the world would " ring with it—yet it would not equal the profits in " Tanjore; and here they promise very far to exceed " that. Lord * * * wonders at my vehemence about " public works; is he really so humble a man as to " think no better of himself than to suppose he could " stand unmoved in a district where 250,000 people " had perished miserably of famine, through the neg- " lect of our Government, and see it exposed every year " to a similar occurrence?" (Remember that, reader!) " If his Lordship had been living in the midst of the " district at the time, like one of our civilians, and had " had every morning to clear the neighbourhood of his " house of hundreds of dead bodies of poor creatures " who had struggled to get near the European in hopes " that there perhaps they might find food, he would " have realised things beyond what he has seen in his " ****shire park ..."

I think the above letter requires no comments of mine, therefore I will now pass on to the Provinces of Bengal and Agra. These Provinces enjoy some real and some apparent advantages which we must reduce to their true value in order to estimate the degree in which the Government has fulfilled its duty towards them. Their first and real advantage is in their navigable rivers, which form a great natural highway to the interior of northern India, and permit the residence of Europeans on the line of the Ganges, &c. because the river navigation affords our indigo planters and sugar manufacturers a means of transit and communication which is not available to residents in Bombay and Madras. Their second advantage is that in the settlement of the North-west Provinces a sum of one per cent on the land revenue was set apart for the improvement of the district roads, independent of the Government expenditure on the trunk lines; and in the perpetual settlement of Bengal, the Zemindars were bound, it was allowed for in their rent, to keep in repair the roads on their respective properties. This advantage in the case of Agra is no doubt real; under the excellent Government of Agra, assisted by Native management and co-operation, this fund and other local funds are turned to the utmost account in improving the means of transit; but in the case of Bengal the advantage is rather apparent than real, because the Government does not enforce the obligation of the Zemindars who neglect their duty. The last apparent advantage of these Provinces is in the fund arising

from the surplus of ferry and river tolls, which is by law destined to the improvement of the local communications. But I have shewn that up to this time the fund in question has been appropriated to the general Treasury in Madras; contrary to the law, and according to the *Friend of India* for July 31, 1851, an accumulation of ferry tolls amounting to eight lacs of rupees was at one swoop so appropriated in Bengal, contrary to the law, and according to the same journal for August 28, 1851, an amount of river tolls has been so appropriated in Bengal, between the years 1824 and 1850, equal to Rs. 37,35,000 (£373,500), contrary to the law; and according to the same journal for April 22, 1852, these river tolls, which are it says "a heavy burthen on the commerce of the country," are still so appropriated, in direct violation of the law—therefore the advantage of the above fund is apparent and not real. But now after enumerating these advantages, I must explain that they do not satisfy the pressing wants of the people. The reader has only to glance at the map of these immense territories to see that the existence of a few navigable rivers does not dispense with the necessity of constructing roads, bridges, &c. &c., all over the country, to give the natives facility of transit for their commerce. I will therefore give some evidence of the extent to which the Government has neglected its duty towards them. Mr. Bird, late Governor of Agra, told the House of Commons' Committee last session, "the obser- "vation of travellers through Agra and Bengal, would "be,—how very little has been done by the Government

" of India for the improvement of the country." This gentleman is called by the author of " *Modern India*," a great man, and it is a sufficient eulogy of his service, to say that, in the technical phrase " he made the North-West Provinces;" it is therefore important to find him speaking of the little done for the improvement of the country in the style that Shore did twenty years ago. Again, the *Friend of India*, of April 24, 1851, says, " one of the most serious " charges brought against the administration of the " Company in India, has always been the neglect of " all public works, and the disadvantageous contrast " which it exhibits, not only to the civilized Governments of Europe and America, but also to its less " enlightened predecessors the Mahommedans. It is " impossible for any man to travel through the two " provinces of Bengal and Behar, which have been " longest in our possession, and which have yielded " the largest amount of revenue, without a painful " feeling that the charge is not without foundation. " The appearance they present after more than ninety " years of occupancy, is that of *the neglected estate* " *of a spendthrift landlord.* For one good road which " we have constructed, we have *allowed twenty others* " *to disappear.* We have erected one magnificent " city, and every other city of note has been allowed " to go to ruin. With the exception of the trunk " road, and the public edifices in Calcutta, there is " nothing throughout these provinces, to shew that " they have been for nearly a century under the Go-

" vernment of the same people who have rendered " their own country a theatre of wonders." In June, 1851, speaking of the above trunk road, the *Friend* says, " we have but one road in Bengal." In March of the same year, 1851, the *Asiatic and Colonial Register*, says, " that in Bengal the public officers " are obliged to travel in palanquins owing to the im- " passable state of the district roads, and the want " of bridges, and take twice the time they need do " if they could use horses and carriages." In July, 1851, the *Friend* says, alluding to a new Toll Act, " But " where are the roads in Bengal? we have but " two which deserve the name: the grand trunk road " to Benares and the road to Juggaureth, which is said " to be a good one." The *Friend* had previously published in April, 1851, a description of the above " trunk road," by an Agra traveller, stating that in many places there was no metalling (stone) at all, and the carriage had to creep along at the rate of about two miles an hour; and there were three miles of heavy sand at the Soane, requiring four pairs of bullocks to drag the carriage through; that the ferry was equally bad and caused great delay; and that most of the metalling was brickdust or inferior stone, which made a difference of two or three miles an hour in the rate of palanquin bearers, as compared with a first-class Agra road. Again, in July, 1852, The *Friend* inserts the following paragraph respecting this " trunk road." " The *Delhi Gazette* warns intending " travellers against attempting the road between Cal-

" cutta and Benares, at the present season. A pas-
" senger by the Transit Company's carriages was re-
" cently thirteen days on the road, aud was compelled
" to walk for nearly sixty miles, as the mud was too
" deep for the carriage to move. Another gentleman
" was obliged to return to Benares after having reached
" the Kurumnassa, having discovered that about six
" feet of loose earth had been heaped upon the road in
" order to raise its level. Near Calcutta, the road is
" in a similar condition." Are such things possible! Bengal and Behar, with but one good road, and " intending travellers warned" that they will have to walk sixty miles upon it, because carriages stick in the mud!

It is difficult to help smiling at such a climax: yet we must recollect that this system of administration is no laughing matter for the unfortunate natives; it is death to them. However, I have now before me a Report printed last year by order of the House of Commons of the public works executed in India during a period of ten years. The details of these works are only given from Bengal to Agra, (the others would have been a still worse exposure), but these occupy the first 145 pages of the Report. I have given in Appendix A, an abstract of this expenditure in Bengal and Agra, prepared by a careful analysis of the above details, and will now notice its result, prefacing this notice by a few remarks on two of the items, viz.: works of irrigation and embankments. The first, as I have shewn in the case of Madras, literally pay their way as they go, and

always yield an usurious interest; and are therefore not to be placed in the same category as works like roads, bridges, canals, &c. which directly benefit the people, and only indirectly the revenue. Of the second, I must remind the reader that, not only is the Government constrained to keep up those embankments by its own engagements at the time of the Perpetual Settlement, but the Government would lose its revenue if it allowed the country to be inundated, and the expense of maintaining the embankments stands on exactly the same ground as the "tank fees" in Madras; it is just as much an essential condition of receiving the revenue as the ryot's expense of cultivation, and it ought no more to have been absorbed into the revenue, and then called expenditure out of revenue on public works, than the ryot's gross produce ought to be put down as revenue, and his expenses called expenditure out of revenue. It appears then by the abstract in Appendix A, that of the gross revenue or whole amount of taxes levied on the people of Bengal and Agra, the average annual expenditure for ten years, on roads and bridges, has been less than three-quarters of one cent; that is less than £110,219 for two provinces larger than England and France put together, and containing a larger population than that of these two kingdoms, and the expenditure on works of irrigation and embankments during the same period has been much less than a half of one per cent. Now could any thing I said be a stronger proof of the cruel and criminal neglect of the

people than these simple facts from the Government's own Blue Book? Could any thing illustrate more forcibly "the stupid and merciless system" of a Bureaucracy?—"Is it surprising," in the words of the *Madras Engineer*, "that under such a system of "managing the country, the people are poor, and the "Government poor, how could it be otherwise?" But when we entrust the Government of India to a class of politicians, of whom Burke said most truly, that "a "large, liberal, and prospective view of the interests of "States passes with them for romance; and the prin-"ciples that recommend it for the wanderings of a "disordered imagination;" is it not to be expected that they should govern exactly as they have done? Is it not natural that such a class should think it the highest art of finance, to do what would be considered absurd in any other civilized country, to raise nearly the whole of the net revenue by direct taxation on produce, and to grasp direct revenue as much as they could, and wherever they could reach it, without an idea beyond this? And of course this drain of direct revenue has fallen upon and ruined every class in their turn—the country gentlemen and farmers have felt it in over-assessment—the merchants and manufacturers, and inland towns felt it in the transit duties. Mr. Trevelyan says that many towns were deserted by the trade and manufactures carried on within their walls, and the inhabitants left as paupers who had previously been industrious workmen; and Shore mentions the failure of between fifty and sixty bankers and wholesale mer-

chants in his experience in one city alone; and this went on throughout the country. At present the only class who can yield any more direct revenue are the Native Princes and the territorial aristocracy, and accordingly the drain is falling upon them, as I shew in my next chapter. Of course this system has pauperized the country, for it would pauperize any country: it is cutting down the tree to get at its fruits. Yet it is still the sole resource of the Bureaucracy. The only hope expressed in the last despatch of raising the surplus revenue of the Punjaub from 18 lacs to 30, is by reducing the expenditure of public works in the Punjaub to the same extent. And so they go on, the only plan for the future is the plan of the past, viz. to drain every thing in and lay nothing out, and this hopeful system has at length brought our Indian finances to the very edge of ruin. It is in vain to tell such a Government as this that the want of public works keeps India poor; that the want of communication deprives the natives of the possibility of commerce or exchange to an incalculable extent; that it forbids progress; it paralyzes industry; it stops the division of labour; it neutralizes God's blessings on the soil; and tends to keep the inhabitants barbarians and paupers. It is in vain to tell them that the elevation of the human species follows the track of every great highway we lead into the interior of India. All this passes with a Bureaucracy for romance: "littleness "in object and in means, to them appears soundness "and sobriety."

In conclusion, I shall not surprise the reader by saying that I have not the slightest confidence in what the *Friend of India* sneeringly calls, "the new vigour of the Government in sight of the Charter discussions." I believe the "new vigour" exactly corresponds to the new responsibility which called it forth, and will only last as long as the cause which produced it. As soon as the Parliamentary responsibility is again comfortably shelved for another twenty years, the new vigour will disappear with it. But I must discriminate here between works undertaken by the new vigour for the English and for the natives. The Government has recently sanctioned three railways and an electric telegraph. Now I have no doubt the latter will be finished, and that speedily, because, independent of the calculation that the users of it will pay its expenses, every man can understand the immense additional strength which the telegraph will give us in India, and our English interest in the matter is so clear to English politicians, that even a bureaucratic administration would not dare to trifle with it. But it is very different in the case of railways. Unfortunately English politicians do not see our English interest in Indian public works, nor feel the ryot's strong necessity for them. There is nothing therefore to ensure the railways being finished, or the want of other communications being supplied—(for two or three railways will not suffice for the wants of India, any more than it would do for England to have a railway from Liverpool to Birmingham, and another from London to

Southampton, and no roads beside.) It appears that the shareholders in Indian railways take the matter very easily as long as they regularly receive their dividends on the money paid up, and as these dividends come out of the pockets of the ryots, who have no voice in the matter, and literally go for nothing in the decision, if once the Charter is settled, and the present bureaucratic Government safe again for another twenty years, there may be money enough spent in dividends on railways always making and never made, to have paid for good roads all over India. In fact, the system will be pursued with railways which has been pursued with other ways; and I must explain to the reader that the published "sanction" for any work in India, is frequently a pure mystification, and does not in the least mean that the work will be made, unless it suits the Government to spend the money.

The Government has various modes of privately stopping the execution of a work that is publicly "sanctioned." One is to write confidentially to the local authorities that the expenditure is "in the present state of the finances, unadvisable." Another is to require further explanation, and so hang up the work just as many years as the Government pleases, pending interminable references to England—the announcement of a reference to England, says Mr. Campbell, "is often regarded as an indefinite postponement." A third mode is to take care in sanctioning a work, that it shall be impossible to execute it, by keeping the district without engineers. And here

I must digress for a moment to remark that in every Presidency in India, the corps of engineers is utterly inadequate to the exigencies of the country, not merely too few to execute new works, but even to keep in repair the old ones.

The *Friend of India*, of February 6th, 1851, after making exactly the same complaint as Shore did twenty years before, that infantry officers, magistrates, and collectors, were constantly called upon to perform the functions of civil engineers, mentions a case where a wealthy native had subscribed a large sum for re-building a bridge, when it fell some years before, and yet, though ample funds were provided for the work, the bridge had not been re-built, and the country had been deprived of the benefit of it, because no engineer could be spared to make it. I repeat, therefore, that the "new vigour" and the public "sanction" of railways, or any other works, gives me no confidence whatever in the Government. I am convinced that the same men, in the same places, will, if they can, pursue the same system in the future as in the past. I have seen that the promises which necessity forces the Indian Government to make, necessity alone will force it to keep.

As I have explained in my 2nd and 7th chapters the remedies which I propose for these grievances, I will not go over the same ground here, except to notice one point. I may be asked, what, if the Bureaucracy is cut down, and power, and responsibility given to the local authorities, what is to ensure their

competency to direct the local administration? for instance, such a Presidency might be named where the only business the Governor is fit for, is to travel about and take care of his health; while his Council are men who have risen by seniority alone, and are remarkable, not for ability, but for the want of it; and supposing 5 per cent of the land revenues were allotted to public works in this Presidency, what is to ensure the money being well laid out? I answer that if the worst comes to the worst, the Local Authorities are always more competent than the Home Authorities, but there is never any reason for having an incompetent local administration, except the private interest of the Bureaucracy. It is always easy enough to make the local Government efficient if there is the will to do it. It is perfectly easy to break through the rule of seniority for the higher appointments, as recommended in Mr. Willoughby's evidence. The only difficulty is that it is not the interest of the "intelligent clerks" to do this, for the more inefficient a local Government can be made, the greater is the power of the Bureaucracy at home. And it is because I have invariably found, in studying the details of local administration, that all the reforms required in India would be a necessary consequence of the reform at Home, that I have struck at the root of the evil, and devoted this book to advocating a change in the Bureaucratic system at Home. Meanwhile, as the case now stands, the Indian Government are imposing a heavy tribute on the ryots, and refusing them the

public works which would enable them to bear the burthen—they are forcing them to make bricks without straw. And so completely does the system of secrecy and the system of mystification keep the English public ignorant of and indifferent to these things, that India might as well contain nothing but cattle besides our functionaries there, for all that its population is talked of or thought of by the majority of my countrymen. Even in the reports of the dinners given by the East India Company to officials going to or returning from the country, the reader will be surprised and perhaps shocked, to find that amid the chorus of praises bestowed on the East India services, and the mutual compliments of Directors and Members of Parliament on the great success of Indian administration, and the great men formed by it, amid all the self-laudation and congratulation, scarcely a word, and sometimes not a word, is said about the natives. And thus it is that every Indian grievance is "out of sight out of mind," and the compliments go on in England, and the complaints in India, from generation to generation.

I have often wondered how it is that those who are so conspicuously active among us in the interests of religion, never turn their attention to India. How is it they never inquire whether, as a nation, we are doing our duty to India? and whether their zeal could not obtain for its vast population that legislative justice which would confer the most solid blessings on a one-eighth part of the whole human family? It seems to me that Christian charity would not be unworthily

employed in such a work as this. However, I know not if my feeble voice can reach my countrymen, but if it can, I tell them plainly that the Bureaucratic Government to which they have entrusted the irresponsible despotism of India, has not secured the happiness of the natives in their person, honour, property, or moral sentiments. It has not acted on what ought to be the principle of every Government, viz., to serve the people, and root the sovereign in their interests and affections. Instead of this, it has acted on a system of distrust, and exclusion, and exhaustion, like that of a bad tenant who feels that his lease will soon expire, and scourges the land to get all he can off his farm before he is forced to quit. And at length the consequence of a policy which has hitherto only been fatal to the millions of our fellow-subjects in India are coming home to our own door. The public have no idea of the imminence of the danger. It has always been officially asserted that peace would soon return, and the finances would suffice for a time of peace, though they could not defray the charges of war. Even had this last assertion been true, those who are acquainted with the private motives which influence our policy on this subject, and acquainted with the tone of the public press on both sides of India, these know that too many of the servants of the state have an interest in going to war, for this promissory note of peace drawn by an irresponsible Government to be any solid security for the future. And at this very time, although the public have been most unjustifiably kept

without official information of the causes of the present Burmese war, which will add its quota of millions to the debt of India, my private intelligence leaves me not a shadow of doubt that there was no more necessity for our going to war with the Burmese than for our going to war annually with the Americans. But while it is not true, that the finances would suffice for a period of peace without an illicit revenue which is in the nature of a gambling speculation, I refer the reader to a statement given at Appendix B of this book shewing that the permanent sources of Indian revenue, which are at present unequal to the charge of the debt, exhibit no increase corresponding to the progress of the debt, but in the case of the customs duties, a decline in the tax-paying power of the people; while on the other hand the regular increase of the debt under the present system of Government is inevitable, and it has only been met hitherto by a gambling resource. In fact, we are staking the credit and apparently the existence of our Indian empire on such a precarious source of revenue as opium-smuggling. And yet according to the last *Friend of India* (Nor. 25th 1852) the Chinese cabinet must soon *be forced by the necessity of circumstances* to change their policy of prohibiting the use of this drug, which, according to the same authority, will annihilate a financial resource amounting to one-fifth of the gross revenues of the British empire in India! Now I cannot tell how this financial prospect will affect others, for there are those who will not believe in the reality

of an earthquake until they are buried under its ruins, but I feel bound to say what it signifies to me as plain as figures can speak. It signifies that we are going on, the blind leading the blind, to a hideous gulf of bankruptcy in India. It means that we are allowing a Bureaucracy to steer the vessel of State to certain shipwreck. And when I think of "the creatures of the desk and the creatures of favour" who are doing this—when I remember what Burke says of them*—I begin to fear lest the old proverb should come true in India, that "Providence raises up great men to found an empire, but employs the lowest of our species to destroy one."

* "The tribe of vulgar politicians are the lowest of our species."

CHAPTER VII.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.

It is a common saying, and has grown into an article of popular faith, that, "after all, India is much better governed than the colonies,"—and I have heard so much from my youth upward of mal-administration in the colonies, that I had always taken the above proposition for granted, and supposed it to be a truism which admitted of no dispute. When however, after investigating the details of Indian administration, the old saying again accidentally strikes my ear, I am suddenly astonished to find so little foundation for it that I am puzzled to conceive how such a mistake could have arisen. After pondering over this phenomenon, I believe the real explanation of it to be that every grievance of the colonies finds loud and eloquent utterance in England, and even within the walls of Parliament, whereas the grievances of India have no voice among us; and the absence of complaint from the latter country is taken to signify the absence of grounds for complaint. This is a sufficiently curious illusion, for if the degree of complaint were evidence of the degree of mal-administration, then England would be about the worst governed country in the

world, and incomparably worse governed than the Papal States; for no complaints are audible from the Roman territory, whatever men are suffering there: the smoke of the sacrifice rises dumbly. But because there is in England, in one year, a thousand times more complaint of the Government than is heard from India during the lapse of a twenty years' Charter, let not the reader too hastily conclude that men do not suffer in India. It is a great mistake, said Sismondi, in speaking of the modern history of Italy, it is a great mistake to suppose that the times about which history is silent are the least calamitous to mankind. All calamities are not historical; they require a certain dignity, a certain evident connexion with politics and individuals, in which all the world can see the chain of causes and effects, before they attract sufficient notice to be recorded in history. But calamities may afflict a nation, not the less real because from their social nature silent, by which a whole people may feel themselves, as men more than as citizens, degraded, demoralized, disgraced in their own eyes, ruined in their fortunes, and deprived of hope so long as to lose the power of voluntary effort, and all this without the connexion between politics and their condition being evident to the world, or any dramatic effect of public interest attracting notice to their inward bleeding wounds.

I shall endeavour to shew the reader that this has been the case in India, notwithstanding the absence of complaint, but I look in vain for anything

like this in the colonies. The Crown has never inflicted on the colonies such a ryotwar system, or perpetual settlement, or judicial system, or such transit duties, as we have forced upon India, and there are perhaps worse calamities behind. I do not mean to deny that grievances exist in the colonies, only they are not equal to those of India, and they receive a very different degree of attention in England. For instance, I will take the greatest colonial complaint of the day, the transportation of convicts. No doubt this evil is real enough, but I must observe that it is a thing of yesterday compared to many Indian griefs, and that the system of transportation has in its time been of essential service to the colonies, and even now it appears, by the *Globe* of November the 2nd, that a portion of the colonists petition for its continuance, as the only mode of supplying the labour market; at any rate the system is old, and the opposition to it comparatively new, and yet from the time that the colonists declare strongly against it they find men of first-rate abilities to urge their complaint, the press, no part of which is gagged as in the case of India, by the threat of withdrawing the large income yielded by the Leadenhall Street advertisements, the press warmly espouses their cause, and every unprejudiced man would admit that their representative in the House of Commons, Sir William Molesworth, is listened to with the utmost respect by the House and the country—that he is virtually a much higher authority on the subject than any official man—and that from the date of his speech

on the 21st of May, 1852, the system of transportation was certainly doomed, and the only question was, how much more odium and disgrace the Colonial Office would incur in a hopeless resistance to its inevitable abandonment. How different is the case of the natives of India! Out of the House the public appears to be indifferent to their fate; and in the House the great authority on the subject is sure to be some official man who may be said to hold a general retainer to oppose the interest of the natives on every occasion, because his own position and influence depend on his maintaining that vicious system of Indian administration which requires his "sharp practice" to defend it, whereas a good system would employ an advocate of a higher character. I may be referred to the efforts of Mr. Bright in 1848 and 1850, and of Lord Jocelyn in 1851, to shew that the natives are not altogether abandoned in the House of Commons. I must answer that the Ministry would have refused Mr. Bright his Committee in 1848, but for the powerful interference of Sir Robert Peel. Alas for India! that great man was beginning to feel an unusual interest in Indian affairs at the time of his death, and, had his life been spared, the prospects of the natives would have been very different from what they are now. However, in 1850, Mr. Bright was cheaply defeated by an official denial of several notorious facts; and if Lord Jocelyn fared better last Session, it was because a mass of new evidence, backed by official reports of which the substance had transpired, and by the public conviction

and degradation of Ali Moorad, had rendered it impossible for the Home Government any longer to burke the case, as they did burke it for years in the Court of Proprietors.—Vide Appendix C. I repeat therefore that, in spite of the isolated, though generous efforts of Mr. Bright and Lord Jocelyn, there is no regular advocate for the natives in the House of Commons, as there is and always has been for the colonists; but the only permanent representative of India in that House, is some official advocate against the natives. There is, then, almost no complaint; but does this prove there are no grievances? I will endeavour to answer this question. The more I study the subject the more I feel a growing conviction that the natives were happier, not merely under their good princes, but happier under the average of their native sovereigns, than they have been under an English Bureaucracy. In discussing this point, we have always hitherto had the advantage of being the judges in our own cause; therefore, because we first acquired power in India during a revolutionary period, we have assumed that the normal condition of Indian Governments was a chronic state of revolution; and we have assumed that the mass of the people must have been miserable, because we can prove that many of their native sovereigns were warlike, bigoted, &c. But we must recollect that India is as large as the whole of Europe; and suppose we were to apply the same ingenious process of crimination to Europe

that we do to India,*—suppose we were to reckon up the wars and acts of oppression of European princes, as we do for the native princes, down to the end of the 18th century, and calculate the amount of bloodshed and human misery caused by their ambition and selfish indifference to the fate of the masses,—suppose we were to rake out of a few centuries of history, for Europe as we do for India, all the deliberate cruelties inflicted on mankind by religious fanaticism,—finally, suppose we were to see what the memoir-writers of the time say of the condition of the great bulk of the people in Europe, down to the period of the French Revolution? If we were to do this with any good faith, we should begin to find it impossible to cast the first stone at India. We should begin to admit that if there had been wars, if there had been bigotry, if there had been misgovernment in India, there had been such things elsewhere. But there had been many compensations in India; there had been long-established Governments, and great masses of contented subjects; the Mahommedan conquerors of India had settled in the country, and identified themselves with the interests and sympathies of its inhabitants; they had, as the rule, respected the customs, and religion, and private landed property of the people, and any infraction of the rule was condemned by their own historians as it would be by Europeans; they had preserved the municipal insti-

* Vide Gulliver's defence of "his dear country" to the king of the Brobdignags.

tutions, and arbitration system, and excellent police, which gave the people the best security for person and property at the least cost; they never burthened the country with *a national debt,* and had spent great sums out of the taxes for the people, on public works and grants for education, and had not attempted to destroy that native aristocracy, whose capital was the support of the labourers, manufacturers, and merchants of India: finally, they had not treated the people as an inferior race of beings; they had maintained a free social intercourse with them; they had not confined them to such low ill-paid offices as they could not fill themselves; they had frequently left the most important share of the civil offices of State in their hands, and had allowed them to rise daily from among the lower orders to all ranks of civil and military employment, which "kept up the spirit of the people," said Mr. Elphinstone. In short, the Mahommedans did not, by dividing the community into two distinct bodies of privileged foreigners and native serfs, systematically degrade a whole people. In a long course of time, and among a hundred millions of men, they had oppressed many; but they had left hope to all; they had thrown open to all their subjects the prizes of honest ambition, and allowed every man of talent, industry and courage to aspire to titles of honour or political power, or high military commands, with corresponding grants of land.

Very different from this has been the government of the English conquerors of India. We have kept the peace in the country for our own sakes, and this has

of course, to a certain extent, increased cultivation and commerce, because the instinctive efforts of men to better their condition will always ensure the material progress of any people, until they reach the point where misgovernment sets a limit to progress. But this benefit of keeping the peace in India is the only one our rule has conferred on the natives, to make up for the loss of all the compensations mentioned above; and if I shew this to be the case—if against one benefit is to be set our systematic impoverishment and degradation of a whole people, what will after ages say of our passion for aggrandisement in India? Will it be sufficient to have changed the mode of extortion, to have substituted the dry-rot of English Bureaucracy for the violence of Roman proconsuls, to prevent posterity from condemning with one voice our selfish policy in India? I deeply feel that it will not: I feel painfully that, although for a while the system may deceive or corrupt contemporary opinion, and triumph over such feeble protests as mine, its triumph will one day be appealed against in a higher court of opinion, and be reversed by the judgment of history; and in that day the verdict of the whole civilised world will be given against England, and the curse of many nations will fall upon her, for her selfish treatment of India.

However, the passion for aggrandisement above-mentioned is both excused and denied. It is excused on the ground that our territorial extension in India cannot be helped; that it is "in the natural course of things." Why, of course it is, so long as we take

every precaution in constituting the Home Government to ensure its grasping tendency. We now make a Home Government which must theoretically know and care little about the natives, and covet any immediate increase of revenue and patronage. But suppose we made the Home Government on a totally different theory; suppose its very constitution ensured its knowing and caring a good deal about the natives, and proportionably less for patronage, and caring more for the ultimate than immediate increase of revenue, more for its real than its apparent value; if we did this, it would then be as much "in the natural course of things" for the Government not to be grasping, as it now is for it to be so.

Again, the passion for aggrandisement is denied, and it is said that our wars in India were defensive wars, by way of disproving the fact. Defensive wars! why the least scrupulous of European conquerors, Louis the XIVth, Napoleon . . . all, have found the same cloak for their ambition, and called their wars defensive measures with the same assurance; so that, with the Scinde and Affghanistan wars fresh in the reader's memory, this exploded old State fiction is not worth answering, as it is not wars alone, that prove this passion for aggrandisement. The reader must recollect that it is not by conquest from enemies, but by cessions extorted from friends, from our unfortunate allies, that a great part of our territory has always been, and continues to be, obtained. The amount of territory taken by Lord Wellesley in time of peace was

prodigious, and at the present day, with profound internal peace, the process of absorbing the native States is going on steadily, not at the expense of enemies but of friends. It is no security to the native Princes to have treaties with us, or to recal times when their alliance was hailed by us as a signal good fortune in a critical period. On some we impose contingents, which keep them in bondage, ruin their finances, force them to oppress their subjects, and end by furnishing us an excuse for interference and annexation. In the case of others, we coolly set aside the lawful succession at their deaths, turn the heirs adrift, and seize on their inheritance. In the same spirit we are confiscating the estates of the landed aristocracy, and it is believed that, what with resumptions of enams and rent-free lands and lapses of jagheers, we have since 1819 appropriated landed property of the value of three millions sterling of annual revenue. And why, for what purpose, is this incessant aggrandisement? Is it to give the natives "the blessings of the British Rule?" Let us see what these blessings have been? 1stly, In Bengal, by one of the most sweeping confiscations the world ever saw, we transferred the whole landed property of the community to a body of taxgatherers; but under such conditions that this body of newly invented landlords were ruined almost to a man, and sold up by our Collectors, and their estates transferred to new men, within ten or twelve years; and in making the new landlords, we promised legislative protection to their tenants, yet we have left them from

that day to this at the mercy of the Zemindars, and only the other day it was said by the *Friend of India*, Sept. 16th, 1852 :—" A whole century will scarcely " be sufficient to remedy the evils of that Perpetual " Settlement, and we have not yet begun the task. " Under its baneful influence a population of more than " twenty millions have been reduced to a state of such " utter wretchedness of condition and such abjectness " of feeling as it would be difficult to parallel in any " other country." 2ndly, In Madras, by another sweeping confiscation, perhaps without a precedent in history, we assumed that the Government was the owner of all property in land, and that in the words of Government, we should " avoid all material evil if " the surplus produce was in all cases made the " utmost extent of our demand;" this being the landlord's rent, and leaving to the cultivator only a bare sufficiency for his own subsistence; and this surplus produce being demanded from the ryots, not as a corn-rent but as a money-rent, and being assessed and collected in districts averaging 7000 square miles, and 150,000 individual tenants, by one or two Europeans, assisted by *informers*, with notoriously incorrect surveys. 3rdly, When this Ryotwar system had ruined Madras, we forced it upon Bombay, in spite of Mr. Elphinstone's opposition, and nowhere did we at any time lower our assessments until the agriculturists were beggared, and we retain the system to this day. 4thly, We established and maintained for the better part of a century, transit duties, which broke the

manufacturers, decayed the towns, and demoralised the people of India, and left it a matter of wonder that any trade could be carried on at all. 5thly, We destroyed those municipal institutions which had, according to Mr. Elphinstone, "preserved the people of "India through all their revolutions, and conduced in "a high degree to their happiness, and to the enjoy-"ment of a great portion of freedom and indepen-"dence." We destroyed these, and with them the excellent arbitration system and native police which gave the people full security for person and property at the least possible cost; and we set up instead, an exotic system of English law, which has so utterly deprived the people of security, besides corrupting their morals, that in our civil courts, "which give every opening for fraud, perjury, and forgery," all the most important interests of the country have been rapidly converted and transferred, and no man's estate is safe, and in our criminal courts nothing but his most singular ill-luck can bring an accomplished criminal to justice, and even within a circle of 60 or 70 miles round our capital city of Calcutta, no man of property can retire to rest without danger of being the victim of Dacoits before morning. 6thly, We levied great taxes on the people, and drained away one-seventh of their net-revenue to England, at the same time burthening them with a load of *national debt* for the first time in their history; and yet, in spite of their admitted rights and necessities, we gave them back next to nothing in public

works; never anything for education, unless forced by pressure from without, and the vigorous initiative of private individuals, and then as little as possible; and in most districts beyond comparison less for roads, bridges, tanks, &c. than has been given by wealthy native merchants and country gentlemen. 7thly, We have long been systematically destroying the native aristocracy, who furnished consumers for the articles of commerce and luxury, who stimulated the production of the labourers, the manufacturers, and the merchants, who were the patrons of art, the promoters of agricultural improvement, the co-operators in public works, and the only class who could enable us to carry out any comprehensive amelioration of native society; and we are extinguishing the native States, of which the effect is, according to Sir Thomas Munro, "in place of raising to debase the whole people," and according to the Duke of Wellington, "to degrade and beggar the natives, making them all enemies;" and meanwhile, our threat of absorption hanging over their heads, deprives both Princes and aristocracy of any inducement to improve their country. 8thly, We regard the natives rather as vassals and servants than as the ancient owners and masters of the country; we have as little as possible of social intercourse with them, and although we allow them to do above 97 per cent of the work of administration, we monopolize the credit and emoluments of it, and keep every high office for ourselves. The establishment of our Rule in any part of India at once shuts the door

on the honest and laudable ambition of the natives; all prospect of enjoying those honours and distinctions, and lucrative situations of trust and power, which reconcile men to the oppressions of arbitrary rulers in native States, is thenceforward cut off; we divide the community into a government of foreign officials on the one hand, and a nation of serfs on the other; of foreigners, constantly shifting their quarters, having no permanent connexion with the country, and always looking forward to the day when they shall return to England with a fortune, and of serfs, who are the natives of the land, linked and identified with its interests and sympathies, and many of whom are regarded as little better than menial servants, who might have been governors of provinces but for us; all of whom are confined to such low, ill-paid offices, as we cannot fill ourselves: for instance, in the military profession, the veteran native officer is as much below the rawest European ensign as that ensign is below his commander-in-chief; and in the civil administration, every appointment of real dignity and emolument is reserved for a covenanted European service; and therefore did Lord William Bentinck say, after having done all that has yet been done for elevating the natives, that our system was the reverse of the Mahommedan policy, that our policy was "cold, selfish, and unfeeling—the iron hand of power on the one side, monopoly and exclusion on the other." And therefore do we hear of robberies and oppressions in Oude and Hyderabad, and yet the people do not fly to us, because hope is

with them, and the future is not a blank; instead of flying into our territory, they go from it; often in flocks; come into it they never do; only the other day some important works on the Kistnah were stopped because the people of the country fled, *en masse*, into the Nizam's dominions. And why do they prefer to live under "effete" native Governments? because they do not feel themselves degraded as they do under us, for it is not the arbitrary power of a national sovereign, but subjugation to a foreign one that destroys national power and extinguishes national spirit, and with this the mainspring of whatever is laudable both in public and private life—but we make them feel the rule of the stranger to their heart's core; we set a barrier of privilege between the natives and their foreign masters; the lowest European officer in a black or red coat, is above every native gentleman, though the latter may be the descendant of a line of princes, and is often a man of the most chivalrous feelings and the highest accomplishments; nevertheless, we treat them as an inferior race of beings, and we are making them so; our monopoly of every high office, from generation to generation, is systematically degrading the people of India; the deterioration of native character under our rule is manifest to every one; and Sir Thomas Munro went so far as to say: "it would be more "desirable that we should be expelled from the coun- "try altogether, than that the result of our system of "Government should be such an abasement of a whole "people." Here are samples of "the blessings of the British Rule!"

I have not the skill to state the case in eloquent language, and cannot express what I feel about it, but a man of imagination who pleaded this cause would often bring tears into his reader's eyes; however, I do beseech the reader to consider this series of facts, told in the plainest, simplest manner, and to say whether such "*blessings*" can justify our passion for aggrandizement in India? And I have not done: I have yet to describe the means and the end of gratifying this passion; because, considering that our bureaucratic, irresponsible Government of India, has lately shewn that it would no longer respect the clearest rights and treaties when it could find a pretext for grasping a little more revenue and patronage; and considering that Malcolm, Elphinstone, Metcalfe, Russell, Munro, the Duke of Wellington, and most of our great Indian statesmen, have emphatically condemned the absorption of the native States, and that our unfortunate allies, above 250 native Princes, in the presence of an overwhelming army, with no tribunal before which they can carry their complaints, and placed as a class out of the pale of the law, that they have now confiscation always hanging over their heads, I must explain the outrageous breach of faith involved in our absorption of native States, and shew what the Duke meant when he said it "degraded and beggared the natives and made them all enemies." The means now employed by the Government to absorb the native States are to deny the right of adoption. Probably the reader is aware that adoption is one of the most

solemn duties of religion in India, in the case of failure of sons: which continually happens in the reigning families. By this ceremony the adopted son becomes as much an heir as an heir of the body, and Mr. Holt Mackenzie has proved beyond dispute that there is no foundation for drawing a distinction between succession to private property and succession to political power, in the force and effect of adoption, but the adopted son acquires all and every one of the rights of a legitimate heir of the body. Of course this right of adoption is the dearest privilege of the native Princes, and the most necessary to them, as their States would soon fall into our hands without it; and this right has been given to the people of India in express words, by an early Act of Parliament, and has been formally asserted by Governors-General, as Lords Amherst, Metcalfe and Auckland, and asserted by the law officers of the Government and the courts of Bengal over and over again, and has been admitted by us for many years in the succession of native States, without any requiring of previous notice, or any reserve or qualification whatsoever, in a great number of precedents. Nevertheless, the Government has at length decided, with the object, avowed without disguise, of getting more revenue, that, as the paramount power in India, succeeding to the authority of the Emperor of Delhi, its sanction to an act of adoption is necessary, and it is entitled to withhold this sanction; and accordingly it has within the last few years set aside three adoptions, and confiscated the native states of Sattarah, Colabah, and Mandavie,

although, in each of these three cases, there were collateral blood relations and heirs of the deceased prince, after the adopted son.

Now, I will first say a few words about the Emperor of Delhi, and put him out of the way; for he has no more to do with the question than the man in the moon. When the poor Emperor came into our hands, as Scindiah's prisoner, blinded twenty years before, did we restore him to his empire? Certainly not! Did he then give us a grant of his paramount power in India? if so, how came we to make treaties with his feudatories as independent Princes? The fact is, as all the world knows, our paramount power was won, and is kept, by the sword. And such are the "blessings of the British rule," that we are obliged to remain armed to the teeth to keep it; and we had better not forget that we keep it by the sword of a native army, which has a strong personal interest in the right of adoption.

I now come to the queetion of the sanction. Undoubtedly, where there is a dispute or doubt as to the succession, the sanction of the paramount power is necessary; because the paramount power is entitled and bound to keep the peace in India, and to prevent any violation of rights, or outrage on the feelings of the people, which may endanger the public safety; and in a disputed or doubtful case of succession, its sanction is necessary, to prove that an adoption is legal and regular, and to award the succession to the rightful claimant. But this sanction of the paramount

power is a judicial sanction; it is the same thing as the Lord Chancellor's decision on a will; and when the sanction of the paramount power is required or requested in allied States, not subject or belonging to it, but connected with it by treaties, its duty is to find out the heir, and to give the succession to the heir, not to seize on the inheritance itself, in defiance of all the heirs. It was as much an act of robbery for us to appropriate the principalities of Sattarah, Calabah, and Mandavie, in defiance of all the heirs, as it would be for the Lord Chancellor to pocket a legacy, because it was being litigated in his court. We are improving upon a precedent set by Caligula, in our violation of the right of adoption. When Caligula was invited to a nuptial feast, he carried away his friend's wife: when the British Resident is invited to the death-bed of a native Prince, he turns his friend's widow and orphan out of doors, and confiscates their inheritance. And they do not take these things so quietly in the country as we do here. We hear of the absorption of a native State, and go about our business, and think no more of the matter; like a ship's crew, who duly note in the log, "run down a vessel in the night: all hands lost;" then pursue their voyage and forget it. But these things lodge and rankle in men's minds in India, where too many of our troops are interested in this question of adoption; and, as I said before, the free press is doing its work.

I am convinced that the Government will some day regret the system that is making so many enemies.

It will some day absorb a native State too many, and feel a pang like one who has put a fruit into his mouth, with a hornet in it. We must not expect the Rajpùt Princes to lie still like oysters, waiting to be dredged. They are, and ever were, a high-spirited, martial race, prompt to appeal to the sword, and just the men to say, in a fit of exasperation, "better an end with fear than fear without an end." Meanwhile, the natives have a stereotyped expression for us, which gives us a false confidence. We tread on ice, and forget the current of passion flowing beneath, which imperils our footing. The natives seem what they know we expect them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings: we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out; we are obliged to keep it up by our native army, which may blaze into a conflagration, and burn the empire. There may be some Procida, matchless in diplomatic art and tenacity of purpose, who will travel for years to knit enemies against us; who will mine the ground under our feet, and lay the train of combustibles: there may be some outrage, which will suddenly raise a cry, terrible as that which broke forth when the bells of Monreale were sounding to vespers, a cry of "Death to the Englishmen:" there may be some conspiracy, of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the native regiments open their fire on our barracks: and, as a merchant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in India which will cost us more to maintain our power, than

all we have gained, or can ever hope to gain, by our confiscations.

Nor does the injury stop with the families of the Princes. Native States support a numerous class of civil and military functionaries, who cannot find employment under us; besides the holders of jagheers, enams, &c. who know that their property is doomed when they fall under our rule. And in a State like the last absorbed, in place of thirty or forty natives exercising the civil administration of affairs, with salaries of from 100 to 200 rupees a month, which they spend in the country, we substitute one or two Europeans, receiving from 2000 to 3000 rupees a month, and remitting the bulk of their salaries to England. Moreover, the bread of almost every man in and about the capital of a native State depends on the expenditure of the native Government; and not only many thousands of natives directly dependent upon it, but the manufacturers and shopkeepers dependent upon them, are nearly all ruined by our absorption; and their distress reacts on the cultivators of the soil. This is why the Duke said that absorption "degrades and beggars the natives, and makes them all enemies." Similar results follow, in proportion, from the resumption of the landed estates of the aristocracy. Shore says, "to bring the subject home to an English heart "and mind, let us turn our thoughts to our native "land, and compare the effects produced by individual "example and influence there, with what might have "been the case here. Let us represent to ourselves

" an English country gentleman, overlooking his estate, " promoting the improvement of agriculture, superin- " tending the roads and public buildings, and sub- " scribing to the local charities. As a neighbour, " opening his house, and by his hospitality affording " the means of social interconrse to his neighbours; all " the different members of his family contributing their " share to the general good. Contrast the picture " with the state of things in India. The upper classes " of the natives, who used to occupy the above situ- " ations, ruined, and their places supplied by fo- " reigners, who keep aloof from the people, and " whose ultimate object is to return to England with a " fortune." He adds, " As to the number of respect- " able people who have suffered, let any one leave the " English stations, few and far between, and go into " the country towns and villages, and there see the " innumerable houses which not many years ago were " in good repair, and inhabited by men who lived in " the style of gentlemen, keeping up establishments of " servants, horses, elephants, and equipages, but which " are now all falling to decay, while their owners or " their descendants are dwelling in mud huts, with " little more than the merest necessaries of life." And let the reader recollect that the destruction of the native aristocracy is still going on with unremitting vigour, as one of the " blessings of the British rule."

How can we reconcile it to our conscience or our reason to treat the natives in this manner? It was a beautiful fiction of the Greeks, that Ulysses could no

longer feign madness when his child was thrown before his plough; but we have allowed a Bureaucracy to plough over India till the "iron has entered into the soul" of her people, when we did not seem to be mad at all.

However, I believe there is a secret cause why the English public feel so little sympathy for the natives, which is entirely founded on a misunderstanding, and on ignorance of the native character. Lord Ellenborough said last session, that "no intelligent people would submit to our Government;" and though he alone would dare to say it, I am quite satisfied in my own mind that many think it, and that my countrymen in their hearts despise the natives of India, because they do submit to our Government. Nevertheless, this submission does not argue cowardice in those who submit. We enforce submission by an overwhelming mercenary army; and as long as that army is faithful, submission is a matter of necessity; but although, under such circumstances they submit to our Government, there is not a race on the face of the earth who possess more personal courage than the men of India; and the fact is not altered by their subjection to us, because the bravest people in the world may be subjugated by foreigners when they are divided against themselves, which was the case with the natives of India when we founded our empire there. And not only were they divided, but for half a century before an opening was given for our supremacy; the great powers of the country had been shattered by wars, which may be called wars

of giants, from the magnitude of their operations. In the last great battle, in 1798, which decided the contest between the Mahrattas and Rajpùts, the forces brought into the field by the latter were 125,000 strong, and by the former 111,000 strong; large bodies of the troops on both sides being armed and disciplined in the European fashion; and I will quote the description of a charge of cavalry in this action, taken from the mouth of an eye-witness, Colonel Skinner, to shew the gallantry of the men:—"We now saw Chevalier "Dudennaig's brigade or division, which was on the "left, charged by the Rahtórs. He received them "nobly, but was cut to pieces by them. Out of 8000 "men he had not 200 left. The Rahtórs, more than "ten thousand in number, were seen approaching from "a distance; the tramp of their immense and compact "body, rising like thunder over the roar of the battle. "They came on first at a slow hand-canter, which "increased in speed as they advanced. The well-"served guns of the brigade showered grape upon "their dense mass, cutting down hundreds at each "discharge; but this had no effect in arresting their "progress. On they came, like a whirlwind, tramp-"ling over 1500 of their own body, destroyed by the "cannon of the brigade. Neither the murderous vol-"leys from the muskets, nor the serried hedge of "bayonets, could check or shake them; they poured "like a torrent on and over the brigade, and rode it "fairly down, leaving scarcely a vestige of it remain-"ing, as if the sheer weight of the mass had ground

" it to pieces." Again, we are accustomed to consider the battle of Waterloo one of the most sanguinary that ever was fought, yet our loss in some Indian battles has been about double the loss at Waterloo. The proportion of killed and wounded at Waterloo was one to six; that of Assaye was just double, one to three, and several have been near it; and the loss in the Sutlej battles, in 1846, was much more severe than that of Waterloo, being in the proportion of one to five. I could add many other proofs of the personal bravery of the natives; but it has always been conspicuous: so I will merely remind the reader of the brilliant native armies of Clive, Lawrence, and Coote, which carved out our way to empire. And yet those armies, unrivalled for valour and loyalty, were officered by native gentlemen, with only one or two Europeans to a brigade; and this was our original system in India, until the thirst for patronage, as usual, surmounted every other consideration, and substituted European for native officers.

Of late years sheer financial necessity has forced us to return to some extent to the old system, which is copied in our " irregular corps;" and the admirable state of efficiency and discipline of these " irregular corps" shews that we can employ the natives when we choose in situations of trust and power, and that it answers perfectly to do so. To return to my subject, I think I have said enough to shew that we should do very wrong to refuse our sympathy to the natives from a doubt of their courage; and they have many other

qualities which entitle them to our warm and kind consideration. I have noticed in the chapter on public works, their disposition to found benevolent institutions, and they are remarkable for a degree of charity in private life which renders the poor independent of public relief in India. "Their large family circles," says Mr. Campbell, "assist and support one another "to an admirable extent. Families generally live "together as on the Continent, and the young men "who go out to service return, and remit money most "dutifully to their families." The native merchants are particularly distinguished for their honourable mode of doing business, as well as for their enterprise; and Englishmen who have resided in native States bear witness to the simplicity and straightforward manner of the agricultural classes both in their dealings with them and amongst each other. It is only when they are corrupted by external influences, by a demoralising judicial system, or oppressive taxation, that art and cunning are substituted for candour, as the only protection against the hand of injustice and power; and I will add that those who have had much intercourse with the natives, in a commercial, political, or military character, almost invariably speak of them in very high terms; it is only among such judicial functionaries as have centered their observations on the most vicious classes of native society, and have overlooked the rest, that their detractors are to be found. Finally, it has been said by one of the most experienced members of the Indian service, that, "for the transaction

" of business, whether in accounts, diplomatic corre-
" spondence, or the conduct of judicial, magisterial, or
" financial affairs, the natives are seldom surpassed.
" They are, on the whole, an intelligent, tractable, and
" loyal people, not defective in energy when there is a
" motive for exertion, and eminently calculated to
" promote the arts of civil life." And now I have done. I have shewn that although there may be more complaint of the Government of England in one year, than we hear of the Government of India during two or three Charters, yet there has been suffering, not loud but deep, in the latter country; its cup of grief has filled silently to the brim, aye, it has filled to running over, though no man complained of it in England. The unfortunate natives have had their rights of property confiscated; their claims on our justice and humanity trampled under foot; their manufacturers, towns, and agriculturists beggared; their excellent institutions broken up; their judicial security taken away; their morality corrupted; their patrons systematically destroyed; and even their religious customs violated, by what are conventionally called the "blessings of the British rule." These great results at once strike the eye of any man who goes seriously into the question of our Indian administration; like the tombs by the side of the road at the entrance of ancient cities, these monuments of the power of a Bureaucracy are the first things we see, and in them lie buried the hopes of India. And as abuses were maintained in the provinces of the Roman

Republic, because the patricians who retired from their magistracy were shielded by the senate, so is the Indian Government regularly shielded by Parliament. And at this day it is an understood thing that the Legislature intends to seal the misery of India, by leasing her out for another twenty years to the present irresponsible Home Government, which will again be exhorted to *govern paternally*, just as Isaac Walton exhorts his angler, in hooking a worm, "to handle him as if he loved him." The Parliament would not dare openly and directly to oppress India, yet it votes a Bureaucracy full power to do so. I cannot help warning my countrymen that if they stand by, and look quietly on, while this political martyrdom is once more consummated, their consenting to the deed will leave a heavy debt of vengeance against them, not only on earth but in heaven; it will provoke that retributive justice, which frequently allows an individual to escape, but never, never fails to overtake a nation. Let them weigh this well before they say, On our heads and on our children's be it! It is true, that we have an overwhelming mercenary army, and the word is passed, no danger above the horizon; but some may be coming; and in history we are always wise after the event, and when it is too late, when the bolt has fallen, and the penalty has been paid, then for the first time do politicians see why a Government based on injustice and bad faith could not stand; and what innumerable consequences of its own wrong-doing were all the while undermining its power. God forbid that we should be wise too late in India!

I have one more word to say in conclusion. Never, since the world began, was so great an opportunity of doing good, offered to a great nation, as that which Providence now offers to us in India. England is the sovereign arbiter and empress of that glorious land, with its 150 millions of "intelligent, tractable, and loyal" people, and she might throw herself on the fallen empire, as Elisha did on the Shunammite's child, "and "put his mouth upon his mouth, and his eyes upon his "eyes, and his hands upon his hands,"—so might England stretch herself on the prostrate Empire, and warm and quicken its torpid body, and breathe new life into India. She might raise the natives, and watch their progress, moral and material, as a mother watches her child, and loves it the better for the anxieties it has cost her; she might behold from year to year, the blessings she conferred, and feel the tie strengthening which attached her to India; she might have the answer of a good conscience, and the esteem of the whole civilized world. Oh, my countrymen! may Heaven itself soften your hearts, and awaken your sympathy for this interesting people; may it teach you not to reject your fated opportunity, nor again throw such a pearl as India, before an irresponsible Bureaucracy.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SYSTEM OF PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION FOR INDIA.

DEAN SWIFT said, in reprobating the neglect of education in his day, that it was a common remark in families who had wealth enough to afford to have their sons good for nothing, "why should my son be a scholar, when it is not intended he should live by his learning?" He added, that by the same rule another man might say, "why should my son be honest, temperate, just, or charitable, when he does not mean to depend on any of these qualities for a maintenance!" And by the same rule the House of Commons actually do say, "why should one of the Ministry be compelled to prove the success of his department, when the Ministry does not depend on Indian affairs for its existence?" This is true enough, and the fate of an English Ministry now depends on matters of Home administration, and on Home questions, and parties, and politics, quite independent of the affairs of India. But I will shew that this state of things is eminently unsafe and unconstitutional, and from the time when, seventy years ago, a mere legislative oversight threw India out of the list of English political questions, it has been the

cause of shameful abuses in India ever since, it is the cause of perilous mal-administration at the present time, it has led to an almost incredible neglect of the subject by the House of Commons, and after all there is not in the whole range of our national interests any one more vital to the national life than our tenure of dominion in the East.

It is wonderful that my countrymen do not see the palpable contradiction of leaving India out of the list of their political questions. Why, there is not one of them of more importance to us! Is not our preservation of India an integral part of the Imperial policy? Is it not necessary to our commerce that India should be prosperous, and to our safety that it should not be disaffected? Would not a violation of religion and the rights of property, which lit a flame of insurrection in the Rajpootanah and sent over three-fourths of our Bengal seapoys to the enemy, instantly paralyze the right arm of England? Would not even a financial crisis in India shake the British Empire to its foundation? But let the reader imagine the same mistake being made in the case of England, that was made in the case of India. Let him conceive a Minister, "with a majority behind," coming down and telling the House that, "the Ways and Means were an exceedingly awkward subject; there always had been a good deal of debating and ministerial risk about it, and there always would be; therefore it would make things pleasant if the House would vote that for twenty years there should be no more Budgets; and the House should

interfere with any thing else it liked except with taxation; and if the Ministry in office, twenty years afterwards, preferred to revive the Budget, it might." Suppose such a measure had been passed in England 70 years ago, and the army had been strong enough to keep the people down, what would our commerce and rights of property have been worth now? What would have become of our municipal institutions? how much judicial reform should we have had? would there not have been an annual deficit in our finances by this time, instead of the surplus? Yet this is substantially the very same measure which was passed for India 70 years ago, and which of course removed her in a very short time from the list of our political questions, and rendered her Government so thoroughly irresponsible, that it now threatens to be the ruin of both countries. And after all, this was a mere oversight of the Legislature, and it shews how blind men are to the future, even the wisest of them, that although in those days the public mind was absorbed by Indian questions, and there was a most able and bitter opposition, eager to find any handle for an attack on the Minister, and headed by such men as Fox and Burke, not one of them foresaw an incidental and indirect consequence of Mr. Pitt's bill, which has had more effect than any direct provision, and has imperceptibly and silently produced a complete revolution in Parliamentary legislation for India, and thrown a subject which used to excite intense interest in the Parliament and the nation, out of the list of our

political questions. The point was this: as long as the Indian budget was presented to Parliament by parties indifferent to, and sometimes hostile to the Minister, and always viewed with distrust by the House of Commons, these parties were obliged to give not merely a simple publication of accounts but a periodical exposure of Indian affairs, with detailed information on all subjects connected with our Indian policy, and this kept the Members of Parliament well informed upon the question, and enabled them to discuss it, or rather ensured their discussing it, from year to year. And of course this constant supply of information was incomparably more necessary in the case of India than in any English question, not only because all kinds of political intelligence are freely published in England, which are concealed in India, but because the mere distance of the people of India from English politicians shews them to us in a point of view so remote that we are too often disposed to *see them as if they were not*, and to neglect complaints uttered so far off that they cannot reach our ears. However, from the time when the Indian budget became the Minister's budget, as he naturally did not feel inclined to provoke Parliamentary inspection of his administration, and as everybody had overlooked the necessity of making an express provision to meet the case, the periodical supply of information came to an end with the state of things which had led to it, and the consequence was that in a very few years Members of Parliament ceased to be well informed

upon the subject or competent to discuss it, and so India imperceptibly fell out of the list of our political questions, and its Government became irresponsible; and irresponsible it will remain, until the Minister is compelled to give Parliament once more a detailed annual exposure of Indian affairs. From the time when India ceased in this manner to be a political question, the neglect of it by Parliament has been something so incredible, that unless when I relate it, I could appeal to history at every step, I should not expect to be believed; and the description of it will be a lesson to Members of Parliament that they are as helpless as children in Indian affairs when they do not receive regular periodical information about them. At the time of the passing of the Charter in 1794, the House of Commons little thought that the recent "measure for the relief of the Zemindars," the "Perpetual Settlement" would effect a complete social revolution, and a sweeping confiscation of property in the doomed provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; nor could they imagine that while Mr. Dundas was giving them a glowing description of Indian prosperity, the despatches of the Governor-General contained a minute and shocking picture of the sufferings of the people, from the vices of the Government! But at this period, from the causes above mentioned, India was already ceasing, and had almost ceased to be an English political question, and as, in Mr. Mill's words, "Ministerial influence in Parliament can always get "ministerial praises received as articles of belief,

"without any real grounds for it." Mr. Dundas literally managed to persuade the nation that the financial state of India was a subject not merely of rejoicing and triumph, but even of astonishment, as affording a surplus revenue! A few years more threw a new and terrible light on the condition of our native fellow-subjects. The surplus revenue had turned out, as Indian surplus revenue *invariably* does, a complete bubble, and it gradually transpired in England that our unhappy provinces in India had been a scene of fiscal tyranny, of crime, and of suffering, unexampled in any civilized country since the decay of the Roman empire. Forced at length to investigate, the House of Commons in 1810, not only corroborated the above charges, but accused the Indian Government of continual misrepresentation; "whether the Zemindar or the ryot were the sufferer, the Government always found something to commend." Meanwhile, as if to balance the calamities of our northern Provinces, a new revenue system called ryotwar was introduced in the south, viz. a settlement with individual cultivators on the basis of assuming 50 per cent of the produce, *in money*, as the due of the Government! After some years experience of this system its originator had discovered that "its radical defect "was our over-assessment, which augments the public "and reduces the private property in the soil to such a "degree as to involve the necessity of ousting all be- "tween the Government and the cultivator." This was indeed a *radical defect*; it was simply the confiscation

of all the landlord's property in the soil by foreign conquerors! Moreover, the Madras Board of Revenue had accused the inventors of this system of "ignorantly denying, and by their denial abolishing private property in land," and though "professing to limit their demand on each field, in fact by establishing for such limit an unattainable maximum, assessing the ryot at discretion." Finally, the ablest administrator of the ryotwar system, Sir Thomas Munro, had declared that unless the assessment were reduced from 25 to 33 per cent, the land would go out of cultivation. Nevertheless, in spite of all this, the Government had but recently enforced the adoption of this ryotwar system, without any reduction of the assessment, when, under such circumstances, the House of Commons was once more called upon solemnly to judge the Indian Government, and to confirm or alter a system which had produced so much pain and ruin, and threatened to produce so much more. I pass over judicial and other grievances for the present, but with the above facts recorded on official authority, the House of Commons discussed the renewal of the Charter in 1813. Surely it was then at length time to do something for the natives; time to amend a despotic Government evidently well adapted for conquest and aggrandisement, but for nothing else; time to revive the periodical statement of Indian affairs, which used to draw public attention to them almost every year; time to adopt the plan recommended so long before by Warren Hastings, and

again urged by the Marquis of Wellesley, to ascertain and define the rights of property of every description in land, and make such definitions the basis of adjudication. But no! it is painful to record the transaction. The natives of India were treated like so many cattle. Their interests, their feelings, their hopes, and their fears, were alike forgotten. The only thing the House of Commons was well informed about was certain private, pecuniary, English interests. The battle of the Charter was fought over the heads of the natives, by parties eager for their trade, but too eager to give a thought to the myriads of human beings who yielded its profit. The leaders in the House of Commons, that is, ministers intent on securing Parliamentary support, Directors and merchants, greedy for private interests, at length struck their bargain, and having done the best they could for themselves, and professed much concern for the natives, they agreed on a fresh twenty years lease of India, to the old irresponsible Government. And now the "radical defect" was allowed to have full swing—the House of Commons had decided that a system which "ousted all between the government and the cultivator," and "assessed the ryot at an unattainable maximum," might be applied with impunity to the natives of India, and the ryotwar system fell with crushing effect on our southern provinces. The miserable inhabitants of Madras endured this oppression until the year 1827, when Sir Thomas Munro carried out, as Governor, the reductions he had recommended

in 1807. And this relief was only obtained at last by the efforts of Sir Thomas Munro and other private individuals, and the pressure of public opinion, not by any act of the House of Commons, which never interfered to protect the natives, nor manifested the slightest sympathy with their sufferings, though it had reserved to itself full power to superintend and control the Indian Government. In the year 1833, the necessity for renewing the Charter once more brought the whole question of Indian administration under the consideration of the House of Commons. There had now been half a century's experience of irresponsible Government in India, and again the House of Commons had the opportunity of altering or confirming the normal system of confiscation which had consigned Bengal to ruin in 1793, Madras in 1813, and which was beginning to crush Bombay in 1833. Moreover, there was now abundant information, which might have been accessible to the House of Commons, of the sufferings and claims of the natives in other respects. The frightful evils of the judicial system had been incessantly recorded by official authority for nearly forty years—the necessity of constructing public works had been loudly proclaimed—the transit duties, now completing the ruin of the manufacturers and towns of India, had been denounced as "the curse of the country"—the attempt to conduct all affairs by European agency, and exclude the natives from every office which it was possible to offer to an Englishman, had been confessed a notorious failure—

the destruction of the native municipal institutions had been admitted to be subversive of the security of person and property among the people—the inhumanity and impolicy of destroying the native territorial aristocracy had been strikingly exposed by Sir John Malcolm and others—the identical recommendation of Warren Hastings and the Marquis of Wellesley, which I have already mentioned, had now been endorsed by the great name of Lord Hastings; and finally the most fatal instance of the operation of "the revenue screw" that ever was known in India, the famous Bundelkund case, was going on at this very time,—and what did the House of Commons do? They met the judicial evils by the mockery of an additional member of Council at Calcutta; they met the necessity of appointing the natives to high office, strongly insisted on by such men as Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Munro, by the mockery of declaring their eligibility, and leaving it to the Directors to carry out this eligibility, who of course treated it with utter contempt. In fact, they shewed as before, that the only matters on which they were really well-informed were certain private, pecuniary, English interests. There was still a rag of the Company's trade to be fought for, and this fight the House of Commons understood and sympathised with, but beyond this they shewed that they did not look upon their responsibility in legislating for so many millions of our native fellow subjects as being really serious, that they were ready to vote anything that suited the Ministry of the

day in Indian affairs, and that they performed this duty of deciding questions on which the welfare of India was to depend for another twenty years, "not "merely with indifference to, but with feelings of im- "patience and disgust at," the whole subject. Of course, under such circumstances, not one of the above grievances was redressed, or even discussed in earnest. As wretched mariners who approach the harbour-light, only to be driven out to sea again by the storm, the unfortunate natives only witnessed a renewal of the Charter to have all their hopes disappointed, and India was again consigned to an irresponsible Government for another twenty years, to undergo all the mal-administration I have described, and a great deal more than I have described. And this "not mere indifference to, but rather feeling of impatience and disgust at," everything which concerns the natives of India, is still the prevailing sentiment in the House of Commons. It is still the case that, as Mr. Macaulay has told us, an inquiry into a row at Covent Garden would ensure fuller benches in the House than the most important subject connected with India. The debate of June, 1850, was one signal instance of it, and I will now give another. There never was a more "wicked war" and a more wholly unjustifiable measure than our invasion of Affghanistan; it is difficult to reckon the number of millions which it has added, immediately and by its consequences, to the debt of India, and it was plunged into in spite of the most energetic remonstrances and warnings, and explanations of its

impolicy, by all those who were competent to offer an opinion on the matter. Nevertheless, Parliament hardly made a pretence of calling to account the irresponsible Minister who said "I did it," and who coolly avowed many years afterwards that it was "a folly if not a crime," and the presentation of a Blue-book, which Captain Kaye has since gibbeted as the grossest specimen of "official lying" that ever insulted a country, at once satisfied the House of Commons.

Now, as this case only came out by accident, we are left to wonder how many millions have been added to the debt of India, by the "follies if not crimes" of our irresponsible Ministers, which have not come out? and, what is still more important, *how many will be added hereafter?* For every irresponsible Minister knows he has nothing to fear from Parliament; and as the ultimate burthen of every "folly if not a crime" falls on the back of the miserable ryots, nobody cares and nobody complains to any purpose in England. However, there is a time for all things, and this system of abuse has had its day, and though I would rather urge reform on higher grounds than those of mere self-interest, I must remark that in such a state of the finances and resources of India as those described in my sixth chapter, something must be done, and done at once, if we mean to avert a catastrophe. For there is reason to believe that the financial state of our Indian empire is really much worse than the studiously mystified and maimed financial report of the Blue-book enables us to prove; but even

from the imperfect data furnished by the Blue-book, any one may see that a crisis is at length approaching, and that our present system of Indian administration must be leading to some fearful tragedy.

I will therefore remind the reader of a few of the most urgent wants of the present system for which I have explained the necessity in this book. 1stly, The condensation of that immense mass of detailed correspondence now transmitted to England, which renders it impossible for Indian Ministers or Directors to read the reports, and thereby reduces the Home Government under the power of a Bureaucracy. And well do the Bureaucracy understand their interest in this matter, for, as Mr. Campbell informs us, page 216, the Governor-General made one or two attempts to condense and arrange the shiploads of papers now sent home from India, and such measures were at once reversed and disallowed by the Home Government. 2ndly, A system of accounts not "made up in a way to deceive the public," to use the words of the Friend of India, by putting down *different* receipts and charges in separate Presidencies under *the same* heads; by omitting the detail of receipts and charges, so that it is impossible to find out the cause of their rise or decline and their ultimate prospects; and in the ways noticed at page 124 and Appendix C. 3rdly, The concession of that administrative power to the local Governments which they alone are competent to exercise, and for the judicious use of which they will be responsible, and depriving them of that political power

for which the Supreme Government will be found a more disinterested depositary. At present we do the very reverse of this; we allow a political power to the local Governments which enables them to involve us in a Coorg war, a Khutputt case at Baroda, &c., and we refuse them sufficient administrative power to make a ghaut or a pier. 4thly, The settlement of the land tax on the principles of the North-western Provinces. 5thly, The expenditure by the local Government of 5 per cent of the land revenue on public works. 6thly, Legal reform, and the restoration of the *indigenous* local self-government of our Indian fellow subjects, and their popular representation to a considerable extent, through their 'head-men' of villages, towns, and counties. 7thly, A just and generous policy towards the Indian princes and aristocracy, and a fair share of official power and emoluments for the natives.

I have therefore proposed to reform those evident abuses in the Home Government to which I trace all the evils of India, by cutting down the Bureaucracy, purifying the Court of Directors, and making the Indian Minister responsible to Parliament. Less than this will not do; but this is merely a practical reform of proved abuses; it is no theoretic innovation; it is no construction of a "model Government" on abstract principles. Indeed, I have not the least idea that the old grievances of India can be cured in a day by any model Government, nor if I could get the same parliamentary representation for India that existed 70 years

ago, should I expect to see any inveterate grievance immediately redressed. For instance, supposing my plan were adopted, and the Minister were compelled to give a full annual communication of Indian affairs, then the way would probably be this: some friend of India would go to a Member of Parliament and say, "When the Minister makes his statement, see what he "says on a particular subject, and then ask him such "and such questions, or state such and such facts." Well, the Member of Parliament would play his part, and the official man, having had due notice, would make a most satisfactory reply, and the House, who were beginning to feel uncomfortable, would be glad to see the complaint so effectually disposed of. However, next Session the complaint would reappear, with a complete exposure of any official fraud and sophistry by which it had been met the year before, with a larger array of facts in its support, with more Members knowing the circumstances of the case, with the advantage perhaps of having appealed to the press in the interval, and it appears by one of my authorities that the *Times* has shewn its readiness to open its columns to any well authenticated case of Indian grievance, and let any one imagine this going on, not for one or two, but for five, or six, or seven years, with a heavier weight of proof thrown into the discussion every year, and the ripple gradually widening and circling round the public, and then say whether it is not probable that, under such circumstances, an Indian grievance would be redressed in a few years? But let me re-

mind the reader that it would be a new life for India to have the chance of getting a grievance redressed in a few years! Under the present system every evil principle of administration is allowed to work itself fairly out, and exhaust all the poison in its nature, before there is any change, so that when at last necessity enforces a change, the mischief done is irreparable. And meanwhile, it is utterly useless to appeal to the Bureaucracy, for the atmosphere of office seems to harden their hearts and render their minds callous to impressions from without, till it changes their very nature; as certain springs have the property of petrifying bits of wood that fall into their water. I emphatically repeat that no reform is more urgently required than this one of giving *by word of mouth* a periodical supply of information on all subjects connected with our Eastern policy to the House of Commons. Let the Minister be compelled to give an account of his stewardship, to give a detailed statement of Indian affairs once a year, and Members of Parliament would again become competent to discuss the subject; and again they would discuss it, again the Government would become responsible, and the grievances of the natives would be redressed, simply because men were informed of them. I will appeal to human nature and to our every day experience for proof of what I say. Why have I written this book, why have I spoken warmly (perhaps too warmly, but my heart has burned within me to see the injury to India and the peril to England), why have I taken so much trouble

about this question? because I was informed of the facts, and other men were not. And in moral qualities I have always observed that the mass of mankind were exactly like myself, neither better nor worse. I have always seen that any gross outrage on common sense and justice, particularly against their own interests, shocked other men just as it did me, when they found it out. And though it may please certain novelists to describe us as purely selfish beings, that is not a true portrait of human nature; there is a divine spark at the bottom of every man's heart which will leap into life when it is properly appealed to; and it is appealed to, every day, among us, in private and in public, in the press and the Parliament, and in no country is it more prompt to answer the appeal.

What is the difference between a Member of Parliament who shews "not merely indifference to, but feelings of impatience and disgust at," the performance of a sacred duty to India, and myself? It is that he has not information and I have. Give him information and he will be as warm for justice to India as I am, for our nature is exactly the same. But some people can trust nothing to human nature; they prefer to invent model Governments to do the work of human nature; it is like the Romans building such expensive aqueducts, because they never thought of water finding its own level. And look at our daily experience. What is the Parliament, and the press, and the system which draws such a degree of popular reverence and attachment to our institutions, as ensured sweet calm

in England, when a hurricane raged over the rest of Europe? Aye! it made our isle a charmed spot where the demon of revolutions could not set his foot; and it procures a visible respect for the law in this nation which astonished the foreigners who visited our Exhibition, more than anything else they saw. What is all this but a system of representation? of representing to the Legislature the wants, and wishes, and claims, and grievances of the people? of informing the Legislature what they feel, and suffer, and hope from its sympathy, or expect from its justice? And why is this system so loved by the people, and so universally admired and envied by foreigners? because it gives the people a guarantee that they shall be governed by equal laws, and that their grievances shall be redressed. Not that it prevents grievances! no system ever did, or could, or ever will do so.

But now see the cruel injustice we are doing to India! We do not find it too much for ourselves to have a Parliament sitting for months every year, to correct and extend our legislation and suit it to our social changes; to have besides the most perfect representation of all our complaints and desires in the press which it is possible to conceive; and with all this to watch vigilantly the responsibility of every depositary of power amongst us, as our only security against official tyranny, neglect, incompetency, and plunder; and, after all, we prove many serious grievances, and the reader of the public journals for the last year alone is familiar with much deserved

blame of every department of our Administration, of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Horse Guards, the Admiralty, the Customs, &c. Can we then affect to believe that a sham inquiry once in 20 years, with almost total neglect in the interval, is sufficient to redress the grievances of India? Can we pretend to think that the despotic administration of 150 millions of men, conducted at a distance of many thousand miles away from us, by a few hundred foreigners, having little intercourse with the natives and no permanent stake in their country, and directed by irresponsible Home Authorities, who betray the utmost anxiety to conceal the truth from the public, can we pretend to think that such an Administration has done or is doing justice to the people of India, without being checked by a particle of anything like political representation? Would not any man who had studied history or human nature, divine all the injury and injustice to the natives which I have described, from merely knowing the conditions of our irresponsible Indian Government? Let the reader conceive any one English question, parliamentary reform, legal reform, free trade, any one of them, being turned over to the Ministry of the day and their successors for 20 years, to give or withhold, at their pleasure, without hearing one word of explanation, or remonstrance, or information of our interest in the matter, and our sufferings for want of a legislative remedy. Would not this seem monstrous in our own case? Why then do we unscrupulously apply it to

India? Why do we treat, not one, but all, of her vital questions and dearest interests in a manner which seems monstrous when applied to ourselves? Oh, my countrymen! do not continue this inhuman system. Do not consign India to an irresponsible Government for another 20 years, and coldly tell her "abi in pace," as the Inquisition used to say in sending its victims back to the torture, when you know it must lead to cruel neglect and mal-administration.

The Indian Government was originally responsible to Parliament, and it is only by an unheard-of abuse, repugnant alike to our principles, and customs, and institutions, and to all our English notions of what is right, that this Government has become irresponsible. Do not permit such an abuse to go on, particularly because England is exposed to great and increasing peril while the Indian Government is allowed to be irresponsible. I shall be met, I know, by the old argument that the Legislature cannot make any change because Indian reformers do not agree among themselves upon what ought to be done. But is this argument really serious? Why men must have remained savages ever since the creation of the world, if nothing had ever been done till all men were agreed upon what ought to be done. The argument is as much as to say there shall be no progress until a condition is complied with, which is notoriously impossible. Besides, I apprehend that it is not merely the function of legislators to redress grievances, but their duty to find out the means of doing so. There is not the same obligation on a private

person who proves the grievance; he is only one of the patients; a legislator is the state physician; and if it is not the business of Members of Parliament to know and apply the proper cure for political grievances, then what is their business? Conceive the doctor of a consumptive hospital telling his patients, "My poor friends, one of you thinks one thing would "be good for his case, and another fancies something "else, now I know how to cure your disease, because "it is my profession to understand it, and therefore "do I hold the honorable appointment of your medical "man, nevertheless as your own opinions about your "treatment differ, I beg you will excuse me from "giving you any prescription at all." Should we not think that a doctor who held this language had gone out of his mind? Yet it is just the same thing for our legislators to say they cannot make any change because Indian reformers do not agree about what ought to be done. After all, if Indian reformers do not agree about the remedy, they all agree about the great abuse of the Indian Government, viz.: its want of parliamentary responsibility. Every independent writer on India for the last fifty years, has emphatically denounced this abuse, and therefore it is the duty of the legislature to find a remedy for it. If Members of Parliament cannot fulfil this duty, they are not fit for the dignified positions they occupy; if they will not fulfil it, their refusal will lead to fatal results in India, long before another Charter is over. This is the opinion of every eminent man of long experience in that country,

whom I have had the honour to know, and it is worth the serious consideration of the British public.

And now I have done what I could to assist a righteous cause, and in this crisis of the Charter, when the future destiny of England is depending upon her choice of a policy towards her Eastern Empire, I expect that you too, reader, will do your duty—and may the Almighty Disposer of events, who has hitherto signally protected and blessed us—and has he not blessed us? are not the signs of his favour visible on every side? is it not written on our Houses of Parliament, and our Protestant churches? on the glories of our literature, and arts, and sciences? on the triumphs of our industry and invention? on the very look of the people, on all that meets the eye of an Englishman? and is it not an ungrateful return for his bounty to abuse that power over a hundred and fifty millions of our fellow creatures which he has given us in the East? may it not provoke him to punish an ungrateful race, and to cut off the inheritance of his blessings from the sons of those who turn his benefits against him? Yet now, while the fate of two Empires is trembling in the balance, even now may His mercy once more lighten upon us, and may He inspire the Great Council of the nation to frame such a legislative measure, as shall give justice to India; and thereby secure the safety and honour of England!

APPENDIX A.

Abstract of the expenditure on public works in Bengal and the North-West Provinces, for the ten years ending 1848-49, *as contained in the Blue Book printed by order of the House of Commons, August* 1, 1851.

Classification of Works.	Expenditure in the N.W. Provinces.	Expenditure in Bengal.	Total Expenditure.
On constructing, improving, and repairing roads	995857	7416659	8412516
Ditto, ditto, bridges	339076	696914	1035990
Total for roads and bridges	1334933	8113573	* 9448506
On canals and embankments, and works of irrigation	4758394	433895	† 5192289
Total for roads, bridges, canals, embankments, and works of irrigation	6093327	8547468	‡ 14640795
On repairs and construction of civil buildings	632635	3329425	3962060
Total expenditure by amount stated in the Blue Book	6725962	11876893	18602855

Mean of annual gross revenue for the ten years, &c., rupees, 14,69,58,709, or £14,695,870.

Mean of annual net revenue for the ten years, &c., rupees, 11,87,82,243, or £11,878,224.

* Mean of expenditure on roads and bridges for the ten years, &c., rupees, 9,44,850 or £94,485—shewing that less than three quarters of one per cent of the gross revenue, that is, less than £110,218, was expended on roads and bridges.

† Mean of expenditure on canals, embankments, and works of irrigation, for the ten years, &c., rupees, 5,19,228, or £51,922—shewing that less than the half of one per cent of the gross revenue, that is, less than £73,479, was expended on canals, embankments, and works of irrigation.

‡ Mean of expenditure on roads, bridges, canals, embankments, and works of irrigation, for the ten years, &c., rupees, 14,64,079, or 146,407—shewing that less than one and a quarter per cent of the net revenue, or less than £148,477, was expended altogether on public works other than civil buildings.

With the above statement before him, let the reader remember the proofs given in the Madras Engineer's letter, that public works in India produce more wealth both to the Government and the people than any gold mine has been known to produce.

APPENDIX B.

LAND REVENUE.

It is difficult to draw any conclusion as to the resources of the people from the produce of the land tax, as the receipts are continually swelled by lapses and resumptions, which augment the temporary revenue by weeding out the capitalists among the landowners; and by annexations, which are often not a gain but a loss to the general treasury; for instance, p. 468, par. 65, 66, states that Sattarah, recently annexed, is a loss to the finances of the state, though a gain to the land revenue of nearly 20 lacs! It requires therefore a knowledge of the particular items of this branch of revenue to draw any certain conclusion from it, and these particulars are not given in any public document. I will however state some general results and add a few comments upon them.

Bengal—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 3,47,616.

Agra—(old territory, excluding the Sutlej annexations.) The four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling-off in the last four years of Rs. 3,25,163.

Bombay—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off* in the last four years of Rs. 1,47,265.

Madras—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an annual increase† in the last four years of Rs. 24,21,306.

* I have deducted the increased revenue charges, p. 451, par. 11, because the Blue-book misstates the case as to the *increase* of these revenue charges. The fact is that "costs of collection" have been put down in the receipts of the Bombay land revenue of late years, which were not previously included in them. It is another proof of the want of detailed items of receipts and charges.

† The Blue-book states, p. 453. par. 16, that a portion of this increase is a set off against a loss of 28 lacs, by the repeal of the "transit duties;" which must be the case as these duties were far more inquisitorial and destructive of industry in Madras than any where else. However, on making application to the India House, to know the particulars of the Madras increase, I received information that the greater part of it was due to lapses and resumptions, quite independent of the ordinary land revenue of the Presidency. It is therefore impossible to arrive at any certain financial conclusion from the published accounts of the land-tax, and it will require full particulars of the receipts and charges to shew the prospects of the Indian Exchequer, and the real condition of the people.

SALT REVENUE.

The Blue-Book states, p. 454, 456, par. 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, that owing to the large importation of salt since the reduction of the duty, the receipts of the Government salt monopoly are rapidly declining, and it estimates the average annual decreased receipt* at 23 lacs in Bengal, 2 lacs in Madras, and 2 lacs in Bombay.

CUSTOMS REVENUE.

These receipts exhibit a falling off at one Presidency, from the abolition of the transit duties, and a still larger increase in others from the progressive importation of salt, but with a most unsatisfactory result on the whole which will require some comments.

Bengal—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual increase in the last four years of Rs. 12,34,153.

Agra—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual increase in the last four years of Rs. 10,90,532.

Madras—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 18,34,695.

Bombay—the four years ending 1849-50, in comparison with the four years ending 1845-6, exhibit an average annual falling off in the last four years of Rs. 6,95,586.

The total falling off on the receipts of above Presidencies, is Rs. 2,05,596.

I cannot but regard this result as a very bad symptom, and the index of a decline in the tax-paying powers of the people; for the annually increasing item of salt forms considerably more than half of the customs receipts of Bengal, and four-fifths of those of Agra, therefore, excepting the salt, I infer from the above result a decided and marked decline in the commerce of the Natives in other articles; and this conclusion is strongly confirmed by the following view, of the exports and imports.

* The cheapening of this necessary of life is indispensable to the health of the people, whatever loss it may be to the Government; and even now, the Natives, who live far more on vegetable diet than Europeans do, suffer severely in the interor of the country from the high price of salt.

IMPORTS.

Comparative statement of the value of merchandize imported into the Presidencies of British India, from the United Kingdom and other countries, from the four years ending 1845-6 and 1849-50.

	From the United Kingdom. Rs.	From other countries. Rs.
Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Average annual value during the four years ending 1845-6.	26,13,15,728	10,13,13,728
Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Average annual value during the four years ending 1849-50.	25,30,17,240	10,83,72,503

shewing a falling off in the value of the imports from the United Kingdom during the last four years of Rs. 82,98,488, and an increase of those of other countries of Rs. 70,58,775.

EXPORTS.

Comparative statement of the value of merchandize exported from the Presidencies of British India, to the United Kingdom and other countries, for the four years ending 1845-6 and 1849-50.

	To the United Kingdom. Rs.	To other countries. Rs.
Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Average annual value during the four years ending 1845-6.	27,48,06,571	36,94,35,307
Bengal, Madras, Bombay, Average annual value during the four years ending 1849-50.	25,41,39,431	36,65,46,925

shewing a falling off in the value of the exports to the United Kingdom during the last four years of Rs. 2,06,67,140, and a falling off in those to other countries of Rs. 28,88,382.

In this state of the resources of the Government and the people, the debt goes on increasing, and the cause of debt, *viz.* territorial aggrandisement goes on *pari passu*. Mr. Campbell published a book last year stating, p. 148, that we had "at last reached the limit of and become supreme in *all* "India. We have the whole country in our power to do as "we will with, and we have a natural line of circumvallation "dividing it from the rest of the world." Hardly was the

book published before the Government began a Burmese war —a war for which I can only conceive two even rational motives, that is, either the pressure of those private interests which seek for employment and promotion; or else the old policy of statesmen, as old as the time of Pericles, of plunging into a war to hide the embarrassment of their accounts by war charges. If this last motive be the true one, the Burmese war will be a dear way of passing the Indian accounts, for it is likely to prove quite as expensive as the last war which in two years added thirteen millions and a half to the debt,* and it will end as usual by annexation, and leave us with the certainty of future hostilities, aggrandisement and debt on a new and very exposed frontier, where we have already sown the seeds of another war by our differences with Siam in 1850. The same system is pursued on the other side of India. Before the Affghanistan war the highest authorities opposed it;† but in vain. Before the Caubul disaster it was pointed out, not only privately to the ministry, but to the nation,‡ that we possessed an impregnable frontier on the north-west, in the line from Loodianah to the sea; but in vain. The system prevailed, the line was passed, gradually Scinde, the Sutlej territories, and the Punjaub were annexed, and thus since 1839, about sixteen millions and a half were added to the debt,§ about 100,000 men to the standing army,‖ with a corresponding increase in the export of stores,¶ the dead weight at home and abroad,** the charges for the navy, &c.;†† and at the present day the Indian Press cries out, that the Governor-General can only be waiting for the conclusion of the Burmese war, to commence offensive operations against the Affghans. Under these circumstances, I derive no consolation from the argument I often hear, that the debt of India is little more than two years income, and good management would soon raise the revenues of the country so enormously that the debt would cease to be formidable. Let me suggest to the reader a parallel case in private life. Suppose a particular individual was on the road to ruin, and

* Blue Book, 1852, p. 485, par. 102.

† Kaye's Affghanistan, vol. 1, p. 363.

‡ Article in the Indian News of Oct. 1841, on "the North Western dilemma;" *vide* Appendix D.

§ Blue Book, p. 485, par. 106.

‖ Ib. 408, 409. ¶ Ib. 278, 279.

** Ib. 479, 433, 480, par. 94, (I find no account in the Blue Book of the pensions to superannuated Native soldiers.)

†† Ib. p. 429, 783, 474 to 477.

all advice, information, and remonstrance were thrown away upon him, although his failure would involve the reader's fortune. Would it console the reader to be told that if this individual only understood his business, and would manage it prudently, he need not become bankrupt? I am inclined to think not: yet it is precisely the same case with the irresponsible administration of India. The permanent resources of the empire are wholly unable to meet the charge of the present debt, and yet the Government does not develope the country's means of production, but trusts to a merely gambling illicit source of income, for one-fifth of its gross revenue; in spite of the great probability of seeing it suddenly cut off. At the same time as the Government gets credit because England is the real security for Indian loans, it make up any deficit by borrowing more capital, and perseveres in that policy of aggrandisement, which causes a progressive increase of the debt. Of course, I cannot tell how long such a system may go on, but any body can tell how it must end.

APPENDIX C.

It happens by an exception to the rule, that the conqueror of Scinde has fallen out with the Court of Directors, and without noticing the cause of their quarrel, the revenge of the Bureaucracy is something so peculiar and so characteristic of the class, that I must direct public attention to it.

Because Sir Charles Napier is a foe, every charge incurred by annexing Scinde is brought prominently forward, and I think with exaggeration, and the financial result of his annexation is exhibited as a heavy annual excess of charge on the Indian revenue. Because Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie are friends, the bulk of the charges incurred by their annexations, are literally altogether suppressed, the receipts are put prominently forward, and the financial result of annexing the Punjaub is exhibited as a surplus. For instance, p. 467, the following six items, Military charges; Extraordinary military charges; Ditto war charges; Commissariat charges; Extraordinary military charges; Arrears of Commissariat, &c. are credited against Scinde, since the date of annexation, amounting in round numbers to the sum of three millions sterling. On the opposite page not one of these items is inserted in the Punjaub accounts, and so completely is every

charge for the Punjaub force suppressed, that we could not even trace its existence without ransacking the Blue Book, till we find a "distribution return," p. 410, which lets out that, besides local and irregular corps, there are 34,000 regular troops in the Punjaub, including 5,765 Europeans. Again, p. 448, Scinde is accused of having added heavily to the debt, which is proved, p. 446, by the increase of the interest of the debt contemporary with the annexation of Scinde. But by the same rule, when I find at p. 479, an enormous increase of the interest of the debt contemporary with the annexations of Lords Hardinge and Dalhousie, I feel bound to accuse these annexations of having been a much greater annual excess of charge on the Indian revenues than the annexation of Sir Charles Napier, notwithstanding that "things are made pleasant" for Lord Dalhousie at p. 466, by proving the Punjaub a *surplus!*

The above is an average specimen of the honesty of Indian Blue Books, and unless the public agree with Hudibras that,

> "Surely the pleasure is as great
> "In being cheated as to cheat,"

I hope they will not tolerate the system of mystification any longer.

APPENDIX D.

I ADD an extract from the "Indian News" of 1841, to shew how our national interests have been, and ever will be, sacrificed to private motives for war and aggrandisement, under an irresponsible Government of India :—

"THE NORTH-WESTERN DILEMMA.

"The present is a fitting opportunity to lay before our readers as complete a view of the question relating to the North-Western Frontier of India as our space permits. A new Ministry is in power, and a Ministry opposed from the first to the policy of the old. Our Indian finances are in a state of absolute ruin, and the government trying, in desperation, to outbid the merchants for those funds which in the hands of the latter are the life-blood of commerce. All our projects have been accomplished; all our enemies beaten; Dost Mahomed is down—Shah Soojah is up; and yet at every step of our advance, we have departed further and fur-

ther from that security which was our ulterior object, and for which we have scattered treasure as if it had been dust, and shed blood as if it had been water.

"It is possible some of our readers may be unacquainted with the nature of the frontier we have of late years been so busily occupied in extending, or rather forsaking: and if so, our repeated declaration that the Indus is the natural boundary of our dominion in that quarter may have given rise to some misapprehension. The Indus is our boundary only as the outermost ditch may be called the boundary of a fortress; and even in that sense it is less important for defence than as affording a means for the conveyance of troops. Within the line of the Indus is *Maroost'hali*, or the Region of Death, a vast wilderness of sand, resembling the Libyan desert, both in its general aspect of desolation and in its oases. From Hyderabad, as far north as Ooch, in looking eastward from the river, the visible horizon is a bulwark of sand, frequently two hundred feet high, guarding the valley of the Indus like the wall of a fortress. Beyond this western boundary the desert stretches hundreds of miles to the east, till it is walled in by the Aravulli, a chain of mountains extending from Delhi almost to the sea. On the north, it meets the valley of the Sutlege, and on the south is lost in the Runn, or great salt marsh of Cutch. 'Instead of the ancient Roman simile,' says Colonel Tod, 'which likened Africa to the leopard's hide, reckoning the spots thereon as the oases, I would compare the Indian desert to that of the tiger, of which its long dark stripes would indicate the expansive belts of sand elevated upon a plain only less sandy.' Mr. Elphinstone describes the northern part of the desert as consisting principally of hills and valleys of loose and heavy sand. 'The hills were exactly like those which are sometimes formed by the wind on the sea-shore, but far exceeding them in height, which were from twenty to a hundred feet. They are said to shift their position and alter their shapes, according as they are affected by the wind, and in summer the passage is rendered dangerous by the clouds of moving sand.' In the journey of this accurate observer from Delhi to Cabool, he found a hundred miles of the desert before reaching Bahawulpoor absolutely destitute of inhabitants, water, or vegetation. The actual distance, besides, was increased by their being obliged to wind round the sand hills; while the path was so narrow as not to admit of two camels going abreast, and if an animal stepped on one side, it sunk above the knees as in snow.

"The wells found here and there in the desert, but frequently from fifty to a hundred miles apart, are so deep (sometimes five hundred feet) that, as Colonel Tod remarks, 'with a large kafila many might die before the thirst of all could be slaked.' This illustrates the fearful description given by Ferishta of the sufferings of the Emperor Hemayoon. 'The country through which they fled being an entire desert of sand, the Moghuls were in the utmost distress for water: some ran mad; others dropped down dead. For three whole days there was no water; on the fourth day they came to a well which was so deep that a drum was beaten to give notice to the men driving the bullocks that the bucket had reached the top; but the unhappy followers were so impatient for drink, that as soon as the first bucket appeared, several threw themselves upon it, before it had quite reached the surface, and several fell in.'—*Briggs' Ferishta*, vol. ii. Hunger is of course a scourge of these desolate regions only second to thirst. The visitations of the *Bookha Mata*, the 'famished mother,' form the staple of the native legends from the earliest time; and the traditions of the oases forming some of the Rajhpoot states, point to a famine which occurred in the eleventh century, and lasted twelve years. At the present day a partial visitation is calculated upon every third year; and one year out of seven is always a year of actual famine.

"But even the Aravulli mountains, which bound the desert on the east, are not our last rampart, for, beyond these, the Rajhpoot princes, our feudal vassals, form the advanced guard of British India. Such is the frontier—consisting of the Indus, the desert, the Aravulli and Rajahsthan, which we now voluntarily overstep; a frontier which, taking its whole length from the Himalaya to the sea, is singularly small for so vast an empire, but which is diminished to about *thirty miles* by coincidences of nature as marvellous as the folly which disregards them. Abandoning this actual frontier of thirty miles, at Loodiana—the north-western gate of British India—and not *permitted* to pass through the Punjaub, we descend the Sutlege from Ferozepore, place in our rear the Region of Death and our other natural defences, and plunge into the western desert of the Indus, in order to force the Bolan pass into Affghanistan, and chase the wild Beloochees through their barren and interminable wastes. We have thus pushed our frontier—which may now be said to be at Herat, and Kirman in Persia—600 miles beyond its natural and safe position; we have extended its only vulnerable part from thirty

miles to at least seven hundred; we have quitted the centre of our resources in money, food and men; and have not only placed between us and them an almost impassable desert, but have scattered our forces over a wide, poor, and scantily peopled region. Finally, we are teaching, day by day, the science of war to these barbarian enemies; and the rising generation of a host of tribes, occupying a breadth of country from Herat to the Indian Ocean, is growing up in horror and detestation of our very name.

"Such is our present position; and one would suppose that we must have been driven into it by some extraordinary force of circumstances, too sudden for human policy to avert, and too mighty for human power to withstand. But in vain we look back to the beginning of this fatal end; we can trace no cause but individual will. Dost Mahomed was then the popular chief of his wild domain, and seeking to recover a portion of the territory he had lost. We refused him our assistance; and because he would not bind himself to reject the assistance of others, then our actual allies, we commenced this extraordinary war. But we were not satisfied with dragging Dost Mahomed from his mountain throne; it was necessary to put into it a man who, within the last twenty years, had been twice driven from it by the people, and who was an object of contempt or hatred to the whole country. We thus commenced the war as auxiliaries of Shah Soojah; and with no other ostensible object than that of replacing a refractory prince by one whose interest, or gratitude, would bind him to our service.

"But, setting aside the question of tyranny and injustice, by what right did the perpetrators of this outrage upon the law of nations squander in so wild a manner the blood and treasure of England? They well knew that one tithe of even the then probable cost of the expedition would have bought the petty mountain chief, body and soul. They well knew that the salary of a diplomatist of common intelligence at Cabool, (*unless they chose to take his reports through the medium of ignorance, stupidity or treachery*) would have been a considerable part of the entire outlay. They well knew in short—to come to the point—or they ought to have well known, that it would not have cost a hundred thousand pounds to secure the hearty co-operation of Dost Mahomed. What is the co-operation we *have* secured? That of a king who is kept in his throne by a hedge of British bayonets, and who would not continue to reign for a week if these were withdrawn; and that of a peo-

ple whom we have succeeded, after infinite labour and expense, in pervading with one universal sentiment towards us of horror and aversion. Ask the Brahoes and the Ghiljees for their co-operation! As well might the French demand the friendship of the Arabs in Algiers; although we believe in our conscience—and we make the avowal with shame and disgust —that our invasion of Affghanistan is far less justifiable either on moral or political grounds than that of our neighbours on the northern coast of Africa.

"But hitherto we have only touched upon the ostensible cause of this unfortunate expedition: the real cause is the dread of Russian influence being established on the borders of our empire, with a view to an invasion of India. This is the consideration which has induced us to convert into implacable enemies the whole continent from Herat to the ocean, and, by the slaughter of certain chiefs, to kindle a blood-feud with their tribes, which according to the customs of the people is inextinguishable! But before this dreaded influence could affect us through Affghanistan, Persia must have become one of the provinces of Russia; and towards Persia, therefore, we should have directed our energies, instead of misusing them in Affghanistan. There, as in the other case, it must be evident to the meanest intellect, diplomacy, and not the sword, should have been our weapon,—but what was the conduct we pursued? On the one hand our ambassador, by his foolish and obstinate arrogance, made a personal enemy of the Shah, and thus to all intents and purposes laid down his office; and on the other, we threatened the incensed monarch with our armies from the Affghan mountains, and captured one of his islands in the Persian Gulf. The effect of this "little war"—(little in every meaning of the word)—was of course to aggravate, not remove the evil; and the result of the whole is, that the Persian forces are now commanded by Russian instead of English officers, and that the Shah, being left no alternative by British wisdom, has placed himself voluntarily and deliberately within the hug of the Bear.

"There is nothing, in our opinion, more unaccountable in the moral history of mankind than the dread of Russia entertained by the late Government of Great Britain. There is in reality no country in Europe, or out of it, so entirely at our mercy as Russia. An English fleet in the Baltic, a cargo of Birmingham arms in the Euxine—or the mere threat of these —would at once settle any question which could possibly arise between the two countries. Without a navy worthy of the

name, and yet vulnerable in two vital points by a naval power; with Georgia and Circassia in arms, as if for the special protection of the East; with an impoverished treasury, a discontented nobility, and a peasantry dragged in chains to the recruiting depôt,—Russia is absolutely helpless.

"We come at length to the question, what is to be done? —and on this point we derive great hope from the fact that the present Ministry, so far from being pledged to the policy of the last, are pledged against it. We have left a good frontier for a bad one; we have made enemies instead of friends; we have thrust Persia from our own arms into those of Russia. We must *retrace our steps;* and if Ministers suppose us to be

> "Stepp'd in so far, that, should we wade no more,
> Returning were as tedious as go o'er,"

we will tell them that we may wade till doomsday in our present course without ever reaching the shore. Let us go on as we do now, and the chronic war we wage beyond our frontier is without end, and our false position with regard to Affghanistan and Persia without hope or help."

THE END.

THE

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MR. JOHN BULL.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE reader of these pages should bear in mind that the first of the three Letters was written before the announcement of Lord Palmerston's scheme for the future government of India; the second after the appearance of India Bill No. 1; and the third, as it now stands, after India Bill No. 2 had been launched by the Derby Ministry.

THE FAMILIAR EPISTLES

OF

MR. JOHN COMPANY TO MR. JOHN BULL.

LETTER I.

In which Mr. John Company refers to the recent disasters in India; maintains that they were not his doing; and insists upon the danger of legislating for India whilst the country is in a blaze.

LEADENHALL-STREET, *January*, 1858.

MY DEAR JOHN,—You are angry with me—you have said some hard things of me—you are preparing to strike me. "Strike; but hear!"

There has been a great calamity in India. A terrible misfortune has overtaken us. Yes, John, your sons and brothers, your daughters and your sisters, have been cruelly murdered or foully outraged. Atrocities, which the soul sickens to contemplate, have been perpetrated by my soldiers. I have never spoken lightly of the burden of suffering and sorrow which has descended upon your people. Heaven knows how sorely I have grieved for them. I have seen the black robes and the pale sorrowing faces of wives and mothers mourning for those who are not; and though I cannot bring back the

John Company bewails the great calamities in India.

dead, I have tried to comfort the living; and I believe that, at least in some cases, my efforts have not been vain. Say what you like of me, John, but do not say that I have made light of this great trouble. We do not mourn in sackcloth and ashes now-a-days. But we go about our work, for work must be done, with heavy hearts; and are not the less stricken, because we do not lift up our voices in loud lamentation after the manner of a Greek chorus.

Yes, John, you may make the most of it—paint it in its blackest colours—proclaim it in the strongest words —no fear that I will gainsay you. No one ought to know, no one does know, so well as I, the full extent of the calamity. "True," you say; "but it is little use to know it now; you ought to have known before that the storm was coming, and you ought to have been prepared to meet it." Brother, brother! I am afraid that we are neither of us prophets. You must forgive me if I sometimes resort to that vulgar figure of speech known as the "*tu quoque.*" It does not make me really better to prove that you are worse; but poor weak mortals like ourselves, John, are only good or bad by comparison; and as you—just as if *your* hands were not full enough already—are talking about taking my business out of my hands, and doing it yourself, I may just ask you whether *you* were prepared for war when you found yourself compelled to put forth all your strength against Nicholas of Russia; whether you had the least expectation, a year before, that your old and holy ally would behave himself so shamefully towards

He admits that he is not a prophet, but asks Mr. Bull if he has caught the mantle himself.

you? Why, it is not long since you "pampered and petted" the padded Autocrat, and were in ecstasies with his "mild eyes" and his gorgeous race-cups. You "did not think he would ha' done it," John. I know you did not. Well, there is no harm in confessing that I did not think that my Sepoys would have done it. If I had thought it, you may be sure I should have prepared myself better for the crisis. I repeat that we are neither of us prophets. But if I did not know in 1856, that my Sepoy army would in 1857 be all in a blaze of mutiny, I am certain that they did not know it a jot better themselves. You know the story of the gentleman who reared and kept a tame tiger. He fed it well with mild diet—with milk-and-bread and biscuits, but no flesh: he treated it kindly, gave the beast a warm place on his rug, and it licked his hand as a cat would, and was long every bit as gentle. One day, you know, the master had cut his finger, and had put a piece of sticking-plaster over the wound; and when the animal licked his hand as usual, the adhesive plaster was removed, the wound opened, and the beast tasted blood. Forthwith it set up a growl of terrible significance. The savage instincts of the flesh-eater had been suddenly awakened; all past kindness was forgotten; the gentle, tractable, domestic habits of the faithful affectionate companion and servant ceased on the instant with that first taste of blood, and the master soon lay a lifeless and mangled corpse on his own hearth-rug. He never thought the beast would have done it. The beast never thought of doing it. He was a good beast up to the very hour in which he turned round and slew his benefactor. Yes, John; and my Sepoys, though,

during the year which has just ended, they have earned for themselves so terrible a notoriety, were really not the traitors and miscreants which you now know them to be, before they had tasted the blood of Adjutant Baugh at Barrackpore. They were wayward and petulant at times like children; but if I had told you a year ago that they were about to rise up and murder their officers, to say nothing of other incredible barbarities, and that therefore it was necessary to send a vast European force to India, to fortify all the large towns, to put a stop to all works of domestic improvement, to send all officers engaged in the great work of administration back to their regiments —in short, if I had prepared myself to stand a siege from my own native army, it is easy to guess, John, that you would have called me a timid old fool, and asked why I was making so much stir about nothing. Nay, if when, for your own purposes, you weakened my European force, sending to me to bring regiments from India for your Russian war, on the plea that I did not want them, I had protested against your selfishness, and declared that I could not trust my native army, you would have jeered at my weak nerves, at my hypochondriac fears, and declared that there was no danger, except in my own diseased imagination. Nay, John, you would have told me (for you wanted your own soldiers then) that if I could not defend the country with my Sepoys, it had better be abandoned altogether, for that you could never divert the strength of your army from its proper uses—the defence of Great Britain, and the maintenance of her position in Europe. It always

Mr. Bull is asked whose fault it was that there were not more European troops in the Indies.

has been so. You have lent me your troops freely, when I have not wanted them any more than yourself, and you have taken them away from me when you *have* wanted them, without caring what I might suffer by their loss. This is your custom, John. Now, I say, is it fair—is it honest, to ask why, when my Sepoys first set up their tiger-cry, and sprang upon their officers, I had not a large body of your troops at my disposal to crush the mutiny in the bud? If I was weak at that time in European troops, brother, who made me so, I should like to know?

Then you ask me why I had not posted the Europeans at my disposal in their proper places? You know the story, John, of your brother Paddy's blanket—how that the said blanket, being too small to cover him from shoulder to heel, he cut a piece off the top, when his feet were cold, and sewed it on to the bottom; and when the draft came to his back, he reversed the process, but did not mend matters, you may be sure. Now, I might have cut a piece off the top, and sewed it on to the bottom, but the blanket would not have covered me, from Peshawur to Pegu, any better for this process. Still, it must be admitted that you hit a blot, when you ask why there were no European troops in Delhi, which contained our principal arsenals and magazines. Well, John, I must make a clean breast of it, and admit that there ought to have been European troops in Delhi, and that I ought to have insisted on having competent soldiers at the head of my armies, to see that the troops were properly distributed. If you are not past shame, brother, you will be abashed when you read this. Whose busi-

ness was it to arrange the military details necessary for the defence of the country? Who but the head of the army—the Commander-in-Chief? But did the ——s and ——s, whom you forced upon me—(you may fill up the blanks, John)—nay, did the great Napier, of whom you are so proud, and whose superhuman wisdom you are continually flinging in my face because I was not prepared to take him at his own or his brother's valuation, and had, therefore, a quarrel with him—did the small ——s, and ——s, or even the great Napier, I say, urge the location of European troops at Delhi? Surely I might, without blame, consider the Governors-General and Commanders-in-Chief, whom you sent me, competent to decide between them in what places the European troops at their disposal were most advantageously to be located. Remember that I am not responsible for the selection either of the civil rulers or the military chiefs, to whom these details are entrusted. Give me a chance, John, and see if my nominees will be caught napping. Do you think that if John Lawrence had been Governor-General, and Henry Lawrence Commander-in-Chief, in the spring of 1857, the troops would not have been in their right places?

John Company affirms that if his great commanders were not capable, Mr. Bull ought to have sent him better ones.

Look at it how you will, brother, and it does not appear that either the paucity of European troops in India, or their imperfect distribution, is fairly to be chargeable to my wilfulness or my neglect. Do you think that if the Horse Guards or the War-office had had the direct management of military affairs in India, things would have gone better? My dear John, I believe that

I do impose some check upon the eccentricities of your people in the regions of Whitehall: they are generally ashamed to propose to me any very egregious job, and if, under strong temptation, they determine to brazen it out, I can make a stand against the wrong; and I have made a stand ere now, with good success, though oftener I have failed to do more than protest against the evil which I could not prevent. Have you ever, I should like to know, except in a great emergency—I mean by this, except when you were fairly frightened—ever sent me out an officer of whom you could make anything at home? Has it not been your wont, John, to send me decayed and incapable generals to command my armies, or divisions of my armies? Have you not sent me the blind, the deaf, the lame, the paralysed, the gouty, the crippled, little heeding the injury they might inflict, the discredit they might bring upon us both, so long as you were able to "provide" for them? And can you now have the face to turn round upon me, and ask why I have not made better military preparations for the defence of the country? If Delhi was left without European troops, who suffered it to be thus defenceless—who declared that my Sepoys were "faithful to a proverb?" It is surely right, I say again, that, sitting in Leadenhall-street, I should give heed to the opinions of competent military authorities on the spot; and if the military authorities on the spot are not competent, it is your fault—not mine—that such men are in their wrong places.

Do you seriously believe, John—nay, does any human being believe, that if India in 1857 had been under your

direct management, there would have been no rebellion? No one alleges that the general misgovernment of the country has had anything to do with the rising of the Sepoys. My domestic administration is often said to be faulty; but I do not think that in this case it has been brought up against me, in the face of the notorious fact of the general quiescence of the people. But my external policy is said to have had much to do with the insurrection of the military classes. I have been trying hard all my life not to have any external policy except a commercial one, but in this I have been overruled; and I am now told that the rebellion of my soldiery has been stimulated by the war in Persia, and by the annexation of Oude. Now, I believe that the war with Persia has really something to do with the matter. In the first place, it carried off a large number of troops, and so diminished the impression of our military strength; and in the second, it suggested to the Persian Court, not very scrupulous at any time, and most unscrupulous in war, the expediency of creating a diversion by exciting a military revolt in Northern India; and their emissaries, I know, were actively employed. I think it very probable, John, that if there had been no Persian war, there would have been no military revolt. But *who made the Persian war?* I do not sit in judgment upon it. It may have been righteous or unrighteous, expedient or inexpedient; but I had nothing to do with it. I know nothing about it beyond what you have been pleased to communicate to me in your Blue-books—always excepting the little business of the bill, with the

John Company believing that the Persian War had much to do with the mutiny, asks who made it?

figures of which I am sure to make acquaintance. And as for Oude, I admit that I assented to its annexation. For years and years, however, often as it was recommended by others, I abstained from decreeing the absorption of a State which at least had been faithful to me. And when at last, after hoping against hope for some improvement in the miserable condition of affairs, which called so loudly for the interference of the paramount power—after trying a succession of princes, and finding every new ruler worse than the last, I gave my consent to a measure which it would have been culpable weakness to have shrunk from any longer—every step that I took, John, was in conjunction with your Ministers. Right or wrong, politic or impolitic, it was well considered by your servants. The measure was as much your measure as it was mine. If it was a folly, or if it was a crime, call your own responsible advisers to account, and ask them why they decreed it.

It comes, then, to this, John, that if the Persian war and the annexation of the Oude principality were among the exciting causes of the Sepoy revolt, three-fourths of the blame attach to you. We must place to your credit the whole of the one and the half of the other measure. What sort of a case, then, do you make out against me, either in respect of military mismanagement or political indiscretions, such as may have excited or aggravated the evil which we are now deploring?—what sort of a case, John, that you should lay claim to the possession of greater foresight and wisdom than I have shown in the management of my affairs? Why, friend, you are like the coachman, who upset the coach, and laid it off on

the guard upon the dickey. The more we look into the matter, the more it will appear, that in all the acts which have been most emphatically laid to my charge, you or your servants, John, have had the principal share. What sort of logic, then, is that which, from these premises, advances to the conclusion that I should be stripped of the little power I possess, and that you should be made absolute and independent in the direction of Indian affairs?

I know what you would say, John: you would say that when a great crisis arrives, I am incapable of grappling with it—that I have shown feebleness and inactivity in going to the rescue of your imperilled sons and daughters in the East. This is one of the cries that has been got up against me, to bring me into popular disrepute, and to prepare the way for my downfal. It would be a strong argument (nothing could be stronger) for my immediate extinction, if it were only true. I should be ashamed of myself, brother—I should not think myself worthy to live, if I had been lukewarm in such a cause. But did I lose weeks, or days, or hours? did I seek to economise the means at my disposal? did I move slowly, or give grudgingly? No; I lost not a precious hour—not a minute, John. You well remember, I am sure, that sultry June morning, when suddenly there broke upon the town the dire intelligence that the Sepoy army was in a blaze of mutiny, and that Delhi, the great imperial city, with all its historical traditions and political associations, and, worse still, with its mighty arsenals and magazines, was in the hands of the rebel army. I shall never forget that morning. It

John Company narrates how he bestirred himself when he heard of the Sepoy revolt.

was Saturday, when, according to wont, John (a good custom, which you properly encourage), little business is done; and after a hard week's work in sultry London weather, I was starting in search of a little fresh country air, when that ominous telegram was put into my hands. The horses' heads were turned, you may be sure, not to the railway station, but to my house of business in the City. On that day a solemn council was held; on that day the first steps were taken towards the strengthening of the European army in the East. On the next business-day I held another special council. I did everything that could be done to accelerate the despatch of troops to the East. And as, fortnight after fortnight, fresh news of disaster and of death came welling in, I increased my efforts to augment my European force, and sent forth regiment after regiment, at my expense, to rescue your sons and daughters from destruction, and to cleanse the national honour from the temporary disgrace that had been inflicted upon it. I do not know, John, that any human exertion could have prepared those troops for more immediate despatch.

But you tell me that I ought to have sent them forth in steam-ships. I was eager to do so, John. I wished to send them forth in some of your war steamers. I thought that, over and above the means of effective transport which your huge steam men-of-war afforded, a great moral impression would be produced by their appearance at my principal Indian seaports. But what was I told, John? what was the answer given by your servants? That you had no steamers for such a pur-

The history of the steamships, and why they were not sent.

pose. I don't know why you had no steamers for such a purpose; for what nobler purpose could they ever be put to than the salvation of our Indian Empire? Have they ever been put to such good uses before? are they ever likely to be put to any better uses? Don't tell me that the transport service is unpopular. If there is a man in your service, John, who would not, at such a time, have rejoiced to see the deck of his ship swarming with soldiers, and have been proud of the great work which he was doing, or helping to do, in conveying fighting men to the seat of war, that man is a disgrace to your navy, and worthy only of ignominious dismissal. If I had been served by such men, John, I should have no great Indian Empire now for you to endeavour to wrench from me.

But why, you say, did I not send out men by means of private enterprise, which never fails on these occasions, across the Isthmus, and by the Red Sea route to India? If Egypt had been part of my territory, do you think that I would not have done it, John? do you think I would have hesitated for a moment? But I was told that there were political questions involved, and of course I knew nothing about the politics of the Porte, or the politics of France, or the politics of any other country with which I have no "relations." It was your business, John, to smooth the way for such transport of troops through Egypt—it was mine to pay for their transport when the road was made clear for them. Meanwhile I took up all the best ships that were offered to me. I took up some screw-steamers for long sea

voyages, and I took up some clipper sailing vessels. It is said that I ought to have taken up more steamers, for the steamers have beaten the clippers. There are two things to be said about this, John: one is, that experienced mariners were doubtful whether, at that season of the year, the screw-steamers would beat the clippers; the other is, that, according to the best information that I could obtain, John, there was not coal enough on the line for a greater number of steam vessels than I took up. I may mention a third matter: if a larger number of men had arrived at Calcutta in the autumn, there would have been no means of despatching them to the upper provinces, and they would have rotted like sheep on the great wet plain which steams around Fort William. You may depend upon it, John, that I did the best that could be done; and the more you inquire into the matter, the better I shall be pleased.

John Company courts inquiry.

What, then, is the charge against me? If I did not cause this disaster by anything that I have done, or anything that I have left undone, and if I did not fail in the hour of need to do the best that could be done to repair it, why am I more deserving of extinction than I was five years ago? Five years ago, John, after a long and patient inquiry, you decreed that I deserved the confidence of the country. If the events of the Sepoy revolt have not shown that I have forfeited this confidence, how else have I forfeited it during these last five years? At no period of history have I been more active in well-doing. Never, in an equal space of time, have I—never, I dare to say, has any earthly potentate, in an equal

space of time—progressed farther in the right direction than I have done since the year 1853. You seek, then, to destroy me in the very zenith of my utility, with all my great material and moral improvements advancing steadily towards perfection. Without any reproach of self-seeking, I may desire—honestly desire, John—to go on with the work I have commenced, to consummate the great experiments which have been so auspiciously inaugurated. You may accuse me of clinging to power, of holding fast to patronage, of fighting sturdily for the retention of my privileges; but the only privilege which I desire to retain is the privilege of doing good to countless millions of people; and I cannot willingly yield that privilege, except under the full assurance that you will carry out the work I have commenced, in a more conscientious spirit, and with more successful results. I confess, John, that although I think you in the main a very good fellow, I have no assurance of this.

But supposing that it *had* been proved against me that I had occasioned, by my mismanagement or by my neglect, this lamentable Sepoy rebellion, and that, having thus created it, I had not exerted myself to put it down, these failures upon my part would not demonstrate the expediency of the present sudden effort to destroy me. There are things which, right in themselves, become wrong if they are done at the wrong time. Can you conceive a worse time than the present for revolutionising the Government of India? Why, John, you are making common cause with the rebels—aiding them to achieve a signal triumph (what greater than the over-

Mr. Bull is told that the right thing may be done at the wrong time.

throw of a government?) and condoning their offences, by declaring to all the world that they are not without a pretext for their crimes. Will not a change of government, following closely upon this hostile demonstration, be a concession to our enemies? Perhaps you will answer, "No—the very reverse of a concession. It will indicate only the settled resolution of an offended nation to put forth all its strength for the chastisement of the offenders, and for the establishment of a more vigorous system of control, under which rebellion can never rear its head again without instant suppression." In other words, John, it will be regarded, you think, in the light of an *aggressive* movement. A miserable alternative, my friend—a more dangerous belief than the other. You will not readily persuade the people that a change of government is not necessarily a change of system. Remember that we have hitherto had only to grapple with a military rebellion. Take care, John, that you do not so disturb and alarm the national mind as to convert this military revolt into a popular revolution. I believe that the proclamations which have been put forth in India, emphatically declaring that the British Government has not, and never has had, a design to interfere in any way with the free exercise of the religions of the people, have had a most salutary and tranquillising effect. The pledges which my Government from time to time has given to the people have never been violated. But a belief, insidiously sown by designing men, has recently grown up, especially among the military classes, who have been more immediately appealed to, that the Queen and the Queen's Ministers have determined to

forcibly convert the people to Christianity, and that a large display of military force in India is a necessary part of the process. You must take heed lest you do anything, John, to encourage the diffusion of this belief among the great masses of the people. They are very ignorant and very credulous, and they are very easily alarmed. Any kind of change fills them with vague apprehensions of evil. You may be sure that the news of the removal of the old Sirkar, and the establishment of a new paramount authority, will be circulated throughout India with every possible kind of disquieting exaggeration associated with it. You have a very vague notion in England of the monstrous and ridiculous falsehoods which find ready currency in India, even in tranquil times. How much more likely are false reports to be circulated in seasons of great popular excitement, when our enemies, active and designing, are continually on the alert, seeking for opportunities of working out our discomfiture by misrepresenting in the foulest and most dangerous manner the intentions of the dominant race, and ever basing, when they can, their mighty falsehoods on some superstructure of truth! If, then, the inauguration of the Crown Government of India be regarded as an aggressive movement, it is not difficult to foresee the probability of a still worse result than that which may reasonably be predicted if the change be viewed in the light of a concession. You have only a choice of evils, John. Either way danger is lying.

Mr. Bull is placed between the horns of a dilemma.

Nay, indeed, I may go further, and say that the two evils are not incompatible with each other—that truly

they are, in the present case, very likely to coexist. For, whilst the rebellious Sepoys may triumph in the thought that they have overthrown the existing Government, and brought about a great revolution (and such, too, will be the view taken by independent lookers-on), the great mass of the people will see only in the change something threatening and portentous, and, too probably—for such is their wont—will be roused into antagonism by their fears. So I cannot repeat too emphatically that even the right thing may be wrong, if it is done at the wrong time.

But how do you know that what you are proposing to do *is* the right thing, John? Are you in a fit state of mind for the consideration of so grave a question? Have you thought enough about it—have you read enough about it—do you know enough about it? I wish I could say, John, that I think our troubles in India are at an end. I thoroughly believe that we have turned the corner—that we have got our innings—but there is a deal of work yet before us. Some, indeed, go so far as to say that India, at the present time, can hardly be called a British dependency. I have no uneasiness on that score. Our position is a secure, though a troublous one. But there is much stirring work to be done before the flames of rebellion are thoroughly extinguished; and who begins to rebuild his house whilst it is yet on fire? Let us first extinguish the flames, and then talk of reconstruction. You will be cooler, you will be better informed; you will know more what you are about, after the mutiny is thoroughly suppressed, than at the present time, when your passions are excited, your understanding

is confused, and you are a long way off from the necessary amount of knowledge for legislation on so great a question. I doubt, John, whether you are fully impressed with a conviction of the magnitude and the difficulty of that question; or of the earnestness and solemnity with which it behoves you to address yourself to its consideration. You may depend upon it that it is a graver matter—that your responsibility is greater—than you think, John. You may legislate in haste; but if you do, you may be sure that you will repent at leisure.

John Company assures Mr. Bull that it is a very grave question.

Be assured that no graver question than this has ever come before you. It is a question which, to be properly understood, must be regarded in many different aspects. It must be looked at from a stand-point, or more than one stand-point, in India, and from another in England, on which it is not less necessary to post yourself with your telescope in your hand. You ought to know more about your own affairs than I do, John—so I will not dwell upon the trouble which you may bring upon yourself by taking the management, and with it the patronage, of India, out of my hands. You remember how it was said of old, that "the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." Now, my Government, faulty as it may be in principle and inefficient in practice, has, at all events, been a good middle-class Government. The Anglo-Indian Empire was founded by the middle classes—was maintained by the middle classes. The middle classes have fought for it; the middle classes have toiled for it. What your orators, John, are wont to call the "cold shade of the

aristocracy," has never chilled the ardour of the real workmen—of the hewers of wood and the drawers of water, who have done so much for your national greatness. The right men, on my estate, as far as you would let them, John, were ever in their right places. Where I alone have had the power of selection, the best men have come to the front. Has there ever been a time, has there ever been a conjuncture, no matter how trying, when my officers have been found wanting? Have I not distributed my patronage fairly and honourably among men who could do little or nothing for their children in Whitehall? Has this patronage (for patronage is power) in any way destroyed, or has it tended to preserve, the just balance of your much-vaunted constitution? It has not gone to swell the powers of the Crown or of the aristocracy, but has served as a counterpoise to the power of both. Take care that you do not place a vast instrument of corruption in the hands of the Minister of the day. But that is an English question, John, and you will see its bearings without my help.

John Company wonders what the House of Commons knows about India.

It is more of my business to point out to you what will be the effect upon India of direct government by the Crown, or, in other words, of Government by a parliamentary majority. I have little to say, John, against your House of Commons. I believe it to be an assembly, on the whole, of very intelligent and right-minded men. But they must be very much changed from what they were a few months ago, if they are at all fit to govern India. A very little time has elapsed since they knew, as a body, as much about India as they cared, and that

was *nothing*. India emptied your House, John, as surely as a Queen's ball or a cry of "fire." Now, I believe that a strong interest in the affairs of my Indian Empire has been recently awakened. But although Apathy may die on a sudden, there is no sudden death for Ignorance. There is, however, something still worse—something still more dangerous than Ignorance, and that is "a little learning." Now, there is nothing more true than that a man may study India all his life, and not be thoroughly master of the subject at threescore. The more one knows on such a subject, the more conscious one is of the deficiency of one's knowledge—the less one is inclined to dogmatise. But your men of a little learning, inflated with a three months' vacation-cram, have no doubts or misgivings. They make up their minds about the most difficult and the most complicated questions whilst they are brushing their hair or tying their cravat, and rush in where ripe Indian statesmen fear to tread, lest they should stumble over some hidden difficulty. I shudder to think of the flood of nonsense that will be poured out next session, John. I wish that it were such nonsense as I could quietly laugh at in an easy-chair: but the nettle danger will be there to sting; the rashness of ignorance will assume the worst forms of aggressiveness. Already I hear it said on every side that Parliament is hot for the discussion of the "religious question." If it had not been for my knowledge and my caution, John, that "religious question" would long ago have destroyed the empire of England in the East. Now, do you really think, John, that your House of Commons is a fit authority to determine the amount of toleration with which the religions

and religious usages of the people of India are to be practically regarded by the British Government in the East? Why, my dear John, if you know anything at all about the religions of India, you must have gained your knowledge very recently. It is not very many weeks since one of your shining lights, a member of your Government (and an historian to boot, I believe), spoke, at a public meeting, of Buddhism as the prevailing religion of India. With knowledge will come caution; but, my fear is, it will come too late. Perhaps you have not considered, John, what will be thought in India, when, together with the announcement that the Imperial Government of Great Britain is about to assume the direct management of affairs, there go forth tidings to the effect that the Imperial Parliament is hotly discussing the expediency of a crusade against the religions of the country, and vehemently condemning me for my toleration-pledges in past years.

Do not think, John, that I deprecate the public discussion of the affairs of my Empire. The more inquiry, the more discussion, the better, so long as it is impartial inquiry and enlightened discussion. What I deprecate is public discussion, which does not seek to elicit the truth, and has no tendency to benefit the people. Ignorance and party-spirit are what I fear. Give full play to these in Parliament, and I know not what may be the result. It has heretofore been the custom to consider the affairs of India to be my concern rather than yours. Your Parliament has been wont to avoid their discussion, and to justify their avoidance, upon the plea that "John Company knows all about these things: leave

them to him; he will manage them." And although I have in this way incurred some obloquy not justly my due, and have smiled at the popular ignorance regarding the responsibilities of Indian government, I have solaced myself, under unmerited condemnation with the thought that it is better, on the whole, that Parliament and the people should not have too clear an impression of the direct responsibility of the Minister of the day for all that is done or left undone in my Indian Empire. In the abstract, I admit, John, that it is not pleasant to be a scape-goat, but I would rather be a scape-goat than I would see India given up to party; and as soon as the direct and sole responsibility of the Crown Minister of the day, for all that is done or left undone in India, comes to be not only a substantive but a generally recognised fact, India will become the battle-field of party. Upon a parliamentary vote relating to some ill-understood Indian question, the fate of a ministry may depend. Nay, I am inclined to think that it will often depend, for India is not likely to be the strong point of a Crown Minister. His own ignorance, and the ignorance of the House, will render him more readily assailable in this direction than on the side of his domestic policy. And you know better than I do, John, that the state of parties at the present time is peculiarly favourable to damaging assaults on the Government of the day. A weak section of the House, representing the views of some particular class of the community—say of that which is typified by "Manchester" or "Exeter Hall,"—aided by those who habitually vote against Government as a

John Company is willing to be a scape-goat rather than that India should be the battle-field of party.

party, or as you call them, John, your "Opposition," will often have the power of obtaining a majority, and of damaging, if not of upsetting the ministry by an adverse vote. Government, in such a case, will either be driven into some dangerous concessions, or a new ministry will replace them, pledged to a measure which may be pregnant with danger to our Indian Empire. Your Indian fellow-subjects will never again be suffered to enjoy their old feelings of security. They will be threatened with continual changes, and they are jealous of change to a degree which you can hardly appreciate. You may sneer at my "traditionary policy," John; but the definite and consistent policy of a permanent Board, not removable at the pleasure of the Crown, and not influenced by political partisanship, is what has enabled us so long to hold the "brightest jewel of the Crown" in our hands.

I do not say that my Government is faultless, John, either in respect of its machinery or the manner of its working. I did not make it. Indeed, no one made it. Like the little negro-girl in Brother Jonathan's famous novel, "I 'spects I grow'd." But I am not peculiar in this. How did you come by your famous constitution, John? Did any one ever make it for you—did you make it yourself? or did it grow out of inevitable circumstances fostered by the genius of the people? Of course it did: and have not your colonial constitutions grown up in the same way? Such constitutions are the strongest, the most flourishing, because the most deeply rooted. What was an acorn, John, is now an oak. You can manufac-

John Company 'spects he grow'd.

ture nothing with half so good a chance of endurance as that which, under God's providence, has grown up in spite of you. I was a trader, as you know—a dealer in piece-goods, teas, and other commodities, and now I am a sovereign power; but still I retain much of the old administrative machinery which formerly governed the affairs of our trading corporation. But it is not for you, John, to reproach me on account of this remnant of the old mercantile leaven. Is there anything of which you are prouder than of your mercantile enterprise? Are you not continually crying out that the activity, the promptitude, and the success of private enterprise are perpetually putting the cumbrous inertness of the Imperial Government, with all its costly failures, to shame? I am not ashamed of having been a trader. If I had not been a trader, there would have been no Anglo-Indian Empire. My Court of Directors is somewhat changed from the Court which erst sat in judgment on investments; but it is substantially the same body. And because it is so, you speak of it as a worn-out institution, and say that it has served its purpose, and must now cease to exist. Let it cease; if you can provide anything better, or as good, in its place. Do this, and without a murmur I will retire into private life.

John Company says he is not ashamed of having made his property in trade.

I will tell you what my Government is, John. It is a Government possessed of knowledge and of independence. My bitterest enemies have never brought to my charge that I know nothing about India. I will not repeat what has been said, from time to time, by some

of the most eminent of your public men, on the subject of the extensive and accurate information possessed by the Court of Directors, and their officials of the India House, respecting the varied concerns of all parts of my immense Empire. I may move slowly, but I move surely. *Festina lentè* has been my motto. It is easy to settle a matter in an off-hand fashion when you are guiltless of knowing anything about it. But a number of men, with large knowledge and extensive experience, cannot, where great interests are at stake, dismiss a question officially before them, in a summary flippant manner. But do you, with your *triple* Government, John, get through business any faster—nay, do you get through it so fast? How long were you manufacturing the new Marriage and Divorce Act? Through how many stages did that unfortunate Bill pass? How did it go up and down, backwards and forwards, from one House to another! Leadenhall-street and Cannon-row are nothing to be compared with Lords and Commons, when they are in antagonism with each other! If Leadenhall-street and Cannon-row fall out, it is said to be an "unseemly spectacle." But do Lords and Commons never fall out? Yes, and you do not talk of unseemly spectacles, but of constitutional checks and elements of safety. The Court of Directors, in their deliberative capacity, may be slow, but in their executive capacity they are not. They can move fastly enough when there is need to be fast, as I have told you in an earlier part of my letter.

Then, as I have said, I am at least independent.

Did any one ever connect the Court of Directors with the party-politics of the day? India is of no party. The India House is of no party. I work as harmoniously, John, with a Whig as with a Tory minister. First one party, then another, is in the ascendant. The storms of faction pass harmlessly over me. I scarcely feel the change in the political atmosphere. My policy is still the same. My agents, when I have my own will, are still the same. I have never made an appointment, or helped to make an appointment—I have never cancelled or helped to cancel an appointment—with any reference to English politics. I have never used my patronage for political purposes. I have never bought or tried to buy, a single vote in Parliament with it. I have never sought to purchase royal or ministerial favour, by supporting measures known to be popular in high places. I have resisted Court intrigue and Government jobbery—vainly, perhaps, but conscientiously. And I have gone about my own business, without a thought of anything but of worthily fulfilling the great trust which has been reposed in me as the ruler of a great empire. I have governed India for the people of India; and even our enemies are now publicly acknowledging that the country has never been governed so well.

John Company does not care a fig for Whigs or Tories.

But can you expect this freedom from party influence to survive my political extinction? If I cease to be, John, will you ever have an independent Indian Government again? You tell me that there is to be a Council, or Board, connected with the Indian Minister —a Council of experienced advisers, men of Indian an-

tecedents and established reputation—such a Board, only more limited in numbers, as the present Court of Directors, and brought into more immediate association and co-operation with the Indian Minister. Establish such a Board, with knowledge and independence not inferior to the degree in which those qualities distinguish the Court of Directors, and I shall not tremble for the safety of my old Empire; but I do not clearly see how you are to establish such a Board. The knowledge and experience of the present Court of Directors cannot be possessed by any council of inferior numbers. We have not now got all that we want even in a Council of eighteen members; and I believe that you contemplate the limitation of the new Council to six or eight members. I hope that you have thought better of this design. For India is a very large place; the Executive Government is divided into a number of different departments. The business, like the people, John, is of a very varied character; and I do not see how a Council much smaller than that of Leadenhall-street, at the present time, can embrace the necessary amount either of local or departmental experience. Then how can you insure its independence? how can you prevent a Council nominated by the Crown—that is, by the minister of the day—from becoming, for all practical purposes of independent Government, a mere name? The minister, in the first instance, would probably nominate certain members of the present Court of Directors. They are independent men; and, under any form of Government, would doubtless be independent. But what would be their power? and, if powerless, of what

use their independence to the country? Now, what power do you propose to give them? Degrade them to the level of mere advisers, and what check is there upon, or what is there to modify, the arbitrary power of the minister? One minister might take the advice of his Council—another might not even seek it. The present Court of Directors *initiates* all the ordinary business of the Home Government of India. Now, a despatch, in the course of the several processes of manipulation to which it is subjected, may undergo some changes; but, after all, the main substance of it will be left much in the state in which it was originally devised. This initiation, therefore, is practically, though not theoretically, real power. It is a pervading influence for good, or for evil; and where the *knowledge* is, there also should be the original creative function. Now, take care, John, that this initiatory process take place in the council-chamber, not in the bureau of the minister. And take care, John, that if, at a later stage, the minister overrules the decisions of the Council, his reasons for so doing are placed upon record, and the protests or remonstrances of the Council also recorded. But will the Council stand up manfully in defence of their opinions, as the old Court of Directors has ere now done, if they are appointed by, and are to be removable at the pleasure of the Crown? In what other way, you ask, can they be appointed? It is not easy to answer the question; for you propose to destroy my privileges and functions as a constituent body, and you have no thought of creating any other constituency. Whether a portion at least of

Mr. Bull is cautioned not to let the initiative pass out of John Company's hands.

the vacancies might not as they occur be filled by the nomination of the remaining members of the Board (the nominee, of course, fulfilling certain conditions, and possessing certain qualifications), is a question which I leave to your consideration. I have no very strong opinion about it myself. All I contend for is, that unless you can establish a Council of experienced Indian statesmen, independent of party, and with some real practical power, you might as well give up India at once to the dictatorship of a Secretary of State.

Perhaps, John, you will remind me of your colonies, and say that you manage your colonies with the aid of a single Secretary of State. So you do, after a fashion. But I am not aware that there are any very useful lessons of external government to be learned from your successes, John. I don't wish to say anything unkind to you, but I have always had a notion that those successes have been *very moderate*—I will not use any harder words. You taunt me with this military rebellion in India. You have contrived to get up rebellions of all kinds in the colonies. Have you not had rebellions in Canada, rebellions at the Cape, rebellions in Ceylon? You are seldom without a rebellion on hand. One day it is a black rebellion; another, it is a white rebellion; now you are dragooning down the aborigines, now warring with your own children. You have almost forgotten, John, that America was once a colony, and that it was lost to you by parliamentary government. If, then, there were anything in the case of India at all analogous with that of the colonies, I

Mr. Bull is reminded of the good government of his colonies.

should still desire to rescue it from the grasp of a single Secretary of State. But India is not a colony, and is nothing like a colony. One of your late Indian servants, John, who has since taken to a seafaring life, put the case so well, some four or five years ago, that I cannot do better than remind you of his words: "It is a remarkable circumstance," he said, "in connexion with this question, that since the celebrated bill which decided the fate of Mr. Fox's Administration, we have seldom or never entered into the consideration of Indian affairs. Party questions with reference to India are almost totally unknown, either in the other House of Parliament or here; and I do not hesitate to say that it would be a source of imminent danger to India if its affairs were again made the objects of party warfare. I have been in Parliament long enough to see that, in colonial matters, party questions have occurred in which the interests of a colony have been neglected in the contests of party politics in this House. But we must not shut our eyes to the circumstance that the case of India is in no respect similar to that of the colonies. In all the colonies belonging to this country there is a large portion of British subjects well acquainted with the principles of representative government; and even if the worst were to occur —if (which God forbid) any of our colonies were to be separated from the mother country, though I do not see why the connexion based upon mutual benefit should not last for a period much longer than we can any of us look forward to—but even if a separation were to take place, there is hardly one of our colonies which would

not be able, with more or less success, to govern itself. But if a revolution of that kind was to take place in India, will any one say that consequences must not ensue at which humanity would shudder? There is, in truth, no similarity between the probable consequences in the one case and in the other, and therefore it is of the utmost importance not to allow party politics to interfere with the government of that great dependency."* There, John, you must needs accept the premises; I recommend to you also the conclusion. You may do mischief enough, Heaven knows, by making colonial affairs objects of party warfare; but this is nothing in comparison with the danger which will arise out of the discussion of Indian affairs in a spirit of vehement partisanship, seeking to destroy or to uphold a Ministry. And as Indian questions are more difficult to understand than colonial questions, a Minister, unaided by an experienced and independent Council, would be more likely than a Colonial Secretary to expose himself to attack. I repeat, then, that if your colonies had been far better governed than they have been, your success (speaking hypothetically, John) would afford no argument in favour of the consignment of India to the tender mercies of a single independent Secretary of State.

And now, John, I have done. At least I have done for the present. You may take away from me my Government, but you cannot take from me my reputation.

* Speech of Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, on moving for leave to introduce a bill to provide for the government of India, delivered in the House of Commons on Friday, June 3, 1853.

Depriving me of my Government, you consign me to History; and History is my best friend. I feel in my heart, brother, that when I become a tradition, my real glory will commence. You may think lightly of it now, John. In the hurry of politics—in the strife of parties—amidst the roar of a great rebellion—it may seem a small thing to you that on some fine summer morning the Government of the East India Company quietly ceases to be. But years—nay, centuries hence, upon the great fact, that an English Company—a Company originally of mere traders—consigned into the hands of the Imperial Government the care of an immense empire, reared, nurtured, and maintained by the enterprise of a mercantile corporation, and by the skill, the courage, and the integrity of their servants—an empire over scarcely less than two hundred millions of inhabitants, of different races and religions—upon this great fact, I say, years, nay, centuries hence, thinking men will comment with wonder and admiration in all the languages of the civilised globe. Such a spectacle the world has never seen before. You may howl at me; you may spit at me; you may drag me with contumely and insult from my throne; but the great fact of which I speak will be still a fact, and time will make you only more sensible of its magnitude and nobility. You may keep that empire, or you may lose it, John; but it will be the empire of the East India Company all the same. The property may change hands; the edifice may be repainted and replastered—you may grave the royal arms over the gateways, and let no one pass without the passport of the Queen; but still there

John Company believes that history is his best friend.

will be the fact that I built the house, that I acquired and extended the marvellous domain—and that it has cost you nothing but some good English blood, which could not have been shed more worthily than in the extension of the empire of civilisation. I write this in no spirit of self-laudation. I do not say that no one but myself could have established this marvellous empire, stretching, as it now does, from the banks of the Indus to the banks of the Irrawaddy. But I humbly and reverently express my belief that an Almighty Providence would not have favoured in like manner the ambitious efforts of an imperial power, seeking to aggrandise itself by armed triumphs in new countries. It was, I humbly believe, because I never sought for territorial wealth or political power; because my mandates were ever the mandates of peace; because I charged my servants not to fortify their factories, not to enlist troops, not to make any parade of military strength, that the Almighty selected me as the humble instrument (I say it reverently) of His magnificent designs. God might have baffled your calculations, prostrated your ambition, and humbled your pride, John. Smiting with the sword, you might have perished by the sword. But I went for merchandise, and I obtained empire. My designs were overruled, my policy defeated. I became, in spite of myself, a power, without a royal title, but still one of the sovereigns of the earth. I did the best I then could to perform worthily the functions imposed upon me; and although no prophet in my own country, people from strange regions looked with admiration upon my doings, and with jealousy upon my success. You thought you

would have done it better, John. God knows! Be thankful that, under Providence, I have done so well; and if it be willed that I am to resign the charge of my empire into your hands, receive the trust reverently, and in a solemn but an humble spirit, deeply impressed with a sense of the magnitude of the undertaking, and the difficulty of the work which lies before you. I have no wish to rule a day longer than is good for India and for England. If the country, calmly, dispassionately, deliberately, with full knowledge and after ample investigation, will that I should abdicate, I shall abdicate, not grudgingly or querulously, but cheerfully and thankfully, and say to you, John, with a hearty shake of the hand, "There! I have fulfilled my mission, I have run my race. I have given you the Anglo-Indian Empire. *Keep it*; and be blest."

I am, your affectionate Brother,

JOHN COMPANY.

LETTER II.

John Company, having read Lord Palmerston's scheme for the future government of India, and the speeches delivered in its support, comments upon them; and cautions Mr. Bull.

LEADENHALL-STREET, *Feb.*, 1858.

MY DEAR JOHN,—You received my last letter in so good a spirit, that I intend to write you another. It is more than ever desirable that I should address to you a few words of caution. They are throwing dust in your eyes, John. They are proposing to destroy me; and, like Mr. Toots in the story, they are telling you that it is of "no consequence." Now, what I want to explain to you is, that it is of very great consequence. You have only to understand what it is they are proposing to do, to appreciate fully the consequence of the change which they are persuading you is so greatly to your advantage.

John Company repeats that the matter is of very great consequence.

I believe that you are open to reason now, John. A few months ago you were in a state of great excitement —irate, confused, bewildered, eager to sacrifice some one to your fury; and I was the victim most ready to your hand. At that time, if any one had proposed to you to surround my big house with fagots, and to burn me to a

cinder, without judge or jury, or benefit of clergy, you would have shouted "a Daniel come to judgment!" and set fire to the pile. It was only natural, John. It is your wont in like cases; and I was not surprised. But you have cooled down a little; you have taken time to consider; you are not quite convinced that I am the author of all the mischief; and if you will give me nothing else, I think you will give me fair play. I am not afraid of that, John. You are an honest, well-meaning fellow; but, you must excuse me for saying it, you are very easily gulled—easily led astray by platitudes and clap-traps. Designing people get about you, John, and throw dust in your eyes. They have an interest in blinding you so that you may not see the truth; and before you have rubbed the dust *out* of your eyes, they have done what cannot be undone, and you are left to deplore at leisure the obfuscation of your intellect, at a time when it was above all things desirable that you should have your senses about you.

Mr. Bull is cautioned against people who throw dust in his eyes.

This has happened before now, John, and it is likely to happen again, at the present time, when you have my affairs on the carpet. Since I wrote to you last, your men of business have presented you with a scheme of their own for laying me snugly in the earth. It may be a good scheme, or it may be a bad one (of course, I think it is a very bad one, and I will tell you presently *why* I think so); but whatever else you may believe about it, don't believe that it is a *small* measure. Don't believe that it is a matter of no consequence. Don't think, because that jaunty First Minister

India Bill, No. I.

of yours sticks a straw in the corner of his mouth, and, telling you not to be afraid, he is not going to hurt you, dawdles through an hour's speech, as though he thought India an ineffable bore, that the question which you are called upon to consider is not one of the gravest that has ever been forced upon you, John. Do not think that, because all the newspapers, which support your men of business, tell you, day after day, that the measure they have proposed for my extermination is a very "modest" one, that the changes which that measure involves are not very material changes—changes, I say, John, radical, revolutionary, and injurious to your constitution, whilst they are destructive of mine. When they tell you that these changes are nominal, formal, mechanical, touching lightly the surface of things, tell them either that they lie, John, or that they are as ignorant as babes and sucklings, and quite unfit to handle such weighty things as constitutions. That "no consequence" cry will ruin you, John, if you do not mind what you are about. You have got a man at the head of your affairs who cannot be persuaded to look seriously and solemnly at the most serious and solemn questions. He has an habitual "pooh-pooh" in his heart, in his head, and on the tip of his tongue. He pooh-poohs me, John, and he pooh-poohs you. He talks about responsibility to Parliament; but he pooh-poohs Parliament, and practically repudiates all responsibility. You must be careful, therefore, how you measure the importance of anything by the gravity with which he is disposed to treat it. He does the leading comic business extremely

Mr. Bull is told to beware of the great master of "pooh-pooh."

well, I admit, John; but the manufacture of a government on which the well-being of nearly two hundred millions of people is dependent, is not a comic business at all.

Look at it gravely, then—earnestly—solemnly. Be assured that no weightier matter has ever come before you than that which you are now called upon to consider. You have never before had to manufacture a constitution *de novo*. Constitutions, as I have told you before, are the growth of time and the growth of circumstances. We do not commonly strike them off, hot from the anvil, at a single blow. But this is what they are doing now, John. They tell you that they are introducing only a few easy and obvious changes, the growth of circumstances, into an existing system. They are doing nothing of the kind. They are starting fresh, with an original conception; not tinkering an old, but creating elementally a new, system. They are inaugurating, in fact, a mighty experiment. Look at it in this point of view, John, and you will recognise the gravity of the occasion.

If the changes recommended to you had been merely nominal changes, I should still have exhorted you not to adopt them at the present time. Names go a long way with some people, and a change of name may well be supposed to prefigure substantive changes affecting mightily the destinies of India. You can proclaim no change that will not create suspicion and alarm. Besides, I repeat that your Parliament, John, is not sufficiently well informed to sit in judgment on proposed changes even of a superficial character. But if it be incapable of

legislating, with any hope of good results, when only slight changes are proposed, how utter must be its incapacity to grapple with the great constitutional questions which are now presented to it. If there was danger of rash judgments in the one case, John, how much more danger is there in the other. If there was a necessity of increased knowledge and prolonged consideration—in other words, a necessity for delay—in the one case, how paramount the necessity in the other. And yet, John, you are going headlong to work, you are rushing blindly upon the manufacture of constitutions. You are suffering your Parliament, without any preliminary training, without knowledge, without experience, without inquiry—almost, it may be said, without as much consideration as, in ordinary parish affairs, is given to a paving or lighting rate;—you are suffering them, I say, as the merest novices, to rush precipitately upon, and to grapple blindly with, this question; whilst your men of business are standing with their hands in their pockets, and telling you not to be afraid, for really it is of no consequence. I tell you, John, that it is a matter of the greatest consequence, and you will find it out some of these days.

John Company is not satisfied with his parliamentary judges;

In my last letter I think I said, John, that if I was deserving of your confidence in 1853, when my way of doing business was thoroughly investigated, I am worthy of your confidence now—unless it can be proved that either by some crime or some blunder, by something done or something left undone, I have caused this woeful mutiny in Bengal, or have failed to take proper steps, on

the occurrence of the disaster, to suppress or to mitigate the evil. But not only, John, is this not proved, but I am happy to say that it is not asserted. One of the best of your servants—a gentleman of great learning and ability—who brought a vast display of historical research to bear upon the question of my extinction, said to you the other night, "I do not believe it possible to show that any vigilance on the part of the Directors in London could have guarded against the occurrence of the present mutiny, or that, when it did occur, it would have been possible to suppress it by measures more vigorous or rapid than those which have been taken."* Everybody expected that, if a formal bill of indictment were not laid against me, some attempt, for mere decency's sake, would be made to show that I had gone wrong somewhere, somehow, and at some time. You would never have heard anything about a new India Bill if there had not been a mutiny in Bengal; and therefore it was naturally expected that some attempt would be made to show how the proposed measure had grown out of that calamity—how the latter, in some way or other, necessitated or justified the former. But not only was no attempt of this kind made by your First Minister, John, but the negative admission of my inoffensiveness was exalted into a positive admission by his coadjutor, in the passage which I have just quoted. And so you were informed that, because I had neither done anything that I ought not to have done, nor left undone anything that I ought to have done, there was a

* Speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 12th of February, 1858.

pressing necessity to extinguish me without benefit of clergy.

——"Logic for ever!
That beats my grandmother, and she was clever."

There was a conclusion utterly without premises. You were told that it was necessary to put me to death; but you were not told in what manner I had forfeited the confidence which, only a few years ago, was reposed in me by the very persons who are now compassing my destruction. On the other hand, you *were* told that I have done nothing to forfeit that confidence—only that I am inherently bad. If I am inherently bad now, John, I was inherently bad in 1853, when you were told that the welfare of India demanded that I should not be laid in the earth. This is so manifest, that history will record against you, that as John Company could not be sentenced to death *after trial*, you were persuaded to suffer him to be sentenced to death *without trial*.

and asks why he should be condemned without a fair trial.

It will be said, John, that you brought me to a drum-head court-martial, and exterminated a great power, to which you owe the very empire from which you derive your greatness, with as little compunction as if you were shooting down a rebellious Sepoy. If you are a great person now, John, who helped to make you what you are? Would you ever have held the high place that you do, in the estimation of your neighbours, if it had not been for me and my acquisitions? You tell me that you did it yourself, that you owe nothing to me. That is like your ingratitude, John! Make me of no account, depreciate my services, say that I have *done* nothing,

that I *am* nothing. It is necessary to follow this line of argument to satisfy your conscience, John. And I see that your servants are following it, as the only way in which they can justify to you the course that they are taking.

I wish to put you on your guard, John. Your servants think, as I have already told you, that they can persuade you into the ready acceptance of this measure, by telling you that it is really a very small affair. And they endeavour to make it appear that it is a very small affair, by telling you that I, John Company, am little better than a name, a tradition. Here, for example, is an astonishing declaration, made by one of your inferior servants, who ought to know better, for he once had a place on the Indian benches of your servants' hall—"He wished," he said, "to speak with all respect of the East India Company; but he maintained that it had not been a great and potent element in conducting the business of India; that it did not possess that great control of which it boasted; *that it had no initiative, and was not the adviser of the Board of Control;* and that, so far as its direct agency was concerned, its functions were so slight, that they might be got rid of without its being found out."* It seems so impossible, John, that one of your servants should have uttered the words which I have underlined, that, if I had not been told, by those who heard him, that he not only said this, but entered into some details confirmatory of the assertion, directly at variance with fact, I should, in the fulness of my charity,

* Speech of the Right Hon. Robert Lowe on the 15th of February, 1858.

have believed that the newspapers had misreported him. To tell me, indeed—to tell you, John—that I have "no initiative." No initiative! Why, I initiate everything not in the "Secret Department." Every despatch is written in my house, and by my servants. Your people in Cannon-row do not see my despatches until my servants have written them. My servants decide, in the first instance, when to write and what to write. Your people know nothing about the matter until the work is done. And I am to be told that I initiate nothing! You are to be told that I initiate nothing—that, initiating nothing, I am of no use, and that, if I were to be abolished to-morrow, "no one would find it out." I suspect, John, that Cannon-row would find it out, if it were suddenly called upon to initiate all the business that is initiated in Leadenhall-street.

John Company is astonished at being told that he has "no initiative."

You will tell me, perhaps, that a statement so diametrically at variance with the truth must surely be discredited in Parliament. But I tell you, John, that it was not discredited. It is true that, five or six years ago, evidence was taken by the House, and is on record, respecting the manner in which my business is done. Any member taking the trouble to walk into the Library may find, in black and white, the whole history of the working of the "Double Government." But who reads the evidence taken by a former Parliament—who troubles himself to search Blue-books for such details? A member of Her Majesty's Government, once Secretary to the Board of Control, surely ought to know how business is done! I was not surprised, therefore, when a highly intelligent

and right-minded young member told me the other day, that the speech to which I am now alluding had made a profound impression on his mind. It had gone a long way to convince him that, for all administrative purposes, I am really little better than a tradition—a name—and that, therefore, there can be no possible harm in sweeping me away. This, you will observe, John, is the language of the ministerial journals. This, you must know, John, is the game your servants are playing. They know how reasonable is the cry against the precipitate adoption of any *great* measure. They know that you, John, being in the main a man of good sense and clear vision, when the dust is not in your eyes, are likely to cry out against the unconsidered introduction of great constitutional changes, affecting the very life of the system, into the government of your great Eastern dependencies; and therefore they are exerting themselves, in every possible manner, by pen and by tongue, to persuade you that they are recommending no vital changes, because in fact I have no life. Let it be once shown that I have no power, no life—that I can do no good myself, and cannot prevent others from doing harm—let it be shown that I do nothing in the initial, the middle, or final stages of business, but throw up obstacles and necessitate delays, and of course all the rest follows.

Mr. Bull is informed that the proposed changes are great organic changes.

The measure they are recommending is really a small measure; the changes are easy, obvious, and superficial, to be considered without alarm, and adopted without danger. Now, John, understand this matter. I assure you it is a very weighty one; the proposed

changes are vital, organic changes; and I am eager to make this clear to you. Know, then, in the first place, how my affairs are managed at this present time. I did not invent the system—you did not invent the system. It grew out of circumstances—and we have it; that is enough for our present purpose.

On my old commercial stock, John, the wisdom of your Parliament, three-quarters of a century ago, grafted a great branch of imperialism. I do not deny that something of the kind was wanted. I had grown from a mere commercial company into a great governing body; and as I had become the master, not merely of factories and of merchant ships, but of territories, fortifications, and standing armies, my affairs became the concern, not of my shareholders only, but of the nation itself; and the nation had a right to demand that I should be subjected to national control. The Regulating Act was passed; an imperial Board of Commissioners was appointed; and all my acts, John, not of a purely commercial character, were subjected to the supervision of the Imperial Government, as represented by the Board of Control. I have nothing to say against this, John. The system of Government thus established was the system of Double Government which you are now condemning. Although it arose out of this necessity to correct an existing evil, and was therefore, so to speak, an accident, there was a sound constitutional principle at the bottom of it. Two distinct governing agencies were thus associated, to co-operate with, but to control,

John Company explains how he grew into what he is;

and shows that there is something good at the bottom of Double Government.

each other. The one was—nay, I may still say, the one *is*—a representative body—a body elected by a constituency—a body representing the middle classes of England. The Court of Directors is at this time composed of men for the most part elected by middle-class voters. The majority are entirely independent of the Crown; they are neither appointed nor are they removable by the Minister of the day. They have nothing to do with fragile parties or fleeting policies. A ministerial crisis is nothing to them. They are subject to no corrupt political influences; they are agitated by no gusts of faction. There is nothing to warp them from the straight course of duty; and I believe that they do their duty as honest men, and as, doubtless, your servants would do their duty, John, if there were no such things as parliamentary majorities. But this body, for all its independence and all its honesty, may go grievously wrong. It may be wrong-headed or prejudiced, or short-sighted, or indolent, or apathetic; and it may sometimes need stimulus and sometimes control. You have then the governing Board to stimulate or to control my Directors, and if they go too fast or too slow, John, your servants may keep them at the proper pace. Now this, I say, is sound in principle; for it represents what you are so fond of talking about, my friend—"the balance of the constitution." There is the independent popular element, and there is the imperial element—each checking and controlling the other. There is a permanent body, with a consistent policy, subject to no fluctuations of party and no caprices of

popular opinion, but with a tendency, therefore, to stagnation. There is, on the other hand, a fluctuating body, with no fixed policy, subject to vicissitudes of party, and continually moved by a pressure from without—whose tendency, if not towards progression, is towards a kind of restlessness that simulates it. Each possesses, in some degree, what the other lacks; and, on the whole, we work advantageously together.

But this is not the point, John, on which it is most important to insist. An obstructive or a torpid government is, doubtless, a bad thing; but a corrupt government is infinitely worse. Now, John, you know much better than I do, that all who have written books on the nosology of your constitution, or who have touched upon it in books upon the subject—down to the latest writer, Lord Grey—have told you that in all parliamentary governments there is a necessary tendency towards corruption. The weaker the government, of course the greater the tendency. Now, it has always been thought that the Home and Colonial services afford quite sufficient opportunity for the corruption of the country without such assistance as India may afford, on that field of action, to the Minister of the day. The patronage of India is not now available for purposes of political corruption. Take care, John, how you do anything that will tend to convert it to these vile uses. You are going to remove the only obstacles which have hitherto lain in the way of this gigantic abuse. Beware, then, lest, when you are endeavouring to rend the oak, you yourself are destroyed by the rebound.

John Company discourses on the existing system of Indian government, and shows that it is a system of constitutional checks.

I must make the matter clear to you, John, by explaining what the checks are of which I speak. My managing board is composed of eighteen Directors—six of whom are nominated by the Crown, the remainder, or two-thirds of the entire body, being elected by a constituency. It may be a good or it may be a bad constituency; but, at all events, it is an independent body. It consists mainly of members of the middle classes, many of whom have served or resided in India, or are in some way associated with the country. They vote perhaps for the best man, perhaps not. Private interest goes a great way; perseverance goes a great way. But politics go no way at all. A man, who puts himself forward as a candidate for the East India Direction, announces his antecedents; sets forth what he has done (most probably in India), and what he desires to do for the benefit of that country. But he never declares whether he is a Whig or a Tory—whether he is for the Government or against it. Mr. Hayter is nothing to him, or he to Mr. Hayter. I declare to you, John, that I don't know what are the politics of any one of my Directors that has not a seat in Parliament. And the few who have seats are so little of party men, that on one day they may vote with the Government, and on another against it. My worst enemies must admit, John, that I have never troubled myself with party politics, or turned my patronage to political uses. The majority of my Directors owe nothing to the Crown—nothing to the Minister of the day; and they have nothing to do with party. I think, then, it is fair to allow that they consti-

tute an *independent* body. Now, as the law stands at the present time, John, all the military, the marine, and the ecclesiastical patronage of India (you have stripped me of the civil and the medical), with the exception of a small share given by courtesy to the President of the India Board, is vested in my Directors. They send out every year a large number of young men; but beyond launching them fairly on the stream of life, they can do nothing to advance their progress. All the rest depends upon their own exertions, or on the view taken of those exertions by the Governor-General, or the Governor, or the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency to which he belongs. Now, these high functionaries, virtually appointed by the Crown—that is, by the Minister—sit in judgment upon the claims of men not appointed by the Crown or the Minister, but by a wholly independent body. The Minister who appoints the Governor or the Commander-in-Chief, has no particular interest in the members of the Indian services, because those services are not appointed by him, and, except in a very few instances, do not belong to his order. He does not, therefore, exercise any influence over patronage *in* India; and the governors and commanders-in-chief appointed by him cannot ingratiate themselves with him by advancing his friends. And they do not care to advance my friends, John, because they owe nothing to me. I never interfere in these matters, and, if I did, my interference might not be very successful. So, with very rare exceptions (exceptions which will arise under any system, to "prove the rule"), every man in the Indian services is left fairly to carve out his own fortune. The best men make their

way to the best places; and when a great crisis arises, the Lawrences, the Nicholsons, and the Outrams are found at their proper posts.

I have said, John, that after I have once launched a man on the stream of life, I do not interfere with his subsequent progress. But I must make one exception to this statement. It rests with me, John, to appoint the members of the Indian Councils. With the Governor-General of India, and with the governors of the minor presidencies of India, are associated Councils composed of members of the Indian services; and the members of those Councils are nominated by me. The governor may legally override his Council; but, practically, the fellowship, in the council-chamber, of some of the ablest and most experienced men in the Indian services, cannot fail to influence, perhaps to restrain, a governor who, in all probability, is destitute of knowledge and experience. The Council thus composed is, indeed, an important constitutional check. And why is it so, John? Because it is appointed, not by the governor himself, not by the Minister who appoints the governor, but by an independent body like myself, John—by a Board composed of men, a large majority of whom are appointed by an independent constituency.

John Company shows how India Bill (No. 1) proposes to sweep away all constitutional checks.

And now, my dear John, I trust that I have made sufficiently clear to you, both the principles and the practice of the much-abused "Double Government of India." Your own natural acumen will clearly indicate to you the constitutional checks and safeguards inherent in such a system. Now mark how, in the pro-

posed new Government, all these checks and safeguards will be removed. Instead of a Board appointed mainly by a constituency, there is to be a Board appointed entirely by the Crown—that is, by the Minister of the day. This Board is to consist of eight instead of eighteen members. Instead of sitting at the other end of the town, it is to sit under the same roof with the Minister, and is to be continually in personal communication with him. Now what guarantee is there for—nay, what reasonable expectation is there of—the independence of a Council so circumstanced? The abstract absurdity of a man appointing his own checks, is patent to every one with eyes to see and faculties to comprehend. But I am not going to ride off on an abstraction. Let us examine the matter more closely, John—let us look at it in all its practical bearings. What hope is there of independence from the characters and conditions of the men appointed to the Council? Why, if there be any hope at all, there it is. The members of the new Council are to be appointed from among men who have either sat in my old Court of Directors, or who have resided a certain number of years in India; and they are not to be permitted to hold seats in Parliament. It is probable that the most independent Council which could be formed would be one composed entirely of my old Directors. They are habituated to independence, John; nay, more, they are accustomed—excuse me for using a not very refined colloquialism—to "think small beer" of the Indian Minister. Carrying with them from Leadenhall-street to Whitehall a large amount of knowledge and experience, and in all probability finding none in the latter place, they are not

very likely to entertain much veneration for their President, or to sit very subserviently at his feet. But even supposing that the first Council were so constituted, new materials will in time be introduced into it, and new feelings will spring up; and even looking at the matter in the most favourable point of view, it will appear that, after all, an independent spirit is of little use without independent powers of action. The men may be honest and resolute men; but, expending their honesty and resolution in fruitless conflicts with a Minister who may reject their advice and scorn their remonstrances, they might, for all practical purposes of beneficial administration, as well be his tools and toadies.

I told you much of this in my last letter, but it cannot be repeated too often and too emphatically; for the First Minister of the Crown has told you that he proposes to transfer to this new Council all the powers possessed by my old Court of Directors; and if you do not look closely into the matter, John, you may be carried away by the belief that he is speaking the truth. Understand, then, that under no possible circumstances can a Board or Council appointed by the Minister be practically as independent as a Board appointed by a constituency. Neither can a Board immediately associated with the Minister, as a component part of the same institution, and in constant personal communication with him, ever be as independent as one sitting in another place, and, except occasionally through its chairman, never communicating with him at all. The power, therefore, derived from independence will not exist in the new Council, as it now exists in my Court of Directors; and the

powers vested in it by the law will be greatly diminished. My Directors, John, stand between the English Minister and his vice-regal nominees in India. They cannot absolutely appoint a Governor-General, or a minor Governor for themselves; that is to say, they can only appoint "subject to the confirmation of Her Majesty;" but as the appointment cannot take place without nomination by the Court of Directors, they have virtually the power of rejecting the man selected by the Crown. But for the existence of this power in the Court of Directors, John, you would probably have seen a worse race of men at the head of affairs in India, than those who have actually governed my possessions, on the whole, so successfully and well. This power, you know, is coupled with the power of recalling an obnoxious Governor-General—a great and substantive power, John, with which I should willingly part only with my life. Now, these powers to reject, or rather to refuse to nominate, the favourite of the Crown, and afterwards to remove him from office, are necessarily a cogent check upon the Minister of the day. The interposition of the independent element of the elected Directors between the two representatives of the Crown in India and in England, has ever been one of the best safeguards of our Indian empire. It was a check that did not exist merely in name; and you must remember, as well as I do, instances in which the power has been exercised.

Mr. Bull is instructed that the powers of the old Court of Directors are in no wise to descend to the new Council.

But this power, John—this interposition—this check—is not to exist under the new system of Government.

The Minister is to send his own nominees to India, and the Council are to have no power either to reject them in the first instance, or to recall them in the last. There is to be nothing between the Crown Minister in Downing-street and the Crown Minister in the Government House of Calcutta—nothing to prevent Lord Palmerston from sending out his friend Lord Clanricarde to India, and from keeping him there as long as he likes. Now, John, I maintain that this is a very great and a very dangerous change. But I have not yet told you the worst of it. You have seen that associated with the Governor-General and the minor governors in India are certain presidential councils, which, being appointed by my Directors, are altogether independent of the Crown and of the Crown nominees. Now these councillors, as I have said, having knowledge, experience, and ability, and being invariably selected, on account of these qualifications, by my Directors, were practically, as well as constitutionally, a most important check upon the governors of the different presidencies. But now, just as the Minister at home, John, is to appoint his own checks, the Minister in India is to appoint hts. And so the aristocracy is complete at both ends, and the old constitution of our Anglo-Indian empire is entirely destroyed.

John Company proceeds to show the gain of patronage to the Crown.

Now, see the effect of this, John, upon the Patronage question. Your Ministers have the audacity to boast that these great changes will not yield to the Government of the day any amount of patronage, of which the country has any occasion to be jealous. But let us see how the account stands. Imprimis, there are eight mem-

bers of the new Council to be appointed by the Government. Well, it may be said, this is not much. At present they appoint six of my Directors—six Directors, with salaries each of 500*l.* a year, and a twenty-second part of the patronage, military, naval, and ecclesiastical. Now, they are to appoint eight councillors, with salaries of a 1000*l.*, and a tenth part (or perhaps not so much; it depends upon the share taken by the President) of the local military patronage. Now, either the share of patronage to be vested in each councillor is much greater than that which is enjoyed by one of my Directors (and the appointments, therefore, proportionately valuable), or a very large portion of my army is to be handed over to the Horse Guards, and the patronage administered by the Crown. In either point of view, the increased power of the Government is enormous. It must be remembered that henceforth even the councillors will be members of the Government; and that although they are not directly dependent on parliamentary majorities, they can never entirely detach themselves from imperial and aristocratic influences; and that, therefore, although in a limited sense as compared with the patronage of the Minister, their patronage will be Government patronage, and an accession to the strength of the Crown. You must bear in mind, John, that although, for decency's sake, when your eyes are upon the Minister, he will probably make, in the first instance, unexceptionable appointments —or the best that can be made on such terms as are prescribed in the Bill—there is no sort of guarantee for the excellence, or even for the harmlessness, of subsequent appointments; and that, as India will be flooded now with

Queen's officers, and all the legal, marine, educational, engineering appointments, &c., will be in the gift of the Crown, Government will have plenty of *protégés* out of the line of those services, which I still, John, am proud to call mine. It will not be very long, you may be sure, before the creatures of the Court and the tools of Party are sitting in the Council of India, and dispensing their patronage for the benefit of the Government of the day.

John Company insists upon the importance of the Council having the initiative.

There is another point, too, John, which I wish to impress upon you. I have said in the early part of this letter that much of my power resides in the possession of the initiative, in the ordinary business of the Home Government of India; and that some of your servants have endeavoured to lower my prestige by declaring that I do not possess that power. I *do* possess it, John; but the Council, which it is proposed to substitute for me is not to possess it. The Bill which Lord Palmerston has presented to you is not very clear on the subject of the procedure of the new Government; but it is plain, at least, that that procedure is to be regulated by the President. The President, therefore, may permit the initiative to be taken by the Council. But what is required, John, to ensure good government, is not that this should be permitted, but that it should be provided. Where the knowledge is, there should be the initiative. Where the independence is, there should be the initiative. Where deliberation and discussion precede action, there should be the initiative. But instead of decreeing that it shall be so, John, you leave the power to originate

as well as to control and to decide, in the hands of a despotic Minister, who may not have knowledge and cannot have independence. You leave it to the Council to advise when advice is sought; and to protest against what it cannot alter or prevent. The President, except in matters of finance, may do everything off his own bat; and yet I am to be told, John, that all the powers of the Court of Directors are to be transferred to the new Council.

And how do you know John, that the Council even thus deterioated will last? how do you know that it is intended to last? It appears to me probable in the extreme that, good at first (as far as such a Council can be good), it will grow from good to bad, and from bad to worse, until it becomes either a scandal and a reproach, or such an entire nonentity that its abolition will be considered a virtue rather than a crime. And so the patronage, after being for some time administered *for* the Government, will be directly administered by it; and are you prepared to place such a gigantic instrument of corruption in the hands of the Minister of the day? Look to this, John, whilst there is yet time; keep your eye on the rocks, or you will assuredly find yourself drifting upon them before you know what you are about.

It appears, then, that a large portion of the initial patronage now held by my Directors is to pass immediately into the hands of the Government of the day, and that there is a strong likelihood of the *whole* of it eventually following in the same direction. But the con-

Mr. Bull is admonished that it is proposed to destroy utterly the constitution of the Indian as well as of the Home Government.

templated changes will do more than this—they will materially affect the administration of patronage in India. The tendency of the proposed measure is to convert the Governor-General into a gigantic despot. All checks are to be removed from him, both at home and abroad. He is no longer to be controlled or influenced by my Directors, or by a council nominated by my Directors. He can do what he likes as long the Crown Minister is with him. The Council at home cannot restrain him, for it is to have no power. The Council in India cannot restrain him, for henceforth it is to be composed of his own creatures. There is nothing in the world but his own scruples to restrain him from an abuse of patronage which may throw the whole country into confusion, and do more harm than a Sepoy mutiny. I admit the possibility, John, of this immense power being placed in worthy hands; but I doubt whether, under the new system, a really honest man could hold the appointment for a twelvemonth. Though free himself from corruption, such corrupt influences will be brought to bear upon him that his position will be painful in the extreme. The Home Government, John, will expect him to serve their friends, and will be continually entreating him to "take care of Dowb." If he be determined not to take care of Dowb, he will soon be hopelessly at variance with his friends at home, and will be glad to make room for a more facile successor. Then the facile successor in India and the corrupt Government in England will have it all their own way. And the appointments in India, which no one has ever ventured to

say have been unfairly distributed under my administration, will be Hayterised without remorse. Seats in Council, residencies, chief-commissionerships, Suddur judgeships, will be given away, at the instigation of the Government at home, for the direct or indirect purchase of parliamentary votes; and we may be sure that aristocratic connexions will never again be of the little account that they now are under my middle-class Government. There will, doubtless, ere long be a line of telegraph the whole way between London and Calcutta. Think, John, of the messages from Jones of the Civil Service to Jones, member for Little Peddlington, announcing that Robinson in Council, or Brown of the Suddur, is sick unto death of cholera, and that the dying man's appointment would just suit the transmitter of the message. Think of the little conversation that evening in the smoking-room of the House of Commons, between Jones, M.P., and the Government Whip, and the consequent message next morning from Whitehall to Government House, Calcutta, that the Minister hopes that Jones, C. S., will be taken care of, if the Honourable Robinson's seat in Council becomes vacant. You may laugh, John, and shake your head, but I assure you that nothing is more likely. We know that such things have happened in other directions before.

And yet, in spite of all this, they tell you, John, not to be afraid. Not to be afraid of a measure which sweeps away all those barriers which have hitherto stood firmly and unassailably between India and the united influence of parliamentary ignorance and parliamentary corruption! The new India bill contemplates

the gradual absorption of all the power and patronage of the Indian Government by the Minister of the day. Can there ever be anything like a consistent policy under such a system of Government? Do your Governments not fluctuate—is your Parliament not capricious? Is not public opinion more capricious still? What, John, is an Indian Minister? Is he not, as I have seen him described, a man "who may be here to-day and gone to-morrow?, who may preside over the India Board and govern India for a fortnight, and then be suddenly deposed by some gust of parliamentary caprice—by the mistaken tactics of an inexperienced party leader, or the neglect of an inexperienced 'whipper-in?'"* Some speaker, during the recent debate on my affairs in the House of Commons, stated that the average duration of the official lives of Indian ministers has been about two years and a half. Surprising longevity! Why, John, there have been as many as half-a-dozen ministers at the head of your colonial office in the course of a single year. There is no reason why you should not have the same number of ministers, in the course of some happy year, at the head of the Indian department of the State —half-a-dozen men, each one knowing as much about India as his predecessor, and that is nothing. Have you half-a-dozen statesmen, John, of the class from which Indian ministers are likely to be taken, who know whether a *Zillah* is a wild beast, a district, or a regiment of horse? How many are there who can tell me off-hand whether Holkar is a Mohammedan or a Hindoo, and whether

John Company again speaks despitefully of the House of Commons;

* KAYE'S *Administration of the East India Company.*

the Mohurrum is a Mohammedan or a Hindoo festival? What more does Parliament at large know about the matter? Not many years ago, a distinguished statesman, now no more, in a speech on the sugar duties, spoke, in the House of Commons, of the hardship of 100,000,000 of the people of India being compelled to drink their tea without sugar. Did the House laugh? Not a bit of it, John. The House listened calmly and complacently, and conjured up to their excited imagination visions of Indian ryots, sitting at the tea-table with their wives and children, and sipping sugarless bohea out of blue and white crockery. An ignorant Minister, John, is to be responsible to an ignorant Parliament. And this is the system of which you are told not to be afraid.

and of that great humbug, "Public Opinion."

But then, you tell me, there is "public opinion." What is public opinion, John? I am telling you that you want something stable—something consistent between India and the Government of the day, and you tell me that there is "public opinion." You might as well tell me that there is the wind. Public opinion is anything—nothing. What has it been—what has it *not* been—by turns, since first the sad news of the mutiny reached us on that sultry June morning? Take only one point, John. You remember what at first was the outcry against proselytising officers. You remember how it was said that the over-zealous and indiscreet interference of missionary officers had done much to turn the hearts and the knives of the Sepoys against us. Well, for a while this was public opinion. But pre-

sently the wind shifted—right to the opposite point of the compass. Instead of this signal calamity having been brought upon us by indiscreet Christian zeal, Public Opinion pronounced that it had been drawn down upon our devoted heads as a punishment for our unchristian indifference. And now many excellent people, John, are proclaiming that we can propitiate the Most High, and remove from our unhappy countrymen the weight of His chastening hand, only by an open, unreserved acknowledgment of the duty of the Government, as well as of individual men, to use every possible endeavour to convert the heathen to Christianity, whatever the prospect of success or the certainty of mischief. This, John, has been enunciated from your pulpits and from your platforms—*is*, John, enunciated now. But there will soon be another reaction; and the sooner, I cannot help thinking, the better. For nothing can be more mischievous than the present outcry—nothing more surely calculated to increase, whilst you are praying to the Almighty to assuage, the malice of your enemies. I told you in my last, John, to think of the effect that all this indiscreet talk about open demonstrations in the part of the State, in favour of extended schemes of proselytism, is likely to have upon the national mind, when coupled with a report of the intention of substituting for the old tolerant Company's Government, a new and more vigorous administration to be carried on in the name of the Queen. Do you not think it likely, John, that emissaries will go from place to place declaring that this is the real meaning of the change of Government, and that all past pledges and

promises will be ignored? What is more likely than this, John? and what will give colour to the falsehood? Why, the Public Opinion, to which you think you may look as a safeguard, but which, in reality, is a source of incredible danger to our Indian Empire.

Yes, John, under the new system of government this "Public Opinion" will drag you into vile quicksets and horrible quagmires of danger. Public opinion, rash, hasty, ignorant, acting upon a Parliament equally ignorant and equally rash. Truly, indeed, was it said the other night, John, by a great man, that "before Parliament can legislate safely for Orientals, they must be able to form a just and discriminating opinion regarding the feelings and prejudices of people of a different colour and a different creed." "They might," it was truly added, "without that knowledge, pass a law which might appear to be for the benefit of the people, but which might turn out to be a horrible punishment."* Wisely did he call your attention to another danger, greater even, if possible, than the ignorance and the arrogance of the House. This scheme, John, for my speedy destruction, is popular in the House of Commons. Why is it popular? Why were so many Members found, on the morning of the 19th of February, to vote, in the face of every possible argument, for the reconstruction of my house whilst it is in a blaze? Because the measure will throw into the hands of the Minister a large amount of patronage to be used for Parliamentary purposes—to be distributed among the hangers-on of Government, among the members

* Speech of Sir E. Bulwer Lytton, on the 18th of February, 1858.

of the Pope's brass-band, and other legislators of that class. Well might the orator exclaim that our Indian Empire is "threatened by a danger far more imminent than that of an enemy in the field—the danger that arises from organised red-tapery and jobbery; and that, as that Empire was won by the valour of the middle classes, he trusted that Parliament would never allow it to be wrested from their hands by official imbecility and ministerial corruption."* Yes, John, these indeed are weighty matters for your consideration. Read the whole of the noble speech from which these words are taken, and lay the warnings it contains to your heart. Never again,—if this measure becomes the law of the land, shall we find the best men working their way to high place by the innate force of their own integrity and ability—their own brave resolution and indomitable perseverance. Never again will the Munros and Malcolms, taking to themselves the noble motto, *Aut viam inveniam, aut faciam*, start from their father's counting-house, or their father's farm, in highland or in lowland, to carve their way unaided to the governorship of a group of provinces. Never again, when a great danger bursts suddenly upon the land, will the Lawrences and the Outrams, the Nicholsons, the Wilsons, and the Chamberlaines,—middle-class men, without courtly favour, without ministerial influence—be found in the high places of the council-chamber and the camp. Never again will the nation turn with the same confidence as of old, to the heroes whom the Company have made, and the Company's system has fostered. A despotic Governor-General, backed by a Minister to whom pa-

* Speech of Sir E. Bulwer Lytton on the 18th of February, 1858.

tronage is the necessary fulcrum of Place, will have it all his own way in one department of the State; and the favourites of the Horse Guards (I will not name them, John—you will easily supply their aristocratic patronymics) will ride roughshod over the other. If there are no places vacant for such favourites, new appointments will be made for them, and I shall not be here, John, to protest against the jobbery. Are these, my dear John, considerations to which you can afford to turn a deaf ear? Is it all mere talk—is all an idle alarum? Or do you see in these suggestions anything to warn you that you are flinging away a great empire, at a moment, too, when it lies in your power to consolidate and to perpetuate it, by the exercise of a little patience, a little caution, and a little thought?

John Company sums up.

And now, John, before I conclude, I wish to put the whole case before you, like a pair of Limerick gloves, in a nutshell. I do not deny that the present system of "Double Government" is in some respects defective. It is said that it is encumbered with formalities, and that it engenders delays. Whether these delays may not on the whole be serviceable delays, I will not now pause to inquire. You do not trouble yourself to inquire, John, whether the old system of stage-coach travelling may not, in some important respects, be more advantageous than the present system of railway travelling. You have got your railways; you use them, and you say that this is a "go-ahead age." It *is* a "go-ahead age." We must take it, for better or for worse, as it is, or we shall be left behind in the mud. Now, I admit that your progress during the last quarter

of a century has been inconceivably fast, and that during that period there has been an amount of progress, of different kinds, in India, far beyond what I ever anticipated; there has been territorial progress or extension; there has been moral and intellectual progress; there has been scientific progress, as demonstrated by the action of steam-communication, of railways, of the electric telegraph. Now, I admit, John, that with all this progress, my administrative agency ought to keep full pace, and that if you prove to me that it has not kept pace, I am bound either to reform myself, to submit to be reformed by you, or quietly to abdicate my functions.

Well, John, I don't want to cavil about the matter. I am not obstinate, or self-sufficient, or vain-glorious. I know what a mess your Ministers would make of the government of India; but I do not maintain that I am perfect myself. It is very probable that my mode of doing business has not kept pace with the requirements of extended dominion and increased facilities of communication—that there are, in short, defects in my system which require to be removed. But the question for your consideration is, whether these are vital, constitutional, organic defects—whether the disease has eaten, like a cancer, so deeply into my life, that it can only be removed at the expense of my existence; or whether they are accidental ailments, to which ordinary remedies may be applied, with hope of restoring me to health and activity, and enabling me to meet the demands made upon me by the increased and increasing business of my Indian Empire. This, John, I say, is the great question for your solution. I do not see that either your Minis-

ters or your Parliament have taken it into consideration; and, therefore, I press it upon your own common sense. You are not wont, John, to prefer abolition to modification. If your own constitutional systems, at any period of your existence, have not worked well, you have modified, or, as you generally call it, you have reformed them; you have not applied the axe to the root. The *diruit ædificat* principle has never been yours. You have let circumstances, out of which all your systems of government have grown, still continue to operate upon those systems, and to shape them according to the pressure of the times. Now, what is it that makes my constitution an exception to your general rule of action? Is it that it is incurably bad? You have tried, from time to time, to improve it, John, and you declare that all these experiments have been successful. What is the logic, then, of declaring, that as all your attempts at improvements have succeeded, it is useless to try any more? One would have supposed that the success of past experiments was an argument for further efforts to improve me. At all events, it sufficiently demonstrates that I have not yet been proved to be incurable. If my defects, then—exaggerate them as you may—be not incurable; or, in other words, be not inseparable from my constitution, why seek to destroy me outright? You are not wont, in the ordinary affairs of life, to proceed in this irrational manner. If your horse goes lamely, you have him re-shod; you blister him, or you fire him; you do not shoot him until you have tried everything else in vain. If your carriage-wheels go heavily and cumbrously, you grease them, or you mend them; you

insert some new wood-work or some new iron-work; or you buy new patent axles: you do not make a bonfire of the vehicle. You do not pull down your house because your fire smokes; you do not cut down your tree because there is a worm in the bark; you do not have your leg amputated, because, as Mr. Dickens says, "your corns are an aggravation." I know nothing in ordinary life that is in any way a parallel to your present proceeding (assuming that you take the advice of your Ministers), except that capital story, John, told by one of my clerks, who, I believe, must have had a prophetic vision of my latter end, as he slumbered over one of my huge ledgers in the old mercantile days,—that story of the Chinamen who, desiderating the luxury of roast pig, and knowing no easier process towards its attainment, burnt down their houses in search of cracklin. Now, is not that what you are doing, John? You want cracklin. You have really only to tell any professed cook to produce it for you, and you will have it on your table at any hour you please to name. You have no need to burn down my house, or any other house, to get it. It is the cook's work, not the incendiary's. I have half a dozen cooks in my big house in Leadenhall-street, who will serve you up the right thing, apple-sauce and all, at a few hours' notice.

You will tell me, perhaps, that I should have done better if I had suggested this before—if I had set my house in order, unasked—if I had reformed myself out of a pure conscientious love of reform. Well, John, I admit it. But we are all of us somewhat prone to adopt

the *quieta non movere* principle. It is a family failing, John. I don't know that it's peculiar to me. We all want some pressure from without to induce us to keep pace with the times. We do not "see ourselves as others see us." We think that we are doing very well; and we remember the words of the old epitaph, "I was well—I sought to be better—I took physic—and—I died." Of course, this dreadful mutiny in India roused me, as it has roused you, to a sense of the insecurity of my position in India; and I should have been culpable in the extreme, if I had done nothing to probe the evil to its depths. But I have done all that, up to the present time, could be done; I have ordered special commissions to assemble in India to ascertain the causes of the outbreak, the defects of my existing military system, and the best means of reorganising the army, now broken and shattered by the shock of this great rebellion. And I will undertake to say, my dear John, that if you do not interfere, my commissions will turn out better than those which you clamoured for so loudly after the Crimean war. Now, this was the first thing to be done. It was surely my business to address myself first to the proximate causes of the great disaster. But although I desired to begin there, I did not desire to end there. I was prepared to consider in what manner the existing system of government in England may have tended to create or to perpetuate the evils out of which the mutiny has arisen. It was your duty, John, to call for inquiry. It was my duty to be prepared for inquiry —prepared to have all my affairs thoroughly investi-

gated. I *was* prepared, John—I *am* prepared. I do not shrink from—I court inquiry. I only protest against being condemned without trial.

If I thought that there were any hope of your proposed new system of government working as well as mine has done, I would not ask you to try whether mine may not be made to work better. But I can see no hope of this. Now, your advisers, John, do not deny that my constitution is radically sound. They do not say that the principles upon which it is based are erroneous. They merely sneer at my cumbrousness and indistinctness; and on account of certain accidental defects—defects which have really nothing to do with the constitutional part of my government, they propose to destroy that constitution, and to substitute for it one that is based upon a wholly different set of principles. They do not say that the representative system is bad; they merely assert that I have a bad constituency. Instead of inquiring whether that constituency might not be improved, they propose to abolish it altogether, and to substitute the despotic principle for the elective, in your new Indian constitution. They do not assert that the principle of Double Government, or constitutional equipoise, is bad. They merely assert that it engenders delay, and obscures responsibility. Instead of inquiring how the joint operation and reciprocal action of the two parts of this government may be simplified and harmonised, and how the responsibility may be rendered more distinct and more intelligible, they propose to convert the Double Government into a single Government, and to destroy at once all the constitutional checks

which have so long been the safeguard of the Indian Empire. But you may easily reform my constituency, John—you may easily simplify the action of the Double Government—and, as to responsibility, that is just what Parliament pleases to make it. But where there is no inquiry, there can be no response. And I do not see that the Indian Minister is to be rendered more responsible, by simply changing his official name.

You know the worst of me, John. You know that I have, somehow or other, added "the brightest jewel in the crown" to the regalia of Great Britain. You know that I have made you the wonder and the admiration of the world. But you do not know what will be the result of the dangerous experiment which your Ministers are now proposing to inaugurate. If there be one axiom, John, in the philosophy of Indian government more indisputable than any other, it is, that there must be a strong intermediate body between India and the Government of the day. Erect such a body, John, and I am satisfied. You may call it the East India Company—you may call it the Council of India—you may call it anything, nothing, I do not care—so long as it answers the purpose. But, be convinced that no council, no board, no assembly of any kind, *can* answer the purpose, if it be nominated by your Ministers. Think, then, if you do not like my present constituency, whether you cannot appoint another, and a better one; think then, if you do not like my independent Directors, whether you can get better ones equally independent; think, if you do not like my present system of check and counter-check, whether you cannot invent another with

the same safeguards, but with fewer delays. Think whether you cannot improve that of which you have experience, before you fly to that of which you have none. Do not, cajoled by your Ministers, without knowledge, without inquiry, without consideration, accept from their hands a wholly new constitution for India, which will place the country at the feet of a Parliamentary majority, and soon assist you to lose it, as disastrously and disgracefully as you lost your American Colonies—and, probably, in the same way.

I am, my dear John,

Your affectionate friend,

JOHN COMPANY.

LETTER III.

In which John Company condoles with Mr. Bull on his change of servants; points out the evil consequences of these changes; and discourses on the Rival India Bills.

LEADENHALL-STREET, *March*, 1858.

MY DEAR JOHN,—You have been in trouble since last I wrote to you. "The greatest plague of life" has been afflicting you. You have had a turn-out of your old servants, and you have set up a new establishment in their place. I can feel for you, John. The new servants may be better, or they may be worse, than the old; but these sudden and most unexpected changes must be very distressing to a good easy soul, fond of quiet like yourself. They unsettle and disturb you. You are accustomed to be driven, and to be ministered to, in a particular manner; and it takes time to get used to the ways of your new servants. Thank goodness, John, I have been spared this vexation. A gust of Parliamentary caprice has ever passed harmlessly over me. It has never been my lot to wake up some fine morning, and to find myself suddenly called upon to attend the

Mr. Bull is condoled with on his change of servants.

inauguration of a new policy. I have gone about my business in my own way, whether Whig or Tory has sat in Downing-street. And I believe that if I had not done so, I should have had, long before this, no business at all. I could not have carried on, if I had been continually at the mercy of a Parliamentary majority.

John Company discourses on the advantages of a settled policy.

I wish you to see the advantage of this, John, and to ponder it diligently, at a time when you are in a fit frame of mind, owing to recent circumstances, to take its importance into account. Up to this time, the intelligence of a change of Ministry in England has little affected the public mind in India. The only question much asked on such occasions is, whether the Governor-General is likely to be recalled? And this question is rather a personal than a political question, instigated by private curiosity, or, perhaps, private interest, rather than by any feeling of its public importance. I don't forget, John, that a change of Ministry necessarily involves a change at the Board of Control, and that a new President may, if he pushes his powers to the extreme point permitted by the Law, inaugurate a new policy. But I need scarcely tell you that practically this has not been the case. President has succeeded President, in that pleasant retired villa on the banks of the Thames, which you call (*lucus à non lucendo*) Cannon-row, because you seldom have a great gun in it; and yet there has been no perceptible change of policy. Indeed, you have generally recognised the propriety of leaving it to me to shape this policy—recognised it, I say, in a manner not to be mistaken, by placing in the President's chair men with little or no experience of the work of Indian go-

vernment. Why have you done this, John, or why have you permitted it to be done? Simply, because you have recognised the truth, that the government of India is the government of the East India Company, and that too much interference with it is neither necessary nor desirable. Hence, I say, whatever constitutional powers may have been vested in the Board of Control, a change of Ministry has, practically, little affected the policy of Indian government; and has, therefore, never had the effect of unsettling the public mind in any part of India. Men may have looked for some personal advantage to themselves as the result of such a change, but even this has very rarely happened; for, as I explained to you in a former letter, John, the middle classes, from whom my servants in India are mainly chosen, have little connexion with the aristocracy, from whom you are wont to choose yours. But even less than these personal emotions are the political feelings excited in India by the announcement of a change of Ministers at home. Everything goes on the same as if nothing had happened. There may be a new Cabinet, but there is the old Court of Directors; and whatever has hitherto been the constitutional power of the Crown, practically the administration of India has been in my hands; and I am bound to say that, as far as matters of internal policy have been concerned, your servants have discreetly left me very much to myself.

Mr. Bull is told that his servants have not much dabbled in Indian politics; and so much the better.

The truth is, John, that your servants have never had an Indian policy. So much the better. They have never cared to have one; because they have said to themselves, "We can leave this to John Company. It

is his business, not ours." Whig and Tory—both the same—both "left it to John Company." There were matters of foreign policy which were not left—so much the worse—to me. But these matters were not meddled with by your servants, John, because they were Indian questions, but because they bore directly or indirectly upon European politics. And then, what was done was the result of circumstances—the policy of expediency—not of any definite principles belonging to one party or to another. What the Whigs did, the Tories might have done, or *vice versâ*. It might have fallen to the lot of Sir Robert Peel to defend the war in Affghanistan, and to that of Lord Palmerston to apologise for the conquest of Scinde—to neither of which was I either an active or a consenting party. Mistakes, doubtless, have been committed both by your Ministers at home and by their representatives in India; but I have not been able to trace those errors, John, to the influence of party. I have not observed any yielding to pressure from without—any operative desire to conciliate a powerful section of the House of Commons, or any influential classes of the community. In matters of foreign policy there may have been a display of rashness and recklessness, or some manifestations of the activity of personal ambition. But these are exceptional cases, by which no precedent is established; they are in no degree shaped or regulated by party—Whig and Tory (I stick to the old-fashioned words, John) being alike subject to such caprices. Neither party can be said to be of the War or the Peace party—the interference or the non-interference party. Everything has been the result hitherto of ac-

cidental circumstance, or of personal predilection, as far as the action of English politicians (whether Cabinet Ministers or Governors-General) has been brought to bear upon our Indian politics. Our great English factions have never identified themselves with any definite Indian policy; and hence it is that our Indian Empire has escaped dangers which otherwise might have brought it to destruction.

John Company repeats that he is willing to be a scapegoat, rather than that the parliamentary screw should be put upon the Crown Minister.

I have been writing here, John, mainly of external politics, with which, as I have said, your servants at home have sometimes indiscreetly interfered. In such cases your servants have generally contrived to mystify you, and to keep you in ignorance of what they were doing, on the plea of State necessity, which, in your good-nature, you are commonly willing to accept, until the interest has passed away, and you have not cared to inquire into the matter. Even here, John, I believe that, although I have really had as little to do with the matter as with the last attempt upon the life of Louis Napoleon, my existence has not been without its uses in preserving India from becoming the battle-field of party. For even here, people, in their ignorance, have declared that it has been John Company's concern—perhaps "John Company's iniquity." But in matters of internal policy, with which I have been properly identified in the public mind, how much more serviceable have I been! If everything done and everything left undone in India had been chargeable directly to the Minister of the day, what party conflicts there would have been—what compromises—what con-

cessions—what yieldings to external pressure! Take, for example, the case of the Manchester party, who think that India was given to us wholly and solely for the purpose of growing cheap cotton, and of consuming manufactured goods. Heaven knows, I have no objection to the growth of cotton in India; and none whatever to the importation of manufactured goods, except so far as it affects the manufactures of India, and the principle which I am not ashamed to profess, of governing "India for the Indians"—a principle grossly violated by the absolute want of reciprocity in respect of the duties levied in each country on the manufactured goods of the other. I have no objection to help the Manchester men as far as I can, without injustice to my own people; but I know that I do not satisfy them. I know that my obstructive policy is a common object of attack. It is said that I impede private enterprise; and honourable gentlemen get up in their place in Parliament, and abuse me for my selfishness and exclusiveness, my want of public spirit, my avarice and rapacity, and everything else that is bad. It is not treated as the immediate concern of your Ministers, John. No pressure from without is brought to bear upon them. No hostile combinations affecting the stability of a government arise out of such a question, because it is believed that the business is altogether John Company's affair. When a stir is made by some interested person, the Minister generally says, in effect, that he will talk to me about it; and he has no doubt that whatever is wanted will be done. But he has no Indian policy. His opponents have no Indian policy. So one Government goes out, and another comes in; and I, John Company,

go about my work just as if nothing had happened. The despatches, commenced when the Whigs are in Downing-street, are finished when the Tories have supplanted them, just as if no change had taken place. And it is the knowledge of this, John—the knowledge that there is a permanent governing body between India and the Minister of the day—a governing body with a settled policy—which prevents that disturbance of the public mind in India which otherwise would assuredly follow every announcement of a change of Ministry at home.

John Company indicates the effects of ministerial changes, and what will be the danger thereof, when he ceases officially to exist.

But although I have said, John, that your Ministers, whether Whig or Tory, have seldom or never had anything that can be called a definite Indian policy (for, indeed, they have seldom known anything about India at all), individual men have expressed in Parliament strong opinions on individual questions, and those men have, under the operation of the "whirligig of time," come to be Ministers of State. You know, John, that I am no party man; I am neither a Whig nor a Tory; I have no prejudices and predilections in favour of one Ministry or of another; and therefore, when I draw my illustrations, as they occur to me, from one party or from the other, I do so with no sort of idea of damaging that party in public estimation. It is with no feeling, therefore, against my Lord Derby's Administration, that I now call your attention to a little fact in connexion with the recent change in your Ministerial establishment. More than two years ago, I, John Company, in conjunction with those who were then your servants, authorised the Governor-General of India to de-

clare Oude to be a province of the British-Indian Empire. If you have any doubt, John, as to whether our interference was righteous, or unrighteous, I would recommend you to read a book written by one of the best of my old servants, now unhappily no more—the late Sir W. H. Sleeman—a book descriptive of the state of Oude before it passed into our hands. However, I candidly admit, that although there can be no question in any unprejudiced mind regarding the necessity of interference, the *manner* of interference—that is, whether it should or should not have gone to the extreme length of the "annexation" of the principality—is a fair open question. I quarrel with no man for thinking that we might have acted otherwise than we did on this occasion. I did the best I could, according to the light that was in me. I believed, and I still believe, that I did what was right. However, some very strong opinions to the contrary have been expressed by members of Parliament—opinions going the length of a declaration, that even now our policy should be reversed, and Oude restored to its native rulers. And among these members of Parliament—nay, foremost and loudest of them all, John—are some distinguished members of your new Ministry—one, a Cabinet Minister; another, the chief law-officer in your Lower House; and a third, your Indian minister and mouthpiece in that House. Now, John, here are three prominent members of your new establishment all pledged to the policy of restoring Oude to its native rulers.

As I am writing this paragraph, John, the morning newspapers, which lie on my table, contain a letter

written by one of the three—the Cabinet Minister—in which he expresses his "regret that Parliament has been deprived of the opportunity of condemning the original act of annexation;" and adds, "but I trust the approaching (*i.e.* the present) session will not pass without an investigation into the causes and effects of that gross crime; and I now beg leave to conclude our correspondence, on my part at least, by expressing my perfect agreement with you, that in the restoration of Oude to its King lies the best chance of safety to our Indian Empire." Of course, John, this was written when our aristocratic namesake was a member of your Opposition, and seemingly as far off from a seat in the Cabinet as I am from the Popedom of Rome; and I know that the lips of honest men may be sealed and their tongues tied by office. But it is not so certain that the natives of India understand that a change of position in such cases is necessarily followed by a change of conduct. And in the present state of affairs, as your Ministers, John, are continually telling you and your fellow-subjects in India that I am moribund, I am by no means sure that the knowledge of the fact that there are three members of the Ministry pledged to the restoration of Oude—one of whom has declared the annexation of the country to be criminal, another of whom (the first law-officer of the Commons) has pronounced it to be illegal, whilst the third, who, only a few nights ago, denounced the illegality and the criminality of the whole proceeding, is now actually one of the Ministers for India—I am not at all sure, I say, that the natives

Three members of the Derby Ministry pledged to the restoration of Oude.

of India, both in this country and in the East, will not think that, as my influence is now said to be gone for ever, these new councils will prevail, and that Oude will be restored to its native rulers. Instead of this belief restoring tranquillity to Oude, I need hardly tell you, John, that it would tend to protract the struggle. I should not be surprised if already advice had been transmitted to India somewhat to this effect: "Lord Palmerston's Government, which sanctioned the annexation of Oude, has been extinguished. The Company has received its death-blow. Our enemies in England are prostrate; our friends are in high place. Hold out a little longer, and the game is yours. All over England the *punchayuts* are declaring in our favour. Petitions on our side are pouring in from all parts. The people of England are tired of the war; they have no more money, and they have no more soldiers. The hot weather is coming on—hold out till it has come; and your friends in the new Government will arrange matters so that we shall get back the kingdom to ourselves." If these, my dear John, are not the words of letters actually written to India, they are, you may be sure, the verbal expression of feelings which, ever since the recent change in your establishment, and the announcement that my death-warrant has been signed, have been rampant in many breasts. The same thing, John, *mutatis mutandis*, will happen whenever there is a change in your establishment. What can be more reasonable, John, than such inferences—such conclusions? And the time will come, too, if I am put out of the way, when such conclusions will be practically con-

firmed. The natives of India have already learned, John, how to rap at the door of the House of Commons. You have been surprised lately, John, at the appearance of your streets in summer weather—at the number of *puggrees* and *paijammahs* (or, as I should translate for your benefit, turbans and loose trousers) which are to be seen flaunting about your metropolis. But what you have seen will be nothing to what you will see, my poor dear John, when you have consented that India shall be governed by a Parliamentary majority. As soon as ever there is a change of Ministry, and men who, in opposition, have declared themselves favourable to certain claims (not because they have any notion of the justice of these claims, but because they desire to embarrass their opponents in the Government), become part and parcel of the new Administration, every native prince or chief who has yielded to the delusion that opinions expressed in opposition will be clung to in power, will send his *wakeels* to England. I am proud to say, John, that the character for good faith established by my servants in India is such, that what an Englishman publicly declares is commonly believed to be an utterance of genuine sincerity. It will take long to teach them that there are certain words to be believed only in a Parliamentary sense; and when they have learned the lesson, what will be the result? Why, a general belief that Parliament is only another name for—what I will not utter.

John Company is aghast at the thought of the influx of *puggrees* and *paijammahs* after his retirement into private life.

I have said, John, that the natives of India have

How to rap at the door of the House of Commons.

already learnt how to rap at the door of the House of Commons—nay, how to go at it, as we used to say at school, "*plenum sed*, or full Butt." There has recently been, as you are aware, an edifying inquiry in one of your Parliamentary committee-rooms; and there has more recently been laid on the table of the House of Commons some still more edifying correspondence. I must say a few words to you about this case, before I pass on to the real subject of the present letter—a few words about the case of Ali Morad of Khyrpore. This man came here to endeavour to obtain a reversal of an unfavourable decision pronounced against him, after a full and impartial inquiry, by the authorities in India. He appealed to me, John; but in vain. I confess I was obdurate. I had the worst possible opinion of the man. I was convinced that the sentence which had been passed against him was just, and that the punishment which had been inflicted upon him was not in excess of his offence. But the Ameer, instructed, doubtless, by others who had been rapping at the door of Parliament before him, determined to put on the Parliamentary screw. With this object, he obtained the services of an Irish member, a barrister by profession; and this Irish member did not—as the Parliamentary committee which sate upon his case has determined—receive a pecuniary consideration for advocating in Parliament the case of Ali Morad, or for otherwise exerting his influence as a member of the House of Commons. But frequent visits appear to have been made to the office of your Indian servants, John; and frequent hints of the inconvenience

of a Parliamentary discussion of the case were uttered in quarters where they were likely to take effect. Now, John, that quarter, you may be sure, was not Leadenhall-street. I am not at all afraid of Parliamentary discussion. I know my business. If there is a disposition to drag such a case as this before the House of Commons, I do not shrink from the publicity. I know what I have done, and why I have done it. I can justify my conduct; I can explain all the circumstances of the case. I am not afraid of an Irish member. I do not quail before the whole Brass Band of his holiness the Pope. Why should I reverse my decisions because interested persons are in league with ignorant persons, and both are eager for concessions, which must be carried out in my name? You may call me obstinate, if you will; and so I am—when I feel in my inmost heart that I am right. I am not to be bullied; I am not to be coaxed. Only when you come down upon me, John, with the strong hand of the Constitution, I am compelled to submit. But before I submit, John, I make a fight of it; and you have now the history of some of these fights on the table of the House of Commons.

I invite your especial attention to this case of Ali Morad. Take it home with you, John, if you have not already read it, and master it in all its bearings. It will beguile your time, pleasantly and instructively, on a leisure day. You will see there how Ali Morad asked me to give him back the territories he had forfeited, and how I peremptorily refused. You will next see how that part of your establishment, known as the Board of Control, which has the power to alter my letters and

despatches, instead of telling Ali Morad that the decision in his case was final and unalterable, told him to go back to India, like a good boy, and establish, by his good conduct, a claim to a more favourable consideration of his case at some future period. Against this alteration I remonstrated. I knew that it would be regarded by the Ameer as a concession, and that, at all events, others would tell him that the letter indicated an intention on my part to restore his territories, if he should behave well on his return to India. I knew that I had not the most remote intention of restoring to him, if I could possibly help it, a single inch of the forfeited land; and I was unwilling to excite any expectations which I had not the remotest intention of fulfilling. I stuck, therefore, to my text. If Ali Morad should render me any service calling for reward, his case, like the case of other princes and chiefs, might be taken into consideration, simply on its own merits; but not with reference to any former decision passed in accordance with my estimate of an act of which nothing can ever make me think otherwise than I do. I remonstrated, therefore, but I remonstrated in vain. The letter went to Ali Morad, as altered by the Board of Control, and next day Ali Morad wrote to me—or a letter was written for him (not, of course, by Mr. Butt)—saying that he understood the words of my letter to mean that I purposed to direct my servants in India to restore his territory to him. I answered that my letter meant nothing of the kind; but the Board, knowing better what it did mean, altered my second letter also; and as the Board finally

John Company shows how, not being afraid of Parliament, he stuck to his text.

determines, so the document passes into the hands of the recipient. Now, what I want you to know, John, is, that I did not (as I have seen it stated) yield at last, rather than have the case brought into Parliament. I went to the utmost point that the law allows, short of going to prison under a writ of *mandamus*. I remonstrated; and, having remonstrated in vain, protested; and these remonstrances and protests are now before the country. Parliament has its uses. There are more ways than one of making the fear of Parliament an operative principle; and I never forget that, having the power of record, I can call Parliament to my aid, when it has been attempted to convert it to my injury. Now, John, bear in mind that this publicity is your safeguard. If my Court of Directors is to be superseded by a Council of India, be sure that you insist upon it that, when that Council differs from the Minister of the day, it shall have the power of recording its grounds of difference, and that it shall be competent for any member of Parliament to move for the production of the remonstrances and protests of the Council, or individual members of the Council. This power of record vested in me, John, now enables you to understand the story of Ali Morad's visit to England, and of my little difference with the Board of Control. Reading it in connexion with the evidence adduced before the Butt Committee (which is "as good as a play"), you will learn more about the working of the Double Government, and get a clearer insight into what will be the working of the Single Government, if sufficient checks are not imposed upon it, than from many an elaborate treatise written for

the express purpose of showing you how India is governed.

Another pleasant *historiette* is also before you, John. It is the charming little tale of that distinguished "Moslem noble," Meer Jaffier Ali Khan, of Surat, and his recent visit to England. You have not before you, I am sorry to say, the evidence taken by a * * * Committee; so that the whole story may not be quite so intelligible as the other. But there will be a good deal in it, nevertheless, not quite a mystery to you, John, who had been wont to see, for so long a time, the sleek "Moslem," in his double-roofed carriage, whirling through your great thoroughfares, from east to west and from west to east, ever and anon condescending to visit the murky regions of Leadenhall, but more frequently disporting himself in the aristocratic neighbourhoods of Westminster and Belgravia. For a time he excited quite a *furore* in Parliamentary circles; and I know not what your faithful Commons would not have done at his bidding, to throw the whole Government of India into confusion, if the House of Peers had not stepped in wisely to avert the evil. Of course, it was all fair and aboveboard; and nothing but an abstract love of justice influenced those who were most eager to promote the claims of the "Moslem noble." His Secretary (who, by the way, has a little case of his own, which was also brought out for your Easter reading) has emphatically declared that it was not a matter of shawls or of other valuables. Who could think of such a thing? "Brutus is an honourable man." Your faithful Commons, John, are "all honourable men." I

The "Moslem noble" from Surat.

only ask you, as another illustration of the advantages of putting me out of the way, to read the Jaffier Ali correspondence after you have read the Ali Morad papers; and then to consider whether some little inconvenience may not result, some day, from giving up India wholly to the tender mercies of the Minister of the day and a Parliamentary majority.

John Company says that Brutus is an honourable man, but that there is a deal of scandal in the world.

I don't deal in scandal, John; and I am willing enough to dismiss this unsavoury topic. I have told you that Brutus is an honourable man. So are they all—all honourable men. But admitting this, at least for the sake of argument, it is still no small evil that sinister reports—I need not explain to you of what character—should continually be floating about the social atmosphere. If the *incorrupta fides* really exist, it is a pity that the princes and chiefs of India should not feel, in their inmost hearts, that they have as good a chance of obtaining justice from the English Parliament by suing *in forma pauperis*, as in any other way. But my fear is, John, that if they do not altogether feel this now, they will not feel it at all if I cease to exist. You admit, John, that, lumbering obstructive though I be, none of the sinister rumours to which I have referred ever affect my character. It is never said that shawls, with or without bank-notes pinned into their corners, are left in my Directors' rooms, or that any one of my Directors' wives is ever seen sporting Moslem jewels in public. Not a whisper, John, has ever been raised against the honesty of one of my servants in Leadenhall-street. If they obstruct business of one kind, you may be sure that they

obstruct business of another. It is, doubtless, a difficulty in these little matters, that the business must be done through me. I may be overruled, or I may be coerced —but, practically, I *am* a *difficulty;* and I repeat this, John, because I desire, above all things, that, if I am to cease to exist, you should be careful to raise up some other standing difficulty of the same kind. I have told you already that you cannot erect one by any means the same in *degree*, as I have always been; but you may have one somewhat of the same *kind.* You must have a body, John, between India and Parliament, neither ignorant nor accessible. You must have knowledge; for ignorance, as you will gather from the papers I am speaking of, makes unjust and inexpedient concessions rather than expose itself, and does other things of which I need not now speak; and you must have independence . . . . . or Heaven knows what will become of your Indian Empire before the world is five years older than it is now.

But how are these essential qualities to be obtained, John, in your new Indian Government? You have now, in black and white, two schemes for the future management of your Indian affairs before you, and you may choose between them. You have had Lord Palmerston's Bill for at least a month in your hands; and I dare say that you have not cared to read it. No sooner had he laid it on the table, than he was expelled from office. I dare say, therefore, that you have regarded it as so much waste-paper—valueless as yesterday's play-bill, or a betting-book of a race that has been run. But it is not altogether a thing stale and unprofitable, for

something may be learnt from it, if only in the way of warning; and it is by no means certain that a great battle will not be fought upon the respective merits of these two bills. Palmerston, as you know, John, has not tossed his scheme into the waste-paper basket. He thinks, or professes to think, that it is a very good scheme as it is, and that the men who have supplanted him have not produced a better. Now, I can tell you at least this much, John, that it would be almost impossible to produce a *worse*. Be upon your guard, my dear friend. There is likely to be a great fight for office; and the future government of India, once again after a lapse of three-quarters of a century, is to be the battle-field of party. Do you honestly believe, John, that both of these two great factions are thinking at this moment of the best mode of governing the Anglo-Indian Empire? You are famous for your credulity, but I do not believe that it has ever reached to such a pitch as that. In truth, my dear friend, we see in this threatened battle of the bills a beginning of the party strife, which all who have pondered deeply over the constitution of our Indian government have ever declared to be the most perilous of all perils that can assail an empire so constituted. Well might one of the wisest of my servants, ever keenly alive as he was to the existence of other dangers (and among them a mutinous Sepoy army)—well might that wise ruler of three great dependencies of the British crown exclaim, that if India is ever lost to us, it will be lost in the House of Commons.

Mr. Bull is told to beware of the Battle of the Bills.

Look to this, John—look to it diligently, earnestly,

resolutely. Do not think for a moment that it is a small matter. Seldom, perhaps never, has a greater claimed all your most serious thoughts. Do nothing to encourage this contest, but call for calm deliberation, for dispassionate inquiry. Insist upon it that your representatives shall not legislate for the future government of the Anglo-Indian Empire in ignorance and in haste. Why, John, it is not long since the most eminent of your present servants emphatically pronounced against this precipitate legislation. And what do they say now? Not that, being in power, they will do what they recommended when out of power, but that they will do the very thing which a few weeks ago they condemned. And what is the argument adduced in favour of this apparent inconsistency? Why, that they were outvoted. Because Lord Palmerston brought in a bill for my destruction, with the consent of the House, they must do the same thing. If it was not right for Palmerston to slay me in the present conjuncture, is it right for Derby to give me the death-blow? I shall be told, perhaps, that that vote of the House of Commons really gave me my death-blow, and that it is impossible that I should survive it. Give me a chance, John, and you'll see how much blood the old fellow has in him still. The leader of the House of Commons, addressing his constituents, was pleased to call me a corpse. I could show the right honourable gentleman how much vitality I have in me. I assure you that I do not feel at all the worse for that vote of the House of Commons. Nothing that others do to me can disgrace me. I can only disgrace myself.

John Company says that he is not ashamed of the adverse vote of the Commons, because the Commons did not know what they were voting.

A large number of gentlemen, I know, voted in favour of the principle that it is expedient to demolish me without loss of time. I should have liked to put the greater number of those gentlemen through their A B C of Indian government. I'll answer for it, that not one in ten is up in his Indian "primer." Do you think then, John, that I feel any shame because men ignorant of the very rudiments of the subject on which they are called upon to legislate, declare themselves opposed to my continued existence? The shame attaches to them, John, not to me; and the shame will attach to you as a perpetual settlement, if you suffer so mighty a question as this to be disposed of in the flush of presumptuous ignorance, and in the passionate excitement of party strife.

But you will tell me, perhaps, John, that it is not what I think of myself, but what others think of me. You will say, echoing the opinions of some of your head-servants, that my prestige is gone altogether—that after such a sentence has been pronounced against me by the House of Commons, I can no longer enjoy the respect either of the people of England or the people of India. I emphatically deny this, John. It is not unknown in England—it is not unknown in India—that less than a year ago the House of Commons cared as little for India as it knew. It is not forgotten in England, it is not forgotten in India, that even up to last midsummer, John, it was difficult to get forty members to sit out a debate on the most important Indian subjects. I have seen, with grief and vexation, the empty benches in that beautiful debating-hall of yours, when the affairs of my

countless millions of people have been feebly discussed, more as a painful necessity, to keep up appearances, than for anything else. Although I have never wished that Indian affairs should become objects of party strife, I have wished to see them excite the interest of the House, and to hear them discussed on broad principles, and in a spirit of calm judicial inquiry. But your House of Commons, I repeat, which now believes itself to be competent to decide off-hand on the most difficult of all questions—the best form of Government for our anomalous Indian Empire—has only within the last eight or nine months given a thought to India at all, except upon great exceptional occasions, when something more than India was on the cards. You may think, John, that this is not known, and discussed, and deplored in India; but I assure you that the knowledge of it is such, that however bad an opinion any one may have of me, he has a worse opinion of your House of Commons. In India, John, that boasted institution of yours is often spoken of in language which I will not pain you by repeating. Has it done anything to deserve the confidence of those who wish well to India and her people? The effect of a judgment such as this, upon popular opinion, depends upon the character of the judge. Now, I protest against any assumption that my prestige is destroyed by the adverse judgment of a judge utterly incompetent, in the present state of its knowledge, to pronounce a well-considered opinion upon a subject of such magnitude as the future government of India.

What is thought of the House of Commons in India.

But supposing that it were a competent tribunal, what

then? The House of Commons declares against me, and I survive. What is the inference, John? That I hold my own in spite of the House of Commons; and is this a sign of feebleness or of strength? Of all things in the world the most uncertain, the most fluctuating, the most unreliable, is a Parliamentary majority. Who ever dreamt of that Parliamentary majority which sent Lord Palmerston into private life? Is the Palmerstonian party moribund—is it a corpse—is it never to show its face again, because a Parliamentary majority has decided against it? I dare say the party feels itself as brisk as ever, and would be very slow to admit that its prestige is gone. And what does Lord Derby think of Parliamentary majorities? His opinions are on record. Did he not write to one of my old servants, whom he had persuaded to take a place under him, well knowing that your service, John, does not yield such good men as mine—did he not write, I say, to my old servant, Charles Metcalfe, that he must go on, in spite of Parliamentary majorities?—did he not say that "hardly a session passes in which the Government, if not actually defeated by a vote in the House, is not compelled to avoid defeat by suffering measures to drop which have been introduced by them as a Government?" "I will only mention," he goes on to say in this letter—and an admirable one it is—"one instance *among a hundred similar* which might be adduced." And he then adduces his instance, and writes more in the same strain. Am I, then, to be snuffed out by a Parliamentary mrjority? Not a bit of it! I should do my business—nay, I am doing it quite as well, in spite

A few words about Parliamentary majorities.

of that adverse vote. I assure you that I feel quite vigorous under it. They who know anything about the constitution of the House of Commons know the value of such a vote; and those who don't, would, if I were to survive it, John, only jump to the conclusion that I have stamina enough to sustain unhurt even the assaults of that great legislative body. You are saying now that our Indian Empire will be stronger after the great Sepoy mutiny than before, because we shall have shown our ability to hold our own in spite of the native army. Every great storm, bravely weathered, shows of what good stuff our timbers are made. Why am I, John, to be a solitary exception to the rule?

John Company says that he can recover from the effects of the majority, but that India will never recover from the effects of a bad Government.

But I will go a little further still, John, and say that, assuming all this talk about the injury done to my character and my prestige by the adverse vote of the House of Commons to be so much undeniable truth—assuming that, for a time, my credit is shaken—that I am, as you say, "under a cloud:" well, what then? Say it is an evil—say it is a great evil; but do you think it is an evil, the magnitude of which can be compared with that of inflicting permanently upon India a radically bad Government? When I use the word "permanently," John, I feel that it is a wrong one; for you may rely upon it that there will be no permanence in our Indian Empire if you now suffer yourself to be betrayed into a fatal error. I could recover my prestige if it were to be lost for a while; but I doubt whether, if you make a false step now, you will ever recover yourself. The question for you to consider

is, not how far a certain vote may have affected my character, but what is the form of government best calculated to render our Indian Empire permanent and prosperous. This, as I have told you before—but as I cannot tell you too often—is a very great and a very difficult question, not to be settled off-hand by a party of men, whether Whig or Tory, the majority of whom have never given a month's—perhaps not a week's—serious consideration to the subject of Indian government throughout the whole course of their lives. Again, therefore, I say to you, John, tell your servants to *pause*. I shall not let matters get worse whilst you are calmly and dispassionately making up your mind whether the immolation of John Company will confer a blessing or inflict a curse upon the country which he has so long governed.

But if they will not pause, John—if they insist upon going on with the project of my immediate subversion—take care that they substitute something in the place of my government not choke-full of all the evils which I have indicated in my former letters—take heed that they do not give up India wholly to the direct government of the Crown; that is, as I have often told you, to the government of a Parliamentary majority. There is, at all events, one comfort, John, in the reflection that nothing can be much worse than the Bill which Lord Palmerston has presented to Parliament. If, as now appears likely, there is to be, after Easter, a great battle of the Bills—if the Palmerstonian clauses are to be arrayed against those of the Derbyite leader—I hope that you

John Company discourses of India Bill (No. I.);

will understand by this time that the great blot of Lord Palmerston's Bill is, that it proposes to confer too much power upon the Crown—that it contemplates the existence of no substantive and permanent body, that can really be called anything better than a sham, between India and the Minister of the day. It proposes to constitute a Council of eight members. The Bill is before you, John; take it up and read the precise words of the draft—"For the purposes of the Government of India, under this Act, a Council shall be established, to consist of a President and eight other members, to be styled 'The President and Council for the Affairs of India:' and it shall be lawful for her Majesty, from time to time, by warrant under her royal sign-manual, to appoint a person to be, during her Majesty's pleasure, President of the Council for the Affairs of India; and, by like warrants, to appoint eight other persons to be ordinary members of such Council." The entire power of nomination is vested in the Crown. The elective principle is cast out altogether. The Council is too small for the work of government, and too weak for independence. Now, any Bill which proposes to enlarge the number of the Council, and to appoint the whole or a part of the councillors by election, must be so far an improvement on the Palmerstonian Bill; because it will impart to the Council, at the same time, greater practical utility and greater independence. Now, John, all kinds of attempts will be made to reason you out of this. You will be told, in a variety of different ways, that inasmuch as that a Council

and clamours for a strong and independent Council.

of eighteen, a portion of which is elected, will nearly resemble the constitution of the present Court of Directors, the proposed reform will be insufficient; in point of fact, that it will be a mere change of names. But don't be led astray by this. Such a change, John, will be much more than a change of names. It will, indeed, be in consonance with the expressed views of Lord Palmerston's Ministry. It was not alleged, John, that I am inefficient; it was not alleged that I am corrupt. I received many pleasant compliments from unexpected quarters. It was merely said that the Double Government is an evil, because it engenders delays; in fact, that the whole system is too cumbrous and complex. According to their argument, John, a Bill which proposes to disembarrass the existing system of all these incumbrances and complications—in other words, to cast out what was said to be an evil, whilst retaining what was admitted to be good (namely, the knowledge and independence of the present Court of Directors)—is the very thing required in the present conjuncture. Now, John, I do not say that any Council sitting *with* the President, and under his immediate personal control, can ever be so independent as a Court of Directors sitting at the other end of the town; but, according to the declared wishes on the one side, and admissions on the other, of the late Government, a Council of eighteen, partly elected, is more in accordance with their views than a Council of eight entirely nominated by the Crown. But rely upon it, John, that they are not thinking of India—they are not thinking of good government—they are simply thinking of their party and themselves—thinking how to em-

barrass the Ministry that has supplanted them and brought forward an Indian Reform Bill of its own.

I stick to the elective principle. If I am to be destroyed as a governing body, I shall lie peaceably in my grave, only under the knowledge that the new Council is partly an elected Council. I have no objection to a certain number of Crown nominees, as a little leaven in the entire lump; but the nomination of the whole, John, by the Minister of the day, is intolerable. When the East India Company is destroyed, there may be some difficulty in establishing another constituency, or another electing body, not properly to be called a constituency. It is Lord Ellenborough's idea to add to the present Court of Proprietors a body of retired Indian servants and railway shareholders—a body with some knowledge, and, for the most part, with independence, and all more or less with "a stake in the country." I am not so bigoted to the existing system as to consider that there is anything very preposterous in such a scheme. I believe that the defects of the existing constituency are very much overrated. The proprietors of India stock, whether men or women, have at least as much intelligence and independence as those who vote for the members of your Parliaments. I know that it has been often said, that the best men are deterred from thinking of the direction by the horrors of the canvass. But how many have been frightened away from Parliament by the thoughts of this canvass? You often tell me of the Elphinstones and the Metcalfes who would not enter the direction through such a road. Would they enter Parliament by

John Company on constituencies and the canvass.

the same road? Metcalfe, eager as he was to become a member of the House of Commons, shrunk from the canvass; and yet, John, I do not think that any one will have the hardihood to tell you that, therefore, your members of Parliament ought to be nominated by the Crown.

Far less intolerable than the idea of giving the entire nomination of India to the Crown, would be the compromise of erecting the Privy Council into an electing body. The Privy Council consists, I believe, of some two hundred members, pretty equally divided among the great political parties of the country. Of course, there are objections to such a scheme—of course, there are difficulties. There are objections to every scheme—difficulties in the way of its practical realisation; but what we have to think of, John, is the choice of difficulties. All legislation more or less involves a choice of difficulties. All legislation is virtually a compromise. I cannot say that I much like the Privy Council scheme; but it gives at least some promise of a partially independent Council. And in the absence of a thoroughly independent body, such as the present Court of Directors (and with all its faults, John, you will never have so independent a governing body again), it will be something to know that there is a Council containing *some* independent members.

In whatever manner the Council may be constituted, John, they will of course have the power to record their opinions when they happen to differ from the President. The Palmerstonian Bill contemplates this. But the power will always be a mere sham, if the Council consists wholly of the nominees of the Crown. "Any ordi-

nary member of Council," says the Palmerstonian Bill, "may require that his opinion, and any reasons for the same that he may have stated at the Board, be entered in the minutes of the proceedings." And, of course, any member of Parliament may call for the production of these records. I hold this, John, as I have said in the early part of this letter, and as I have shown by illustrative cases, to be an invaluable aid to good government. But if the members of Council are the dependents of the Minister, the power of record, for all practical purposes of control, is a delusion and a sham. The Minister will in effect be an autocrat. The Council will soon fall into contempt, and, as the Palmerstonian journals acknowledge, "into desuetude." The cry will be raised that the Council is of no use; and so the vessel of your Indian government will drift into a pure despotism.

Now, John, as I have told you again and again, I am not a party man—I never was a party man; I have nothing to do with Whig or Tory. If, therefore, I tell you that one Bill is better than another, you may be sure that I thoroughly believe that it is so. I repeat to you, earnestly and emphatically, that a Bill, which proposes to establish in my place an administrative agency, consisting of a President and eighteen Councillors, one-half nominated by the Crown, the other half elected by a constituency, is in principle a better Bill than one which contemplates the erection of a governing Board composed of a President and eight Councillors, the whole nominated by the Crown. It is so far a better Bill, as it insures the possession by the Council of a larger amount of know-

The principle of Bill No. 2 better than that of Bill No. 1.

ledge, and a larger amount of independence. If knowledge and independence be good things, the more we have of these good things the better. You will tell me, perhaps, John, that, according to this, a council of thirty would be better than a council of twenty, and a council of sixty better than either. Well, you may enjoy your *reductio ad absurdum;* I do not grudge you the benefit of it. Practically, the matter is simply this—India is a very large subject. A man who has passed all his life in Bengal may know little or nothing about Bombay; and a very experienced military officer may be as ignorant of revenue and judicial matters as if he had lived all his life in St. James's-street. The experience which is required in an Indian council is varied local and departmental experience. We require military experience; judicial experience; political, or, as you would call it, diplomatic experience; fiscal experience; commercial experience; and these, not relating to one only, but to all the several Presidencies of India. Nay, indeed, we require even more than this; you sneer sometimes at my bankers and ship-captains (with what marvellous inconsistency, you dear old shopkeeper, it is impossible to declare), and yet your new Indian Government, let me tell you, John, will find it difficult to get on without bankers and ship-captains. Why was the whole business of the embarkation of your troops for India so well managed—why was I enabled to send out, in the course of a few months, that gigantic relieving army, in a manner which is the admiration and envy of all your departments, John? Because I had a ship-captain in my Court of Directors. Did any of your servants, John, ever do anything of

John Company stands up for his bankers and ship-captains.

the kind half as well as that committee of bankers and ship-captains which had the management of this stupendous embarkation? Generals, and judges, and political agents might have broken down in such a matter as this. But I had a particular committee qualified for this particular work. If my Court of Directors had consisted only of eight members, I could not have had that Committee—I could not have had any Committees at all.

Lord Palmerston's India Bill seems to contemplate the division of the Council into so many heads of departments. "The President and Council shall, from time to time, make such arrangement and distribution of the business of these establishments as to them may seem proper, and may, if they think fit, place any separate department thereof under the special charge of one or more of the ordinary Members of Council, who shall from time to time report in relation thereto to the Board." "One or more." It could hardly be "more," John; for my business divides itself into no less than eight departments—Military—Marine—Political—Public (or General)—Judicial—Revenue—Public Works—and Financial. A Council of eight, therefore, could be little more than a number of departmental under-secretaries or chief clerks; and on the occurrence of a vacancy you would be compelled to look about for a man with the same description of knowledge and experience as his predecessor, or the Council, in respect of practical utility, will be left incomplete. I do not say that all the required experience is likely to be found even in a Council of eighteen; but it at least admits of the establishment of

committees similar to those over which I now distribute my Directors. And I need not tell you, John, that there is far more likelihood of the "report" of a committee, than a report of an individual, influencing the opinions and shaking the decisions of the President who controls the Board.

I stand up, therefore, John, resolutely for the Council of eighteen, on the ground that the business of Indian government can not be effectually done by a smaller number of Councillors. And I stand up for the principle of election, upon the ground that without it there can be little or no independent action in the Council. I could have wished that twelve, or two-thirds of the councillors, were representative members; but after Lord Palmerston's attempt to sweep the entire right of nomination into the hands of the Minister of the day, I suppose I ought to be content. At all events, the change is a relief to me; I breathe more easily under it.

Now, so far at least you see, John, that I am in favour of Lord Derby's scheme. I call it his, in honour of his position at the head of the Cabinet, and his consequent responsiblity; but I believe that it is to the active brain of a brother Earl that we are chiefly indebted for so ingenious a performance. So far, I say, my voice is raised to support Bill No. 2, in preference to Bill No. 1; but I cannot go much further. I have all along contended, John, that the Council which is to supplant my Court of Directors cannot possess the necessary amount of knowledge if it be more limited in its numbers, and cannot possess the necessary amount of independence unless a large number of the councillors are elected by

an independent constituency. Now, India Bill No. 2 recognises, in a manner, the necessity of establishing a Council equal in numbers to my Court of Directors—a part of whom are to be elected by different constituencies. It recognises, moreover, the necessity of infusing into the Council the necessary amount of varied local and departmental experience for which I have always contended. But the scheme is nevertheless a faulty scheme. Its authors have attempted too much. I have spoken of one of the constituencies; I shall speak of the other presently. Let me now say a few words, John, about the composition of the Council.

John Company shows that Bill No. 2 falls by choice into some of the same errors as Bill No. 1 by necessity.

I have told you that Lord Palmerston's scheme of a Council of eight members, to each of whom a department might be given, is open to serious objections, and among others that, if it were adopted, you would be compelled, on the occurrence of a vacancy, to look about for a man with the same description of knowledge and experience as his predecessor. Yet by a strange fatality, John, against this very objection which I had thought to be peculiar to a Council of such limited dimensions as Lord Palmerston's, Lord Derby has ingeniously contrived to knock the head of his bill. That it is extremely desirable that in the new Council of India all kinds of local and departmental experience should be fairly represented I have already told you. But I do not hold, therefore, John, that it is necessary or expedient to provide constitutionally for this representation. The necessity of such a provision must often be attended with extreme inconvenience; and in all cases I believe

an openly recognised, or rather declared representative system, is liable to grave objections. The inconvenience is palpable. It is proposed to you that the Council shall consist of nine nominated and nine elected members. The nine nominated members are to be representative members. They are to represent the four civil services of India (that of the North-West Provinces included)—the four armies of India (the Queen's service included), and the political or diplomatic service. It is right that all these should be represented, John; but it is not right to decree it by act of Parliament.

Under such a system you would often be compelled to nominate to the Council a mediocre (say) Bombay civilian, when you have a first-rate Bengal man, like Sir John Lawrence, ready to your hand; or you would be driven into a corner, John, in some other one of the various manners which such a specification will suggest to you. Nor is this all, John. The proposed Council is to contain four members elected by an enlarged Anglo-Indian constituency. These four members are to possess certain qualifications for office derived from residence in India, and will commonly be members of the Indian services. Now among these four elected members there will be generally one, or perhaps more, possessing the same experience as one of the nominated or representative members; and I need not tell you how the existence of this reserve list renders it less necessary that the system of class representation should be constitutionally decreed. For example, it is proposed that in the new Council Mr. Dorin shall represent the Bengal Civil Service. In the second list of four elected members (elected members, in

the first instance, John, after the very Irish manner of nomination by the Crown) it is proposed to place Mr. Mangles and Mr. Prinsep—both members of the Bengal Civil Service. Now, under the contemplated representative system, if anything were to remove Mr. Dorin from the Council, it would be necessary to nominate a gentleman, with knowledge and experience similar to those possessed by Mr. Mangles and Mr. Prinsep, and therefore by no means needed in the Council, although such a man as Mr. Bartle Frere, of the Bombay Civil Service (the able and energetic Commissioner of Scinde), might be on the spot, ready and willing to take a seat in the Council.

Such, John, are the practical inconveniences of the proposed arrangement. But over and above these objections, I hold that the thing is faulty in principle. It inevitably suggests an idea of the representation of local and class interests. Each of the nominated members, under such a system, would consider it his especial duty to look after certain particular interests, and to apply himself to a particular description of business. Now, although there is in all mixed councils—in my own Court of Directors, for example—a natural tendency on the part of every man to take most interest in and to devote himself most assiduously to that particular business which he best understands—and, on the whole, it is desirable that it should be so—it does not follow that it is desirable to send men into Council with what Mr. Leigh Hunt calls

John Company's protest against the representation of class interests.

upon them. Such a stamp, it appears to me, John, is likely to impair the utility of the Honourable Member for the Bengal Army or the Bombay Civil Service, by narrowing his views, by contracting his sympathies, and by sometimes placing him in inconvenient antagonism with his colleagues. Every member of the Council, whatever may be his especial qualifications, should consider himself the honourable member for India, and look upon all classes of the people and all parts of the country as equally his care.

Whether Members of Council should sit in Parliament.

I am of opinion, on the whole, that the elected members of the new Council ought to be permitted to sit in Parliament. Just see how the matter stands. If nine nominated members, named in the Bill, men of Indian experience, and of high character and ability; and nine others, elected by a constituency which, in all probability, will return men of similar qualifications, are excluded from Parliament, you shut out from the House eighteen men, who, if not of all others presumedly the *best* qualified to speak on Indian subjects (for it must be remembered that there are some men of great Indian experience who will not abandon Parliament for a seat in the Council), are at least eminently qualified to take a distinguished part in all Indian debates. This is one evil. Another is, that whilst the Council deprives Parliament of men who might advantageously be there, Parliament will return the compliment by depriving the Council of men who might be its greatest ornaments. It appears to me, moreover, to be expedient that some members of the Council should sit in the House to explain, and, if neces-

sary, to defend their acts. These, John, are patent objections; but there is something to be said on the other side. There are difficulties which will, doubtless, occur to you, in the way of any other arrangement. It seems to have been generally admitted that the nominated members of the Council ought not to sit in Parliament. But I am not sure that this admission has not been made, in most cases, in contemplation of the proposal that the Crown should nominate all the members. The case, however, is materially affected by an arrangement, under which only half of the Council is so nominated. If the elected members, as now, were to outnumber the nominated members, there would be little or no objection to the whole of them sitting in Parliament. But, under the half-and-half system, it may still be expedient to exclude from Parliament the nominees of the Crown. If, then, the nominated members are excluded from a seat in the great assembly of the nation, can the elected members be admitted to a privilege not enjoyed by their associates in office? Would not such an invidious arrangement lower the character of the Crown nominees? I confess, John, that I think it very probably would; so I admit that there is a difficulty in the way of admitting only elected Directors to Parliament; and that, therefore, it might (mind, I don't say it would) be expedient to leave the whole free to follow their own inclinations. If I had my own way, I would cut the Gordian knot, by nominating only six members, and letting the whole eighteen sit in Parliament, if they can get seats. But as I have little hope of effecting this, John, I must leave it to you to

consider the choice of evils, into which, as I have already said, nearly all legislation resolves itself. What the Council will gain in knowledge, it may lose, perhaps, in independence; or what it will gain in independence, it will most probably lose in knowledge. The loss to the Council of the knowledge, of the high character and ability, which follows the exclusion of members of Parliament from the Council, is something, however, far more certain than the loss of independence entailed by the admission of Councillors to Parliament. I know, John, that the most perfect independence is quite compatible with the combined office of member of Parliament and nominated Director; but now, John, we live at the other end of the town, and there are many other circumstances which will cease to operate for good when I am laid in the earth. I do not think that any argument can be deduced from the honourable fact which I have mentioned; so I leave you to consider the choice of difficulties on which you are necessarily thrown, by the determination of your servants to overthrow the existing order of things.

But after all, John, if I were to admit that this Bill No. 2 proposes to give you really a good Council of India—I mean, a Council composed of eighteen able and honest men, with the necessary varieties of local and departmental experience—supposing I were to tell you that the proposed Council has been very carefully elaborated—that great pains have been taken to produce the proper amalgamation of diverse materials, and that all these several parts have been really blended into one perfect

and harmonious whole—what then? You have heard of the famous recipe for making a good salad—you have heard how the learner was instructed to be careful in his selection of all the necessary ingredients—how the lettuce was to be the best possible lettuce, and the beetroot the best possible beetroot, and the endive the best possible endive—how the egg was to be pounded, and how the cream was to be mixed, and in what proportion the vinegar was to be applied. You have heard, John, how the instruction proceeded: "Mix all these several ingredients well together; then take the whole—*and fling it out of window.*" Now, is not this, I ask you, John, precisely what they are proposing to do with the new Council of India? They are proposing to take the best possible soldiers, the best possible civilians, the best possible diplomatists, &c.; they are telling you how to mix up the whole well together, and then—to fling it all out of window. In other words, John, utterly to throw away all this amalgamated experience, as something useless and unserviceable. The salad, when made, is not to be eaten. The Council, when formed, is not to be used. Mr. Disraeli (who, if I mistake not, has put this story of the salad into action in one of his pleasant romances) must have been thinking of this famous recipe when he devised the elaborate Council of India Bill No. 2, and then made provision for its reduction to the most complete and ridiculous nullity—the most glaring political fiction—ever seen since the world began.

John Company shows that the new Council, like the famous salad, is good only to be thrown away.

The fine new Council, John, proposed to you in Bill No. 2 is, after all, practically, merely an ostentatiou-

sham. This is very disappointing and disheartening, after the apparent recognition of a sound principle in the formation of the new Council. It keeps the word of promise to the ear and breaks it to the hope. It is everything and nothing at the same time. The composition of the Council, John, is one thing; the constitution of the Council is another. What is the use of being liberal in the one, if despotism is to break out in the other? The proposed new Council of eighteen are to have no sort of power. As far as I can see, John, they are to be neither potential nor influential. They are scarcely to have a voice in the Government of India. They are to meet at no stated times, like my Court of Directors. They are not to have the initiative like my Court of Directors. The Secretary of State is to be the alpha and omega of the new Government. In the first stage and in the last stage he may have his own way. He may even go to the length, in cases of emergency (and every case is a case of emergency if he chooses to call it one; for he is to be absolute "judge in his own little court"), of sending out instructions to India, without the knowledge of any member of the Council; the councillors being at liberty to protest, after the mischief is done. Now, John, I ask you, as a reasonable man, what is the use of selecting eighteen eminent gentlemen, distinguished more or less in the history of India, experienced more or less in the administration of India, if they are meant only to subside into nonentities and to be ridden over roughshod, at every stage, by an imperious Secretary of State? It is true that a Secretary of State *may* consult his councillors. But, John, he may *not*. And what you

have to see to is that the arrogance, or impetuosity, or the indolence of a Secretary of State, and, above all, the inevitable tendency to yield to the assaults of party, which is inherent in every weak Ministry—and we have small chance of seeing a strong one—what you have to see to, John, is that all these adverse influences do not render the Council of India as inoperative and uninfluential as a bundle of eighteen hop-poles or any other dry sticks.

John Company thinks the popular constituency scheme is not worth writing about.

Time is valuable, John, and I do not see why I should waste any of mine on that grand project for the infusion of the popular element into the new Government of India —the proposal to return five members to the Council of India by the suffrages of five great constituencies. The ingratitude of the world is great, John; and even the five great towns, in spite of the proverbial admonition not to look a gift horse in the mouth, laugh the project to scorn. Whilst other great towns, the *spretæ injuria formæ* working mightily in them, are indignant at the thought of others being selected in preference to themselves. I may safely leave this matter to be settled by the large towns. He who runs may read the folly of the thing.

John Company protests against the Royal Commission which is to upset the Government of India.

And now, John, a few words about another notable project, which appears to find much favour in the eyes of some of your present responsible advisers. You propose to despatch to India what is called a Royal Commission to inquire into the financial condition of the country. I don't know what there is, John, relating to

the state of my finances which you cannot learn as well by a journey to Leadenhall-street as by a voyage to Madras and Bengal. I can give you any kind of information. You may examine all my books; you may put to me any questions that you like. If you will step into my new Museum, you may get a lively idea of the manners and customs of the people from an inspection of the clay figures there; and among them you may see models of the different modes of torture whereby I extract my revenue from the miserable ryots.* I do not know, John, that your Commissioners can do much harm there; but they may do a vast deal of harm in India. An authority of this kind, independent of the Government of the country, with new and unintelligible functions and powers, would, in quiet times, grievously unsettle the public mind and throw the country into confusion; and in our present state, John, when it is desirable to apply sedatives wheresoever we can, will stimulate and irritate, and keep up the inflammatory action which we are so anxious to allay. No one who has any knowledge of India, John, will support this thoroughly English notion of sending out a Commission to be a law unto itself, and to set the Governor-General of India at defiance. I know that more than eighty years ago you were persuaded to send out what were called "supervisors" to inquire into the state of the country; but a beneficent Providence prevented them from doing any mischief by drowning them on the way.

* Mr. John Company is here supposed to refer ironically to the models of the swinging ceremonies of the Churruck Poojah, which, when displayed in the Paris Exhibition, were generally pointed out as representations of the modes of torture adopted by the Company's officials for the extraction of the public revenue.

I do not wish any like calamity, John, to fall upon your new Commissioners, should you suffer them to be appointed; but I think it would be a very good thing if the Governor-General, in such a case, were to place them in arrest and send them home under fixed bayonets. There is only one other course for him, and that is to put himself and his Council on ship-board and to leave the new Commissioners to carry on the Government by themselves. But as I do not suppose that you are prepared to place the whole government of India in commission, I think that, perhaps, it might be expedient, as some of your people have a notion that India is in love with royalty, to send out one of your little princes under the care of the supervisors, ready to be proclaimed Viceroy as soon as the Governor-General and Council have thrown down the reins in dudgeon. Then, John, you will have a fair field and no favour; and may ascertain for yourself how long it will take you to knock down the magnificent empire which nothing but your non-interference system could have enabled me to raise.

And now, John, I have had my say. Before I have an opportunity of addressing you again perhaps I shall be virtually defunct. But bear in mind what I have told you. Fight manfully for an independent Council. Do not suffer India to be given up, bound hand and foot, to a Parliamentary majority, swollen by the Pope's Brass Band. Depend upon it that you will rue the day when you suffer all the corrupt influences, to which I have already alluded, to be brought to bear upon the government of our Indian possessions. Depend upon it, John, that there was never yet before you a question

of such magnitude as this—never a question which called for more solemn and dispassionate inquiry—never one, by the ignorant and hasty solution of which you have been more certain to jeopardise the prosperity of the nation. Take time, then—take heed—take thought, or some day you will wring your hands in despair, and bewail your marvellous folly.

I am, my dear John,
Very faithfully yours,
JOHN COMPANY.

P.S. Since I finished this letter, John, I have learnt that you are really coming round to my way of thinking, and that your servants, having learnt to appreciate the folly of legislating for India in ignorance and in haste, are bethinking themselves of the expediency of laying down the basis upon which legislation ought to proceed. Having built up two houses on a foundation of sand, and found them both toppling down, you are very wisely coming to the conclusion that you had better give some thought to this matter of the foundation before you begin to build. But although you are coming to your senses at last, I cannot help thinking, with advertence to by-gone proceedings, that you cut a very poor figure. All your past abortive legislation—comprising the great goes of two different Cabinets—is to be a *rasa tabula;* and they are to start again from first principles. Your House of Commons, John, is now about to proceed by Resolutions—that is, it is to resolve what are the principles upon which legislation ought to proceed before you commence the manufacture of clauses. Having deter-

mined these principles you must start fresh. There must be no botching and tinkering at the old bills. A clean sweep of them, John!

Non multæ possunt, una litura potest.

Not many wipes, but one, John—wipe it all out at once, and then try what you can do from a fresh starting-point.

Perhaps, John, as you are coming to your senses, you will thank me for a little advice. Let then the basis of your legislation proceed upon these,

Resolutions of John Company.

1. That the transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown can be effected, with safety to the State, only under certain conditions.

2. That the most essential of these conditions is that the government of India should not be suffered to degenerate into government by a Parliamentary majority.

3. That to ensure this, there must be a strong independent administrative body between India and the Crown.

4. That this strong independent body can exist only so long as the majority of its members are elected by an independent constituency.

5. That this intermediate body, possessing knowledge and experience, should have the initiative in all matters of ordinary administration (as at the present time), and the power, when overruled by the Crown Minister, of recording its dissents.

6. That this initiative, if the East India Company

be abolished, should take effect through the agency of a Vice-President of the Council of India, appointed by the members of that Council; and that this Vice-President should preside, in the absence of the President or Secretary of State, over the weekly meetings of the Council.

7. That it is essential to good government in India that the Governor-General and the Governors of the minor presidencies should be associated with independent Councils; and that, therefore, those Councils should be appointed in England by the Council of India, with the sanction of the Crown.

8. That the patronage now possessed by the Court of Directors should be transferred to the Council of India—the Crown Minister retaining no greater share than is now vested in the President of the Board of Control.

Stick closely to these, John, and it is possible that you may not have to bewail, in blood and tears, your treatment of

JOHN COMPANY.

THE END.

C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.

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